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CONTENTS

	Page
1. The Ontological Status of the Categories : P. T. Raju	... 1
2. The Concept of Difference in relation to the Problem of External Relation : D. M. Datta	... 12
3. The Return to Socrates : K. R. Sreenivasa Iyengar	... 17
4. Philosophical Analysis : Kalyan Chandra Gupta	... 30
5. Are we Philosophically Progressing ? : G. R. Malkani	... 37
6. The Method of Doubt : J. N. Chubb	... 43
7. Scepticism : R. Das	... 49
8. Objects of Knowledge as Constructions : S. C. Chatterjee	... 56
9. The Object of Sense-perception and the Sense-datum Theory : Chandrodaya Bhattacharyya	... 64
10. On 'Creative Synthesis' as a Philosophical Concept : P. S. Naidu	... 73
11. The Hedonistic Element in Learning : P. S. Naidu	... 81
12. Is the Gita a Gospel of War ? : T. M. P. Mahadevan	... 88
13. The Category of Difference in Vedanta : P. Nagaraja Rao	... 100
14. Aesthetic Experience : N. Sivarama Sastry	... 105
15. The Doctrine of Momentariness : T. R. Sundararaman	... 118
16. Shankara and His Modern Interpreters : S. Vittala Sastri	... 125
17. Theory of Relativity and The Sankhya System : B. A. Krishnaswamy Rao	... 131
18. Jnanad Eva Tu Kaivalyam : S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri	... 138
19. Prof. Collingwood's views on Metaphysics : M. Yamunacharya	... 144
20. The One and the Many : G. R. Malkani	... 151
21. Value-Consciousness : H. M. Bhattacharyya	... 157
22. The Final Subjective Form of Whitehead : Anil Kumar Sarkar	... 161
23. The Effect of Feeling on Memory : Sambhunath Roy	... 168
24. The Axiology of the Normalbewusstsein R. M. Loomba	... 174

25. The Doctrine of Ultimate Reality and its Application to Society :	...	179
Manubhai C. Pandya		
26. Gandhiji's Political Philosophy :	...	185
V. S. Ram and Gopi Nath Dhawan		
27. A Study in The Visistadvaita Doctrine of Negation : K. C. Varadachari	...	193
28. New Light on the Carvaka System :	...	196
P. S. Sastri		
29. The Sacred Temples of India :	...	199
C. T. Srinivasan		
30. The Idea of 'Personal Contact' in Education :	...	201
Indra Sen		
31. Personal File	...	211
32. Presidential Address : G. Hanumantha Rao	...	218
33. The Philosopher's Enquiry :	...	227
G. N. Mathrani		
34. The Nature and Significance of Religious Experience : N. V. Banerjee	...	237
35. Personal and Impersonal Persistence :	...	244
H. D. Bhattacharyya		
36. Classicism and Romanticism in Art :	...	258
M. M. Shariff		
37. The Nature of the Methods of Political Science : K. R. Sreenivasa Iyengar	...	264
38. Democracy as Plural Government :	...	273
Bepin Vehari Ray		
39. On The Alleged Instinct for Music :	...	282
P. S. Naidu		
40. The Place of Emotion in Mental Life and its Relation with Feelings :	...	288
D. D. Vadekar		
41. What a Thing is In Itself :	...	297
K. R. Sreenivasa Iyengar		
42. Is Intelligence Inherited ? : B. Kuppasawmy	...	306
43. Is Gestalttheorie Apriori ? : P. S. Naidu	...	311
44. The Unconscious in Yoga and Psycho- Analysis : S. M. Sreenivasachar	...	317
45. Heredity and Environment :	...	325
Angelo Moses		
46. Perception and Evolution of Sense Organs :	...	333
B. Kuppasawmy		
47. The Self and Aesthetic Experience :	...	340
S. S. Raghavachar		
48. The Visistadvaitic Conception of Upasana :	...	343
M. Yamunacharya		
List of Members	...	345

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The Ontological Status of the Categories

BY

P. T. RAJU,

The problem of the ontological status of the categories is not new to European philosophy. The use of the word categories in the sense of the non-empirical universals has been brought to the forefront by Kant. But long ago Plato held that both the empirical and non-empirical universals or Ideas were the only reality and that they existed somewhere in a heavenly sphere. The phenomenal things were only their imperfect copies. Had Plato regarded the world of things as existence, then he would have treated his Ideas as not existent but only as subsistent or real or as merely concepts. But he treated the world of Ideas only as the really existent world, and the world of things was only a world of shadows. But Aristotle treated all the universals as existing in the particulars. Thereby even if he had conceived this world as the existing world, he could have viewed the categories as existent, because the categories constitute the phenomenal world. In the philosophy of Kant we find some difference. Unlike Plato, Kant had no transcendental realm of Ideas, which was the only true existence. The three Ideas of Reason which Kant postulates are, for him, only heuristic principles and are beyond existence. For him

the world of space and time is the existence, and the twelve categories he gives constitute it. If this world is taken as existence, for Kant, then, only the categories can be taken as existent and not the Ideas. That is, we may say that only the categories and not the Ideas are ontologically valid. But for Hegel there are no Ideas of Reason which are different from the categories of the Understanding. All are categories and they form a regular ascending series beginning from Being and ending with the Absolute. All constitute our experience and so are ontologically valid. Of the later philosophers *Vaihinger* thought of them as *analogical fictions*. Some of the neo-Kantians treated them as values which have no existence or reality but are valid. That is, they may be given axiological validity but not the ontological. There seem to be other differences of view on this question, but it is enough to note these which are important for our purpose.

Whether we write Reality with a capital R or call it the Absolute, is that also to be treated as a category which is neither real nor existent but only axiologically valid? Kant and the neo-Kantians want to treat it as only axiologically valid. But this they can do only because they approached the problem in the peculiar way they did. For Kant the Absolute is only a heuristic ideal, and reality is just the phenomenal world. Kant arrived at the idea of the Absolute of course after raising the question of truth, and arrived at it as the ultimate implicate or presupposition. But he felt that the Ideas of Reason transcended sense-perception and lacked the material of existence. And as pure forms or Ideas they should be viewed, Kant thought, only as regulative and not as constitutive of our experience. But really if, to order our sensations, the Ideas of Reason are as necessary as the categories of the Understanding, then they must as much constitute our experience as the latter. This point was pressed forcefully by Hegel. Indeed if the Absolute is to be accepted at all, it has to be accepted as existing and constituting existence, when we use existence not in the specific sense in which Hegel uses it in his dialectic, but in the general sense of reality or truth.



Besides, so far as the Absolute is concerned, if we accept it at all, there are very cogent reasons for accepting it as existence. The problem that drives us on or even Kant to postulate it is : why are some of our experiences true and some false ? Why do some of the objects we perceive exist and some do not ? This is the same question as why are some of our ideas true and some false or, as Kant formulated it, why do the objects agree with our ideas ? And if Kant's system is to be rounded off, Caird and others felt, that the answer lies in the intuitive understanding of God, which they identified with his creative understanding, that is, the understanding that creates the sense material according to its own forms. Objects agree with our ideas so far as this intuitive understanding works within us. Then we have to say that those objects which are the work of this understanding are true and the rest false. That is, objects exist so far as they partake of this understanding, which is the true existence.

This problem, we see, started with the search for existence, and has found out the intuitive understanding, which is developed into the concept of the Absolute by the post-Kantians. Therefore, it is just but reasonable that the Absolute should be regarded as the Existence. It is not merely what regulates existence, but is Existence itself. Hence it is not only axiologically but also ontologically valid. And even when ontologically valid, it is not only reality but also existence. For the differentiation between reality and existence, which has become fashionable with some of the contemporary philosophers, rests on uncertain grounds.¹

But now, if we attribute ontological validity to the Absolute, can we do the same to all the other lower categories like negation, number etc. ? Apart from the question whether ultimately these are real or not, even so far as the empirical world is concerned, are we to treat them as existing ? Hegel of course would say that they exist because they constitute

1. For an examination of this point see the author's *Thought and Reality*.

existence. The neo-Kantians confer upon them only axiological validity. Almost all the neo-Hegelians treat them as ontologically valid. Bradley at first viewed negation as subjective, but later under the influence of Bosanquet asserted that it belonged to reality as much as affirmation. By Bosanquet negation is reduced to difference and as his Reality is an identity in difference it is treated by him as part of Reality itself.

But the strongest objection against treating the categories like number as forming part of existence comes from the modern mathematical conception of the ontological status of number. The idea of number is admitted to be at first connected with existence. But later it has been abstracted, and the abstraction has been carried to such lengths that it is inconceivable how some of the numbers can be referred to existence at all. In Indian philosophy the Naiyāyikas, for instance, treated number as having existence or *sattā*. But we cannot imagine how numbers like the imaginary or complex ones can have any existence. Still the idea of imaginary numbers has been logically developed out of the idea of the other numbers which were based upon existence. So though the idea of number is indirectly connected with existence, still we find it difficult to maintain that number as an entity exists. The Naiyāyikas say that number is a quality (*guṇa*) or property of things and exists like them. But we cannot understand how particularly the imaginary numbers can be the property of existing things.

Similarly with regard to negation. The paradox of negation is too well known. If there is actually something in reality corresponding to the 'not' in the negative judgment, then this something cannot be negative; for whatever exists is positive. But if there is nothing in reality corresponding to the 'not', then either the judgment is false or is only a subjective interpretation of an objective fact. Even if negation is reduced to difference, if difference is still a 'not', the paradox cannot be escaped. And the only right procedure seems to be to regard negation as logically valid and not ontologically. That is, it is only a regulative and not a constitutive idea.

But now are we to say that Kant was wrong in treating negation and number as constituting our experience and so existing? For Kant these are categories of the Understanding and so constitute existence. Hence just as they are for the Naiyāyikas, they are for Kant also existent. The neo-Kantians indeed interpret them differently. Vaihinger, again, calls them methodological fictions. But if they are really necessary for our knowledge and constitute our existence, they should not be treated as fictions. But then how are we to understand that a number like $\sqrt{-1}$ exists or that it can be referred to existent things? And if some numbers cannot be treated as existent and cannot be referred to existent things, shall we be justified in treating some other numbers as existent and as the qualities of things? For instance, in epistemology when it is found that the object of illusion is not real but is only some isolated idea, philosophers began treating the direct objects of all perceptions, both true and false, as ideas, and out of them constructed objects. Similarly, are we not to begin by treating all numbers as not existent but only as subsistent, and then divide them into those that can be referred to objects and those that cannot be? Even then this reference cannot make number, even that number which can be so referred, existent. Similarly, negation, though it can be referred to things, is not existent. To call these fictions is certainly to use a word with misleading associations. Yet these categories, if they are thought of as having corresponding entities in reality, will have to be treated as false. They have only a logical validity and not ontological.

But here the question may be raised: If these categories have logical validity and are therefore true, what is the ground of their truth? Generally, whenever we say that a judgment is true, we mean that there is a corresponding reality. But this may be true only in the case of affirmative judgments of quality like "The rose is red". The distinction is drawn by many logicians between judgments of quality and reflection; and so far as the latter judgments are concerned we may not find a reality that exactly corresponds to them. So the truth of the

negative judgment etc., then may consist in their having been based upon existence or reality. That is, they refer to reality, but they do not have an exactly corresponding reality. However, they do not lack a ground for their truth.

Here it may be objected that we are limiting our meaning of reality to what is given in sense-perception, that is, to that reality which corresponds to our affirmative judgments of quality. If negation and number cannot exist, then causation and goodness too cannot exist. The hypothetical judgment has for its basis some causal relation. And causal relation is generally treated by us as ontologically valid, though whether goodness, beauty etc., are objective facts or not is a controversial point. But if reality or existence is not limited to sensations and sense-perceptions, if the human mind spontaneously builds up a world for itself in which all human beings partake, then even the world of goodness and beauty has to be treated as existent; for even sensations, we may say, are what are spontaneously brought into existence by human minds.

This objection is not very different from the line of thinking adopted by Hegel and many Hegelians. If we begin separating the existing world from everything that is due to human interpretation, spontaneous and deliberate, little or nothing of it would remain. The question is there for the absolutist, whether ultimately all the categories are valid. But so far as the empirical world is concerned, we feel that all these ideas which we deliberately obtain by some abstracting intellectual process cannot have corresponding existent entities. And what category is deliberately abstracted and treated as a distinct entity and what is not so treated can be known only by examining every category by itself. Some categories like causality and substance and attribute are never used by us except in relation to the reality given in our sense-perceptions. But negation and number we abstract completely from existing things and treat them as if they are distinct entities. And all those entities which are the results less of spontaneity and more of deliberate abstraction and interpretation we tend to regard as not existing.

It may be asked whether the Absolute or the intuitive understanding of Kant is also not the result of such deliberate intellectual process. Of course Kant knew it as such, and that is why he treated it as only a regulative principle. But he seems to have overlooked that there is difference between categories like negation and number on the one hand and the Absolute on the other. True, Kant found that he was unable to apply the Idea of the Absolute to any sense-given material. But he overlooked the importance of the fact that it had to be postulated in order to confer existence upon what we call existent things. But really negation and number are not postulated in order to explain existence. And if the reason that the Absolute as an Idea cannot be applied to any sense-given material makes the Idea only a regulative principle, then number too like $\sqrt{-1}$ and pure negation as an entity corresponding to the 'not' can only be heuristic principles.

Of course none of the categories is a sense-given material. That is why they are called forms. But some of the categories we tend to abstract and treat as distinct entities, not merely as forms of the sensuous material. And then they cease to have ontological validity. But others we always think of only with reference to existing things. For instance, causality and reciprocity we do not think of apart from existing things. But negation and number we treat as existing entities. We say, "There is a negation of the pen on the table." But when we say that A is the cause of B, we refer the idea of cause to a tangible thing A.

We may be asked to decide whether we treat a category as existent because it is the result of an intellectual process or because it is inapplicable to sensuous material. So far as the Absolute and the Ego are concerned, they are not applicable to sense-given material. Negation like "The lion is not an elephant" and "The rose is not red" are applicable to sense-given material, but they are the result of deliberate intellectual process. The perceptions in the two judgments we do not feel to be spontaneous. But now what are we to say about the

judgment, "Fire causes the powder to explode" ? Here are we using the idea of cause spontaneously or getting its idea by deliberate abstraction and interpretation ? We feel that we are using the idea spontaneously. The amount of intellectual activity of which we are conscious in negation we do not feel in the idea of causality. If we take number, imaginary numbers like the $\sqrt{-1}$ and irrationals like $\sqrt{2}$ are the results of deliberate abstraction. But even if we take an integer like 2 we feel that it too is the result of deliberate abstraction, though it is applicable to existing things. Of course even the irrationals may be regarded as applicable to things. However, all numbers are the results of relational or referential cognitions. That is, if we count A and B as two things, A is one and B is two with reference to A ; and when this reference part of our cognition vanishes, number too vanishes. The same may be said with reference to the idea of causality also. If A is the cause of B, then A is the cause with reference to B. But our freedom in understanding here, as Kant said, is restricted. We cannot proceed from B and say that B is the cause of A. We feel that there is something in A itself that makes it the cause of B and not its effect.

Now after noting these differences among the categories, can we generalise and say which categories are existent and which not ? Of course, all categories constitute experience. But experience is too wide a term and building castles in the air too is an experience. Roughly we may divide our categories, according to these differences, into four classes. Obviously, all the categories, when we deliberately abstract them from existence and treat them as separate entities, cannot be said to be existent. It is possible to abstract even causation from existing things and think of it as an existent entity like the Platonic Ideas. But generally we do not do so and think of causation as an inherent property of things themselves. Now, first, there are the categories of the type of the Absolute which we have to regard as existent and real, though they are not applicable to sense-given material ; for they confer existence upon what we regard as existing things. Then there are

categories like negation which are applicable to existent things, but which are the result of deliberate abstracting and interpreting processes. And though they are applicable to things, our general tendency is to treat them as entities apart from things. And this tendency is carried to the greatest length in the case of number, to a length where the category ceases to be applicable to things and comes out as a pure abstraction. In the case of negation, European philosophers are wavering between calling it existent and calling it non-existent. But in the case of number the tendency is becoming stronger to treat it as non-existent, and this view is almost universally held now. But it is possible to treat both cases as one,—in which case we shall have only three classes of categories,—and if the reason for treating number is that it is the result of deliberate abstraction and interpretation, then the same may be said about negation. Of course, this important point we should not forget, namely, that in both cases we tend to regard the categories as distinct and even separate from existing things. Fourthly, there is the type like causation, the use of which is spontaneous and which we do not regard as an entity distinct from existent things. We may therefore have to say that causation exists.

Perhaps, if we examine each of the categories of Hegel's dialectic chain, we may be able to find some more differences. But it is not possible to attempt such a task here. So far as the question of the ontological status of the categories is concerned, our differentiation may be said to be fairly adequate. We have tried to show that Kant's view that the differentiation between categories that exist and Ideas that do not exist has to be made by putting the question, Is the Idea or category applicable to any sense-given material? is not really tenable. Even what Hegel and many Hegelians held, namely, that all those categories that regulate our experience also constitute it and whatever constitutes it also exists does not supply an adequate criterion. For experience is too vague and wide a term. Not even the doctrine of the neo-Kantians that no heuristic principle and so no category exists or is real is found to be well grounded. For

to say that, only because a category regulates our experience, it is merely heuristic is wrong. For it may constitute our experience and constitute it in such a way as to confer existence itself upon what we generally regard as existent. That is, the latter may owe their very existence to the category. And a category that does not itself possess existence can hardly confer it upon things. Hence within the categories that constitute our experience, the distinction has to be drawn between those we spontaneously use in order to get existing things themselves and those we obtain by deliberate abstraction, interpretation and intellectual construction. The latter we cannot treat as existent, that is, as being ontologically valid.

But there is one difficulty. The difference between spontaneous and deliberate seems, at least in some cases, to be one of degree. In the perception, "The rose is red," the application of the category of substance-attribute does not seem to be deliberate and reflective at all. But in the judgment, "Fire causes the powder to explode," the application of the category of causality seems to be slightly deliberate and reflective. But in either case we do not treat the category as separate from the existent things. Because of this kind of difference the distinction we draw between the categories which are ontologically valid and those which are only logically valid may not appear to be hard and fast. But this kind of defect is found in every thing that is empirical, as is demonstrated by Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. When the categories themselves do not have absolute reality, the distinction between the ontologically and logically valid can hardly be expected to be absolute.

Before closing this discussion we may consider one more objection. If somehow we are to regard the categories as belonging to the intuitive understanding, which creates sensations according to its forms and if the intuitive understanding confers existence upon everything that belongs to it, will it not confer existence upon some of its forms like negation and number? In answer we can only say that we have no

evidence that it creates sensations corresponding to negation and numbers like $\sqrt{-1}$. For if really there is some sense-material corresponding to the 'not', then it cannot be negative. And we can neither think of nor imagine a sensation corresponding to $\sqrt{-1}$. The intuitive understanding is postulated only to explain the existence of what we accept as existing things, but not to confer existence upon all types of intellectual constructs that we can invent.

The Concept of Difference in relation to the Problem of External Relation

BY

D. M. DATTA

In connection with the problem of relations it is necessary to define clearly the meaning of difference. For the problem whether relations are internal or external, in one of its meanings, raises the question whether relations make any *difference* to the terms related, and the solution of this question depends partly on the meaning we attach to the word, 'difference.'

In his essay on 'External and Internal Relations' Moore raises this question and discusses some alternative meanings of 'difference' and their effects on the theory of internal relations. He distinguishes between qualitative difference and numerical difference, and points out that wherever there is qualitative difference, there must be numerical difference too : but some relations are found not to make terms numerically different, therefore they do not make them qualitatively different either : hence, concludes Moore, some relations do not make terms either qualitatively or numerically different, so that it is a mistake to hold the universal proposition 'All relations make terms different and are internal.'

We shall examine here the soundness of this view, The specific points we shall enquire into will be : *a.* What is qualitative difference ? *b.* What is numerical difference ? *c.* What is the relation between the two ? *d.* Finally, what bearing have these distinctions on the problem of relations, internal and external ?

By qualitative difference Moore means difference in the essential qualities of a thing, the qualities which make the

thing what it is. By numerical difference Moore means change in identity. He, therefore, thinks, naturally enough, that if there is any change in the essential qualities of a thing there must necessarily be a change of its identity, in other words that, qualitative difference implies numerical difference as well. But, he points out, numerical difference does not necessarily imply any qualitative difference.

Now, if 'qualitative difference' be taken in this narrow sense of difference in essential qualities alone, the division of difference into qualitative and numerical is not exhaustive. For there can be such a thing as difference in accidental characters of a thing, which should be given a place under difference. As property follows from essential quality, difference in property may not claim a separate place; any change in essential quality involves change in property, and any change in property invariably implies some change in essence. But such is not the case with accidents which bear no necessary relation to essence. It is logically necessary, therefore, to recognize, what Moore does not do, accidental difference as a third kind.

With the recognition of this third kind of difference *one* of Moore's proofs for external relations falls through. Starting with the premise 'If there is qualitative difference in a thing, there is numerical difference too' and adding from observation the other premise 'Some relations do not cause any numerical difference' he comes to the conclusion, by denial of consequent, that 'Therefore, some relations do not cause any qualitative difference.' But the major premise which is treated as an *a priori* self-evident truth stands only if qualitative difference means difference in essential quality. For, if there is change in accidental qualities there may not be any consequent numerical difference. Change of cover does not make a book, for example, a different book; its numerical identity does not suffer. So that, if there is no change in numerical identity it would not necessarily follow that there is no change in quality, unless the word is confined only to essential quality.

There would be some justification for the narrow meaning of qualitative difference, if for refuting the view that all relations are internal it were sufficient to show that some relations do not change the *essential* quality of a term. But that is not really the case. The question involved in the internality and externality of relation is whether relation makes *any* difference to the terms, and if there be any difference even in accidental characters of the terms, the internal view remains unrefuted.

When one closely follows the controversy between the externalist and the internalist he finds that they do not attach the same meaning to the word 'difference.' An example will make this clear. When John is enlisted in an army, does this relation to the army cause any change in John? The internalist would say, "No, there is no change, since John remains the identical individual." The externalist would contend, "Yes, there is some change, since John becomes a soldier that previously he was not." It is found here that while the externalist is thinking of numerical difference, or change of identity, the internalist is thinking of qualitative difference. The opposition between the two on this point is, therefore, really about the meaning of difference.

Moreover, it is not always certain what amount of, or kind of, change constitutes numerical difference. As an advocate of common sense an externalist like Moore would perhaps hold that when we fail to recognize a thing we can say that there has been change of identity or numerical change. But common sense is often deceived by external looks. A change of colour may make one regard a car as a different car, while change of more essential internal parts like the engine may be ignored, and the car may continue to be regarded as the same car. It is also seen here incidentally that there is little justification for Moore's view that difference in essential quality implies difference in identity.

But if we do not depend on what things appear to be to common sense, we have only one other way of determining whether

a thing has changed its identity and has become a different thing. And that is reflection on the qualities that make the thing what it is, and see whether such qualities have changed. But that procedure would involve the assumption, that only change in essential qualities constitutes change of identity. This Moore does not admit ; he thinks that difference in numerical identity does not necessarily imply difference in quality. There may be a sense in which Moore's contention is justified. Two new coins similarly struck do not possess any qualitative difference, but they are numerically different. In other words two things may be found to be two, though there may not be found any difference in quality between them. But there is another sense, a sense which alone should matter so far as the problem of relation is concerned, in which Moore's contention that numerical difference does not necessarily imply qualitative difference is scarcely tenable. Can the same object become different numerically (that is, come to be regarded as another thing) without undergoing any change in quality ? One fails to understand how it can be. If a relation changes any of its terms so as to render it numerically different, there must be some change in its quality. And if the numerical difference in question is a genuine difference standing the test of reflective analysis, the change of quality would most likely be one of essential quality.

It is necessary to discuss the meaning of essential quality in this connection. Essential quality may be defined, as it has been done already, as quality which makes a thing what it is. But there is an ambiguity, at least a vagueness, in this definition, since it is not absolutely fixed what a thing is. The same individual may be treated as a soldier, a man, an animal a mass of matter and so on. The question whether this individual undergoes any change in essential quality when, say, he is related to an army as a member may be differently decided because though as a man, as an animal, as a mass of matter, he remains the same in essence, he acquires the new qualities essential for a soldier. Much of the controversy between the externalist and the internalist suffers from this ambiguity. In refuting, for example, the idealistic theory that organic

relations are all internal, some externalists put forward arguments like the following ; when food is eaten and thus related to the body, it does not undergo any change since by analyzing blood we can discover the chemical constituents of the food. The ambiguity is obvious. The food, regarded as inorganic matter surely suffers a change in essence as it becomes organic in the metabolic process. But regarding its ultimate chemical constituents the food does not undergo change. Unless both parties take the thing in one and the same aspect, their arguments do not meet ; their opposition is, therefore, only apparent and verbal, and it flourishes in ambiguity.

This short discussion also shows, among other things, that even some of the so-called radical differences among philosophers are based on ambiguities, and they melt away when meanings are cleared by analysis. It further shows the great value, in philosophy of the method of analysis initiated by Moore, and advocated now by the logical positivists,

The Return to Socrates.

BY

K. R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR.

The question whether the doctrine of Ideas which we meet with in Plato's *Dialogues* is Platonic or Socratic in origin has afforded ground for lively debate and discussion among Greek scholars in recent times and one who is ignorant of Greek cannot hope to contribute anything original to the discussion. I can but review the evidence on either side and I may say at once that in doing so I find the evidence for the Socratic origin far more convincing to me than the traditional view.

The traditional view of the matter ascribes the Ideal doctrine as such to Plato on the ground of Aristotle's testimony that Socrates was mainly interested in originating the method of logical definition by defining concepts and in paving the way for induction by generalising upon facts. Plato, it is said, went one step further and objectified Socrates's mere conceptual definitions and thus give birth to the theory of Ideas as we know it to-day. Plato himself has said nothing about the origin in the *Dialogues* wherein, he puts the whole doctrine into the mouth of Socrates. Why not then accept the obvious implication that Plato intends the doctrine to be taken as Socratic in origin? Here comes the view of traditional critics and commentators who think the portrait of the historical Socrates as given by Plato in the *Dialogues* is more an artistic construction than a drawing of reality, that Plato the master painter who was quite capable of creating the character of Socrates has given us such a highly idealised picture of Socrates that to all intents and purposes it has become a character of fiction. As against Plato's testimony we have that of Xenophon whose plain matter of fact account of Socrates, we are told, bespeaks greater fidelity to the

original. The critics consequently prefer the Socrates of Xenophon to the Socrates of Plato as being probably more historical. And the Socrates of Xenophon, it would seem, give us no reason to think that he could have conceived of the doctrine of Ideas as we find it in Plato. But the strange thing about this whole question is that our picture of Socrates is neither purely Xenophonic nor solely Platonic; we have been accustomed to take what we admire in Socrates's character, mind and personality as known to humanity so far from Plato's portraiture, and to put down what we consider to be the limitations of Socrates's actual teachings to Xenophon's credit. And we please ourselves by imagining that we have got one picture of Socrates which is all of a piece without perceiving the inner contradiction that rends asunder the being of this composite portrait. The things that we admire and love Socrates for—his searching penetrating sceptical intellect always on the alert to puncture pretensions and expose ignorance, his irony, his humour, his insistence on his own ignorance, his wide human interests, his courage, his effortless superiority to all the sensual passions combined with a freedom from ascetic rigourism and moral snobbery, his unbounded sympathy with human weaknesses and limitations combined with an insatiable zeal for moral reform of society and the individual—for acting as the gad-fly of the state—his conviction of the reality of moral standards with a mystical enthusiasm for their eternal beauty and perfection, his trances, his dæmon voice—all these traits of Socrates's character and personality we entirely owe to Plato. In Xenophon, on the contrary we find, it would appear, a stodgy mind for the most part without salt or humour, a preacher and exhorter without that tone of ironic self-depreciation (which we find in Plato) to relieve his sermonizings, a prig almost who accepts the Delphic God's deliverance regarding his pre-eminent wisdom as just his due. This is not the Socrates we know, and yet it is to the author of this Socrates that we look for the other element of our view of Socrates, viz., his turning away from cosmology and metaphysics to ethics and politics, although Xenophon adds that he (Socrates) was not unversed in these things. How we are to reconcile this

picture and that to make the two hang together we do not ordinarily pause to consider.

It is not merely that the Socrates of Xenophon is not true to character as we know Socrates; there is no reason to believe that if Plato is not to be trusted, Xenophon is more true to the historical Socrates. For Xenophon is confessedly an apologist who wants to clear Socrates of the charge of irreligion and immoral influence in the state. And it is only to be expected that with such a motive an advocate is not bound to be over-scrupulous about strict accuracy, if he is not actually obliged to colour the evidence. And returning to Plato, we must remember that admitting as we should that Plato is a great artist we should be doing less than justice to Plato's artistic genius and greatness if we are to believe that he has—unconscious exaggeration apart—deliberately misrepresented his master in his writings. If one thing is more true than another in these matters, it is that Plato genuinely revered his master, respected his memory and wanted the whole world to be influenced by his moral earnestness, transparent sincerity and desire for self-reformation. Is it credible that such a disciple should have presented to the world a picture which he knew in his heart of hearts to be unreal and false to the original, and put into his mouth words and thoughts which he knew were his (the disciple's) own? Plato has represented Socrates as a mystic. At the battle of Potidæ, we are told Socrates stood in a trance for one whole day and a half while the rest of the camp came out with blankets and watched him with curious interest. He used to participate in the well-known Greek mysteries. He was a follower of the Pythagorean system from which he learnt the value of spiritual discipline and self-control. As the *Phædo* tells us, he believed in the immortality of the soul and frequently referred to the dogmas of the Orphic religion as supporting his own convictions. He believed in the prior existence of the soul, and in the doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence. He also believed in divine inspiration which worked in him as the dæmon voice. He was an idealist inasmuch as he believed that 'nous' or mind was the primal

cause of the universe and he was dissatisfied with the physical explanation of the Ionians. If Socrates was none of these things, it is at any rate Plato himself who has given us these things about Socrates—the same Plato who puts the doctrine of Ideas into Socrates's mouth in the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus* and other dialogues. The *Phaedo* makes it particularly hard to deny the Socratic origin of the doctrine. Socrates is delineated there in his last moments and talks of immortality and pre-existence, of an ideal beauty and righteousness and truth as they exist unchanging in a changeless world. Is it possible to believe that any disciple who at all had any respect for his master, would choose the sacred moments preceding his master's martyrdom for putting into his mouth opinions which he well knew were thoroughly contrary to the master's teaching, and which he equally well knew would be recognised by the others also who were present at the death-bed as not the master's own? To do so were not merely the sin of disloyalty and untruthfulness, it were very bad art as well. And we must remember that making Socrates central in the *Dialogues* is not merely for the sake of historical effect, for in the later dialogues he recedes more and more into the background so much so that in the very last ones he disappears altogether.

There are three other considerations which incline us to think that the Socrates of Plato is the real Socrates and that as such the doctrine of Ideas belongs to him in the first instance. Anybody else than the Socrates of Plato's portraiture, least of all the stolid prig of Xenophon's pen, could not have exercised that tremendous influence which the historical Socrates is believed to have exerted on the young men of Athens throughout his life—an influence which affected men of such varied temperaments as Plato, Aristippus, Alcibiades, Euclid, Antisthenes etc. And secondly in his *Epistles* whose genuineness is now generally recognised, Plato himself has explicitly stated that there are no teachings of his own, but that all which go under his name belong to his master Socrates "turned young and handsome"—an exaggeration, no doubt, but still having a genuine ring of

truth. Thirdly, Plato's testimony is corroborated by an able and independent witness who had far greater opportunities of studying Socrates in Athens at first hand than the foreigner Xenophon. Aristophanes the comedian, in the *Clouds* has preserved for us in his caricature of Socrates as the head of a body of students meeting in the "notion-factory" of Socrates's house a delineation of the philosopher which agrees in essentials, with the lineaments of Plato's Socrates given above. These students are represented, in the words of Prof. Taylor, as "a set of ragged and hungry ascetics with unusual 'spiritualistic' views," professing cosmological doctrines of "the Eastern type". Socrates in particular is described as doing his thinking swinging to and from the clouds in a basket-like machine a clear enough hint of Socrates's interest in cosmological problems. If later on Socrates abandoned such pursuits and turned to humanistic enquiries, it was not because he was anti-metaphysical by temperament but because he could find no clear light thrown upon such problems. Xenophon's testimony to the contrary is worth nothing as he became acquainted with Socrates only in his later life, probably after his forty-fifth year, by which time of course Socrates had turned his attention to ethical questions. Does not Socrates's expression in the *Phaedo* of his great pleasure at hearing somebody talk Anaxagoras' *nous* as the cause of all things, and his subsequent keen disappointment at finding Anaxagoras' *nous* perform only the role of the *dieu ex machina*, itself bespeak Socrates's abiding interest in cosmological and metaphysical problems?

So far we have been reviewing evidence for and against the Socratic origin of the theory of ideas and one is inevitably led to the conclusion that the evidence *for* is overwhelmingly large and more significant than the evidence *against*. We are led to believe that Socrates was not a plodding empiricist or utilitarian collecting instances and drawing inductive definition therefrom,—induction and definition were only the *methods which he adopted to make clear to others* the meaning of his thoughts—but an idealist for whom, if dialogues like the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus* etc, have any value, the world is moral and

spiritual, and who is essentially a mystic with a passionate enthusiasm for an ideal righteousness, truth and beauty which are not of this world. This world contains only copies of such eternal verities and we can apprehend them not by means of sense particulars which only suggest them to us, but by means, of contemplative blessedness and holiness which are the conditions of mystic immortality, and mysticism is the true philosophy (*Phaedo*, 69). This is the 'spiritual' or 'theological' view of the universe which Socrates was searching for in vain in the early Ionian systems and upon which he seemed to stumble in Anaxagoras' theory of nous.

The Ideal theory then did not originate in a Platonic substantiation of Socratic concepts in mathematics and ethics; Socrates himself had considered that universally valid truths, particularly possessing an emotional appeal like equality, truth, goodness, beauty, justice etc. and fit to serve as norms, were objective realities—far more real than any things of sense—and it is well to remind ourselves here once more that Socrates had believed in the Pythagorean theory of numbers. When he said that virtue is knowledge, he meant by knowledge, not mere intellectual apprehension of truths, but a heart-realisation, a face-to-face vision, as it were, of eternal verities resulting in a transformation of the whole being of the experiencer—a conversion which in moral language is nothing but virtue. Here then we already encounter the Ideal theory in the earlier dialogues.

If then Socrates himself had originated the Ideal theory, the question naturally arises: Where does Socrates leave off, and where does Plato begin? To answer this we need to look into the dialogues a little more closely when we shall find that the theory is presented in two fairly well-marked stages. In the earlier and less metaphysical group of dialogues—not including the *Republic*—the interest is mainly ethical; ethics is a discipline or way of life; mystic vision of the Ideas is the goal of life, and philosophy is only a preparation for this goal which is fully attained only after death; sensual experience is a

clog to the soul and drags it downward. In these dialogues we may recognise the voice of Socrates speaking. The hand is that of Jacob but the voice is that of Esau. It is the voice of ethical idealism pre-eminently. In the later and more metaphysical dialogues—beginning with the *Republic*, we may say—the interest is more logical and philosophical; not mystic vision but rational understanding—logical analysis—is the goal of philosophy: not the sensual but the sensible is what now drags the soul downward clouding its vision, for it relates to that which is metaphysically unreal; not the purgation of the mysteries, but the dispelling of ignorance by dialectical education is the method of salvation. And it is not freedom that is attained only after death as in Socrates, but the freedom of a life of pure scientific activity that is the end. In the *Ion* Socrates considered poetry as god conversing with man; in the *Republic* Plato dismisses poetry as twice removed from Reality. In these later dialogues then it is Plato himself that is speaking the language of metaphysical idealism introducing a systematic realm of Ideas corresponding to the sensible realm.

The relation between the ideal world and the sensible world is the veritable apple of discord among Platonic scholars. The traditional view regards the ideal world as separate from the sensible which is then said to be a copy of the former. What participation means is a riddle. As we have seen, there is a definite demarcation between the teachings of the earlier and those of the later dialogues. The separation of the two worlds is more clearly marked in the earlier than in the later dialogues. Some thinkers like Jackson and Windelband who recognise this difference but are not prepared to accept the Socratic origin of the doctrine have declared that Plato has actually given us two drafts of the doctrine. Zeller and a majority of thinkers with him accept the ordinary dualism of the two worlds as inherent in Plato's own mature thought. Others like Jowett think that there is no such thing as an earlier or later Platonic theory but that all dialogues equally assert or imply that the relation of things to ideas is one of participation and imitation. Still a fourth school represented

by such thinkers as Natorp and Stewart believe that there is only a development of, not a differentiation in, Plato's thought from the earlier to the later dialogues. Stewart in particular holds that the hypostatisation of the ideas and their assignment to a realm of their own is the result only of the poetic, aesthetic or religious tendency of Plato given as he was to moods of contemplation, while the true doctrine of ideas is simply that ideas are *in* the things as laws of nature, scientific principles of explanation, something like the categories of Kant. The difficulty with this view is that it makes Plato both a scientist and a mystic at the same time whereas so far as we can judge from the tenor of the later dialogues Plato was far from being a mystic. Or if he *was* a mystic also—a Pythagorean at heart—then it is easier to account for this strain in his character by tracing it to the influence of his master who had far clearer claims to the title of a mystic.

Nineteenth century Platonic scholarship had both its strength as well as its weakness. Its weakness was that it followed an essentially false track in distrusting Plato's evidence regarding Socrates and allowing itself to be deceived by Xenophon's plain style. Its strength was that it seems to have caught a glimpse of the true import of the doctrine of ideas in insisting upon the separation of the two worlds—an interpretation of the doctrine which began with Plato's immediate and greatest disciple, Aristotle, who had the best chance of learning his master's mind ; which was explicitly developed into a doctrine of two worlds by the only metaphysical thinker of note of the post-Aristotelian period, Plotinus, who claims to *revive* Plato's doctrine in his system ; which was accepted by and incorporated into the heart of the new religion that swam into the horizon soon afterwards, viz., Christianity which glories in the transcendence of the spiritual over the empirical ; which gave birth to the school of the realists in the Middle Ages as well as to the schools in Modern Philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists, of Descartes and Leibnitz with their doctrine of innate ideas, and of Berkeley with his Infinite Mind as the repository of all ideas ; which has generated the doctrine

of essences for the Neo-realists and of ideas in the Phenomenologists of Contemporary Philosophy; which has in fact been not a little responsible for the "Great Tradition"—the idealistic and Absolutistic tradition throughout the history of philosophy—an interpretation which has had such tremendous influence on the progress of thought could not surely have been one prolonged gigantic error of the human mind. On the other interpretation of pure immanence, pantheism would be the only legitimate philosophy. The spiritual interests of the world are saved only by recognising some kind of transcendence. Aristotle's testimony on the separation of the two worlds in Plato's thought is dismissed as due to a misunderstanding. If he could be supposed to have misunderstood his own immediate teacher on such a vital point, what reason is there for trusting to his opinion regarding his teacher's teacher when he said that to Socrates we may fairly attribute inductive argument and universal definition, unless of course it be the case that it is *we* who are all along misunderstanding Aristotle by attributing to him perhaps more than he meant, for it is possible that Aristotle might have said this purely with reference to the sources of *his* own thought without thereby implying anything as to the origin of the Ideal theory.

Professors Burnet and Taylor whose lead is followed in this paper believe that the doctrine of separation has a real basis in the dialogues, and they both think that in this form the theory of ideas was that of Socrates. While Taylor feels that the problem raised by the theory is well-nigh insoluble even on the basis of holding that the universal is *in* the individual sensible thing as its essential character, Burnet suggests that in Plato's own thought the boundary-line between the intelligible and the merely sensible is not a fixed one and that the sensible may be made progressively intelligible, *i.e.*, that there is a tendency towards monism (*Greek Philosophy*, I, 344).

The doctrine of separation or transcendence as we may put it appears to obtain fresh advocacy at the hands of modern scholars who might still hold to the Platonic origin of the Ideal theory. German scholarship has a weight and authority all its own and

Constantin Ritter, who has made Plato his life-long study is of the opinion that ideas are objective realities and that the *Real Meaning* of Plato is that "the Ideas are fixed in nature like patterns or . . . the Ideas give us a firm hold and points of direction in the real world ; whereas the individual sensible objects are patterned after these Ideas and therefore partake in the universal characteristics of forms." "The expression 'fixed in nature', it seems to me, designates the permanent nature of the Idea which is free from all change and from all vacillating subjective perceptions ; but we should be entirely wrong if by this we understood a spatial characteristic" (*The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, 105, 154). The separation or transcendence of the idea, is not spatial—the ideal world is not *another spatial* world,—but only metaphysical, and in a way far more real than the sensible. Professor Hardie of Oxford, again, has very ingeniously, it seems to me, interpreted the doctrine of separation by saying that "To say that a form is 'separate' is to say that there can be a form without there being particulars which exemplify it"—*e.g.*, perfect straightness, perfect virtue, perfect justice—and that the doctrine of transcendence has a double aspect : "It is not only the doctrine that beside the world of changing particulars, there are transcendent forms ; it is also the doctrine that beside the world of unchanging forms, there is the fact of coming-to-be and passing away". (*A Study in Plato*, 75, 77). He also considers that Neo-Platonism is an important school of thought which throws a flood of light on Plato's doctrine. But it is Prof. F. M. Cornford of Cambridge who goes back most explicitly to Zeller and Aristotle in this matter. Cornford's view in *Plato and Parmenides* is highly interesting because he holds that while "Socrates had talked like anyone else, of characters present in things", "Plato has... propounded his own doctrine that Forms exist separately" (78). He thinks that it was Plato who took the further step of giving "these characters an independent existence" and calling them "Forms" and that Socrates, who "was not a metaphysician" could draw the distinction between the character of beauty, for instance, and the objects which are beautiful "without going on to assert that the Beautiful itself has a separate

existence independent of the main things in which the character appears." "If (as I suppose) Plato was aware that his own doctrine of separately existing Forms had never been maintained by Socrates we might expect some embarrassment just here, where he has to speak, through Socrates's mouth, of the relation between Form and thing" (78). His belief, is that the doctrine of Anamnesis in the *Phaedo* is necessarily bound up with the separate existence of the soul before birth and the separation of Forms from sensible things, all three of which "stand or fall together" (74-77). And he thinks that Parmenides' criticism of the separation in the *Parmenides* are very weak and fallacious (95-99). Another interesting feature of Cornford's view is that according to Plato the unique and unchanging Form, e.g. Tallness must be distinguished both from concrete things which can share in a number of characters' as well as from a particular tallness which is in the person and which may be called an immanent character or an instance of Tallness (78). It is this immanent character that mediates between the Form and the sensible object.

My object in referring to this present revival of the "separationist" theory, as we may call it, of the Ideas is to point out that the doctrine of the two worlds has an acknowledged place in the Dialogues, and is not merely the result of a misunderstanding on Aristotle's part. If so, the conclusion I would consider most plausible is this : Instead of imputing the dualistic theory to Plato and then finding all sorts of difficulties in reconciling it with the other tendency towards monism in the later and more metaphysical dialogues, would it not be far more natural, probable and conducive to clarity of comprehension to think that it was Socrates who, given as he was to mystic contemplation, participation in religious mysteries, belief in divine inspiration etc., and who was definitely a Pythagorean believing in the objectivity of numbers, harmony, order etc.,—that it was Socrates who held that ideas were separate from sensible things forming an intelligible world by themselves of which the sensible things are copies, and which we had beheld in a previous existence and whose vision we can

recollect or regain in the present by means of contemplation in which the body is freed as much as possible from contact with sense-objects ?

This is the doctrine taught in the earlier dialogues including the *Phaedo* which must therefore be set down as purely Socratic ; and then we can imagine Plato trying to criticise, refine, re-formulate and re-interpret his master's teachings in (as he must have considered) a more philosophical fashion in the later and larger dialogues. I can see no insuperable difficulties for this view. On the contrary it solves many which are now well-nigh insoluble on the other view.

I should like to conclude this paper with pointing out one difficulty which to me appears to be satisfactorily solved by the above supposition. The question who the "Young Socrates" in the *Parmenides* could be who held the doctrine of separate ideas has excited much interest among Platonic scholars and very ingenious answers have sometimes been made. On the supposition that Plato's mature thought is against the separationist view, it has been suggested that the "young Socrates" might well be Plato himself holding an erroneous view in his earlier years which he is criticising in this dialogue ; or that he might be a pupil of the Academy who took up the Ideal theory exactly as Aristotle took it up. Stewart even considers the possibility that it might be Plato's "young pupil Aristotle" himself who is here unsuccessfully defending his own erroneous view of the true Platonic doctrine ! But—apart from the difficulties of chronology which Stewart notices,—he forgets the more important incongruity of making a person *defend* a theory which he later on was never weary of *attacking* in season and out of season ! The thought seems never to have struck anybody that the "young Socrates" might be Socrates himself here represented as holding a doctrine which Plato knew he did hold and which Plato feels the need to criticise and represented as *young* not because Socrates was only twenty or thereabouts at this time when he met Parmenides—it is not at all necessary to suppose that the dialogue is a dramatisation

of the actual meeting if it ever took place—but because in the presence of the venerable Parmenides, the father of metaphysicians in Greece, anybody else, however old in years or wisdom, must be depicted as young ! If we suppose then that it is Socrates's own view which is submitted to criticism here, it is easy to see why, while he feels sure of moral and mathematical ideas, he feels hesitant to admit forms of such things as mud, dirt, hair etc. Socrates was led to develop the doctrine on the basis primarily of moral and mathematical truths ; he required to see that the logic applies to all things and that there can be nothing too mean not to have its proper idea. But this extension of the Ideal theory might well be due to the logical and metaphysical Plato.

Philosophical Analysis

BY

KALYAN CHANDRA GUPTA.

We may readily admit that a careful and systematic analysis of our notions and beliefs is likely to play an important part in philosophical discussions, but there is certainly novelty in the claim put forward by a certain group of contemporary philosophers that analysis either exhausts or is the sole foundation of philosophy. The claim if substantiated, would revolutionise our idea of the nature, scope and function of philosophy and hence deserves serious consideration. 70225

It is well known that B. Russell and certain other writers who would like to give to philosophy the precision and certainty which admittedly belong to the exact sciences have advocated the use of the logical-analytical method in philosophy. Russell points out, for instance, that the notions that we ordinarily use in philosophy and specially in metaphysics are mostly inexact and approximate, essentially infected with vagueness, and hence it is necessary to make them clear and definite as far as possible. This can be done by analysing our notions, that is to say, by pointing out the most elementary, primitive or basic facts on which those notions are ultimately based and out of which they have been constructed. Facts of which we have knowledge by acquaintance or which are immediately presented to us are most certain, since they are believed on their own account without the support of any outside evidence. They are "hard" data, i. e. the simplest and most indubitable facts and all our knowledge is ultimately based on them. The main business of philosophy, according to Russell, is not to discover any new facts but to relate our notions or concepts to the basic facts out of which they are constructed and to which they can be shown to be ultimately equivalent. This is the process of philosophical analysis the fundamental principle of which may be expressed

by saying that we would, wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities. Notions which cannot be analysed into or reduced to basic facts must be regarded as spurious and scientific thought cannot take any account of them. Since, however, concepts are used in propositions, an analysis of concepts enables us to analyse propositions. To analyse a proposition is to discover what exactly it asserts, and this is done when we reduce a complex proposition to one or more elementary propositions in which the complex concepts used in the former are replaced by the basic or elementary facts of experience out of which they are constructed. Thus philosophical analysis comes to be identified with logical analysis or the analysis of propositions. Logical analysis dispels all confusions arising from our imperfect understanding of propositions and clearly shows what we really mean when we assert a certain proposition. For example, the proposition "The round square does not exist" containing the descriptive phrase "round square" can be reduced to the proposition, "No one thing can be both square and round" and the belief that "round square" refers to a subsistent entity arising from the fact that this expression is used as the subject in this proposition can be shown to be illusory. Similarly many metaphysical propositions which purport to refer to transcendent realities can be shown to be pseudo-propositions which have no meanings as they stand but the real meanings of which can be discovered when they are reduced to one or more elementary propositions whose sense is completely determined by real or possible empirical facts.

Since propositions are embodied in sentences the next step is to assert that logical analysis is ultimately nothing but linguistic analysis—a step that is actually taken by the positivistic thinkers belonging to the Viennese Circle, according to whom the real business of philosophy is not to establish truths concerning transcendent realities but to clarify the meanings of sentences occurring in a language by showing the relationships between different types of sentences and by analysing the symbols used in them. A sentence which is not analytical or

tautologous but is supposed, to refer to a matter of fact is significant or has sense either if it can be directly verified (i. e. confirmed or refuted) by the actual facts of experience or can be translated into sentences which can be so verified. A sentence which cannot be verified is non-significant or a piece of non-sense and embodies a pseudo-proposition which is neither true nor false. Sentences which express metaphysical propositions are all of this type. As they stand they are non-significant. Their real significance can be discovered only by analysing them, that is, by reducing them to other sentences in which the complex symbols used in the former are replaced by demonstrative symbols. It is in this way that all confusions about the meanings of sentences disappear and metaphysical disputes are clearly seen to arise out of such confusions.

Thus a philosophical or logical analysis of language, if properly and systematically carried out, leads to the elimination of metaphysics which is supposed to investigate the nature of ultimate reality. Since all sorts of insoluble problems and meaningless controversies arise in connection with our investigation of ultimate reality it is possible to do away with all of them if it can be shown that the metaphysics with which we are familiar is a jumble of statements and counter statements which, as they stand, have no real significance and consequently which can be neither true nor false. Shorn of all metaphysical nonsense philosophy is expected to attain the exactitude of the special sciences and the progress of philosophy will consist in the formulation of more and more precise rules for carrying out the analysis of propositions.

As against these claims put forward by the advocates of the "logical-analytical" method in philosophy I shall try to establish first, that "analysis", taken in the sense referred to above is not the sole function of philosophy, and secondly it does not really serve the purpose which it is supposed to do.

The view that a complex proposition is to be reduced to one or more elementary propositions which directly refer to the immediate data of sense in order that its real significance

may be brought out clearly presupposes that there is only one type of experience, viz., sense-experience which validates our propositions. Thus when the modern positivist asserts that "a sentence is factually significant to any person, if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition it purports to express" (*Language etc.*,—Ayer p. 19) he refers only to verification in terms of sensuous experience. But unless we adopt a purely procrustean attitude towards experience we must admit the existence of diverse forms of experience and consequently of different grades or levels of facts corresponding to them. It would be sheer dogmatism to deny that values, ideals, universals etc. are also facts and restrict the application of the term "fact" exclusively to facts of sense-experience. If there be really different forms of experience and different grades of facts there is no reason why a philosopher should not extend recognition to all of them.

The term "verification" is not free from ambiguity. In what sense is a proposition verified? From the writings of modern positivists it would appear that a proposition is verified if it can be shown to be a picture of facts or can be reduced to propositions which are pictures of facts. Thus philosophy is said to be concerned only with those propositions which are directly or indirectly pictures of facts presented to our sense-organs, and hence the main function of philosophy is held to be the analysis of propositions with a view to showing which of them are pictures of facts and which are not. But can we not say that a proposition is also verified if its truth must be presupposed for a proper understanding of the facts of experience and their structure? Such a proposition would not be a picture of facts but would make facts of sense-experience intelligible, and this characteristic would constitute the verifiability of the proposition concerned. A proposition relating to the existence of other people's minds is verifiable in this sense though it does not represent any fact of sense-experience. This leads to the question whether it is not also the function of philosophy to enquire into the conditions or presuppositions of certain forms of experience.

Thus even granting that science and philosophy have to deal only with significant forms of speech and that the significance of a proposition is determined by its verifiability we find that "analysis" taken in the sense referred to above cannot be the sole function of philosophy. If there are different forms of experience revealing different grades of facts it is certainly the function of philosophy to try to correlate them and assign to each of them its proper value and significance. If, moreover, the nature of our sense-experience depends upon certain conditions, it is also possible for us to raise significant questions relating to such conditions. In other words, there is no reason to change our view of philosophy as a systematic attempt to know the nature of ultimate reality as reflected in the whole of our experience. As it has been very aptly remarked, "sentences are the counters with which the philosopher plays his game, but that game is neither lexicography nor syntax. The philosopher is attempting to discover the truth about the universe—to probe the ultimate nature of reality" (A. H. S. Coombe-Tennant, *Mind*-1936, p. 449).

My next task is to show that the application of the method of analysis cannot give to philosophy the precision and certainty which are possessed by the exact sciences, nor can it provide us with easy solutions of the outstanding philosophical problems by eliminating metaphysics from the realm of significant discourse. The purpose of analysis, it is said, is to distinguish between propositions or sentences which are significant and those which are non-significant. We have to analyse a proposition in order to discover what exactly it asserts. But the fundamental objection to such a statement would be that we cannot analyse a proposition unless we already know what exactly it asserts. The modern positivist contends that a man's initial understanding of a sentence is incomplete and only a logical analysis of that sentence can make it complete. Even this however does not meet the requirements of the situation. The truth seems to be that the more complete a man's understanding of a sentence the more adequate his analysis is likely to be. The meaning of a sentence is determined by many factors such as the context in which it occurs, the mood of the speaker or writer and so

on. There is no meaning which can be said to be *the* meaning of a sentence detached from its context, the intention of the speaker or the ideas which it arouses in the minds of the hearers. A sentence may have one meaning in ordinary conversation, another in a scientific discourse and a different one in the context of metaphysical speculation. What is supposed to be *the logical meaning* of a sentence is only one of these meanings selected for a particular purpose. By analysing such sentences as "The round square does not exist" or "The author of Waverly was Scotch" we cannot show how sentences which are far more complicated can be analysed. Even granting that the meaning of a sentence consists in verification we cannot lay down any mechanical rules which when applied to a sentence bring out its real meaning. We check the correctness of the analysis of a proposition by reference to its meaning and not its meaning by reference to its analysis. This is borne out by the fact that the same sentence may be regarded as true as well as false at the same time in different contexts, that is, with reference to different meanings. For instance, a sentence relating to the progress of the war will be either true or false according to its meaning, and it will have different meanings accordingly as it is uttered by a German general, a British cabinet minister, or a stock-market speculator. No single set of sentences can be said to be exclusively equivalent to such a sentence, and we cannot determine what particular analysis will be *the* analysis of the sentence unless we already know what exactly it is intended to convey.

Let us now find out the bearing of this discussion on the question of the elimination of metaphysics. If we analyse the sentence "I am now sitting in front of a table," containing a symbol referring to a physical object, into sentences which do not contain that symbol or any of its synonyms but only symbols which stand for sense-contents, the question whether such analysis is correct or not will depend upon the meaning that we assign to the word "table". Such an analysis will be regarded as correct only if we already agree to mean by the table a collection of sense-contents and nothing more. But if we

mean by "table" a substance or substratum which is the source of sense-contents but is not itself a sense-content, the analysis of the sentence in terms of sense-contents alone will be correct or adequate. Our belief in the existence of substances or other metaphysical entities may or may not be valid, but it cannot be shown to be invalid or non-significant by a logical analysis of the sentences referring to such objects, since such analysis already presupposes that those sentences are to be interpreted only in a particular manner.

In fact what has been called philosophical or logical analysis has no bearing whatsoever on the validity of metaphysical theories and the attempt to eliminate metaphysics by applying the logical-analytical method is only an idle dream. And so long as metaphysical problems confront us philosophy cannot attain the exactitude of the special sciences. In this connection reference may be made to the contention of Russell and others that metaphysical problems arise because metaphysicians are misled by superficial grammatical features of language or that they are duped by grammar. Modern positivists are never tired of asserting that all metaphysical speculations arise out of the faulty construction of language which it is the business of logical analysis to prevent. Thus the whole fabric of Hegelian Philosophy can be shown to be based on the stupid and trivial mistake of identifying the "is" of predication with the "is" of identity. But the mere fact that one of the joint authors of *Principia Mathematica* has presented us with an inposing system of metaphysics shows that this may not be the whole truth about matter. The source of metaphysics lies deep in the nature of human mind and cannot be traced to mere grammatical or linguistic confusions.

Are we philosophically progressing?

BY

G. R. MALKANI.

Progress is the watch-word of modern times. We naturally suppose that this progress is all-round. That there has been considerable progress in our knowledge of nature in recent times may be undoubted. But we are prone to think that the spiritual stature of man too has grown proportionately. Unfortunately, in holding this belief, we are governed by a certain prejudice. We think that knowledge is the highest faculty of man, and that knowledge is essentially of an outside reality which can be empirically studied. All positivism is unconsciously governed by this idea. It is thought that real progress is scientific progress. It is progress in the theoretical understanding of reality. This reality is extremely complex. But science at least introduces system into our knowledge of it, and thereby it helps our understanding of the same.

What then is the function of philosophical knowledge? Philosophical knowledge appears to be a species of knowledge. But evidently it is not scientific knowledge. Can there be any other kind of knowledge? The old-type philosophers believed that philosophical knowledge was also knowledge of reality. It answered certain ultimate questions about it. The philosophers, so it is thought by modern positivists, vainly sought those answers. The result was that they were like blind men led by the blind. They raised false issues, and wasted their labour in pursuing them. We should recognise that philosophical knowledge is not knowledge. It is more or less a grammar of the universal language of experience. A grammar is not a study of reality. It does not presume to give new knowledge. It merely systematises and sets out the rules that are already in operation. These rules, as used by us, are unconscious. Grammar, for the first time, fixes them explicitly in our

consciousness. Philosophy is similar to a grammar in this sense. But the language which it studies is not the phonetic language of any social group. It studies the rules of the universal language in which the common experience of humanity is expressed. It makes clear the theoretical sense of common statements, however they may be expressed.

If this view is right, the problem of philosophy is essentially a problem of meaning. We must not expect our knowledge of reality to be advanced through philosophical thinking. We must raise the right issues. And we can only do so, when we realise the meaning-function of language. Statements which have no meaning for the common man or the social man ought never to be made or discussed ; and yet it is exclusively with such statements that traditional philosophy occupied itself. It talked about super-sensible reality or ultimate reality, etc. We must correct this attitude. We must take our stand upon common experience, and interpret all significant statements in terms of it. We may no doubt be mystically inclined. In that case, nobody can prevent us from indulging in our favourite pastime. But the experiences of the mystic are his personal affair. Other people do not share them, and do not understand the language in which they may be communicated. Mysticism is not philosophy. It is beyond ordinary logic. The business of philosophy is to achieve clarity of meaning ; and it can only do this through reduction of more complex statements of experience to their simplest logical constituents. All philosophical problems are in this sense language-puzzles.

This conception of philosophy is the natural result of a scientific bias. If science alone gives any useful knowledge of reality, what has philosophy got to do ? It must either merge in science, or it must change its course. It cannot stand ambiguously between science and religion. It must disconnect itself from both. It must be conceived as a new science, more or less formal in character, in which the meaning-function of language is analysed and studied.

We do not agree with this view. We hold the traditional conception of philosophy. Philosophy has something to do with reality and the understanding of reality. Indeed, it is not one of the empirical sciences, or even a universal or an all-embracing science. It is not a science at all. By a science we understand any empirical study of reality. Philosophy is not an empirical study. Its approach to reality is entirely different from that of a science. It does not formulate hypotheses and then test them by facts. If it did this, it would indeed be a science ; and like every science, it would compel acceptance of its conclusions by every right-thinking person. It would be speculative only in the sense in which all science is speculative. We do not believe that this universal science is possible. All science is restricted to well-defined groups of facts, and governed by certain postulates. Such restriction is inadmissible in philosophy. Again, there are no questions relating to all facts alike which can be empirically or scientifically tackled. We cannot have a science which has this universal scope. Even if it were possible, we should leave it among the sciences with an appropriate name, and reserve the name "philosophy" for some other kind of approach to reality which we believe to be possible.

In order to understand this properly we must realise the inadequacy of the scientific approach. Scientific knowledge may be knowledge of reality. But when every precaution has been taken to render it true to reality, we may yet be obliged to recognise the subjectivity of this knowledge. Sense-data are subjective. Categories of thought are subjective. All empirical concepts through which we interpret and determine the nature of reality are subjective. Knowledge should be of the thing in itself. Or alternatively, the thing should declare itself to us for what it is. This is never so at any stage of scientific knowledge. The result is that our knowledge does not realise the ideal of knowledge. The distinction of reality and appearance is forced upon us. The most certain knowledge of the object that we can possibly have is still subjective. It is open to modification, to doubt and even to

sublation. Certitude is impossible. Can we still claim that this is *knowledge*, and that we have no further problem regarding reality ?

Some one might argue that we can and do have this certain knowledge in which subjective intervention, subjective interpretation and subjective mediation is wholly absent or at least negligible. In that case, evidently, he has no problem left. However he has got to this knowledge, there is no need and no scope for him to philosophise. He has reached truth without philosophy. There might be others who think that although we cannot eliminate subjective mediation, there is an empirical way, through trial and error, to truth. An error may last long. But it can be exposed. Thus, although there is always *room* for correction, we can be reasonably sure that a particular piece of knowledge is true after we have applied all the empirical tests that are relevant and that are at our disposal. Truth for us is empirical. We cannot transcend normal means of knowing, normal means of detecting error, and agreement with other normally constituted individuals. We may all be living in a sort of cave of which Plato spoke, and we may all be seeing only the shadows and not the reality. But there is no means of getting out of this cave. Our only contact with reality is sensible contact, and we cannot substitute anything else for it equally certain.

If such is the state of our knowledge, a problem certainly arises. We are evidently not satisfied with our knowledge as it is. The empirical approach may be continued and it may be carried far. But it is like a blind alley. We must change the mode of our approach. This mode we may conveniently call the non-empirical or the transcendental mode. Philosophy stands for this.

Kant talked of non-empirical or *a priori* categories of thought. He talked of the transcendental unity of apperception. But in so far as these had a necessary reference to the matter of experience; they were not truly transcendental. Kant started with an initial bias, the scientific bias. The result was that he did not work out all the implications of his own critical standpoint.

One cannot criticise, except from a stand-point which is absolute and which is not itself open to criticism. There must be this transcendental certitude if all empirical knowledge is to be criticised and condemned. Kant did not explore this possibility. He reduced the mind to a number of empty forms of thought, and the self to an empty or logical unity. He could see no "reality" in that transcendental direction. He had already come to the conclusion that no reality could be found in the direction of the empirical object. Kant recognised a philosophical problem, but he went the wrong way about it. He was obsessed with empiricism and logical formalism. It is not the problem of philosophy, as he supposed, to justify our ordinary knowledge or scientific knowledge against the attacks of scepticism. This knowledge cannot be justified, and scepticism with regard to it is inevitable. It will be found on examination to be not real knowledge, but only an appearance of knowledge.

The distinction of appearance and reality is the very starting point for a new effort at a comprehension of reality. Whatever appears to us is infected with subjectivism. Reality cannot appear. The initiative of knowledge must not lie with us, who can only contemplate reality from the outside. It must be with reality itself. Reality must reveal itself, or know itself. Self-knowledge is the only form of knowledge which can survive the attacks of scepticism.

The self cannot be known as something outside or as something sensibly given. It is the only directly intuited reality. It alone is capable of realising the ideal of knowledge. To know all reality in the form of the self or as the self is to know it as it is in itself. Philosophy ought to seek this type of knowledge. The self, if we think of it as a category of thought, is the only one that is adequate to reality.

We conclude that philosophy seeks knowledge of reality. This knowledge is knowledge in a higher and a truer sense. It is knowledge in the sense in which reality evidences itself and is not a subjective construction. This reality is ultimate

reality. It is also super-sensible reality. We cannot carp at the notion of ultimate reality. Ultimate reality is the same thing as reality ; and this is opposed to mere appearances. The distinction of appearance and reality cannot be denied. It is our starting point. If we do not make this distinction, we have no philosophical problem. But if we make it, we cannot avoid the subsequent issue. If we condemn one piece of knowledge, we must replace it by another which is true. If we condemn all empirical knowledge in principle, we must replace it in principle by knowledge which is transcendent and absolute. Philosophy, in the pursuit of this ideal, has nothing in common with the scientific method of knowing which is the method of abstractive reasoning. Philosophy does not rely on imagination and make suppositions or hypotheses which would presumably explain facts of sensible experience. It does not explain facts hypothetically or theoretically. It seeks to *see* them as they are in themselves and the only means of this seeing is to criticise experience itself and as a whole from the standards of certitude already contained in it. There is no room here for imaginative thinking. There is room only for seeing the issues properly, and seeing their answers as contained in experience. Any other view of philosophical knowledge will not mean progress to a higher ideal,—there is no higher ideal. It will mean renunciation of the ideal and of the only justification of philosophical thinking, and so a regress from the goal.

The Method of Doubt

BY

J. N. CHUBB.

The method employed by Descartes in attempting to construct a system of ideas, resting on secure foundations, is not new to Philosophy. We do not need a special occasion, like the collapse of a Civilization or Culture, to straighten out our thought by bringing to light its ultimate presuppositions and so to discipline our minds that it forms "sound and correct judgments on all matters that come up before it". Hence the ever present need of the application, in some form, of the method of Doubt, which should aim at freeing the mind of all prejudice and accidental limitations, so that it may seek unfettered the satisfaction which its own nature demands.

I propose to examine, first, Descartes' method of doubt, with a view to disclosing certain shortcomings, not indeed in the method itself, but in Descartes' application of it. I believe that the method, if employed rigorously, as it was not by Descartes, is far more fruitful in leading us to the desired goal, *viz.*, reasoned certainty about various things, than Descartes himself suspected.

The first certainty which we reach as a result of doubting is, according to Descartes, the *Cogito* principle which, though important in itself, is very meagre in content, in comparison with the vast structure of knowledge which reason is capable of erecting. Unfortunately, in reaching this result, the method in the hands of Descartes seems to exhaust its own fertility and is incapable of further results. At this point he is forced to change his tactics if he is to proceed further. He cannot reach fresh certainties, or affirm as certain what he had originally doubted, without setting about in right earnest to prove the existence of God and invoking His Goodness as a guarantee of the truth of those ideas which in our own minds we clearly and

distinctly perceive. This, to say the least, makes his philosophical system rest on rather shaky foundations. It seems to me that the reason of Descartes' failure to demonstrate the truth of other ideas with the same clarity and conclusiveness as he demonstrated his own existence, or rather the existence of the doubter is that, though he started with a desire to be critical, he does not display a sufficiently critical spirit in the initial stages of the application of his method. Paradoxically, it may be said that Descartes doubts uncritically. He begins straight-away by doubting everything "that can be doubted", without pausing to reflect on the positive nature and the proper function of an act of doubt and the presuppositions on which it rests. If doubting consists merely in saying, "I doubt", or even if no more is involved in it than the negative act of suspending one's judgment, then a particular doubt once entertained, would ever remain insurmountable. Absolute doubt, in the sense of a doubt that presupposes a completely blank or virginal state of mind is inconceivable. Doubting, to be a significant activity of a rational mind must commit us to something definite even prior to our reaching certainty in the *Cogito*.

The truth is that doubt, as Descartes himself recognized, is only provisional in character, though he did not stop to reflect on the implications of his own starting point. He proceeded in the task he set himself, that of doubting one thing after another, until he reached a point where doubt gave place to certainty, without recognizing that it would be impossible to start doubting at all, unless he was already in possession of the truth, which no doubt could ever assail, that there is reality transcending what James calls "the mere present phenomenon of consciousness", which is the fact of the mere appearance of something to the mind of the doubter, and that, further, the specific nature of this reality is not known to be such that it is unknowable. The unchartered freedom to doubt is a myth. All doubt is controlled and subordinated to the recognition of a reality, whose nature, in outline, and as far as possible in detail, it is our business to determine.

This is not the only implication of our starting point, important though it is. If doubt is provisional, that is to say, if it is a significant activity in the service of knowledge, it must be accompanied by a claim on behalf of the doubter to be in possession of a *criterion* which he employs explicitly or implicitly in determining what shall be pronounced by him to be real or indubitable and what shall be set aside as false, as arising from the mere precipitancy of the human mind or as grounded only in prejudice. This criterion must be regarded by us as at least theoretically infallible, though it may turn out to be, perhaps inevitably, fallible in practice. The criterion may be formulated thus : that is certain, which in the attempt to deny it, is found tacitly to be affirmed, or in reference to which doubt is seen to be self-destructive ; or conversely, that is certainly false whose articulation involves its own denial. Thus a proposition which breaks down in contradiction is certainly false, and, likewise, a process of doubting a proposition, if it breaks down in contradiction, completely guarantees the truth of that on which it is directed.

There is however another fact which Descartes completely overlooked. It is that the contradiction in which an act of doubt may result, is not an analytic or explicit contradiction—'A is B and not-B,' the logical opposite of the barren tautology AB is AB. It is my belief that no man explicitly contradicts himself, any more than he indulges in obvious tautologies. This only goes to show that the intellectually virginal state of mind which Descartes demands as a presupposition of all effective doubting is a myth, impossible to realize. The mind can never make itself what it isn't, and what the empiricists have thought it is to start with—a *tabula rasa*. The contradiction lurks insensibly in the background and is brought to the surface in the process of doubting. Continuous with every mental act there is a mental background, from which it arises, and when this background is made explicit, certain elements may be discovered in it which are found to cancel each other out—and hence the contradiction. The conflict is to be removed by a widening of the mental background, by drawing more and more on the (to us)

'unconscious' depths of our own mind. This process of widening the horizon of mind, simultaneously removes a conflict from a lower level and paves the way for a conflict at a higher level of thought—and this process is endless.

We have not yet exhausted the fertility of the method of doubt. By a more rigorous application of it one can make it yield far-reaching results. One great presupposition of the act of doubt is the fact of *error*, as can be seen from the fact that Descartes was enabled to use doubt as an instrument for reaching certainty through the explicit recognition of this important presupposition of doubt, though it is a matter of great surprise that he himself did not realize any of the implications of what he had committed himself to at the start of his philosophical enquiry. At every turn, the argument has to appeal to the indisputable presence of error in the background, to the recognition of which philosophy as an intellectual discipline owes its very existence.

Let us follow Descartes' argument again in the attempts to discover the full significance of doubt. Let us take his doubt concerning the commonsense belief in the existence of physical objects. Descartes is determined to doubt so long as there is "the least ground for doubting." He therefore presupposes, and quite rightly, that the activity of doubting is intelligible to us only when it is found to rest on some grounds. He finds no difficulty in bringing the material world within the sphere of "what can be doubted." The ground on which he urges doubt concerning the existence of material objects is that "it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive." It is worth while to pause and ask how much has already been admitted in pointing to the fact that our senses are deceptive as a justification for directing philosophical doubt on the objects of the senses. Descartes unfortunately does not do this and consequently fails to see that his quest for certainty is over almost as soon as it is begun. He starts his programme of methodical doubt with an unquestioned certainty. He claims to be certain that "our senses sometimes deceive us", that, in other words, our minds in the attempt to determine the nature of the independently real have occasionally fallen into error. The

starting certainty of Descartes' philosophy should have been, not *cogito*, I think, but *Erravi*, I have erred ; and as from the fact that he thinks or doubts, Descartes concludes that he exists, so from the fact that he has erred, he could conclude that the recognition of this fact itself would be impossible, unless he were certain of the existence of some things of the sort concerning which he had fallen into error—in this case, of the existence of material objects. Descartes' doubt concerning material objects is sustained by the fact of illusion and hallucination ; but this fact would mean nothing to me unless I were certain of the existence of material objects. I find myself assured of the existence of a world of material objects within which my illusions and hallucinations themselves have being. The doubt is thus seen to invite its own destruction. I cannot be certain that my senses have sometimes deceived me unless I am also certain that at other times I have had experience of real objects outside me. To consider a case of what we recognise to be an illusion : if at one time I seem to perceive a piece of rope in front of me to be a snake, I cannot recognize my mistake and declare I have had any illusion, unless I now feel certain of the existence of the piece of rope in front of me. It is because I contrast the rope with the 'Snake' that the fact of illusion is brought home to me ; and hence to urge that because I have once had an illusion I may constantly be having illusions, is to raise a meaningless doubt, a doubt that does not understand itself, or it would not be there. When an illusion is cancelled, something survives, something is left behind on which we take our stand and judge our previous experience to be illusory. When the hallucination of the 'pink rat' is corrected, the whole world of physical objects is still left to us, from which the 'pink rat' is now consciously banished. We could not talk of 'pink rats' in inverted commas, unless we could talk of chairs and tables, sticks and stones, without the use of them. These latter are not to us possible cases of the former. Indeed the very suggestion that they are is, as I have tried to show, groundless and cannot be entertained. This discussion will help us to fix the proper limits of doubt. It follows from what has been said that I cannot doubt a specific

belief in the existence of an object falling within a particular sphere of the real, on absolutely general grounds, such as the fact of error. There must be *specific grounds* for doubting, let us say, an act of perception. Otherwise the doubt becomes motiveless and therefore unintelligible.

Perhaps I should explain what I mean by a specific ground for doubting a particular perception. As contrasted with a general doubt which is directed not to this or that perception, but to perception as such, a specific doubt cannot be shown to involve its own destruction. Indeed, in certain cases it may be well-founded. The doubt, however, does presuppose the existence not indeed of that on which it is directed but of other things like it. If, for example, I doubt whether there really is a chair in the corner of the room, because I know that there are a number of mirrors skilfully arranged in various parts of the room, my doubt rests on specific grounds. But it presupposes the existence of the physical objects like mirrors and rooms.

The above argument may be regarded as a defence of "Commonsense" against the Problematic Idealism of Descartes. I am not sure whether one cannot by reflecting thus on the limits of rational doubt, succeed in constructing a complete philosophy of "Commonsense." The task of such a "commonsense" philosophy would, I imagine, be to sort out the commonsense beliefs, i.e. those primitive and irreducible beliefs with which the mind is found to be already furnished when philosophical reflecting sets in, and to present these beliefs as connected elements within a coherent whole of knowledge. Such an attempt, if successful, could be regarded as at once a continuation of Hume's sceptical attack on a certain form of Rationalism, as well as an answer to it.

Scepticism

BY

R. DAS.

The term scepticism appears in philosophical literature with various significations. I shall not be concerned to determine what these are nor whether in any of its various senses it offers a tolerable philosophical theory worthy to be accepted by any serious people. I am interested merely to point out that in a certain sense scepticism is forced on all candid minds engaged in purely philosophical reflections, so that it need not always be condemned as a defect of philosophical thought, but may sometimes be admitted as a mark of its genuineness.

A philosopher whose final position is not at all sceptical may provisionally adopt scepticism as a means of arriving at certain truth, as did Descartes. Even Kant who condemns sceptics as nomads of the world of Spirit, admits the value of scepticism as a preparatory step to the true critical position. Hegel recognises scepticism as a necessary moment in the complete self-evolution of every philosophical system. In all these cases scepticism is not recommended either as a final position which we may adopt and in which we may rest, or as a permanent attitude which we may maintain in all our philosophising. On the contrary we are urged both by example and precept to go beyond scepticism. I am however going to suggest that once we have appreciated the grounds of scepticism and left the path of unquestioning faith, it is very difficult to revert to the same old path. In other words, I should like to maintain that an element of doubt cannot be finally and completely overcome in our philosophic life. Let us see how scepticism has been sought to be overcome in the history of philosophy. Two examples will suffice for our purpose.

Descartes began his philosophising by doubting everything, but very soon he discovered that his very doubt contained an indubitable element. If this were so, it would mean that scepticism could not stand very long against rational criticism. Let us see if this is so. Let us see especially if Descartes' sure conclusion was consistent with his initial sceptical position.

Everybody is familiar with his famous argument 'cogito ergo sum.' But is it any argument at all? The self which is sought to be proved in the conclusion (sum) is already assumed in the premise (cogito). An argument of this sort can never amount to a proof. But although this argument may be worthless as a proof, it may serve to draw our attention to an indubitable fact. What is this indubitable fact? It may be said that doubting is thinking, and no thinking is possible without a thinker. And so it seems that, even though we may doubt everything else, we cannot doubt the doubter, the self. But where do we get the doubter? We have only doubting on our hand, and we do not find the doubter in the doubting. If you say you find such a doubter. I can always suggest that your finding is wrong, and is due to defective analysis. Many philosophers have failed to find a standing self in any act of consciousness. So if I doubt whether there is any self present in the act of doubting, my doubt cannot be resolved. That we are unable to speak of doubting without a doubter may be a linguistic inconvenience which can never establish a metaphysical fact.

It may be objected that the difficulty is not merely verbal. We are unable to think of an act of consciousness without a subject. But should we introduce the concepts of act and subject here? I am concerned with doubting; whether it be an act or a state requiring a subject is a further question to which there is no urgent reason why I should proceed at all. If you are obliged to think of a doubter when you think of doubting, this is due, I may suggest, to a mere habit, having no other warrant in reality. In any event it seems clear that a standing persistent self cannot be proved from the fact of doubting.

You may say that at least the fact of doubting stands firm. Does it really? In describing a state of things as doubting, we are applying a concept (doubt) to an empirical fact. But how can we be sure that the concept fits the fact? It is doubtful therefore whether even doubting itself can stand firm.

You may ask me whether I can really doubt that I am doubting, when I am actually doubting. When I am doubting anything, should I not accept at least doubting as indubitable? I do not see that a consistent doubter need accept anything as indubitable. The doubter is not interested in upholding any particular position; he is not making any positive assertion at all. When he is doubting, he is in an uncertain state of mind; he is unable to make up his mind as to the real nature of things. His mind is wavering and hesitant. Now when a man is doubting the existence of tables and trees and is thus subject to a wavering state of mind, we cannot suppose that his mind is at the same time maintaining an unwavering attitude in regard to doubting itself. This would require a duplication of mind which is scarcely thinkable. The fact is that when a person is considering tables and trees in a doubting attitude, the question of doubting is not before his mind at all, and he is not called upon to decide his attitude towards doubting itself. When however his attention is drawn to the fact of doubting itself, I do not see why he should not be able to maintain his doubting attitude even in regard to this supposed fact. For by drawing his attention to doubting, we simply make him conscious of a new object, namely doubting, just as he was formerly conscious of tables and trees, and if he could doubt those objects he should as well be able to doubt this object also. You cannot say that tables and trees are external objects or objective facts, while doubting is an inner state or a subjective fact, and so the latter is not open to doubt even though the former were. Because the distinction of outer and inner, subjective and objective, presupposes a good deal of positive metaphysics, with which we cannot burden a sceptic who is doubting everything. He finds one object after another;

whether we choose to call the one material and the other mental, is no concern of his, and if he is allowed to doubt one object, then there is nothing in the evidence of his own consciousness which should prevent him from doubting the other also.

One may still argue that though whatever is presented as an object may be doubted, consciousness itself cannot be doubted, because it is no object. But where is consciousness by itself apart from all objects to be found? We never come across mere consciousness. All the consciousness we are bound to recognise is implicated in the object, and when we doubt the object, the consciousness involved in it is also made doubtful. It is not certainly more difficult to doubt the being of consciousness, which scarcely ever meets our notice, than the existence of so many other things which are forced on our attention. We understand consciousness after the manner of expression. Consciousness is so to speak an expression and what it expresses is the object. When the object is doubted, the expression itself is rendered dubious. There is no actual positive being which is left over intact beyond the reach of all doubts.

It is to be noted here that if the sceptic asserts doubting as a fact, he will be compelled to accept consciousness as indubitable, because doubting is nothing but a mode of consciousness. But a sceptic need not make this assertion. His is an attitude of non-committal doubting, and if he can maintain this attitude in face of clear objective perceptions, I do not see how by any new evidence he can be made to give up this attitude. The evidence will take the form either of an argument or of a new perception. But how can he be sure that the argument is not fallacious or the perception is not illusory? Thus I see no apparent illogicality in the position of a sceptic who doubts everything including the fact of doubting itself. But I am not interested in supporting such radical scepticism. I am prepared to admit that there is consciousness, that something exists, although we may not know exactly what it is, and even that

I exist or the self exists. But these assertions contain no solution of any of the important metaphysical problems in which we are interested. We want to know, e. g., the nature of reality and we are far from getting any satisfactory answer to our question when we merely learn that I exist or I am conscious or that something or other exists. I maintain that to a question of this magnitude no answer can be devised by human ingenuity that may be offered or accepted with absolute certitude.

Let us now turn to Kant and see how he disposed of the scepticism of Hume. Hume was an empiricist and Kant grants that empiricism only leads to scepticism. Kant was a moderate empiricist when he said that no knowledge was possible without experience. But for the possibility of knowledge he wanted to supplement experience by contributions from the understanding. If, however, in knowing anything, we refuse to make any contribution ourselves to the making of the object—and this appears to be the only sane attitude in matters of knowledge—I do not see how we can be helped out of scepticism by Kant.

Hume demonstrated that there is no warrant in experience for the supposedly necessary connexion between cause and effect. The necessity does not lie in the nature of things themselves but is only subjective, born of custom and habit. Kant maintained that the principle of causality is not derived from experience, but is a form of the understanding. Even so it does not cease to be subjective. It is of course not subjective in the sense of being peculiar to any particular individual, but still it is subjective in the sense of being peculiar to human understanding only. It is certainly not objective in the sense of being true of things in themselves. When Hume declared it to be subjective, he did not, I imagine, mean it to be peculiar to any particular individual; he meant that the necessity of the causal law was accepted by the common run of people who were subject to habit and custom. Both Hume and Kant recognised an element

of necessity in our notion of causality. Hume tried to explain it by habit and custom, and Kant by supposing it to be inherent in the nature of our understanding. But whether born of habit and custom or inherent in the understanding, the necessity of causal relation reveals to us no real state of things in the downright objective sense. According to Hume we can have no *a priori* knowledge ; according to Kant we have such knowledge, but only of phenomena, the things in themselves remaining unknown and unknowable. Thus it appears that the Kantian criticism of Hume has not resulted in any positive gain for metaphysical knowledge. In place of Hume's scepticism we have only Kant's agnosticism, and it is difficult to decide which is the more comfortable position for one who is anxious to know the nature of reality.

Kant himself has shown how very unreal all our supposed knowledge of God, soul and the world is. He has shown for all time how easy it is to fall into obstinate error and illusion in such matters ; and if we can learn well the lesson of his negative criticism, we shall never rashly come out with bold and confident assertions about the sum-total of things nor be so foolish as to swallow such statements when made by others. When we have ourselves struggled with any philosophical question and seen how difficult it is to arrive at a definite conclusion, when we find Plato contradicted by Aristotle, Kant by Hegel, Nyaya by Vedanta, and Vedanta in its turn by all other systems of Indian thought, we cannot but be somewhat diffident about the truth of any philosophical assertion. When a person asserts that a particular conclusion on a philosophical question is the final and absolute truth about the matter, we may well suppose that he has studied the history of philosophy to no purpose ; that he has no proper appreciation of the complexity of the subject, or that he has an unjustifiable faith in his own infallibility.

The truth of a philosophical assertion can be brought home to us by a rational argument or by an immediate perception. I do not see how else we can arrive at a philosophical conclusion. And it is quite easy to be misled by a false argument

or to see things wrongly. An argument has steps, and although we may quite easily proceed from one step to another, it is difficult to be sure that there has been no jump or that the subsequent step at every stage is really logically necessitated. Moreover so many unproved assumptions may be lurking in an argument which we fail to notice. An immediate perception too is conditioned not only by so many psychological factors, but also by much theoretical analysis, and there is thus ample room for its going wrong. Sankara recognises no ultimate stability in reasoning, and perception would not be in a better case for him ; his appeal is to revelation, a source of knowledge quite out of reach for a modern man.

I do not mean to say that there is no knowledge, and no truth, and we should not make any assertion at all. I only suggest that for a properly instructed philosophic mind, knowledge is reasonable belief, truth is what is highly probable, and no assertion can be made without some reservation. In philosophy we do, and must, hold some opinion or other. But our opinions should be lightly held with intellectual detachment as always subject to revision and correction. We should not hold fast to them with passionate zeal as absolute truths. We should be untrue to the philosophic spirit if we did so. Our study of philosophy should make it clear to us that there is no intellectual means at our disposal to arrive at absolutely certain conclusions about metaphysical matters. Whenever a claim is made to absolute certitude, we are likely to find behind it either some kind of religious faith or blind prejudice. Faith, stable and firm, is necessary for the life of action but it would be prejudicial to the life of thought or philosophy, which can thrive only on the basis of intellectual freedom and by adventures of ideas. An element of doubt thus is not only ineradicable by rational means, but seems to constitute an essential ingredient in the philosopher's mind which should always be open to new ideas and ready to revise its conclusions.

Objects of Knowledge as Constructions

BY

S. C. CHATTERJEE

In an article on "The Relation of Knower to Known", contributed to the last session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, I made an attempt to show that although knowledge may be regarded as directly related to its objects, yet the latter are in some sense or other constructed by the knowing subject. But while this view may be accepted in the case of imaginary or illusory objects, it has hardly any chance of acceptance in the case of what are commonly called real objects. An imaginary or illusory object may be said to be constructed or even produced by the mind of the subject who knows it. But it will be said here that to cognise the false or the unreal is not to *know* anything, rather it is to lack knowledge of some real thing. To know is to cognise a real object and be also assured that it is real. The function of knowledge in relation to the object is revelatory and not constructive or creative. To know is to reveal or manifest a real object and not to construct it in any way. If, therefore, the object of knowledge be regarded as constructed by the knowing subject, the distinction between the real and the unreal cannot be maintained, and the universality and necessity of our knowledge of objects cannot be explained. When I perceive a red rose I do not seem to construct it at the moment of knowing it ; rather I feel that a real object stands revealed before me and that, under similar circumstances, it will so reveal itself to all other persons. How then are we to explain the universality and necessity of our knowledge of objects consistently with the view that they are constructed by the knowing mind ?

In this paper I shall try to answer the above question. In an epistemological enquiry like the present one we propose to take knowledge in the ordinary sense as a relation of subject and object. But the subject-object relation into which knowledge is usually analysed is not ultimate. While the idealists take knowledge as a relation between subject and object, the neo-realists treat it as a special kind of relation among objects. Both however fail to see that the ultimate condition of knowledge is the self as related to an "other". In every case of ordinary knowledge the individual self is confronted by a real which stands as an "other" over against it. To know is, for one self, to experience an "other". The self as knowing is the subject of knowledge and the "other" as manifested to the self is the object of knowledge. The "other" or the real that confronts the self is not known as such or as a thing-in-itself. Strictly speaking, the real cannot be described even as a thing-in-itself, for a "thing" is not the real as such but as construed by the knowing subject. Hence what we know, when we know anything, is a manifestation of the real as some object or thing. The object of knowledge is not the real as such but a manifestation of the real as conditioned by the self's relation to it. The manifestation owes it to the constructive activity of the knowing subject that it becomes an object. Let us see how.

What we commonly call an object of knowledge is a spatio-temporal particular possessing some qualities. It is a thing which has qualities and exists in time and space. The object of knowledge is thus a thing which exists in the spatio-temporal world. Now the question is: How do we get an object as an existent particular in space-time? Is the object like a red rose given to us as an independent real thing in the world of space and time? Both common sense and realistic systems hold that it is so given and exists as a real independently of all experience. But a critical examination of the object shows that it is neither absolutely given nor independently real. If the red rose as an object were an independent real and all its characters were absolutely given, then we have to say that it possesses all the contrary and contradictory qualities that are

perceived in it by different perceivers. Or, we have to say that all the perceived characters of an object are not its real given characters. But then we should give up the view that the object is an independent real which is completely given in experience.

Taking any object of knowledge like a rose or an orange we find that it may be analysed into three kinds of elements, viz., the material, the formal and the verbal. The first consists of the actual and possible data that compose the object. The data are the *sensa* which are presented to the mind by the activity of a real outside the mind. They are not absolutely given in the sense that there would be data independently of the psychical and physiological conditions of experience. Their appearance as data is conditioned by the healthy working and normal development of the psycho-physical organism concerned in experience. What is really given in experience is the "other" to which every experience refers independently of all other considerations. The "other" is the real which acts on the mind and manifests the data relatively to the capacity and competency of the mind concerned in experience.

But sense-data do not by themselves constitute an object of knowledge. An orange, for example, is not a collection of certain visual tactual and other data. It is rather a thing which has certain specific qualities and a general nature which it shares in common with other oranges. The visual and other sense-data represent the specific qualities of the orange. But how is it that a patch of yellow-red becomes the colour, or a tactual impression the touch-quality of an orange? How again is it that an orange has a general nature like "orangeness" in which all oranges participate. That there may be a universal like "orangeness" in an orange we do not deny. All that we contend is that while an orange may have "orangeness" in it, a collection of sense-data cannot have any such universal in them. For a collection of sense-data to become a thing we have to introduce the formal relation of substance and quality, and treat sense-data as qualities of a substance. It is only

when we have a thing as a substance with qualities that we can speak of a general nature or universal characterising it in some sense.

The object of knowledge, we have said, is a spatio-temporal existent. But how is it that we know the object to exist in space and time? That we have spatial and temporal *sensa* like visual and tactual ones is highly improbable. It may be said that although there are no space-time *sensa*, yet spatial and temporal characters belong to visual and tactual *sensa*, and these constitute the data of our knowledge of space and time. But it should be observed here that spatial and temporal characters do not explain but presuppose space and time. To understand a spatial or temporal character is to know already what space or time is. Further, what exist in space and time are not *sensa* as such, but things as substances outside and succeeding one another. Spatial and temporal characters belong primarily to things and secondarily to *sensa* taken as qualities of things. Thus we see that space and time are not parts of the given data of experience, but forms of order under which we bring objects apprehended as things or substances with qualities. Space is the condition for the existence of things that are apprehended as separate from one another. To apprehend one thing as separate is to apprehend it as occupying space. Time is the condition of the order of succession among different things or different states of the same thing. To apprehend one thing or state as coming before or after another is to apprehend it as being in time. The objects of knowledge are thus found to be constituted by certain formal elements which make sense-data, unmeaning by themselves, significant as qualities of things.

But the object of knowledge is not fully explained by reference to sense-data and certain forms of relation like substance-quality, space and time. There are certain verbal elements which play an equally important part in the constitution of the object. At the present state of our knowledge we cannot think of anything except through some word. The intimate relation between thought and language is now a commonplace

of psychology. All objects of thought are bound up with the words by which they are denoted. The structure of the objects of knowledge partially reflect the structure of human language. The ordinary objects of knowledge like chairs, tables, books, etc. would not be such unless they were associated with their respective names. To a baby who has not yet learnt to speak or to use these names there would be no such things as chairs, tables and books. If no names were invented for the different kinds of golden ornaments and if there were no such word as "ornament", then the objects which we now know as bracelets or necklaces would be but gold, just as all stones on the roadside are only stones, although they may have different size and shape. The objects of knowledge are substances which are related to certain qualities. An object like the jar is said to be a substance which has colour, touch, etc. as its qualities. The relation of substance and quality is a formal element in the constitution of the object. The basis of the formal relation of substance and quality is the grammatical relation of subject and predicate. The grammatical subject is that which does or is something, while the predicate is what is said of the subject. It is on the basis of this grammatical distinction that the logical relation of substance and quality has been developed. It is not unlikely that the subject-object relation in philosophy which is held by many to be ultimate for knowledge is itself a development from the grammatical relation of subject and predicate. That knowledge is an activity of some kind is perhaps the oldest and most widely accepted view of it. But if to know is somehow to act, there must be a subject which acts and an object in relation to which it acts. The self that knows thus becomes the subject and the things known become its objects. With the development of language the old conception of the self as a substance with the quality of consciousness is replaced by the idea of it as the subject of the act of knowing. It would thus appear that verbal elements enter into the constitution of the object of knowledge as much as formal and sensuous ones.

If the foregoing analysis of what is commonly called an object of knowledge be correct, we have to accept the conclusion

that it is a construction of the knowing mind on the basis of certain sense-data. An object like the jar exists as a thing before me because my mind is related to an "other" or real which presents some visual and tactual data and because it construes the sense-data as qualities of a substance occupying space-time and bearing the name "jar". But here the question arises : If the jar is constructed by my mind, how is it that all persons perceive the same jar ? In other words, the question is : How are we to explain the universal and necessary character of our knowledge of objects on the construction theory ?

To this I should say first that there is no inherent contradiction between construction on the one hand, and universality and necessity on the other. To be constructed is not necessarily to be subjective as, contrariwise, to be unconstructed is not necessarily to be universal and necessary. Some modern logicians regard *classes* as logical constructions in the sense of being referred to by incomplete symbols. But for that they are not treated as subjective fictions. "There is nothing *fictitious* about a logical construction. To say that *tables* are logical constructions is not to say that *tables* are fictitious or imaginary, or in any way unreal".¹ The meaning of a sentence is said to be a construction of the separate meanings of its constituent words. Still the sentence bears a meaning which is the same for all persons who understand the language in which it is expressed. On the other hand, the pain of toothache as felt by one man seems to be given *par excellence* and not constructed. But for that we cannot say that it is a universal and necessary experience for all persons. It is doubtful even if the sense-data that are given to different individuals by what is commonly called the same thing are exactly the same for them all. It is all but certain that the data of sense are slightly different for the different perceivers, according to their different positions and powers of sensibility. Nevertheless, the different individuals perceive the same thing, because they construe the sense-data in fundamentally the same way and because the thing serves the same practical needs. This is my second answer

1. Vide L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 158.

to the question how a constructed object can be universal and necessary.

In the construction of the object, we have already seen, there are certain material, formal and verbal elements. The material elements are the data given to the individual subject through his senses by the action of an "other" or real. The sense-data are relatively the same for all individuals, since their general sensibility is the same under normal conditions. The formal and verbal elements come from the intellectual constitution of the individual. As the result of a long process of development under practically the same physical and social conditions, certain forms of thought and modes of verbal expression have become so ingrained in the human mind as to be the stable contents of its experiences. It may be that these forms of thought and speech have been evolved by the human intellect to serve the needs of our organic life, But through long and effective use in our practical life, they have so moulded our intellectual life that we cannot now think or experience except through them. Take, for example, the word "book". Corresponding to the word or name, there is a concept or idea in our mind as to what it means. Both the concept and the name "book" have no doubt been formed by our intellect to bring order into and communicate certain experiences of what we call paper, printing, etc. But at the present state of our mental development we cannot have these experiences except in the form and under the name of "book". When we have these experiences we feel that we have really a book before us. For the primitive man, however, who knew nothing of reading and writing, there might be the same experiences, but no "book." Thus the book is an object for us in so far as we construe certain sense-data as qualities of a substance occupying space and time, and bearing the name "book". Similar is the case with other objects of knowledge like chairs, tables, etc. In every case the object is what it is because certain sense-data come to us clothed with the formal and verbal elements which enter into the present level of human knowledge. We are not aware of any constructive activity of the mind when we know an object, because it has become instinctive with us, just as we are not conscious of

doing what has long become habitual for us. Again, just as a long-standing habit creates a necessity for the means of its satisfaction, so the instinctive reaction of the mind to sense-data creates a necessity for the forms of its reaction. Hence the objects constructed by the human intellect become necessary for all individuals who have the same intellect. This view of the object seems to be endorsed by A. A. Bowman ² when he observes: "But as the psycho-physical organism adjusts and readjusts itself to its environment until the point of relative stabilization is reached, there finally emerge certain stereotyped products, among them those well-defined presentational contents which are the familiar objects of our day-to-day experience".

One thing however must here be made plain. When we say that we perceive the same object, say water, we do not mean that it is absolutely the same for all of us. The object is relatively or practically the same, because it serves the same practical purposes for us. We cannot logically prove that the water perceived by several men is absolutely the same, but we know that the practical effects produced by water are about the same for all normal persons. All men do not perceive all or even the same aspects of a thing. Yet the thing is judged to be the same because it has the same fundamental characters and practical effects for us. The universality and necessity of the objects of knowledge are more matters of our practical life than of anything else. The objects of knowledge are the stable constructions that we make of the real through certain instinctive modes of thought and speech, and they are the same for us in so far as they serve the same needs of our practical life. What the real is in itself and how it can be known are questions which take us beyond the scope of this paper and should be reserved for future consideration.

The Object of Sense-perception and the Sense-datum Theory

BY

CHANDRODAYA BHATTACHARYYA

The word sense-datum, as far as we know, first occurs in Mr. Bertrand Russell's "*Problems of Philosophy*". There, starting with the Cartesian doctrine that philosophy should be based on the indubitable element of our experience, Mr. Russell discovers this element in what is immediately known to us, without the help of intellectual processes like inference ; and he thinks that a thing like a table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known ; for the table appears to have different sizes, shapes and colours, under different conditions of perception. These different sets of size, shape and colour, which are the immediate objects of our apprehension, must be different from the table which cannot be supposed to vary with the varying appearances. We, of course, customarily identify one particular set of these immediate contents with the actual properties of the table...namely the set which is perceived under normal conditions of perception. But if we are not to be guilty of favouritism, we should admit that any one of these sets has as good a right to be considered real as any other. "Let us" says Mr. Russell, "give the name of sense-data to the things that are immediately known in sensation : such things as colours, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses and so on." (*Problems of Philosophy*. Pages 9 to 18).

It would appear from the above account that the word sense-datum, as used by Mr. Russell, is associated with three distinct and slightly different ideas, namely those of "indubitability", "immediacy or given-ness" and "sensible appearance." And we are of the opinion that most definitions of sense-data, while

taking for granted their indubitability, are based on either of the last two notions, namely, given-ness and sensible appearance.

Thus Professor Price defines a sense-datum in terms of the given element in our experience. When I see a tomato, I may doubt if it be a tomato and not a painted piece of wax, or if I be not under a hallucination or some other mistake. But that something is red and round, then and there, I cannot doubt. There is some presence to consciousness which is direct and not obtained by inference, comparison or analysis. "This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is called 'being given,' and that which is thus present is called a datum." (*Perception* ; Page 3).

Dr. Broad's definition is based on what he calls the notion of "sensible appearance". We constantly make judgments of the kind : "The penny seems to me elliptical," without the least doubt about their truth, though we are at the same time quite sure that it is really round. In other words, "appearance is not merely mistaken judgment about physical objects". Sensible appearances may give rise to mistaken judgments about physical objects, but they need not and commonly they do not. When we say that something looks elliptical to us, we have a peculiar experience. According to Dr. Broad, there may be two theories to account for it : (1) the multiple relation theory and (2) the object theory. The second, which is supported by Dr. Broad as the more plausible of the two, suggests that here we are really aware of an elliptical object, standing in a cognitive relation to me and in a relation, which is yet to be determined, to what we call the penny. Such an elliptical object is called a *sensum*. As for the relation between the sensible appearance and the physical object, he says that in the beginning of our investigation it is permissible to suppose that, when one looks straight down on a penny, both the physical object and the visual appearance may be round, though in general there could not be anything but a mere correlation between the properties of

the object and the appearance (*Scientific Thought* ; Pages 239 to 244).

This implies, as it seems to us, that even to start with, we must not suppose that the distinction between the physical object and the sensible appearance could ever cease to exist, though possibly they might occasionally possess the same property. In other words, though the conception of sense-data involves no epistemological theory with regard to their mental or non-mental nature, still it does involve the theory that sensible appearances are *objects* which are always different from things (like pennies) which we believe to be knowing in sense-perception.

Dr. Broad and Professor Stout have recommended the use of the term *sensum* instead of *sense-datum*, because the latter, according to them, implies in a question-begging manner that our knowledge can never transcend immediate experience. But what's in a name ? We do not think that the association of the *sensum* with that aspect for which the term *datum* stands has been, or can be, removed in that way. Professor Price has definitely defined a *sensum* in terms of the given element of experience. Dr. Broad too has done the same thing, though a bit indirectly. The fundamental fact on which he bases his definition is our sense of indubitability about the existence of an elliptical thing as the object of our consciousness, when, e. g., we rightly say that the penny looks elliptical. What is this indubitability about the existence of an elliptical thing if it be not its immediacy or givenness ? For, if it were due to any process of mediacy like inference, it might be wrong and the basis of the object theory of appearance would vanish.

What precisely then is this 'datum' which seems thus to be an indispensable element of sense-data ? Professor Price, after pointing out that, whenever we know something, there obviously is 'some sort of presence to consciousness which is direct' and not obtained by inference, comparison or analysis, says that this ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is called 'being given'. (*Perception*; page 3). It may be noticed

that he uses in this connection two different sets of epithets : (1) primary, ultimate, etc., and (2) immediate, direct etc. When I think that I am seeing a tomato just before my eyes, Mr. Price would declare that the sense-datum, here, is a patch of red of some particular size, shape, depth etc. Now by the first set of adjectives he probably intends that the sense-datum must not include within itself any element which is the result of some prior process of mediacy, e.g. its softness ; and the second set is designed perhaps to exclude everything that may, now and subsequently, be inferred from the red patch, e.g., its connection with some types of vitamin. It would appear, therefore, that the sense-datum is not merely that immediate object of my *present* perceptual consciousness, from which the further process of intellectual interpretation is to proceed, but it is also that genetically primary and raw element on which the interpretative process exercised itself for the first time in our life.

Probably the distinction between the ostensible and the real sensum will help us to understand the position of the sensum philosopher. By the ostensible data we mean all those elements which a philosophically unsophisticated grown-up individual (when properly interrogated) will declare to be the object of normal perception (when e. g., he says that he is seeing a tomato). The ostensible data in such an instance will, we think, be the tomato with a certain size, shape, colour, etc. But all these would not be regarded as sense-data by the sensum philosopher. It is only a selection out of these which is the true datum. The tomato, e. g., is either an intellectual construction or an object of some sort of belief (Russell and Price). Intellectual interpretation being essentially liable to error, the principle of discovering the genuinely 'given' is to discard, from the ostensible data, everything that can be regarded as contributed by the mind.

It seems that Kant too applied the same principle in arriving at his notion of the 'given', though he did not look upon the intellect with the suspicious eye of the sensum

philosopher. He, however, in his search for the truly 'given' did not stop at the 'sensible appearance' of Dr. Broad, but rightly or wrongly went further to something which he described as an amorphous and wholly unrelated manifold of bare sentience. It would appear, therefore, that both for Kant and the sensum philosopher, 'the truly given' is the non-intellectual element in the ostensible data of sense experience. Both would admit that there is such an element, though according to Kant in our mature experience, it can never be found in its pristine purity.

Now we are of the opinion that the sensum philosopher is not as thorough-going as Kant in applying the principle of discarding all interpretative element from the sphere of 'the genuinely given'. Let us substantiate our statement.

Professor Price has indirectly suggested a method for separating the given from the interpretative element, by saying that in the sphere of the given, what seems, is: there is no distinction, here, between 'seeming' and 'being'. Of course, he maintains that a patch of red with its size, depth, shape etc., stands this test, and that if any characteristic of it, say its solidity, appears to a philosopher incapable of being given, he must be holding a wrong theory of the givable. (*Perception*; Page 10).

But we contend that in an entity like a patch of red, the distinction between 'being' and 'seeming' cannot possibly be avoided. The sensa which we apprehend at any one time are, as Broad points out, well-nigh always outstanding differentiations of a sense-field; and it is certain, as Broad admits, that two sensa in the same sense-field might really differ in quality, when we think that they are alike. (*Scientific Thought*; Page 244). Here, then, a sensum would appear to be what it is not. Broad tries to get over the difficulty by drawing a distinction between 'failing to notice what is present in an object' and 'noticing what is not present.' But as Professor Dawes Hicks remarks in this connection, our failure in such an instance to recognize the difference which is there must be

due to one of the *sensa* or both of them appearing different from what they are. (*Critical Realism*; Page 59). The *sensum* with the discerned characteristics a, b and c is sure to appear different from the *sensum* with the discerned characteristics a, b, c and d. Dr. Broad himself has referred to the fact that most often the elliptical sense-datum connected with a penny appears round to most people, and it is difficult to convince them that it is not so. But the solution suggested by him is not at all convincing. He thinks that an ellipse is, as it were, a circle with the addition of some differentiations, and so to regard an ellipse as a circle is only to fail to see these differentiations. But what about the plain fact that the elliptical *sensum* is different from the circular one? And if one could still appear as the other, whatever the reason, where is the alleged indubitability of the sense-datum?

As a matter of fact, the red *sensum* (as much as the red tomato) with its visual extensity, depth, shape etc., is a result of comparison, analysis, synthesis and some sort of pseudo-inferential process. Not that the clear-cut patch of red is made to undergo all or any of these complicated processes at the very moment of, or just prior to, its being apprehended. Yet, without a lot of previous analysis, comparison, etc., which might be unconscious, nascent, or more or less conscious, the present red *sensum* could not have been apprehended in the form in which it is being apprehended just now. And as the results of such processes are not free from the possibility of error, there can be, to the reflective consciousness of the philosopher, no intuitive certainty about them. If, however, we search for that pure *sensum* which is absolutely uncontaminated by any intellectual dubitability, we shall probably have to go to the object (if there be such) presented for the first time to the consciousness of a new-born baby. But it must be extremely difficult to guess what might be present to such a consciousness. Is it what James has described as a 'blooming buzzing confusion'? Or is it that hypothetical 'blind sentience' which Kant sometimes describes as a 'rhapsody of perceptions'? Whatever it be, it is not, at any rate, such a well-defined and unitary object as a patch of red.

If once we free our mind of the false notion that a *sensum* is a pure datum, untouched by any intellectual process and hence marked by indubitability, it will be easy to admit the plain fact that in its mode of presentation to consciousness, a patch of red stands on a par with a thing like a tomato. At the purely perceptual level, we intuitively take such a patch to be a part of an external object. That the existence of the tomato, at this stage, is not apprehended by inference is admitted both by Professor Price and Professor Broad, though they do not think it to be sense-given. It is no doubt true that the whole of a tomato cannot be said to be presented to my consciousness in the same sensuous way in which the part of it which is within my visual range is presented. Still, the visible part, namely the red patch, with its size, shape and density in the midst of its sense-field does not appear merely as an isolated patch, but appears to be sensuously given as a part of a thing, which I recognise as a tomato. Without referring to the *sensum* theory, it can, we believe, be truly stated that the qualities of a thing are always apprehended as constituting, or inhering in, a thing and not as hanging in the air without any support. Substantiality, ostensibly at least, is as sensuously given as any thing else—if it be true that we intuitively apprehend sensible qualities like red, round, etc., it is equally, and in the same sense, true also that we intuitively apprehend them as the qualities of a thing. Even when we are not able to refer a visible patch of red (say at a distance) to a particular thing like a tomato, this patch is still as much a thing as, though different from, a tomato. To speak in the language of Kant, even the *sensum* philosopher's knowledge by acquaintance is not possible without the category of substantiality. This is not to express any opinion as to whether substantiality is contributed by the mind, or discerned by it as presented in the given itself. We only insist that at the level of consciousness at which a patch of red is, or appears to be, a sensuous datum, the substance too is, or appears to be, so ; in respect of immediacy and indubitability both the red patch and the substance of which we take it to be a part or quality sail in the same boat.

From the scientific point of view, it may appear rather hard to conceive how thinghood could be given to visual (or, for the matter of that, any) sense at all. Some philosophers would exclude even extendedness and depth from visual data ; that, however, is not the view usually held now-a-days. In our opinion, this is not an epistemological difficulty at all ; it is only incidental to the physiologist's attempt to explain sensation in terms of physico-chemical laws. At any rate, the same difficulty should be felt with regard to a patch of red too, nay, even the bare quality of red. How could the tiny, inverted and two-dimensional image on the retina give rise to the vision of a quality called red, in an extended and three-dimensional patch, out there, at a distance from the body ? If still a red patch with its size, depth etc., could be sensuously given to sight, we do not see what objection (from the physiological point of view) could possibly be urged against the thinghood of the patch also being similarly presented.

It may be rejoined that while the various sensible qualities as colour, taste, roughness etc., may be traced to the instrumentality of one or more sense-organs, there is no sense-organ which could be connected with thinghood. To this, we would suggest the following answer, though with some degree of doubt in our mind. It appears to us that while every sense-organ may be said to supply us with its own peculiar datum or data, all the sense-organs, separately or in combination, may be said to give us (over and above their respective *sensa*) also another datum, namely that of thinghood. The reason why we generally do not recognize this may be that this thinghood is not ascribable to any one, or any particular group, of our senses.

We do not, however, positively assert that the various senses do, as a matter of fact, give rise to a sense-datum called 'thinghood'. We merely make the moderate suggestion that at least they seem to do so ; thinghood too appears to be as sensuously given as what is called a red *sensum*. We have already tried to make out that the distinction between 'seeming' and 'being' cannot be eliminated from the objective constituent

of the awareness of even a bare quality like red. So the patch of red, the soft pressure, the inviting smell and the thing tomato—all of them stand or fall together. In Kantian phraseology, every one of these, as any other, belongs to the same phenomenal world.

The above is not so strange a view as it may, at first, appear to people who are imbued through and through with the physiological sensationalism of the west. With the exception of the Buddhists, probably almost all schools of Indian philosophy admit that the physical object itself with its colour, shape etc., is immediately perceivable, at the stage of what they call determinate knowledge, though there are differences of opinion among them as to how the sense-organs function in conditioning perceptual knowledge and as to the ontological status of the objects of such knowledge. As for the Buddhists, they do not think that determinate knowledge is immediate perception at all; for they restrict immediate perception to the unique particular. The names, universals etc., which seem to be given in determinate knowledge are, according to them, really due to imagination. The sensible object of the Buddhists would, therefore, appear to be similar to the uncategorised 'given' of Kant, with this important difference, however, that Kant's datum is a manifold, while their's is a unique particular. But we were talking about the sensible object of a subsequent stage, the stage of determinate knowledge. And there, we contend, the object is as much, or as little, given to sense, as its qualities—the red patch is always given as either a thing or a part of a thing, if the patch is capable of being regarded as given at all.

On 'Creative Synthesis' as a Philosophical Concept

BY

P. S. NAIDU

The principle of *Creative synthesis*, with its allied theory of levels, has been used by Professor Patrick to 'explain' organic evolution. We shall proceed, in this short paper, to examine the implications of this new principle with a view to assessing its value for philosophy.

A careful examination of Professor Patrick's view of evolution as it emerges from his general philosophic background leads one to the conclusion that 'creative synthesis' is the result of the Professor's attempt to synthesise the principle of 'creative evolution' of Bergson with Lloyd Morgan's 'emergent evolution'. Such a synthesis is exceedingly difficult, for in the former the psychical takes precedence over the physical, while in the latter the order is reversed. Creative evolution opens out the way for a successful attack on the very subtle type of materialism championed by contemporary science, while 'emergent evolution' plays into the hands of the Marxists. The former is a truly philosophical principle of explanation, while the latter is a working hypothesis of the scientific type. Even so has 'emergent evolution' failed to achieve much. It has been pressed into service in many fields, and the last drop of usefulness has been squeezed out of it. The net result may be summed up in the words of Dean Mathews of King's College,

London. The learned Dean says, "Without doubt 'emergence' is a valuable descriptive formula for certain aspects of the evolutionary process. . . . But, I would ask, does the concept of emergence take us beyond description? Is it any more than a convenient description? Is it any more than a convenient summary of observed phenomena? We may all gladly admit that there is continuity and that there is emergence of new qualities within that continuity; but we feel some curiosity about the reason why there should be this emergence. It is the task of philosophy not simply to describe, but to explain. Perhaps you will permit a somewhat frivolous illustration. We have all seen a conjuror produce a rabbit out of a hat. We may have felt some pleasure when the conjurer promised to explain how it was done; but we should have been greatly disappointed if he had informed us that when the passes of his magic wand reached a certain degree of complexity the rabbit emerged. After all we know that already."¹

To understand clearly the significance of 'creative synthesis' we must take a glance at the general philosophical position of Professor Patrick. The world view presented in his *'Introduction to Philosophy'* is, we are told, realistic and idealistic, pluralistic and theistic and certainly optimistic. Furthermore, he says, 'the validity of the realistic standpoint of the special sciences is quite shamelessly assumed, and it is taken for granted that they deal with realities and not with appearances'!² This quotation, I believe, gives the clue to the understanding we have been striving to secure. The priority of matter is taken for granted, and by the introduction of the 'theory of

1. McDowall, R. J. S. *The Mind*, pp. 161-162.

2. Patrick, G. T. W., *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. vii

levels' the evolution of life, mind and values is sought to be accounted for. 'At each new level of reality we have new powers and new capacities and new qualities. It is a flowering-out process, wholly different from the mechanical sequences which we see in the world of physics.'³

There are three conflicting elements in the theory of 'creative synthesis' which we are analysing. Aristotle's *matter and form*, Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, and Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution* have been put together, and a determined attempt has been made to synthesise them. But will they fuse into a harmonious whole? Aristotle's thought is finalistic, and finalism is strongly condemned by Bergson, while Morgan's view is unmistakably mechanistic. A coherent blend of these three is a logical impossibility. 'Creative Evolution' will no doubt triumph in the end, but its triumph will mean the death of 'emergence.'

The bed-rock on which the principle of creative synthesis is founded is the old view upheld by mechanistic biology that matter is temporally antecedent to life. The mechanistic biologist understands by life, merely an organism which is an automaton, and mind has no meaning for him. This is crude materialism; but there is perfect consistency in such a view. It cannot, however, be made the foundation for a philosophy, such as that of Professor Patrick, which believes in the reality of mind, life and values.

The most significant question that arises in connection with our discussion is whether that which is latent or quiescent can have causal efficacy; whether that which is yet to be born

3. *Ibid.* 110-111.

can itself create other things. 'Why may not' asks the Professor, 'spiritual values emerge late in evolution and yet have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe?' Not only values, spiritual as well as aesthetic and ethical, but also mind and life are conceived as *late emergents* exercising a determining influence over the whole course of evolution. If it be assumed that psychical entities and values are latent in the earlier stages, then it is clear that they themselves have to be helped out of their dormant state to flower into their full existence by the organisation of matter. How, then, can they control or direct organisation which determines their own flowering-out? Surely, there is considerable confusion of thought here. Either mind and spirit have causal efficacy in the course of evolution, in which case they cannot be quiescent entities waiting to flower out or they have not. There is no middle course between these two extremes.

The cause of this confusion is the fallacious extension of the principle of *emergence*. We are familiar with what are called the emergent properties of chemical compounds. These properties are *novel*, but they belong to the same category as those which are old. There is no striking novelty in them. A molecule of water will freeze at 0°c and will nourish plants. These properties are not possessed by oxygen and hydrogen. Yet they are only physical properties. In the new way of mathematical thinking parts when put together may produce something greater than the whole. Two plus two may give rise to five or seven. The novelty, however, is on the same plane as four. But two plus two cannot make a rainbow or a star. In the theory of emergence something more surprising than the rainbow or the star is produced by adding two and two. Molecules *organised* in

a particular way cause life to emerge. Chemical analogy breaks down completely at this point.

There is a significant question left unanswered by emergent evolutionists. Organisation requires an organiser. The word 'organisation' masquerading as a noun really stands for the effect of an activity. And an activity demands the existence of an acting agent. Besides 'organisation' indicates a standard with respect to which that which is organised may be judged as to the degree of organisation or disorganisation. There are so many difficulties in this unanalysed concept that we are bound to deny it any great degree of validity in philosophy. Those who have given 'emergent evolution' a most thorough and searching consideration are agreed that 'the doctrine implies some latent or potential or minimal amount of psychical life in the world ; that it is illegitimate to assume any psychical teleological activities to have been evolved by any natural process out of a purely mechanistic world' ⁴ Haldane and Whitehead insist on the efficacy of psychical forces as truly teleological factors in nature. The most considered and enlightened view on the subject seems to uphold the priority of the psychical. But to Professor Patrick evolution is still a process wherein matter takes on form, structure and organisation, 'and as the outcome of these new forces we see the creation of new and strange powers. At each new level of reality we have new powers and new capacities.' What is the urge to this form ? This question is not answered at all, but Emergence is put forth as a principle of explanation. Emergence is not a philosophical principle, but only a descriptive concept serving as a working hypothesis.

4. William McDougall : *The Riddle of Life*, p. 232

If emergence and the theory of levels be discarded, there remains only 'creative evolution' as the component of creative synthesis. The position may seem intolerable to a thinker who believes that priority of spirit must imply the postulation of a 'mysterious vital principle.' But why should it? It is now admitted that all cosmic processes are purposive in essence. Both nuclear physics and nuclear biology have demonstrated the inadequacy of the law of mechanical law of causation. 'The Great Design', the symposium to which fourteen eminent scientists contributed comes to the conclusion that when we 'contemplate the order in nature, the system of the spheres, the universality of law, we seem to see a great design—a pattern in the whole. . . the world exhibits evidence of an infinite intelligence that holds the worlds in order.' Against the philosophic principle which such a view implies Professor Patrick seems to have only one objection. It will reduce the whole process of evolution to a copy of the pattern in the divine mind. We shall be going back to the old Greek theory of archetypes. Personally I see no demerit in such a view. In fact some such belief in divine pre-eminence is urgently needed in the present day non-moral world in order to produce a wholesome fear of God. We are told that we are drifting back to the mediaeval age. It is to be desired that this would imply a return to the faith in the principle that 'the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom.'

Ethical considerations apart, there is a psycho-biological fact of great significance for our discussion. Life and mind have been proved to be co-extensive. Mind is not a late emergent and as for values it must be noted that they emerge not from organisation in an individual, but organisation of individuals. These

two concepts are so entirely different, denoting two different kinds of organisation that we should have two different words to express them. In the lower stages of evolution there is now a tendency to regard matter as psycho-tropic. But the more significant aspect of the problem is missed in these gratuitous concessions to the efficacy of spiritual forces. The fact is that spirit or mind is not only antecedent to matter, is not only the organiser of matter, but matter is merely an organ of spirit. In the present stage of evolution we have to conceive of matter and its relationship to spirit as somewhat analogous to the limb of an organism which the latter sometimes throws off in order to grow a fresh one in its place. Such a view is open to us in creative evolution.

Bergson's creative evolution opens up a magnificent vista for the philosopher. The great intuitionist has not himself traversed far along the path which he has opened up. It is our duty to push ahead and make fresh discoveries.

There are two avenues of approach to the idea of 'creation', one through individual human consciousness, and the other through a great work of creative art. In both cases we start with first discarding absolutism of all types, and replacing it by a concept which depends on the reality of *la durée*, contingency, unpredictability or indeterminacy, and real creativity. For our purposes we may take a great work of art. All that the artist is conscious of is a great and irrepressible urge to creation. A great idea is struggling to be born through the mind of the artist. He works by no preconceived plan. He does not know beforehand what definite shape his handiwork will assume. It is true that he will use raw materials which will be available to all, but he will use them in a new way. Be it music, painting, sculpture,

or poetry, the final aesthetic product will be a new creation. It will be an expression of the great sentiment which was forcing its way through the medium of the artist. Consider the soul-ravishing *rāgas* created by Tyagaraja. The physicist may analyse them into waves with varying frequencies, amplitudes and timber. But the sentiments stirred up by them defy analysis. And Tyagaraja himself could not have foretold what was going to be the final shape of his *kritis*. Evolution is such a creative process, but with this difference. The urge *of* evolution, the urge *to* evolution and the process of evolution are all one. In other words, that which evolves partakes of the nature of the spiritual force which controls evolution. The evolving world is a 'limb' of the spirit. It may be contended that such a view will reduce the supreme spirit to the level of imperfection. True, and it must be frankly admitted that finalism and absolutism have all become effete. Let us throw them all aside, and seek a new view which will do justice to the facts of experience, both religious and secular. The view of open evolution suggested here opens up a new line of thought.

Creative evolution, then, is not the creative synthesis of which Professor Patrick says, 'Creative synthesis means nothing more than that a synthesis takes place, and thereby new process, powers, or activities appear—that is, are created.' It is the evolution resulting from the adventure of the spirit in experimenting with itself, the materials of the experiment being part of itself. Of the why of this adventure we may not ask. Enough unto us is the understanding of the temporal process. If the great formula propounded by the Upanishadic thinker is true—*Tattvamasi*—and if the process of biological evolution is also an aspect of truth, then I contend that the only philosophic concept which can embrace both is that of 'open evolution' which depends on contingency and indeterminacy, and which is the negation of all types of absolutism.

The Hedonistic Element in Learning

BY

P. S. NAIDU

The subject of learning has come to occupy a prominent place in the front rank of topics in which contemporary psychology is interested. Authorities on the theoretical side of psychology, as well as leaders in the experimental field, are coming to regard learning, human and animal, as *the* problem of supreme importance. In spite of the light thrown on the subject by the patient workers in the field of experimental psychology, there seems to be considerable confusion in the theories relating to learning. Murphy says of the learning process that it is 'something which we scarcely understand at all at present', and Lashley declares that 'It is doubtful that we know anything more about the mechanism of learning than did Descartes.' What is this strange ignorance in a very familiar field of human experience due to? I contend that it is due to the mistaken conception of the relation to one another of the elements which recent psychology has analysed out of the complex process of learning. The goal of learning, the process of learning and the affective elements in learning have to be viewed in their proper relationship to one another. In this paper I shall show how even in the most advanced school of contemporary psychology there is a distortion of the correct perspective with regard to the hedonistic element in learning, and in consequence, this simple fact of every-day experience is still a puzzle to our understanding.

Hormic psychology has stressed the essentially conative nature of all our experience. In the analysis of the goal-seeking activity of man, this school has assigned to each element its rightful place. Conation, affection and cognition have been put in proper relation to one another. But, with respect to pleasure, there is, unfortunately a certain degree of vagueness in McDougall's brilliant analysis. The vagueness relates to the causal efficacy of pleasure. Its source is not easy to detect, but we may hope to get at it, if we secure a clear picture of the results of hormic analysis in our hands.

Our experience, which is conative and goal-seeking in essence, is concrete. It has many aspects or facets, which we identify and distinguish in psychology, but it must be remembered that mind being non-spatial, immaterial and dynamic, cannot be cut up into parts. Hormic psychology has pointed out the need for a three-fold analysis of the instinctual structure of the mind into cognitive, emotional and conative factors. In any concrete act of behaviour all the factors are operative. And now the question is, as behaviour is goal-seeking, should we or should we not speak of the mental tone of successful goal-seeking as different from the tone of unsuccessful goal-seeking? Hormic psychology distinguishes between pleasure and its opposite, which may be conveniently called unpleasure. We should not commit the fallacy of reification which McDougall so strongly condemns, and give an independent status to pleasure or unpleasure.

What is this pleasure? On the hormic scheme, when the organism is striving successfully towards its goal, the instinctual structure of its mind (with its three-fold innate endowment) is working smoothly. There is experienced satisfaction at the mental level. It is this halo playing round the dynamism of mental structure which we term *pleasure* or *unpleasure*. Pleasure and its opposite are adverbs, as they are characteristics of mental activity. Hence, in the totality of concrete mental experience which we may represent schematically by the following figure, we distinguish between the working of the instinctual structure of the mind, and the affective tone of

pleasure and unpleasure PU. Within I, we may of course distinguish I_1 (the perceptual aspect), I_2 (the emotional aspect) and I_3 (the behavioural aspect). Now, the source of confusion lies here. There is in the first place, an affective tone of the entire working of the instinctual structure, and then there is an affective tone of I_2 , and finally the totality of experience embracing these affective tones is also highly affective. Unfortunately we do not have different words to indicate these different aspects. About their individuality we have no doubt, but psychologists have not yet cared to think of them separately. Some attempt has been made along these lines in the distinction between pleasure and unpleasure on the one hand, and affection on the other. But a more sustained effort is needed at analysis, specially after the advent of the hormic principle. It is the absence of such analysis that is responsible for the present confusion in regard to the role of pleasure in learning.

At the very outset, an important fact which renders our task difficult, has to be noted. There are three stages in the development of the hormic theory of learning just as there are three stages in the evolution of the general theory itself. The first stage is outlined in McDougall's *Social Psychology*. In discussing the role of pleasure in human and animal activity McDougall has in view the urgent need for refuting the mechanistic theories of behaviour. These theories, with their insistence on the non-existence of mind, cannot take cognisance of pleasure and unpleasure, for these are mental qualities. If we could establish the efficacy of the affective tone in controlling the course of behaviour, then we shall have dealt a death blow to mechanistic behaviourism. McDougall, therefore, is concerned with the task of showing the great influence of pleasure in guiding action. So, in the first supplementary chapter to the *Social Psychology*, he upholds the role of pleasure in behaviour. But, it must be clearly pointed out that at this early stage pleasure is given just what is due to it, neither more nor less. It is conceived as the concomitant of successful striving towards the goal. 'In each case the strength of desire, of the conative tendency, seems to be quite, or almost quite,

independent of the quality of and of the intensity of its hedonic tone. While, on the other hand, the hedonic tone seems to be manifestly conditioned by the conative tendency, its quality by the success or failure of the striving, its intensity by the strength of the tendency.¹ 'Pleasure and pain are always conditioned by the success and failure of conation respectively.'² It is clear that there is no suggestion of the causal efficacy of pleasure in these statements.³ I wish to stress this point, because I am convinced that it is the departure from this firm position that has landed McDougall in a great difficulty with respect to the theory of learning.

The second stage of the development is to be found in McDougall's 'An Outline of Psychology'. The author's general attitude towards pleasure has not undergone any change, for he still maintains the primacy of conation, and the dependence of feeling on conation.⁴ But, in discussing the role of pleasure in animal learning, he makes certain remarks which seem to me to contain the germs of the surprise in store for us in the 'Energies of Men'.

'The correlation of pleasure with success or with progress toward the end of action, and of displeasure with failure and thwarting of action, must be accepted as fundamental. *And it is more than a correlation* ; we find that in ourselves pleasure sustains, prolongs, and confirms the modes of striving which bring pleasure, that is the successful modes . Pain or displeasure, on the other hand checks us... To this fundamental feature of its nature the mind owes its directive power to guide and improve our modes of striving toward our goals . When we encounter a second time circumstances under which we have striven

1. Social Psychology, p. 318

2. Ibid p 321

3. This point is stressed in the discussion of Happiness. Pleasure is there described merely as 'a qualification of consciousness of momentary duration, or at most of a fleeting character.' (Soc. Psy. p. 134)

4. An Outline of Psychology, pp. 268-271

successfully, *the satisfaction we have attained on the former occasion revives and colours our anticipation*, reinforcing and sustaining our efforts...It is in this way that the pleasures and pains of the past guide our actions in the present.⁵

There is evident here an anxiety to assign to pleasure and pain greater force and effectiveness than would be admissible on the ground that they are merely concomitants of mental functioning. We notice a drift towards the position where causal efficacy will be assigned to pleasure. It is admitted that pleasures and pains of the past guide our actions in the present, that is, the revived memory of the pleasures and pains of the past influences present action. How exactly they influenced action in the past, that is, at the time of their occurrence is the question.

The answer to the question is founded in the 'Energies', where McDougall definitely assigns causal efficacy to pleasure and un-pleasure.⁶ After clarifying Thorndike's position, and giving support to it on the psychical plane, McDougall asserts definitely that pleasure exercises causal efficacy over behaviour, and that learning is due to such efficacy. Further, there is an elaborate defence of the way in which pleasure, which is temporally consequent on the attainment of the goal, may still be viewed as an antecedent directing the course of action towards the goal, for cause must precede the effect. It is at this point that McDougall introduce the concept of 'foresight' in learning. In referring to Thorndike's experiments with the cat in the puzzle box, specially to the second trial of the animal, McDougall says, 'How . can the pleasure which does not arise until the crucial movement has ceased and been followed by many other movements, how can it 'stamp in' the association between the movement and the sense-impressions that evoked it? Causes must precede their effects.. This, I think, is the main ground of the general reluctance to accept Thorndike's law of effect...The key to the riddle is...foresight or expectation...As you foresee the attainment of the goal and the steps

5. Ibid, pp 191-192. (italics mine)

6. The Energies of Men. pp, 352-357

necessary to the attainment of it you experience something of the pleasure of success⁷

Starting with a position where pleasure merely plays round conation as a halo, and passing through one or two stages where feeling is given greater and greater prominence, McDougall finally arrives at the conclusion that pleasure has causal efficacy in behaviour. This is unfortunate, and as in the case of relationship between instinct and emotion, 'The Energies' does not seem to be an improvement on the earlier works. Here, at any rate, the attitude taken up in 'Social Psychology', is in my opinion, the best and nearest the truth. Hormic Psychology cannot tolerate the assignment to pleasure (or its opposite) of any independent function. If pleasure be conceded to have causal efficacy, then it will not be difficult to transform it into a goal or even *the* goal of action. Hedonism will be the natural consequence of McDougall's position as it is that of Thorndike's.

Pleasure, or to be correct, the pleasant tone of behaviour, is merely the concomitant of action. It is a halo, just as the rainbow is the invariable concomitant and a halo playing round the rays of sunlight refracted through transparent media. We may even look upon it as a catalytic agent, but we can never grant it causal efficacy

McDougall has done a great service to psychology by his brilliant analysis of the learning process. He has shown how the apparently conflicting theories of learning propounded by the behaviourist and the gestalt psychologist may be reconciled in the hormic formula, by introducing the concept of four stages in learning. Trial and Error learning, learning by conditioning, by insight, and purposeful or planned learning are all exhibited as different aspects, of a single hormic theory. But an unexpected difficulty is created by introducing pleasure as the cause of learning. As the result of this pseudo-hedonistic position, McDougall is forced to recognise the existence of two types of learning. One of these is intelligent learning involving achievement through insight and foresight; and the other is

7. Ibid pp. 333-34

'mere repetition with some increase of facility, some fixation of the particular sequence of activity such that it repeats itself more readily after each repetition'. To one accustomed to view conation as the supreme guiding principle of behaviour, it will come as a surprise that the leader of the hormic school should be compelled to admit the validity of a quasi-mechanical principle just in that field where there should be no room for mechanism at all. This unfortunate concession to a non-teleological factor is a defect in the hormic theory, and it can be rectified only by pushing pleasure back to the position assigned to it in the 'Social Psychology.'

Is the Gita a Gospel of War ?

BY

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

The pacifist who believes in the teaching of the *Gītā* has to meet the charge which is often levelled against the Song of *Kṛṣṇa*, that it is an exhortation to violence, a gospel of war. The charge is neither new nor flippant. In the *Parapakṣa* of the *Śivajñāna-siddhīār*, Aruḷ Nandi argues that the *Gītā* is on a par with the *Bauddha* works in that it is a book of guile, and says that when Arjuna refused to fight his own kinsmen, *Kṛṣṇa* who wanted that they should be killed used a specious argument by telling the *Pāṇḍava* hero that he, the Lord himself, was responsible for the killing and not Arjuna¹. We shall first state the case for regarding the *Gītā* as a gospel of war, then examine the possible answers to the charge, and lastly make an attempt to interpret the *Gītā*-teaching consistently with the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*.

I

The case for regarding the *Gītācārya* as an advocate of war is based on the incidents of the *Mahābhārata* that culminated in the fratricidal battle and the words of counsel that he gave to the despondent Arjuna. The *Gītā* opens with a scene on the battle-field of *Kurukṣetra* at the commencement of the Great War. All attempts at a peaceful settlement of the dispute between the *Pāṇḍavas* and the *Kauravas* had failed. Even *Kṛṣṇa* could not succeed in his mission of peace. The wily cousins of the *Pāṇḍavas* under the headship of *Duryodhana* were unbending. Even the modest demand of five villages was refused by the wicked son of *Dhṛtarāṣṭra*. And so the five Princes prepared themselves, though reluctantly, to decide the

I. The substance of Aruḷ Nandi's argument is given, and not a literal translation of the verse.

issue by an appeal to arms, Duryodhana, who had been thirsting for war, was only too glad ; and he was confident of victory because he had superior strength. On the field of Kurukṣetra the armies assembled in battle array. The leaders reviewed their troops and blew their conches as a signal for war. At that moment Arjuna desired to have a near view of his opponents. And so he requested his divine charioteer to lead his car and station it between the two armies. When this was done, Arjuna saw before him teachers, friends and kinsmen whom he had to kill. Though he had known already whom he had to meet in battle, he realised the ghastliness of this act of war only when he was face to face with his foes who were but his kinsmen and friends. Overcome with pity, he dropped his bow and refused to fight. This was a moral crisis of great magnitude. To fight or not to fight was the question. Upon this depended the fate of millions of lives.

Instinctively Arjuna felt that to fight was wrong. He thought that it was better for him to be killed in war unarmed and unresisting than to kill his own kith and kin. "These I would not kill," he said, "though killed myself, even for the sovereignty of the three worlds, much less for this earth".² What was the use, he argued of a kingdom when all the near and dear ones had perished ? "Therefore we must not slay our kinsmen, the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra. For how can we be happy, if we kill our own kindred ?"³ True, Duryodhana and his compeers were in the wrong. They were evil-hearted men overpowered by greed. But to kill them was also wrong. And two wrongs would never make a right. If one had in mind the disastrous consequences of a war, one would not go to battle, whatever be the cause. Society would come to ruin with the destruction of its elders and youths ; there would be lawlessness, confusion of orders, immorality and consequent degradation and degeneracy. And so was it not a sin to have resolved to go to war ? What after all was the cause ? The ostensible reason was the

2. Gītā, I, 35. The translation of the Gītā verses is in the main taken from Sri D. S. Sarma's edition.

3. Gītā, I, 37.

wickedness of Duryodhana. But was not the real reason 'Our greed for the pleasures of the kingdom' ?⁴ Arguing in this way and overwhelmed by grief, Arjuna told Kṛṣṇa that he was not for the fight.

It is true that the Pāṇḍava hero was not motivated by any absolute standard of morality. He felt that he should not kill his kindred (svajana). If his foes had been strangers, perhaps he would have nonchalantly finished with them. But that does not make his resolution wrong. He was right in so far as he thought that it was immoral to kill one's own kinsmen. Kṛṣṇa, if he were the Lord of Peace, should have complimented Arjuna on his wise resolve and prevented the carnage and blood bath. But on the contrary, what he did was to chastise the hero for his meekness, and make him fight by appealing to his Āryan valour, by specious metaphysical arguments, and even by intimidation and threat.

Kṛṣṇa begins his discourse by rebuking Arjuna for his ignoble, disgraceful, and heaven-barring loathsome feeling. An Āryan fighter should never yield to weakness and faintness of heart. To him there is no higher good than a righteous war. A true Kṣatriya should be delighted when such an opportunity presents itself before him and should regard it as an open door to heaven. To run away from a war of this kind is not only cowardly and dishonourable but also sinful and immoral. To a man of honour, is not dishonour worse than death ? What would the great warriors think of Arjuna, if he desisted from fighting ? Will they not think that he had fled from battle through fear and make light of him ? Victory or defeat, Arjuna should fight. If he fell, he would go to heaven ; if he won, he would rule the earth.⁵ Even on metaphysical grounds Arjuna need not be afraid of war. After all, who is the killer, and who is killed ? Not the soul. For it is unborn, eternal, ever-lasting and ancient ; it is not slain when the body is slain. "He who thinks it slays, and he who thinks it is slain—neither of them knows

4. Gītā, I, 45.

5. Gītā, II, 2, 3, 31-37.

it truly. It neither slays, nor is it slain." If Arjuna should think that the soul is subject to births and deaths, even then there is no room for sorrow. Whatever is born is sure to die, and whatever dies is sure to be born again. Why then should he grieve for what is inevitable ?⁶

Kṛṣṇa's appeal to Kṣatriya valour cannot be justified by the codes of higher ethics. To fight in battle is bravery, no doubt. But to die unresisting requires more courage. And this was what Arjuna proposed to do. The metaphysical argument advanced by Kṛṣṇa is pointless. On the ground of the indestructibility of the soul any war can be justified and no act will appear to be unethical ; for is not the soul non-active ? Kṛṣṇa did not stop with mere arguments. He had recourse to intimidation and threat. He revealed to Arjuna his 'aweful' form with a thousand faces and myriad eyes. The devotee saw the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra together with the hosts of kings, Bhīṣma, Droṇa, Karṇa and the leading warriors, all rushing into the flaming mouths set with terrible fangs. He saw some of them caught between the teeth and their heads crushed to pieces.⁷ Kṛṣṇa's plan succeeded. Arjuna got unnerved and became completely docile. He was told that he was not the killer, for the work had been accomplished already by the Lord. Arjuna was to serve merely as an instrument (nimitta), an apparent cause.⁸ And at the close of his discourse, Kṛṣṇa informed the Warrior that all his resolve not to fight would be futile. "If indulging in self-conceit you think, 'I will not fight', vain is your resolution. Nature will compel you".⁹ Subsequently, no doubt, he asked Arjuna to consider the pros and cons fully and act as he desired. But this advice was to no purpose, for it came only after Arjuna's demoralisation had been complete. This is evident from the reply which he gave : 'I shall do thy bidding.'¹⁰ As a result of this teaching Arjuna did fight, and the war was

6. Gītā, II, 12, 13, 16-27.

7. Gītā, XI, 26, 27.

8. Gītā, XI, 33.

9. Gītā, XVIII, 59.

10. Gītā, XVIII, 73.



waged to its bitter end. Such is the argument of those who hold that the *Gītā* is a gospel of war.

II

It is possible to answer the charge by admitting that the substance of it is a contingency of the acceptable (*Iṣṭāpatti*). The central teaching of the *Gītā* is that all should perform their respective duties (*sva-dharma*). "Better is one's own duty, though imperfectly done, than the duty of another well done. He who does the duty ordained by his own nature incurs no sin. One ought not to give up the work which is suited to one's own nature, though it has its imperfections; for every enterprise is beset with imperfections as fire with smoke."¹¹ The word '*sva-dharma*' in the *Gītā* connotes *varṇa-dharma*, viz., the duties of the main classes into which society is divided. The duties of a *Kṣatriya* are : heroism, vigour, firmness, resourcefulness, dauntlessness in battle, generosity and majesty. He is the guardian of society, its protector and preserver. He is the soldier who fights for the freedom of the race and the prefect who keeps the peace of the land. He has to save the social polity from internal dissension and external aggression. *Ahiṃsā* is a virtue only with those who belong to the last two stages (*āśrama*) in life, *vānaprastha* and *sannyāsa*.¹² Arjuna who was a *Kṣatriya* in the second stage of life wanted to pursue the ideal of the *vānaprastha* and the *sannyāsin*. He desired to sacrifice his own *dharma* and embrace another's *dharma*; and that was clearly wrong. An action enjoined by Scripture, though it may entail injury, ought to be performed. The warrior has to welcome a righteous war and do his duty, though it may involve the killing of his own

11. *Gītā* XVIII 47 & 48.

12. Sir P. S. Sivaswami Ayyar : The Hindu books on polity and *Niṭiśāstra* emphasise the importance of the employment of force for legitimate purposes, such as the preservation of law and order and the defence of society against external aggression. Neither in theory nor in practice is there any justification for the belief that Hinduism has adopted the unqualified doctrine of non-violence...The teaching of the *Gītā* is undoubtedly in favour of fighting against unrighteousness not by means of non-violence but by recourse to arms (Dr. Besant Memorial lecture on *Ahiṃsā*).

kindred.¹³ There can be no greater boon to him than the opportunity to fight for a good cause. As the *Gitācārya* says, it is a door to heaven. The Lord of the *Gitā* advised Arjuna to fight in strict accordance with the Scriptural Law. When all other means of bringing Duryodhana to his senses had failed, there was no option but to wage war against him. Returning from his unsuccessful mission of peace, Sri Kṛṣṇa said : "Duryodhana was told what was truthful, wholesome and beneficial ; the fool is not amenable. I consider, therefore, chastisement by war (*daṇḍa*), the fourth expedient, as proper for those sinners ; by no other means can they be curbed."¹⁴ The use of force is not only sanctioned but enjoined in such cases. Sri Kṛṣṇa, the sole purpose of whose advent was to establish dharma, could not but give the advise which he did give to Arjuna.

A different line of argument may be pursued in reply to the charge against Sri Kṛṣṇa's conduct. Sri Kṛṣṇa was the incarnation of God. He came to the world for a set purpose viz., the protection of the good and the destruction of the wicked. This divine plan "must be carried out, at whatever cost for the moment, by those who are His agents in the work. The great plan you can not change ; the opportunity is given to you to co-operate ; but, if driven by your past to co-operation and resisting in the present by egoism, by thinking yourself the actor instead of yielding yourself as a tool in the Dramatist's hand, you say ; 'I will not fight ; I will not do my duty ; I will not perform my task ;' then in spite of the unwilling performance, you shall be utterly destroyed ; for your present choice is then to fail in your duty, and the inner choice determines the future as the past choice the present. The plan shall be triumphant, but the egoism in which you took refuge shall destroy you. even while you are forced

13. Sri Saṅkara in his Commentary refers to this view as a *pūrvapakṣa*. See Memorial Edition of Saṅkara's Works Vol. II, p. 18.

14. *Mahābhārata*, *Udyoga Parva*.

into outer obedience to the plan."¹⁵ Arjuna was the chosen instrument ; and he would be made to fight whether he willed or not. Willing co-operation on his part would bring him the greatest good, while unwilling obedience would spell his own destruction. Sri Kṛṣṇa was Time (Kāla) made manifest to destroy Duryodhana and his allies. The time had come when, for the good of all humanity, these obstructive objects should be swept away. This was the divine Will ; and wisdom on the part of Arjuna required willing obedience to the Lord's command. The ordinary codes of morality cannot be applied to Sri Kṛṣṇa ; for he is above Law and the promulgator of Law. If a man kills another out of his own will, then he is immoral. But if he does so, prompted by the divine Will, then he is not to be blamed. Non-violence is a general rule. The call to violence was made by Sri Kṛṣṇa as a special command. As between a general rule and a specific injunction, the latter should be preferred. And when that injunction comes from either Scripture or God, there is no sin in carrying it out, however unethical it may appear to be. On the contrary, sin will accrue if it is not obeyed. Sri Kṛṣṇa asked Arjuna to rise above the ordinary distinctions of good and bad. "Surrendering all dharma come to me alone for shelter. Do not grieve, for I will release thee from all sins."¹⁶

A third line of approach is as follows. To mistake Arjuna's attitude at the commencement of the Great War for that of a true satyāgrahi is to miss the import of satyāgraha. Arjuna's resolve was born of weakness and not of strength. He had no objection to killing as such ; he only recoiled from killing his kinsmen. The advice which Sri Kṛṣṇa gave him was of course to do his duty on the battle-field. But at the same time he undermined the ground of violence. He wanted Arjuna to fight without anger, fear and hatred, to remove every trace of selfish desire from his heart and to have the same regard for friend and foe. If these conditions were satisfied, the spirit of non-violence

15. Dr. Annie Besant : Hints on the Study of the Bhagavad Gītā.

16. Gītā, XVII; 66.

would have been achieved. Sri Kṛṣṇa did not advocate the abolition of war as a means of settling disputes because the time was not ripe for it. All the same the substance of violence was taken away and only the outer shell was retained. By his teaching he tried to change the whole mental back-ground of the fighting man into one of pure non-violence, while he kept only the external physical form of violence.¹⁷

It will be evident that the answers suggested above are unacceptable, either wholly or in part, to the pacifist. Evil must certainly be resisted. But is not non-violent resistance more in keeping with the spirit in man than violent means? "Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man. Destruction is not the law of the humans. Man lives freely only by his readiness to die, if need be, at the hands of his brother, never by killing him."¹⁸ Judged by this standard, the first two answers suggested above are unsatisfactory. If these were the only possible explanation of the Gītā-teaching, then the pacifist would rather disclaim his faith in the Gītā than renounce his principle. As regards the third view, it is defective because, in so far as it admits the retention of the shell of violence by the Gītācārya, it tacitly avers that the Celestial Song is imperfect. To avoid all difficulty it has been suggested that the Gītā episode is to be understood as an allegory. The battle of Kurukṣetra is the battle of life raging in the heart of every one. The dialogue is between the apparent self and its *alter ego*, the real Self. And the central doctrine is a call for sublimation of all the lower instincts and passions for the sake of reaching perfection. In the remaining part of this paper we shall see if it is possible to read a meaning into the Gītā so as not to do violence either to its teaching or to the doctrine of ahimsā without resorting to allegory.

17. See Sri D. N. Sarma : Krishna and His Song ch. II.

18. Mahatma Gandhi in the Harijan July, 20, 1935

III

Let us first apply the pragmatic test to the *Gītā*. What feelings does it arouse in the mind of its reader? It certainly does not inspire the feelings of hatred and anger which are the spring of violence. On the contrary, every honest student of the *Gītā* feels that it teaches equanimity, freedom from malice, lust and hate, and devotion to duty without counting the costs or calculating the advantages. To believe that the *Gītā* was preached for the specific purpose of asking Arjuna to fight is to miss the entire purport. It has been said that the *Gītā* is "the most beautiful, perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known tongue."¹⁹ "In point of popularity the *Gītā* is second to no work in the world of Indian thought. It has always commanded great admiration and its popularity now, if anything, is on the increase."²⁰ All this eulogy would be meaningless, if the *Gītā* were a book of exhortation to violence.

The *Gītā* is not a mere dharma-sāstra; it is a mokṣa-sāstra. Its primary aim is to save the soul from the slough of saṃsāra. It begins by setting forth the real nature of the Self which is unborn and eternal and proceeds to explain the paths to its realisation. It is attachment to objects born of delusion that binds the soul. Man's activity is governed by love and hate, and is undertaken for the sake of acquiring what is desirable and avoiding what is undesirable. The process does not end with this; for man's desires increase and he suffers in consequence. A way out of this vicious circle is shown by the *Gītācārya*. Action is to be performed without a desire for its fruit. Instead of having different selfish ends for different actions, let there be only one motive purification of the heart (*ātma-suddhi*) in the case of him who is on the road to perfection, and guidance of the world (*loka-sangraha*) in the case of him who has reached perfection. This is karma-yoga. The same end of freedom from attachment and misery can be achieved through devotion to God. In truth, Karma-yoga would be without its soul if there were not

19. William von Humboldt.

20. Prof. Hiriyanna : *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 116.

on the part of the agent a sense of dedication to the Deity. All work must be regarded as the worship of God. Whatever the devotee does he does for the glory of God. He has no selfish ends to gain. He is indifferent to the fruits of his work. By absolute self-surrender he becomes free from the bonds of *samsāra*. This is *bhakti-yoga*. *Jñāna-yoga* is the way of wisdom. At the very commencement of the *Gītā*, Sri Kṛṣṇa preaches the wisdom of the Self and gives a glorious account of the man of Self-knowledge. The fourth chapter entitled *jñāna-yoga* contains the praise of wisdom as the panacea for all ills. Man should know the Truth, and the Truth shall make him free. As a background for all this teaching the *Gītā* explains the nature of the world, soul and God. Hence the *Gītā* is a philosophical song in every sense of the term, and not a treatise on the ethics of war.

The *Gītā* expressly teaches *ahimsā* at least in four places. In X, 5, non-violence is enumerated among the virtues that have their source in God. In XIII, 7, non-violence is taught as an ingredient of true knowledge. In XVI, 2, *ahimsā* is given the first place among the virtues that constitute the heritage of the gods (*daivi-saṃpat*) ; and Sri Kṛṣṇa adds : "The heritage of the gods is said to make for deliverance, and that of the demons for bondage. Grieve not, O Arjuna, thou art born to the heritage of the gods."²¹ In XVII, 14, *ahimsā* is regarded as a penance of the body. All this is in keeping with the tradition of the Hindu *sāstras*. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, for instance, teaches *ahimsā* as the proper gift.²² The *Kalpa-sūtras* afford great importance to it in their teaching.²³ The *Mahābhārata* of which the *Gita* forms a part devotes a whole chapter to the 'Reviling of Sacrifice' and extols the principle of *ahimsā* as constituting 'virtue entire' (*sakalo dharmaḥ*). It is no doubt true that absolute *ahimsā* is achieved only in the realisation of oneself as the whole universe,²⁴ and that in a world of claims and counter-

21. *Gītā*, XVI 5.

22. *Chāndogya* III xvii 4.

23. Gautama's *Kalpa-sūtras* ii, 19, 23. ix 70.

24. See Sri S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's article *Ahimsā and Political Idealism in the Aryan Path*, March 1940.

claims such as ours a certain amount of himsā is inevitable. Violence is born of fear; and fear persists so long as there is a sense of otherness. It is only with the realisation of the non-dual Reality that all trace of violence will disappear. This is recognised by the great exponent of ahimsā, Mahatma Gandhi. He grants that, so long as there is the dvaita-bhāva, universal non-violence is impossible,²⁵ that all life in the flesh exists by himsā, and that none, while in the flesh, can be entirely free from himsā, because one never completely renounces the will to live.²⁶ Until the beast in us has been sublimated, there will be the tendency to violence. And no Scripture need teach violence. Himsā is not enjoined by the sāstras; it is only permitted under certain circumstances as a concession to human weakness. The very fact that the Scriptures put restrictions on violence shows that the goal is ahimsā. That is why Sankara in his Commentary on the Gitā remarks that the duty of fighting is not enjoined and that 'Do thou fight' (yudhyasva) is not a command but a re-statement.²⁷ And he maintains that the arguments advanced by Sri Kṛṣṇa in II, 31-38, which constitute the main source of strength for those who regard the Gitā as a gospel of war, are mere worldly considerations adduced to dispel grief and attachment, and that they do not form the main subject of the teaching.²⁸ While studying the Gitā it is better to forget the opening scene of war. In fact, as one listens to the discourse of Kṛṣṇa, one becomes oblivious of the din and clash of war. "As the dialogue proceeds the dramatic element disappears. The echoes of the battle-field die away, and we have only an interview between God and man. The chariot of war becomes the lonely cell of meditation, and a corner of the battle-field where the voices of the world are stilled, a fit place for thoughts on the supreme."²⁹

25. Young India March 7 1925.

26. Young India, Oct. 4, '28.

27. Memorial Edition. Vol 11, p. 31.

23. Memorial Edition Vol 11 p 48,

29. Sir S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 521.

Why then, it may be asked, did the poet of the Mahābhārata introduce the Gitā on the field of Kurukṣetra in the midst of violence and war ? It has been suggested ³⁰ that the propriety of choosing the battle-field for imparting the teaching is that nowhere else is the subordination of individual aim to the general good so complete. The soldier represents the specimen of an unselfish worker. He may know the cause for which he is fighting. But what will be the result he does not know. Even if his cause succeeds, he may not be there after all to benefit by it. On account of this uncertainty he is not to shirk his responsibility. He has to do his best and serve to his utmost capacity. "That represents the highest form of self-sacrifice...to work for no profit to oneself, but yet to exert oneself to the utmost ; and the finest exhibition of this spirit in the world is to be seen on a battle-field." While agreeing with this explanation, we should like to hazard another suggestion. The Gitā teaches mainly the excellence of karma-yoga ; it shows a way of doing things without getting enmeshed in saṃsāra by becoming attached to them. Fighting is the most violent kind of action, as it embodies "the very quintessence of activity, the rush of it, the whirl of it, the turmoil of it, the din of it," The meaning of selecting such a crisis to teach the gospel of karma-yoga is to show that the yogin is unperturbed and unruffled even in the midst of universal disaster. "The man into whom all desires enter as the waters enter into the sea, which, though ever filled, remains within its bounds—such a man attains to peace, and not he who hugs his desires." ³¹ The setting of the Gitā is to be interpreted in the same way as the passage of the Kauṣītāki Upaniṣad, which says that even such heinous crimes as matricide, parricide, theft and infanticide do not affect him who is released, is to be understood. A true karma-yogin will be incapable of violence, even as the very nature of the mukta cannot lead him to sinful ways.

30. See Prof. Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 123.

31. Gitā, II, 70.

The Category of Difference in Vedānta

BY

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The logical category of Difference is central to all the different schools of Vedānta. An elaborate attack on the concept of difference has been the chief concern of pre-Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara Advaita dialectics. The schools of Vedānta elaborated by Rāmānuja and Madhva have made heroic attempts to defend the intelligibility of the concept of difference. The deep interest evinced by the different schools of Vedānta (the absolutistic as well as the theistic types) in the discussion of the concept of difference arises out of the logical needs of their respective systems.

The central doctrine of Advaita Vedānta is the identity of the individual soul with Brahman and that doctrine cannot be conclusively established without the clear demonstration of the untenability of the ultimate reality of the concept of difference. It is this deep metaphysical need to establish the one without a second that has led the Advaitin to refute the concept of difference. The strongest case against the intelligibility and ultimate reality of difference is from the camp of the Advaita Vedāntin. Difference essentially is a relation between two terms. We cannot have a relation without two relata. Without the intelligibility of the concept of difference there cannot be a pluralistic universe with objects differing from one another. Refutation has to adopt the logical methods of debate. The Realists hold that perception, the primary pramāṇa, establishes the world of plurality. Hence what is established by a valid instrument of knowledge is also valid and real. So perception seems to go against Advaita. The Advaitin meets the argument in two ways. He denies the Realist contention that perception gives us a world of plurality with distinct objects differing from one another. Maṇḍana, the great elder contemporary of Śaṅkara

holds that perception does not cognise difference. The nerve of the argument is as follows. There are two types of perceptions, the Nirvikalpaka and the Savikalpaka (the indeterminate and the determinate). The Advaitin recognises the priority of the indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception presents to us not a differentiated pluralistic universe but a single positive undifferentiated continuum. It is only the secondary determinate perception that gives the world of apparent plurality. Hence perception does not give us the cognition of plurality.

The second line of argument is as follows. Granting that perception gives us a world of distinct objects, it is by no means necessary that it should be accepted as final. Perception no doubt is a basic *pramāṇa*, but it does not follow that it is unsublatable. "Where a subsequent cognition arises validly, it cannot arise except as subsuming what goes before ; the earlier cognition should necessarily be taken to be sublated : e.g., the cognition of nacre could not arise, if the original cognition of silver persisted ; hence nacre-cognition is admitted to sublate the earlier silver-cognition. Thus the priority of perception would of itself be an argument for its sublation by the subsequent resulting scriptural knowledge."

Inference cannot establish what perception has failed to do. Perception is the basis of inference. Besides inference is not just the *Pramāṇa* to be used in the establishment of the concept of difference. Because inference presupposes difference, as it depends on the invariable concomitance of the *prabans* and the *probandum*. A *pramāṇa* that presupposes difference cannot be made use of to refute or to establish difference.

Scripture the most important of all *pramāṇas* is said to be in favour of difference by the Realists. The Advaitin holds the view that the prime purport of the scripture is the identity of the individual soul with Brahman. Scripture in itself is but an array of words. It has to be interpreted by an agent. Interpretation follows the six traditional determinative marks of purport. Sankara holds that a scientific use of the

determinative marks of purport yields that identity is the prime purport of the scripture. Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri in his learned introduction to the translation of Bhāmatī takes the classical Chāndogya Srūti "That thou art, O S'vetaketu ! (tattvamasi)" and points out that the interpretation of the Srūti according to all the determinative marks establishes the identity of the individual self and Brahman. The teaching is repeated nine times to show that it is important and that it is the prime purport of the Veda. The statement is novel and not a mere restatement, because the identity of the individual soul with Brahman is not known through ordinary experience as the heat of fire or the price of bread. The knowledge of the identity is useful because it helps us to enjoy bliss and be rid of saṁsāra (the cycle of births and deaths). The knowledge of identity is praised and its opposite deprecated.

As for the presence of the scriptural statements that have difference for purport, the Advaitin has an answer. The scriptural statements that have difference for their purport are said to be the elaboration of the difference that is empirical in order to refute it later on.

The Advaitin further contends that reason (*Upapatti*) the chief determinative mark of purport is against the acceptance of difference. The argument is from Maṇḍana. Difference is a relation. It presupposes two relata for its existence. It must either be the nature of the things or the attribute of them. If it were the nature of the things, there would be no things to be different. If any one were to point out an entity as being one and single, that will break itself into a number of things, because difference is of its nature. Such a position will make the process go on endlessly and would not even rest with the primal atom. Hence difference cannot be the nature of the thing.

Nor can it be the attribute of the relata (things that get into relation). If difference is to be the attribute of things then we have to know whether the attribute is different from

the substrate or is of its very nature. If the attribute is different from the substrate, we have three entities (a) the substrate (b) the difference which is its attribute and (c) the difference of the attribute from the substrate.

Again once we start the enquiry into the relation of this difference to the substrate on the one hand and the attribute on the other we are condemned to infinite regress. Thus it follows that the category of difference gives us appearance and not truth. To use the words of Bradley it is a makeshift, it is a device, a mere practical compromise most necessary but in the end most indefensible.

The theistic schools of Vedānta of Rāmānuja and Madhva have upheld the doctrine of difference. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja is not against identity of any type. The Brahman of Rāmānuja is an organic whole having for its outer cover (prakāra) the souls (cit) and Matter (Prakṛti). Viewed from the organic standpoint (Viśiṣṭadr̥ṣṭyā) there is identity. It is referred to as Viśiṣṭaika (organic unity). Viewed from the point of view of attributes (Viśeṣādr̥ṣṭyā) there is difference between the souls and Brahman. This doctrine in spite of the stout protestations of Rāmānujites comes very near to the acceptance of the doctrine of identity-in-difference (Bhedābheda).

The Radical realist Sri Madhva holds the view of absolute difference (Atyanta bheda). To Madhva there are not two things alike. The objects of the world are entirely different from one another and their attributes are also different. Difference is fundamental to reality. He enumerates a scheme of Five-fold differences. (1) the difference between Iśvara and Jīva, (2) the difference between Jīva and Jīva, (3) the difference between jaḍa and jīva (4) the difference between jaḍa and jaḍa and (5) the difference between Jaḍa and Iśvara. As against the criticism of Maṇḍana against difference the Dvaita Vedāntin has the following answer. Difference is of the very nature of the thing (svarūpa). Though difference is of the very nature

of the object, still it is possible to effect differentiation where there is no real difference. To explain this fact Madhva posits a category called *Viśeṣa*, whose function it is to effect differentiation where there is no real difference. This *Viśeṣa* is infinite in number. The *viśeṣas* do not need any other object to differentiate them from others. They are Svato-vyāvartaka, self-differentiated. They exist in every object unlike the *Viśeṣa* of Nyāya school.

As against the Advaitin's contention that scripture merely elaborates the phenomenal difference and then refutes it, the Dvaitin turns round and asserts that there is nothing preventing him from holding the opposite view i.e., that the abheda texts can be construed as phenomenal and the bheda texts as refuting them. Further there is no necessity for the elaboration (*anuvāda*) of what is obvious. With this idea in view Madhva interprets the *Srūtis* with the help of the six determinative marks of purport in the dualist manner. He says that all the scriptural statements have as their purport difference and there is no scriptural authority for identity. The great Dvaita dialectician Vyāsa in his *Nyāyāmṛta* has set down a number of inferences to prove the validity of difference. He has also refuted the inferences of the Advaitins stated in order to refute difference. This, in short, is the outline of the discussion on the concept of difference in Vedānta.

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Aesthetic Experience

BY

N. SIVARAMA SASTRY

I propose in this short paper to deal with the nature of aesthetic experience. I leave completely out of consideration problems like the nature of Beauty or the nature of the experience of the creative artist himself. I do not even take into account all the current theories on the nature of aesthetic experience. Besides I shall try to avoid all controversy and confine myself to the discussion of some Indian views, particularly one with which I agree in essence and which forms the basis for my own view. Apart from the fact that as an Indian, Indian views should appeal to me most, the reason why I have chosen to refer to them is this ; Indian thinkers have arrived at certain definite conclusions as a result of their investigations for nearly a thousand years into the nature of Art. And we in the twentieth century have not been able to make any substantial changes in their general features—which is indeed a great compliment to their validity and value.

From very early times Indian thinkers have grappled with the problem of Art, even as they have grappled with kindred philosophic problems of Truth, Reality and Goodness. Side by side with the growth of classical Sanskrit literature grew also various theories of poetry. There is fortunately preserved for us a voluminous treatise on Dramaturgy—the *Natya-Sūtra*—which deals not only with the Drama in its modern sense but also with music and dancing, poetry and metre, and many other related subjects. It is in fact an encyclopædia of fine arts as known and understood in those times. The earliest portions of this work go as far back as the beginnings of the Christian era. The whole work is attributed to a mythical sage Bharata—indicating thereby that the science had a long history, which is borne out also by other facts. From Bharata onwards we

have a long list of illustrious names and the theories propounded by each one of these thinkers is interesting in its own way. But it is not my intention to deal with all these theories. I shall content myself with speaking a little more about Bharata himself. For the germs of the theory I am going to discuss are already found in his work.

Bharata stands at the head of a school which has come to be known as the Rasa School in opposition to another known as the Alaiṅkāra school. The latter arose as a school of literary criticism as distinguished from dramatic criticism. In general it emphasised *ulatīkāra*, embellishment, the outward vesture of poetry—beautiful words and meanings, figures of speech and turns of expression—and considered that anything that enhanced their excellence was the soul of poetry itself. The Rasa school laid emphasis on the *rasa* or æsthetic delight as its essence—the nature of which we shall shortly discuss. This school arose in connection with the drama, and in its explanation of the genesis of Rasa we find certain features peculiar to dramatic representation. At a later stage in the history of Indian poetics, about the 9th century A.D., there appeared a school of Dhvani led by Ānandavardhana, which emphasised that *dhvani*, the implicit or suggested meaning was always superior to the explicit or expressed meaning and that *rasa* was the implicit meaning *par excellence*. Thenceforward the two schools of Alaiṅkāra and Rasa merge and the theory of Rasa-Dhvani is made applicable to all forms of literature, and we may add Art. The classic elaboration of this theory is found in the works of Abhinavagupta, the great philosopher and critic of the eleventh century.

Now in the work of Bharata this theory of Abhinavagupta is already in the germ. He discusses at length in a whole chapter the nature of *rasa* and its classification. But unfortunately he has devoted only a short sentence to describe how *rasa* arises. This aphorism is the basis on which later writers have developed their theories. I shall deal with them here in some detail.

To begin with it is necessary to say a few words about the word *rasa* itself. *Rasa* means taste or flavour and is used in this sense quite commonly in Sanskrit. Even as food is tasted and relished we taste and relish Art and the word is used metaphorically for all such æsthetic experience. The word *rasa* is also significant in this that it suggests that the æsthetic experience is something always and entirely pleasurable. Similarly in the elaboration of this doctrine words like *carvuna* 'chewing', etc. are used. These are no more than metaphors and we must guard ourselves against any inference based on such words which more often than not is likely to lead us astray.

The famous aphorism of Bharata runs like this :

Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyugād rasa nīpattih.

Rasa or æsthetic experience arises when there is a blending of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāri* or *samcāribhāvas*.

These rasas are eight in number corresponding to eight dominant emotional moods in man, like love and laughter, anger and sorrow, fear and courage, wonder and disgust. These are called *sthāyī-bhāvas*—stable or permanent moods—radical or primary emotions inherent in all human beings. *Vibhāvas* are the causes, *samcāri bhāvas* the accessories and *anubhāvas* the effects—all of which by blending rouse one of these eight emotions which then becomes transformed into a strange experience called *rasa* or æsthetic experience. To take a familiar example, love as a primary emotion or *sthāyī-bhāva* is in the bosom of every individual. When for instance—confining our attention to drama—a person in the audience witnesses the famous play of *Sakuntala* on the stage and sees king Duṣyanta falling in love with Sakuntalā the *sthāyībhāva rati* or love is kindled in his breast. The causes or *vibhāvas* in this case are the handsome hero and the charming heroine themselves to begin with and then the whole environment—the beautiful season, the sylvan surroundings and the sweet conversations of Sakuntalā and her friends, Priyānvadā and Anasūyā, in which

the king sometimes takes part and which sometimes he overhears. The first of these is called the *ālambana-vibhāva* or the supporting or main cause and the second *uddīpana-vibhāva* or the exciting cause. Now these causes lead to effects or *anubhāvas* like Sakuntalā pretending to stumble upon a thorny bush and stealing glances at Duṣyanta. The accessory causes or the *samcāri-bhāvas* are, for example, Sakuntalā's bashfulness, her fears and joys and such feelings which are not abiding like a primary emotion but are derived and transitory. All these blend together and transform the primary emotion *rati*, which has already been kindled, into the *rasa*, *Śṛṅgāra*.

Now the most important word in this sentence is *saṅyoga*—'fusion' or 'blending'—which explains the whole process. Upon the interpretation of this word depends everything. Various views have been held about this.* One school argues thus: as the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *samcāri-bhāvas* are seen in the actors representing the characters, they combine to produce a *sthāyi-bhāva* first which develops into a *rasa* and we the spectators or the readers seem to feel that the characters and the clever actors are experiencing it. And the contemplation of this process is said to give us joy. This sounds rather strange, for the *rasa* not being experienced by us cannot possibly give us only joy. Mere contemplation of the scene in the *Sakuntala* without the *rasa* might, for example, arouse in us jealousy.

To avoid this difficulty a certain thinker Śaṅkuka argues as follows: Even as one might imagine a beautiful picture of a horse to be a real horse, though one might be beset by a hundred doubts, one might begin to feel that Rama on the stage is Rama himself. And though the *vibhāvas*, etc., which the clever actor playing the part of Rama represents by his speech, gesture, and histrionic skill are quite unreal and artificial, we persuade ourselves that they belong to Rama. And then by a kind of inference we see the *sthāyi-bhāva* in him. Though we thus identify the character and the actor for the true being, this emotion cannot possibly belong to the actor. And yet our

* cf. *Kāvya-prakāśa*, Ch. IV.

inference leads us to the experience of "rasa". For, it is said, the *sthāyī-bhāvas* also being in us, it is their nature to become "rasa". Even this view is not satisfactory. For one thing it makes of the aesthetic joy which is admittedly an immediate experience, something like a second-hand mediate inferential knowledge.

Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka improved upon this view in the following manner. "Rasa" is not something to be inferred, it is not produced, nor can you say it is suggested or manifested. Even as words in poetry and drama have the power to signify meanings, they have two other powers—*bhāvakatva* and *bhōjakatva*—the power to universalise and the power to yield delight. This process of *bhāvakatva* of poetic expression impersonalises the personal *vibhāvas*, etc., represented by the actors and also the personality of the spectator himself. Then follows through the third process of *bhōjakatva* the uncovering of the essence of his self which is *ānanda*. This is done by kindling the *sattva* or spiritual element in his self. This revealed *ānanda* or aesthetic joy is of the nature of "contemplation dissociated from all practical interest." It is peace, 'composure'.

The only defect in this explanation, if it can be called a defect at all, consists in this that poetic expression is endowed by him with these two powers as against the much simpler explanation that words have *dhvani* or the power of suggestion.

Last comes the explanation of the famous Abhinavagupta. In the world we have been used to infer emotions like *rati* or love in other persons by observing their behaviour. We are also familiar with them in ourselves. They dwell in us as *vāsanās* or impressions. When the same kind of behaviour is vividly brought before our eyes in the kingdom of art, the *sthāyī-bhāvas* slumbering in ourselves are immediately roused and then we do not experience the *vibhāvas*, etc., as belonging to me, to another, or to a third person, or even as not belonging to them, but in general and as impersonalised. Though it is now my limited self that is experiencing, for the time being it sheds its finitude

by virtue of this power of universalisation. The *sthāyī-bhāva* has now ceased to be a *sthāyī*, but has been transformed into "rasa". This "rasa" is of the very essence of enjoyment, lasting as long as the *vihhūvan* and the others last. It seems to flash before us. It seems to enter our hearts, to fill our whole frame. It shuts out everything else from us. We dip in it and we dive. It is like the bliss of Brahman. It is *alaukika*, extra-empirical, is this "rasa". It is a strange effect that does not survive its cause. It is not produced from its causes, it is mysteriously suggested by them. It is no knowledge—neither indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) nor determinate (*savikalpaka*). Nevertheless it is something that does not contradict ordinary experience and yet transcends it. Such is the view of the greatest of the exponents of the "Rasa" theory.

Now by the foregoing analysis we find that the very first thing that strikes us as characteristic of aesthetic experience is the unity underlying it. The spectator and the aesthetic object contemplated are rolled into one integral experience. The distinction between the individual and the object is obliterated.

Now life contists in desire and strife due to some primeval original *avidyā*. The world outside Nature and Man—stands there like a challenge and yet as the goal of all human activity. The attitude that an individual takes towards it might result in pleasure or pain as the case may be—his desires may be gratified or they may be thwarted. But the creations of art being idealised pictures woven by the poet's fancy do not challenge us in the same manner. There is no strife as far as *they* are concerned. The result is always pleasure as there is no struggle and as this world of the imagination is not pursued with any end in view. It is an end in itself. *Rasa* is not a means to something else. Any results that may follow from the experience fall outside it and do not determine the aesthetic attitude. Any lessons that Poetry might offer—and it does offer many lessons—do not constitute Poetry. The poetic experience is just joy—an immediate experience that is self-contained and self-determined. So

if lessons do follow out of Poetry, they must do so in a very subtle manner—the more seductive because subtle—"like the influence of the beloved" as one critic puts it. In the words of a poet. :—

*"Yad eva rocate mahyāni tad eva kurute priyā
Iti vetti na jānāti tat priyam yat karoti sū."*

"My beloved does just those things that I like. So thinks the lover. He does not realise that whatever she does is dear to him."

This unifying character of aesthetic experience might be viewed also in another way. A cloud for example, might at best evoke in me impressions of smoke and light, wind and vapour. But the sight of it made the heart of Kālidāsa leap. If I read the *Meghadūtā* now the same thing happens to me. The cloud is no longer dark vapour blown about by the wind, but a person, a friend, one with myself in my aesthetic joy. Kālidāsa has unified my soul with the soul of the cloud—he has compounded Man and Nature in the unity of feeling and transmuted both by the alchemy of his art. This may appear anthropomorphic. It is bound to be so to some extent as long as we are in this anthropo-centric predicament. And yet it is so only from the outside. The experience itself cannot be truly characterised so—for the joy that I experience is the basis, the ground, both of Man and Nature.

A word might be said here about the relationship between poet and reader. According to the Indian way of thinking the reader or the critic is in essence the same as the poet and is therefore called *sahṛdaya*—having the same "poetic heart". The faculty is the same in both. The difference consists in this. The poet experiences beauty in Nature and Man—feeling himself through sympathetic imagination one with the contemplated object and is beside himself with joy. This experience is synthetic or integrating. Then follows his poetic

activity which while expressing creates beautiful forms. This process is bound to be analytic. He selects such aspects of his experience—the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *samcāri-bhāvas*—which were essentially the features that induced that experience in himself and thus gives it ready made to the reader—though no doubt his genius even while experiencing was selective. There is an illuminating passage from Rabindranath Tagore about this selective activity of the mind—which is expressive and creative at the same time.

"I know not who paints the pictures on memory's canvas ; but whoever he may be, what he is painting are pictures ; by which I mean that he is not there with his brush simply to make a faithful copy of all that is happening. He takes in and leaves out according to his taste. He makes many a big thing small and small thing big. He has no compunction in putting into the background that which was to the fore, or bringing to the front that which was behind. In short he is painting pictures, and not writing history." (*My Reminiscences* p. 1.)

The critic or the *sahṛdaya* when contemplating the work of art, rather than when seeing the objects themselves out in nature, has the same faculty aroused in him and in his turn he experiences the same joy. If now he sees the objects by himself he may more easily have the same experience. It is like digesting honey which has been already partly digested by the bee. Poets are Nature's favourite children. She yields her secrets to them more readily than to others. The best part of her gifts is given to them, even as the cow, as it is said, yields the best part of the milk to the calf.* It is better to approach Nature through

* Vāzdehenur dugdha ekaṁ hi rasam yadbāla'rṣṇayā
Tena nāśya samah sa syāt duhyato yogibhir yath.

—Bh: 11a-nāyaka.

Gurūpadeśād adhyetum śāstram jādulhiyo'pyalam.
Kāvyam tu jāyate jātu kasya cit pratibhāvatah.

—Bhāmaha.

her children and the saḥṛdaya is content to do so. He will be grateful for a chance to see through the eyes of the poet and have visions of Siva's laughter in the snow-clad Himalayas, of stairs leading to heaven in the Ganges descending to the plains, of sylvan deities bidding farewell to Sakuntalā in the voices of the birds, and of Mother Earth clad in the waters of the sea.

When the saḥṛdaya is seeing visions it does not occur to him at all whether these things be real, whether these things exist. It seems an irrelevant question. This is a direct result of the aesthetic attitude characterised by detachment, which does not aim at the existential or the practical aspect of its objects. May be in one sense they are more real than reality. This aspect of aesthetic experience we may discuss now.

It was said by Abhinavagupta above that aesthetic enjoyment is akin to brahmānanda. It is very important to remember that it is only akin to it and not brahmānanda itself. It is *brahma-nanda saḥodura*—its cousin as another puts it. It is no doubt a foretaste of it. But it is still appearance, avidyā—though its influences are now at a standstill. The soul is still sheathed in the ānandamayakośa. Avidyā is at the basis of Beauty. In other words Beauty is appearance—with all its implications. Beauty clothed in all the fineries that Prakṛti can offer dances before Puruṣa for his enjoyment. But she is an appearance. As this aesthetic enjoyment is so near being bliss of Brahman, we may speak of it in a sense as more real than reality as we ordinarily understand it. As Prof. Hiriyanṇa has beautifully put it, it is "the layman's yoga"* and we may call a saḥṛdaya a lay mystic. He has through the contemplation of art glimpses of that Reality which is inclusive of all values—Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. Kāvya-yoga is also a pathway to Reality, even as Karma-yoga, for example.

There is one other point to which I must refer before I close. I have already spoken about the aesthetic attitude inducing a state of peace and detachment. In elaboration of

* ABORI, XIX. "The Indian Conception of Values".

this aspect of the experience, I should like to examine certain strange experiences of several people—widely separated from each other in point of time, place and temperament. And if I make a few quotations it is because I want to make the discussion as objective as possible.

I shall first take the experience of Kālidāsa, expressed in a well-known passage of the *Śākuntala*. It is the day on which Sakuntala is coming to the home of her husband full of hope for her future happiness as well as that of her coming child. King Duṣyanta is seated in his chamber with his friend Māḍhavya—after discharging the exacting duties of a king, weary and relaxed—when sweet strains of music stream into their ears. Some one is playing on the *viṇa* and singing. The song is about love—of the type of *vipralambha* *Śṛṅgāra* or unhappy love. It is one of his queens singing. The song is a rebuke to the king though veiled and gentle. It accuses him of indifference and of transferring his affections to a less worthy object. Evidently the king had lost all interest in his queens these months, devoting himself more than ever to the service of the state. The Queen has instinctively made a correct guess that the king has fallen in love with someone else. Indeed it was true, but then alas ! across the memory of the king was drawn a thick veil by the curse of *Durvāsā*. He appreciates the cleverness of Queen *Haimśapadikā* and sends *Māḍhavya* to congratulate her on it. After he has gone, the strains of music still pouring in, the king begins to feel a vague longing—for something he knows not what. It grows upon him so much that he begins to wonder what could be the matter with himself. He then consoles himself with this thought ;

Ramyaṇi vikṣya madhurāṁśca niśamya śabdān
Paryutsukibhavati yat sukhito'pi jantuḥ !
Taccetasā smarati nūnam abodhapūrvam
Bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntara-sauhṛdāni.

"When a person though quite happy, at the sight of beautiful objects or hearing sweet strains of music begins to feel anxious

and vague longings overpower him—then indeed his heart remembers, though it has never experienced them before, affections of a former life firmly seated within as impressions."

This is not an example of the experience of "rasa" as some have understood it. It is a peculiar reaction to beauty of colour and sound. It looks as if beauty soothes the nerves, if we may say so, and releases the mind from the stress of the common conscious or unconscious pursuits of little ends in life. When the mind is thus freed the deepest reaches of the soul are uncovered. It now feels something which is more akin to peace than anything else. Its lost equilibrium is restored and it is isolated from everything else except the object before it. In this condition the latent energies of the mind are released and it seems to become most active and what it could not do in the ordinary waking life, it seems capable of doing now. Duṣyanta almost remembers his Sakuntalā. Whatever explanation we may offer for this phenomenon—impressions of one's past life or the family or species or even race—the phenomenon itself is common and is borne out by the experience of many. The important thing to note in this peculiar instance is that instead of feeling unalloyed joy by the excitement of the "sthāyi-bhāvas," the subject Duṣyanta feels a painful longing. The parallelism with aesthetic experience therefore is here only partial. It proves one thing that when the dominant emotions are evoked the feeling is akin to peace and detachment characteristic of all "rasa;" so much so that some critics have held that this peace or "śama" is the basis for all other primary emotions. But that is only by the way. The painful longing in this instance must therefore be due to quite other causes and not the "vibhāvas," etc. With the release of the perpetual stress on mental activity, it is directed for some extraneous reason to other channels, instead of being allowed to follow the aesthetic object, when the resulting experience would have been "rasa" and therefore only joy. As a matter of fact the aesthetic experience is arrested half way. At the stage of arrestment the "sthāyi-bhāvas" have no doubt been roused, but are not yet transformed into "rasa." This process of transformation itself, while it lasts, is "rasa" and ceases with the

disappearance of the "vibhāvas," etc., which brought it into being.

Goddess Sarasvati has toyed with this idea once again after centuries. We find an Elizabethan reminiscence of this feeling in that other darling child of hers—in Shakespeare. I refer of course to that celebrated passage in the "Merchant of Venice," beginning with :

How sweet the moonlight sleeps on this bank...I quote only two lines. Jessica says to her lover Lorenzo :

I am never merry when I hear sweet music. More important for my purpose is the answer of Lorenzo which is not as well-known as it deserves to be. He says in answer :

The reason is your spirits are attentive. The spirits are never more attentive, never more wide awake than when under the spell of Beauty—particularly in music.

Here is another reminiscence in Robert Browning. In a context somewhat different from these two, we find Bishop Bloughram saying—

Just when we are safest, there's a sunset-touch,
A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
A chorus-ending from Euripides,—
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
As old and new at once as nature's self,
To rap and knock and enter in our soul,
Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring,...

All these passages which have a family resemblance refer to the strange melancholy that sometimes steals over the soul under the influence of Beauty in Nature and Art.

I give below two more passages—for the influence of music in particular. It is said of Legrange, that prince of mathematicians, a Frenchman, by his biographer that he behaved strangely under the spell of music. He says,

"In the midst of the most brilliant society he was generally absorbed in his own reflections, and especially when there was

music, in which he delighted, not so much for any exquisite pleasure that he received from it as because, after the first three or four bars, it regularly lulled him into a train of abstract thought and he heard no more of the performance except as a sort of *accompaniment* assisting the march of his most difficult investigations which he thus pursued *with comfort and convenience*.

And Darwin writes in his *Autobiography* :

"Music generally sets me thinking too energetically on what I have been at work on instead of giving me pleasure."

If after all this mass of evidence I may be permitted to add my bit of testimony, quite often have I felt it easier to think out problems and do other things than listening to really sweet music just because really sweet music is *accompanying* the march of those thoughts. It is a well-known fact that suffering man finds *relief* in a cry, in mourning, in song, in listening to music. He then regains that equipoise, that peace which is the heritage of every soul. These are not examples of pure aesthetic experience. They fall short of the final stage, though they go to prove that when the "sthāyi-bhāvas" are excited and are on the way to become "rasa" they partake of the nature of peace.

To come back to our theory of aesthetic experience we find that Ahinavagupta has touched the very mainspring of this unique experience when he speaks of the dormant primary emotions being released in a state of mental relaxation under the beneficent spell of the ideal creations of Art. The released soul flows out and expands and becomes one with the aesthetic object. The experience, to repeat, is very much akin to the mental equipoise of a saint or a *sthita-prajña* and yields the same *ānanda*, even if it be transient, as that of the knower of Brahman.

The Doctrine of Momentariness

BY

T. R. SUNDARARAMAN

One of the fundamental doctrines peculiar to Buddhism is its view that all objects, without an exception, are momentary. All entities are merely strings of momentary events. They appear only to disappear. "This, their character of being split in discrete moments, pervades everything."¹ The essence of these entities is to disappear without leaving any trace behind. For the Buddhist, therefore, "there is no other ultimate reality than separate, instantaneous bits of existence. Not only eternal entities, be it God or Matter, are denied reality, but even the simple stability of empirical objects is said to be something constructed by our imagination. Ultimate reality is instantaneous."²

If this doctrine is proved to be true, all other systems of thought will stand refuted. The Mīmāṃsā belief in the eternity of the Veda, the Sāṃkhya doctrine of eternal Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of eternal categories, and the very Cārvāka belief in four kinds of eternal material atoms and the entire edifice of the Vedānta Philosophy, will crumble to pieces at one stroke. Hence, the doctrine of momentariness has been subjected to severe attack from every quarter. As it would be quite impossible within the limits of a short paper to examine all the arguments formulated by the several systems of thought, this paper aims at setting forth the chief objections that have been taken to the doctrine of momentariness by Venkaṭanātha, one of the greatest exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaita thought.

In support of his doctrine, the Buddhist adduces the evidence of perception and inference. He contends that if objects are not taken to be momentary, but believed to be stable, contradictory qualities would have to be attributed to an identical

1. Th. STCHERBATSKY, *Buddhist Logic*, p. 79.

2. *Ibid.* P. 80.

object. Take, for example he says, a seed. From the sprouting (noticed in the seed when sown in the field) and from the absence of any sprout (when the same seed was in the granary) one would have to attribute the contradictory features of sprouting and not-sprouting to an identical seed. Further since the capacity (sāmarthya) to sprout means actual sprouting, it must be said of the seed (in the granary) which has not yet sprouted, that it is actually sprouting—an obvious contradiction. Hence it is a clear that objects are not stable, but momentary.

Venkatanātha replies to the Buddhistic contention as follows ; —By sāmarthya (capacity) is meant only the capacity to produce an appropriate result when certain auxiliary factors are given, and not to produce it in their absence. If at one time the seed sprouts and at other times, it does not, it is because of the presence or the absence of the auxiliary factors. Hence there is nothing wrong in attributing two qualities to an identical object.

The Buddhist may urge that the contradiction still persists. For the seed is said to possess the contradictory features of having and not having the presence of the auxiliary factors. To this, Venkatanātha replies that since the auxiliary causes depend in their turn upon a stream of helpful factors, which is present only at certain times, there is no real contradiction here. He goes on to add that the Buddhist himself must offer a similar explanation to account for the fact that the phenomenon of sprouting is noticed only in one seed preceding that which sprouts.

Finding his argument turned against himself, the Buddhist takes up another line of reasoning. The belief that an entity endures implies, says the Buddhist, that it exists before and after, i.e., prior to its own existence, and after its own destruction. Surely, this is absurd. Therefore, things are not stable, but momentary.

Venkatanātha after scrutinising the significance of the phrase, "existing-at-an-earlier-and-at-a-subsequent-time," concludes that

it must mean one of two things :—(1) an object existing at a time when *another object* is not produced or after the destruction of *another object*. (2) an object existing prior to *its own* existence and subsequent to *its own* destruction. The latter is certainly unacceptable. And there is nothing wrong in saying that an object exists prior to the existence of another object and after the destruction of some other object. For example, a pot may exist at a time when some other pot, or book, is not made or some other pot or book is destroyed.

The Buddhist may again ask, how can the earlier and the subsequent moments, which are opposed to each other, as light is opposed to darkness, exist together in self-same entity ?

Venkatanātha points out that while it is impossible for the earlier and the subsequent moments to exist simultaneously in a given object, there is nothing illogical in maintaining that an identical object can have relationship with the earlier and the subsequent moments. Moreover, so long as it is not admitted that an identical object can have relationship with two objects, knowledge which has two objects (*viśayas*) would for ever be impossible.

The Buddhist may say that the relation of an object to time is to be conceived as one of identity (*tādātmya*), that is, time itself is the object. Hence an identical object cannot have contact with two moments. Should it be contended that an object can have relationship with two different moments, then these moments would have to be equated. For there is the well known principle that what is non-different from a given entity is that entity itself. Therefore, an instant of time that is non-different from a given moment is that instant itself and hence it cannot be identical with two instants.

Against the above contention, Venkatanātha points out that even though colour (*rūpa*) and taste (*rasa*) are distinct, there is nothing to prevent them from existing in the self-same object and on that account none identifies the two. Similarly the earlier and the subsequent moments may well be connected

with an identical object without their being equated. Further, on the Buddhist view, when a number of objects are known to exist at a particular moment, all of them would have to be identified, as they are all in contact with a single moment. But even the Buddhist does not dream of identifying them.

The Buddhist may argue that since the judgment 'a certain entity exists at the present moment,' marks off the entity from objects existing at other times (that is, the entity in question does not exist at other times), it follows that objects are momentary.

In reply, Venkatanātha maintains that all that the judgment viz., a certain entity exists at the present moment, implies is that the entity exists at the present moment ; it scarcely implies that it does not exist at the earlier or the subsequent moment.

It is now quite clear from the foregoing that perception teaches that entities are stable, just the opposite of what the Buddhist claims it proves. Recognition further supports the theory that objects are stable and continuous and not fleeting and momentary. Consider for example, recognition of identity or the perception of an object which has been already apprehended in the past. e. g., this is the jar which I saw yesterday. There is no warrant for the Buddhist to dismiss this recognition as illusory so long as there are no defects in the perceiving apparatus (*karaṇa-dosa*) and so long as this knowledge of identity is not contradicted later (*bhādhaka-pratyaya*). It cannot be urged that for the very reason that they are recognitions, all recognitions are illusory, for this type of reasoning will land the Buddhist in nihilism. The *Mādhyamika* also with equal justice could declare that all knowledge is illusory for the simple reason that they are *jñānās* (knowledge).

Coming to inference, we find the Buddhist position stated as follows:—For the very reason that entities are existents, they are

momentary, like a pot. This argument is fallacious, says Venkaṭanātha, because if the term "all entities" denotes 'all existent things' the distinction between *pakṣa*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta* in the inference disappears. Should it be said that the term "pakṣa" (i.e., "all entities") denotes 'all objects except the pot' the illustration (i.e., pot) will not be appropriate, since the pot (*dṛṣṭānta*) is not proved to be momentary.

The Buddhist might argue that if the illustration of the pot is considered inappropriate, he could cite a thing which exists just for an instant of time (*kṣaṇa*) and no more and add that even this cannot be dismissed as enduring; for, if it were so, it would scarcely help one to measure the moment. Venkaṭanātha points out in reply that since the moment can be measured with the aid of objects that persist for more than a moment, it is quite unnecessary to take an entity that exists only for a moment and no more (*kṣaṇopādi*).

Having failed to maintain his point with the aid of "anvaya-vyāpti," the Buddhist may state his case with the aid of "vyatirekavyāpti" (negative concomitance). His argument may read as follows: "Whatever is not-momentary (*akṣanika*) cannot be an existent (*sat*), like the horns of hare." This argument seeks to establish the momentary character of all things on the basis of universal concomitance between *Akṣaṇikatva* and unreality.

Venkaṭanātha contends that this argument fares no better. For the universal concomitance that is said to be noticed between *Akṣaṇikatva* and unreality could not have been noticed when *kṣaṇikatva*, its *pratiyogin*, is itself unproven.

To this, the Buddhist might say that this would not touch his position; for he could give a positive connotation to *akṣaṇikatva* and take it to mean "What endures". Then his argument would read as follows:—"Whatever endures must be *usat*, like the horns of a hare".

Venkaṭanātha takes objection to the illustration cited:

since śaśasṅga (horns of a hare) is devoid of all qualities. The question whether it endures or not, therefore, does not arise at all.

Confronted with this difficulty the Buddhist might say that he could cite the non-existence-of-the-horns-of-a-hare (śaśasṅgā-bhāva), as an illustration ; but it is unhelpful, because he would only be attributing the character of persistence to śaśasṅgā-bhāva and thereby making it a reality.

Finding that a strict application of the Buddhistic argument that "whatever is not momentary is unreal", would prove that the doctrine of momentariness is itself momentary, some of the followers of Buddha have restated the argument as follows :— Whatever is certain to happen cannot depend on a cause (i.e., It would not wait for its cause). Should it wait for its cause, it could not be said to be certain. Therefore, dhvamsa (destruction) which is the certain factor in all actions, does not wait for its cause. That is, the moment there is production, there is also destruction. That is, all things are momentary.

Venkaṭanātha shows that since, on the Buddhistic theory that no event waits for its cause, all future occurrences, for the very reason they are bound to come, must come into being along with the first occurrence in the series. That is, all future pots along with the first pot in the series of pots, all books along with the first book in the series of books, etc., must be simultaneous. Being momentary, they must perish the next moment. So the entire cosmos would disappear in a moment.

Next, Venkaṭanātha proceeds to show that the Buddhistic argument "Whatever is certain to happen does not depend on a cause", is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa* (i.e. where the *hetu* is present, but the *sādhya* is absent). For when the series of similar pots is followed by a different stream (i.e. of pot-sherds), the first event in the dissimilar stream of potsherds (*kupālakṣyaṇa*) is simultaneous with the act of striking the pot

with a stick. Here the *hetu* is present and not the *sādhya*. That is, the first event in the stream of potsherds, is not independent of a cause but it is directly dependent on the application of the stick. Therefore, the occurrence (here of the stream of potsherds) is certain (*Dhruva-bhāvi*), but it is not without a cause (*ahetuka*). As we have now cited an instance where there is certainty but not the character of being independent of a cause, the Buddhistic argument stands condemned.

Sankara and His Modern Interpreters

BY

S. VITTALA SASTRI

It has been the misfortune of Sankara, like some of the great philosophers of the world, to be misunderstood by his own followers. As interpreted today, Sankara is responsible for a peculiar speculative system of which he is perfectly innocent.

Almost all presentations of Sankara's system whether by the commentators or by translators, whether by adverse critics influenced by the later Bhashyakaras (please refer to analysis of Sri Bhasya by Ramanuyachari) or by independent exponents guided by original scholars now speak of the Mayavada as the central doctrine of Advaita. Advocates of Sankara seem to talk enthusiastically in defence of what is known as the Moolavidya or Maya which they evidently regard as the very corner-stone of the system, while the opponents appear to feel no less shocked at the very mention of the word. It may be said that for some centuries a fierce fight has been raging around this chimerical principle of "Moolavidya".

And yet, it would appear, that the great thinker knew nothing whatever of this wonderful Moolavidya. Translations of almost all the genuine works of Sankara are now available, and one searches in vain in the great Bhashyas to find even the faintest trace of such a doctrine. More than 10 years ago Sri. Y. Subrahmanya Sarmā threw, in his Sankara Hridaya or Moolavidya-Nirasa, a challenge to Sanskrit scholars to produce a single quotation from Sankara, or at least to adduce cogent reasons in support of this blessed theory, and that challenge remains unanswered still. He has very recently brought out a Kannada book discussing this point at length and showing the utter hollowness of the contention that

Sankara ever countenanced this ruinous stop-gap devised by later Vedantins.

It would be necessary to examine this Moolavidya doctrine a little in detail in order to distinguish it from the genuine doctrine of Avidya taught by Sri Sankara. No two teachings could be so dissimilar as the theories of Avidya and Moolavidya. For Sankara, Avidya means no more and no less than the mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self and the mistaken transference of the characteristics of each to the other. This superimposition and transference is, according to him, due to a natural tendency in man which can be rooted out only by the realization of the truth of the Adwaita or of the one Highest Reality without a second. The philosophic grandeur and significance of this theory cannot be explained, I fear, in the space of a short paper like this. I shall therefore content myself with the remark that Sankara relies entirely on facts of life and experience to show how our real self as witness of the three states or *Avasthas*,—waking, dream and deep sleep,—transcends all limitations and is in fact the one metaphysical reality in search of which all philosophy has been at work ever since man began to think.

In perfect contrast with this, is the Moolavidya theory bolstered up by the neo-vedantins in the name of Sankara. They have quietly *assumed* the oneness of Reality, and in order to account for the plurality experienced in life, they postulate a primeval nescience, the Maolavidya, which is the cause of all phenomena including the superimposition of the self and the not-self referred to above. This Avidya is Root-ignorance, in that it is the cause, the material cause, that gives rise to all the various ignorances attaching to individuals in every day life. It is not my ignorance or your ignorance, but the Universal Beginningless Ignorance, residing in Brahman or pure consciousness, and it is called Avidya, because it is *admitted* to be sublated by Vidya or the knowledge of Brahman.

One detects here at once the influence of the realistic Sankhya, for the conception of cause so naively introduced militates against the strictly non-dualistic teaching of the Upanishads according to Gowdapada and Sankara who have shown the untenability of all causation whatever from the highest standpoint of Vedanta. But our friends have carefully glossed over their theory of causation so that it may not offend against the feelings of any conscientious followers of Sankara. This Moolavidya, it is averred, is not transcendently real but only empirically so, and even as such, it neither is nor is not. Again, it is not distinct from Brahman in which case it would militate against the oneness of Reality, nor is it identical with Brahman seeing that it serves as the cause of the phenomenal world. The causal Avidya being thus indescribable in nature, its effect embracing the stream of superimpositions on the one hand and the objective world on the other, partakes of its nature also and is equally indescribable ; hence, it is claimed, the possibility of the total disappearance of Avidya and all its effects at the dawn of knowledge.

But here again the doctrine is faced with an insurmountable difficulty of a more serious nature. How are we to be sure, that knowledge will disperse all ignorance of this type ? Is there any enlightened soul who has got rid of all Avidya and who can point out to us the way of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman ? This natural question put to the advocates of Moolavidya makes them very uncomfortable. For if one has completely annihilated Avidya he cannot perceive our world which is admittedly the effect of Avidya, and if there be no enlightened teacher who can prove the truth of Vedanta to us, unity of Brahman would be no more than an undemonstrable dogma. An escape from the horns of this dilemma is impossible, but the followers of Moolavidya were undaunted. They made an immediate alliance with the mystics, the followers of Yoga, and boldly affirmed that Avidya is destroyed in Nirvikalpa Samadhi or the highest trance. It will be remembered that this root-Avidya is held to be present in all the three States

(Avasthas) waking, dream and sleep ; only it becomes potential in deep sleep and active as soon as we awake. The persistence of Avidya in all the states, therefore, desiderates some other special state in which it may be safely declared to be absent and so these thinkers thought it best to identify the Thuriya of the Upanishads with the Samadhi of the Yogins. Thus all difficulty is solved, Avidya is finally seen to be destroyed by Samadhi and till one attains that condition, it may, with impunity, be held responsible for all plurality.

But this is only an escape from the frying pan to the fire. For even so, there is no escape from this dreaded Avidya. If a man who gets this trance awakes from it, he does so along with Moola Avidya which alone can create a world ; but if he goes to final Samadhi never to rise again, there is left no one to testify to the truth of Vedanta.

The last link in this chain of the Moolavidya argument, has got to be mentioned now. We have seen that this undesirable Moolavidya haunts man throughout his life and shows its cloven hoof even subsequent to the mystic trance. So to avoid its reappearance, the doctrine of "Avidya-Lesa" a trace of Avidya, is pressed into service. It is affirmed that although Moolavidya is mostly destroyed by Samadhi, to the teacher who awakes from it is left just such a trace of Moolavidya as would suffice for perception and commerce with the world. From his own view, even this perception is illusory, and when finally he shuffles off the mortal coil he becomes a full-fledged Mukta or released soul never more to return to this transmigratory life. Should it be still objected that traces or parts of such a principle as Moolavidya are inconceivable in as much as it is not material, there is the *Anurachuniya-Vada*—the doctrine of indescribability ever ready to hand. Parts of Moolavidya are as indescribable as Moolavidya itself and so no logical difficulty need worry us.

This in brief is the Moolavidya theory piously fathered

upon the great Sankara. A full account of all the various branches of this scholastic line of thought that are current today, is neither possible nor desirable here. Even a brief account of the historical origin and growth of this doctrine, interesting as it would be, cannot be undertaken here. But I hope that sufficient information has been given in this paper to persuade any one that this teaching is as different from Sankara's as tinsel is from gold. At the very commencement, it assumes the unity of non-dualistic Brahman (with individuals) which has got to be proved, and it explains away the plurality universally perceived by conjuring up the ghost of Moola-vidya from whose clutches final release is possible only after death.

As I have already stated, it is not altogether hopeless to rescue the genuine doctrine of Advaita taught by Sankara from the obscurity since we have abundant material for this purpose in his great Bhashyas.

My own version of his philosophy as gathered from these sources cannot, as I have already said, be set forth at any great length here. But I have here pointed out the one key which ensures access to Sankara's system which would otherwise be altogether unintelligible. Passages abound in Sankara's Bhashyas where he is never tired of repeating that Adhyasa or mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self is the only Avidya which is in our way of realising the truth. We are all apt to over-emphasise that aspect of the self where it appears to be actually conscious, where one inevitably transfers the characteristics of the mind to the self. The self, however, ever remains in its pristine purity transcending all individuality, personality and plurality in spite of this Avidya, for the simple reason that mistaken notions can never affect facts. Sankara therefore appeals to universal experience and following the great upanishadic seers like Yajnavalkya and Uddalaka, shows that an examination of the three states of consciousness, discloses the absolute identity of the witnessing consciousness in

each one of us with Brahman or absolute self. For the detailed account of the method of enquiry he proposes, I beg to refer to his Bhasyas on the Vedanta Sutas, the Brihadaranyaka and the Chandogya.

Theory of Relativity and The Sankhya System

BY

B. A. KRISHNASWAMY RAO

The paper is an attempt to show that the conclusions of the Theory of Relativity bear a very strong resemblance to the Sankhya conception of Space, Time and Matter. Even the motive for formulating a single entity for accounting for all phenomena would seem to be very nearly the same in both. The special theory of relativity as is well known unifies Space and Time into a Four-dimensional continuum called space-time, space and time as we experience them being the abstractions or projections of Space-time and not independent categories existing in their own right. The measure of space and time is not universal and is different for observers in different states of motion, but the 'interval' in Space-time is however the same for all. Mechanical processes can be described in equations which have the same form under transformation from one system of co-ordinates to another (provided they are in relative uniform motion). But when one turns to electro-dynamic and optical processes the equations describing them are not found to be invariant. In 1905, Prof. Einstein suggested that, if as the celebrated Michelson-Morley experiment showed, we assume that the velocity of light in empty space is the same for all observers in uniform relative motion, it can be shown that physical processes of any kind and not only mechanical phenomena can be described in equations which are the same or invariant under the transformation from one system of co-ordinates to another. After the formulation of this suggestion Prof. Minkowski recognised clearly the formal equivalence of space and time and fused space and time into an entity called space-time. In 1915, Prof. Einstein felt that the restriction to frameworks in uniform motion was arbitrary and had no logical justification.

The restriction was removed in the general theory of relativity by the postulate that the laws of physics have the same form with respect to any co-ordinate system in arbitrary motion. Prof. Einstein gives the reasons for extending the relativistic postulate in these words :—"The laws of physics must be so constituted that they should remain valid for any system of co-ordinates moving in any manner. We then arrive at an extension of the relativity postulate. Besides this momentous epistemological argument there is a well known fact which speaks in favour of an extension of the relativity theory".¹ The well known fact to which Prof. Einstein refers is the fact that the terms uniform motion and variable or accelerated motion are really relative and there is no absolute criterion by which a motion may be judged as 'uniform' or 'accelerated'. One of the important consequences of the generalised theory of relativity is that matter may be regarded as a property of space-time. Space, Time and Matter were regarded as ultimate elements in classical physics. The special theory of relativity fused space and time into a whole and the general theory of relativity further synthesised Space, Time and Matter into one fundamental physical entity. Space, Time and Matter taken separately are mere abstractions and physical Reality consists of a synthesis of all these. Again the necessity for regarding Space, Time and matter as altogether separate and independent entities too does not arise. "Physical space-time is perceived to be intimately connected with the actual local distribution of matter. Euclid-Newtonian space-time is not the actual Space-time of physics, simply because the former completely neglects the actual presence of matter. Euclid-Newtonian continuum is merely an abstraction while Physical space-time is the actual framework which has some definite curvature due to the presence of matter"². In the presence

1. Original papers of A. Einstein and H. Minkowski translated by M. N. Saha and S. N. Bose, p. 93.

2. Ibid. Int. p. XVIII.

of matter, there is, as it were a 'hump' or 'hill' in space-time and what we call matter is at the top of the 'hill'. The 'hill' is however, the real thing and matter is assumed at the top as a concession to prejudice. We may ignore matter altogether and regard the 'hill' as matter. As Prof. Eddington rightly observes "matter does not cause the curvature of space-time. It IS the curvature". Thus space, time and matter are fused into a unified entity space-time, matter being a deformity or curvature of space-time.

Among the systems of Indian Philosophy the conceptions of the theory of relativity find strong parallelism in the Sankhya system. Space and time are regarded as aspects of Prakriti in the Sankhya. "Even space and Time are represented as aspects of Prakriti and do not therefore exist apart from it as independent entities."³ Space and time regarded as a unity are all-pervading and eternal. But in the empirical world they appear limited and even as distinct and separate from one another due to the conditioning by masses of matter and matter in motion. In the earliest available manual of the Sankhya system *viz.*, the Sankhyakarika of Iswara Krishna no direct reference to Space and Time is to be found. In commenting on the 33rd Karika, where it is said that the external organs function only in respect of time present while the inner senses function in respect of time past, present and future, Vachaspathimisra, however, explains in the Tatvakoumudi⁴ why the Sankhya does not admit Time as an independent entity. "Even if we do recognise it as the Naiyayikas do, we have to recognise three varieties of it, past, present and future ; and to explain these we have to look to something other than time itself. It would be simpler to recognise and deal with the defining conditions, instead of postulating a superfluous entity called Time."⁵ It is, however, not clear from this whether Absolute

3. Outlines of Indian Philosophy : M. Hiriyanna. p. 270.

4. P. 101-102.

5. Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna. Edited & translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastry. p. 32.

Time is recognised as a real entity even if empirical time be regarded as phenomenal or conditioned. A clarification and a real advance as A. B. Keith observes in his "The Sankhya system" in the conception of space and time is made by Vijnanabhikshu in his Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya. In commenting on the Sankhya Aphorism "Dikkalavakasadibhyah" (II-12) he says "He (the sutrakara) declares the creation of limited space and limited time. The space and time which are eternal (and absolute), these two being the source of the Ether, are really distinctive qualities of Nature; but the Space and time which are limited, these arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that (limiting) object."⁶ When space and time are designated as qualities of nature it should not be supposed that they are different from Nature in the sense that an attribute may be different from the substance in which it inheres. In fact, Vijnanabhikshu himself observes in his Sankhyasara (II Pariccheda) that it should not be contended that the Gunas (qualities) of Prakriti are different from it; they are the Prakriti. Thus according to Vijnanabhikshu space and time are merely aspects of Prakriti, unified into a whole and eternal. The authority for Vijnanabhikshu for regarding absolute space and absolute time as eternal and all-pervading are the Aphorisms, "Nakalayogato vyapinonityasyasambandhat" and "Nadesayogatopyasmat" (BK I. 12-13) which refer to time and space as pervading (Vyapinah) and eternal (nitya). Dr. Dasgupta, however, observes that "the Sankhya did not admit the existence of real time; to them the unit of Kala is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements."⁷ This view of time as being not real seems to contradict the explicit statement of Vijnanabhikshu who says that space and time are aspects of Prakriti and hence real and the limitations of space and time, eternal and all-pervading in themselves, are due to the limiting

6. Dr J. R. Ballantyne's Translation. See, p. 11. of Bk. II.

7. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 311.

adjuncts, which incidentally serve as measures of Space and time. The essence of the Satkaryavada is that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existing and since like can only be produced from like, limited space and limited time are to be regarded as effects of which absolute space and absolute time form the material cause (Upadana-karana). The advent of upadhis (conditioning circumstances) only renders manifest what was latent or unmanifest. Dr. Dasgupta himself observes "but according to Sankhya the karya exists in a potential state in the karana and hence is *always existing and real*,"⁸ (italics mine). Vijnanabhikshu even says "Yadapi tattadupadhi visishta Akasameva Khanda dikkalau,"⁹—as a matter of fact limited space and time are Akasa itself perceived as space and time by limiting adjuncts. Here one can see even a better advance in the conception of space and time as projections or abstractions of the unified entity Akasa, even as Space and time are projections or abstractions of the unified entity space-time in the theory of relativity. The Vyasa bhashya in commenting on the 52nd Aphorism of Patanjali Yoga Sutra says "Sakhalvayam Kalah Vastu Sunyo buddhi nirmanah" (III. 52)—"infinite time is a nonentity objectively considered being only a construction of the understanding based on the relation of antecedence and sequence in which the members of the Phenomenal series are intuited to stand to one another."¹⁰ (Dr. B. N. Seal). It would appear from this that Time has no claim to be regarded as absolute and that the Sankhya-yoga denies Time as an absolute entity. Dr. B. N. Seal however observes "Vijnanabhikshu points out that this does not amount to a denial of time. It means that time has no real (or objective) existence apart from the 'moment'. But the latter is real being identical with the unit of change in the Phenomena".¹¹ It is clear therefore that for Vijnanabhikshu, absolute time and absolute space are real and limited space and limited time too real being the

8. Ibid. Page 258. f. n.

9. Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya. II 12.

10. See Positive Sciences of the Hindus, p 14.

11. Ibid. p. 21

effects which are non-different from the cause. Anirudha too in his Sankhya Sutra Vritti says that limited time and limited space are really Akasa (Akasameva) conditioned by upadhis and hence are included in the unified entity Akasa (Akase Antarbhutau).¹² We may thus take it that in the later Sankhya as represented by Vijñānabhikṣu space and time are unified in Nature (Prakṛiti) and empirical space and time are projections or effects non-different from the unified entity.

In thus raising the status of space and time to the level of Prakṛiti itself Vijñānabhikṣu has merely pushed the realistic dualism of the Sankhya to its logical limit. The chief aim in including space and time in Prakṛiti is the very necessity for the Sankhya to include all except spirit in prakṛiti in order to maintain the realistic dualism which is fundamental in the system. Prakṛiti if she is to be the "mūlābhavādamulam mulam"¹³—the rootless root of all—as the Sankhya Aphorism so expressively puts it, must include all in itself and even space and time the receptacles of all that is and all that happens must themselves be part of Nature or prakṛiti itself. Matter as we know is according to Sankhya merely a manifestation of Prakṛiti in a gross form and none other than prakṛiti. Thus space, time and matter find their explanation in prakṛiti, space and time being unified in prakṛiti as an integral part of her very being and matter being the modification of prakṛiti.

The theory of relativity lends no support to the subjectivistic theories of space and time such as the Kantian. The contention of some that a subjective conception of space and time which regards them as phenomenal rather than real may be taken as more approximating to the relativistic conception, does not appear sound. Bertrand Russell observes "The subjectivity concerned in the theory of relativity is a physical subjectivity, which would exist equally if there were no such things as mind

12. Sankhya Sutra Vritti, II, 12.

13. The Sankhya Aphorisms I, 68.

or senses in the world. Moreover it is a strictly limited subjectivity".¹⁴ Prof. Whitehead also observes "There has been a tendency to give an extreme subjectivistic interpretation to this new doctrine. I mean that the relativity of space and time has been construed as though it were dependent on the choice of the observer. It is perfectly legitimate to bring in the observer, if he facilitates explanations. But it is the observer's body that we want and not his mind. Even this body is only useful as an example of a very familiar form of apparatus".¹⁵ When a coin is viewed from an angle it appears elliptical and when viewed along with its axis it appears circular. According to the relativistic mode of thinking we are as much entitled to regard the coin as elliptical as to regard it as circular, but the relativistic mode of thinking does not altogether knock out the reality of the coin in which its shape inheres.

Thus the realistic Sankhya as represented by Vijnanabhikshu in its attempt to explain space and time as aspects of a unified entity prakriti, and matter as manifestation in a gross form of the Final Unmanifest, echoes, as it were, from a distant past the fundamental conclusions of the Theory of Relativity.

14. ABC of Relativity p. 219.

15. Science and the Modern World. p. 148-49.

Jnanad Eva Tu Kaivalyam

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

The search for release points the permanence of what is sought ; this seems inconsistent with production or attainment ; what is produced or is finite is perishable ; release must therefore be a manifestation of the ever-existent and infinite. The manifestation is necessary because of the present obscuration, a function of *māyā*. On the sublation of *māyā*, our eternal freedom stands self-revealed. This sublation is also spoken of as destruction or annihilation. Nothing that exists can be wholly annihilated ; but *vidyā* is known to annihilate *avidyā* ; knowledge destroys ignorance ; since the phenomenal world due to *māyā* is annihilated at release, *māyā* is equated with *avidyā*, destructible by knowledge. Since without the destruction of *avidyā* release is impossible and since *jñāna* alone can destroy *avidyā*, *jñāna* is claimed to be the sole means to release.

Certain points are worth keeping in mind. *Jñāna* in the sense of *svarūpa-jñāna*, the consciousness that is Brahman, is identical with release ; it is not a means to release, being indeed the substrate of *avidyā*. What is claimed to be instrumental is *vṛtti-jñāna*, a particular cognitive psychosis intuiting the impartite and arrived at by study of the Vedānta, reflection and profound contemplation. It is a function of the internal organ. Though itself a product of nescience, it has the capacity to destroy all lower psychoses such as apprehend the finite, the relational and the diverse, and finally to annihilate itself.

What exactly does this final psychosis do to the lower *vṛttis* ? It is said that the latter are destroyed. It is suggested, however, that such a view is inconsistent with the *advaitin's* own position, as to the nature of *avidyā*, that it is a positive entity. The belief that knowledge destroys ignorance is bound up with

the superstition that ignorance is just lack of knowledge ; since knowledge and the lack of it cannot co-exist, the latter is believed to be destroyed by the former. If, however, nescience is positive, how can this be destroyed, any more than anything else which is positive ? True it is knowledge and nescience cannot apparently co-exist. This is, however, not an absolute position ; for, apart from the co-existence of avidyā and svarūpa-jñāna, the advaitin himself shows the co-presence of knowledge and ignorance in such experiences as "tvad uktam artham na jñāmi." It may be asked whether with development knowledge does not replace ignorance and in that sense destroy the latter. We suggest that it is the ignorance itself which has developed into knowledge, instead of being replaced by the latter. The process is not self-contradictory since both are āvidyaka, of the nature of indeterminable māyā. The real cannot change ; nor can the unreal ; but the ignorance that was and the knowledge that now is, both are anirvācya as real or unreal, *sat* or *asat*. Change is inevitable ; to the extent that this change unifies instead of dividing, is more inclusive rather than less, manifests harmony rather than discord, it is a case of ignorance becoming knowledge. The *coming into being* of harmony is unintelligible in the last resort, except as a manifestation of the non-difference that is eternal. This when realised immediately (aparokṣatayā) constitutes the final psychosis (carama vṛtti).

The unintelligibility of the world, on the cognitive side, has been worked out in great detail by advaita disputants, under the caption drk-dr̥śya-sambandhānupapatti. Because of such anupapatti, there comes the realisation, primarily mediate (parokṣa), that *seer* and *seen* are alike superimpositions on the *sight* (consciousness). If analysis thus reveals the failure of the relational concept in the field of knowing, does it not, we ask, reveal a similar defect in the fields of conation and emotion ? A bare cogniser in front of a barely external object is helpless to know ; a bare agent in respect of a barely external object, is he better off in respect of the capacity to act ? And a barely external situation confronting a bare subject, can it

more intelligibly cause an emotion? In every case, we have to rely on the concept of relation, and it does not on analysis reveal greater capacities in some cases than in others. If it be said that men do act and feel, it may be retorted that men do also know. If the stress be laid on the analysis that reveals the cloven hoof, it must be remembered that people analyse not merely in knowing, but also in acting and even in feeling. Men do not act unreflectingly any more than they can cognise inactively. * The difference in analysis is one of degree, not

* Advaitins were not unaware of the contention that cognition is itself a mental act. In spite of this, however, they have tried to make a hard and fast distinction between cognition on the one side and both ritual activity and meditation on the other. The usual line of distinction is this: Cognition is objective and of what is; ritual activity is directed towards what is to come into being; it is also optional, depending on the will of the performer; meditation may be of what is; but it may also be of what is not, like the contemplation of the woman as a fire in the *pañcāgnividyā*. The distinction is good as far as it goes; but it is by no means absolute, being only one of degree. This is masked by the assumption that contemplation can be of the unreal, while cognition cannot be. The wholly unreal (*tuccha*) is only a limiting concept; it cannot even be spoken of, much less contemplated. An object, whether of contemplation or of cognition, is neither real nor unreal. The barren woman's son is not real; it is not unreal, if an object of contemplation, since barren women exist and also sons, while it is only the relationing that fails, as in the *anyathākhyāti* version of error; the difference between the shell-silver and the barren woman's son is that while the former is an immediate presentation, the latter is not. Contemplation may make immediate what is mediate; after imagining it for a long time one may really hold that a person *B* is the son of a woman *A* known to others as barren. Is this not a logical contradiction? Not unless you mean just the combination "barren mother"; and that is not a possible object of contemplation any more than "black white" is a possible object of cognition; the bare words, of course, could be suitable objects in either case. To the advaitin, more than to all others, the recognition of a class of untouchables should be repugnant; yet that is the class to which he has tended to relegate *karmā* and *upāsana*. The Indian philosophers, advaitins included, seek a purpose even for philosophic pursuits; unfortunately, however, they were not

of kind. The saintly man in action may conceivably have arrived at a mode of action which reflects non-difference, not because of a metaphysical discipline, but because of a practical discipline leading to harmony overruling discords, a dharma whose observance promises and gives no reward other than its own realisation, a mode of life radiating sweetness, imbued by love and inspired by sacrifice. Some degree of cognitive analysis we may admit even in this case ; that, however, can give only the parokṣa starting-point ; the discipline that ends in the immediacy of perfection, is it not imprudent to deny it and idle to call it jñāna ? The devotee whose heart melts with love, who asks for and takes nothing for himself, whose sole desire is to be with the Lord and one with the Lord that is Love, not lover or beloved, since reflection has convinced him in a remote way that Love alone is the perfection of which loving and being loved are imperfect appearance, is his discipline to be discarded or identified with jñāna ? Neither course is worth while.

The truth is one ; but we live in a world of truths which are but half-true. The good is one ; we act in a world of goods, none of which is wholly good. Love is one, we move and suffer in a world of loves, none of which transfigures the whole self. Realisation comprises two stages—the realisation of the partial and imperfect nature of what we have, and the manifestation of the perfection but for which the imperfect would neither be nor be known. The first of these stages requires reflection and analysis, which may if desired be treated as cognitive ; the subsequent discipline, however, may be cognitive, conative or emotive. The service of the saint and the devotion of the bhakta are not necessarily inferior to the wisdom of the sage, if by wisdom we mean a function of the internal organ.

thorough-going purposivists in their psychology ; had they been, they would not have sought to confine jñāna and karma in water-tight compartments, but would have treated them as different inter-penetrating phases of purpose, purpose itself being self-transcended in the eternal.

If, however, we mean the wisdom that is *caitanya*, there the need to distinguish will not arise, since all three will have arrived though by slightly different paths. The emphasis on knowledge as the sole means to realisation has been due to (1) an intellectual bias, perhaps due to the fact that metaphysics was the special pursuit of *sannyāsins* who had finished with their duty to society, (2) a defective psychology compartmentalising cognition, conation and emotion, (3) possibly an escapist mentality engendered by conditions of life in general on the one side and an excessive ritualism on the other.

It is often asked whether sages are doing the proper thing by the world by living in retirement. One of the many assumptions underlying the question is that perfection is possible for the sage alone and that if he retires from the world, the world will not have the benefit of his realisation. Even sages may be intelligibly exercising an occult influence over the rest of creation. That apart, they certainly serve as noble exemplars and inspirers to others on the path of *jñāna*; they are specially of service in this way, when they are more or less easily accessible like Bhagavan Ramaṇa or Sri Aurobindo. Even assuming, however, that sages do not mingle with the world and live as members of it, that is no detracting from the *advaita* ideal of perfection, which may be attained by the saint in action as much as by the sage in wisdom. If the latter discipline requires more or less complete withdrawal from the world, the former does not; and the saint may do for his fellow-creatures what the sage may not do or do but imperfectly because of the difference in his initial equipment.

On the view that release is possible for all, and that till the attainment thereof, the perfection of sage or saint is relative, being but the attainment of *Īśvaratva*, there is a special value attaching to the performance of karma by the man of wisdom; for while wisdom illumines the wise man alone, action lightens the load and smoothes the path of the ignorant as well; the perfecting of the latter is accelerated, thus bringing nearer the

making absolute of the mukta's relative perfection, the Brahmi-bhāva of him who has but attained Īśvara-bhāva. Hence it is that Maṇḍana Miśra wisely advocates jñāna-karma-samuccaya, holding that the wise man's performance of karma accelerates release, just as the use of a horse accelerates one's arrival at one's destination. Much of this, however, has to remain as speculation ; for we are all too human, while we discuss how Īśvara will act. Will He function as a great knower or a great doer or a great lover ? We know only this much that it would be the height of presumption to deny Him any or all of these roles, whether simulatneously or in succession.

Prof. Collingwood's views on Metaphysics

BY

M. YAMUNACHARYA

In his *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933) Prof. R. G. Collingwood wrote : "If the state of philosophy at present is chaotic, that is because the rubbish left on the ground by the decayed systems of the last century is an impediment to sight and an obstacle to progress." This called for a cleansing process which Prof. Collingwood has undertaken to do on a systematic scale in his recent book *An Essay on Metaphysics* (1940). His *Autobiography* published in 1939 marks the stages by which he travelled to the view of philosophy he propounds in his latest book. In his own words "The autobiography of a man whose business is thinking should be the story of his thought".

He rejects the view inherited from Aristotle that Metaphysics is the science of pure being on the ground that such a science is a misnomer. If such a science were possible it would come to have really no subject matter of its own. There would be nothing distinctive or valuable about it and it would have no special problems of its own or a special technique to deal with them. It is this view of Metaphysics that has been responsible for the stalemate in philosophy. The symptoms of the stalemate are the various schools of anti-metaphysics and pseudo-metaphysics. Prof. Collingwood is too much of a metaphysician himself to allow metaphysics to die of this anaemia. He wishes to infuse new blood into it and he has no doubt whatever of the capacity of Metaphysics to recuperate. To this end he suggests a remedy. The remedy is in a word the marriage of Metaphysics and History. History which is the very stream of life has the capacity to bring Metaphysics back to ruddy health. That Metaphysics is a historical science is his main theme. Nothing can

be called a science according to him, unless two conditions are fulfilled. "There must be orderly or systematic thinking, and there must be a definite subject-matter to think about." If philosophy is regarded as the science of pure being, these conditions will not be properly fulfilled.

Like Kant, Prof. Collingwood raises the question : Is Metaphysics possible ? He has no hesitation in answering the question in the affirmative provided the question is viewed as he views it. According to him, the subject-matter of Metaphysics is to think about absolute presuppositions. He defines "absolute presuppositions" as those which are taken absolutely for granted whenever anybody thinks. Absolute presuppositions should not be confused with propositions. His view is that while a proposition is that which is stated as an answer to a question and is capable of being either true or false, an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true or false and is not verifiable. Further, absolute presuppositions must be distinguished from relative presuppositions. He defines a relative presupposition as "one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another question as its answer" while "An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never an answer."

This leads him to the question of the relation between Science and Metaphysics. There are certain things which the Scientist just takes for granted. These are his presuppositions but they are not absolute but only relative because they are answers to other presuppositions which are answers to no other question. Metaphysics then has as one of its tasks the disentanglement of those presuppositions which form the basis or framework of science. The foundations of sciences are in Metaphysics and to ignore Metaphysics is to ignore the very foundations of science. But how about those scientists who do not care to probe into these foundations, nay even deny them ? Collingwood says that this is a mark of what he calls low-grade thinking content with skimming over the surfaces of things. But a genuine and deep

scientific temper is capable of transcending this low-grade thinking. Metaphysics therefore is the creative activity of a first class or high-grade thinker and not the thin and jejune stuff that often passes for Metaphysics.

It is this genuine Metaphysics that is allied with history. It is to bring this alliance between the two that the bow of his thought had always been bent ; for he writes in his *Autobiography* "My life's work hitherto, as seen from my fiftieth year has been in the main an attempt to bring about a *rapprochement* between philosophy and history." It is significant that to Prof. Collingwood the elucidation of such terms like event, process, progress, civilization and so forth are metaphysical problems *par excellence*.

But what is history ? The ordinary belief is that history is a repetition of statements about the past which are found ready-made in the writing of persons whom the historian calls his authorities. This, according to Prof. Collingwood, is "history improperly so-called" or as he picturesquely calls it "scissors-and-paste history." "But history to-day" he writes, "is no longer a scissors-and-paste affair. Instead of repeating statements accepted on the testimony of authorities, the historian of today makes his own statements on his own authority according to what he finds the evidence in his possession to prove when he analyses it with a certain question in his mind." (P. 59. *Metaphysics*). And what is the bearing of this on Metaphysics ? Collingwood says that the method that the true Historian follows is the method of Metaphysical analysis, "by which the metaphysician discovers what absolute presuppositions have been made in a certain piece of scientific work by using the records of that work as evidence" (P. 59).

The present dissatisfaction with the state of metaphysics can be removed "by taking seriously the proposition that metaphysics is an historical science". And, not regarding it in this way has been responsible for what he calls pseudo-metaphysics. It is the business of true Metaphysics "to find out what absolute presuppositions have actually been made by various persons at

various times in doing various pieces of scientific thinking." But pseudo-Metaphysics is described by him as "a kind of thought in which questions are asked about what are in fact absolute presuppositions, but arising from the erroneous belief that they are relative presuppositions, and therefore, in their capacity as propositions, susceptible of truth and falsehood" (P. 47). To talk of 'schools', 'doctrines', 'theories' is a characteristic of pseudo-Metaphysics. He illustrates this by taking the example of Spinoza. When Spinoza says that Nature is the same as God, he is not propounding a 'metaphysical doctrine' or 'metaphysical theory' but is only stating a historical fact about the religious foundation of Seventeenth century natural science. His is a statement as to certain facts made by contemporary writer. All this stuff about schools, doctrines, theories belongs to the apparatus of pseudo-metaphysics.

And again Prof. Collingwood rejects the notion that there are certain eternal metaphysical problems or that there is a certain repertory of problems which every Metaphysician is under an obligation to deal with. To think so is to take a very unhistorical view of Metaphysics and this is tantamount to landing oneself in pseudo-Metaphysics. The problems of philosophy have a perennial freshness about them. The same problem does never recur any more than the same event. Each age is unique and fresh and its problems are consequently unique and fresh. But to say this is not to deny a certain continuity and resemblance of these problems. He clarifies this idea in a passage in his *An Aut biography* where he says: "I found (and it required a good deal of hard detailed work in the history of thought) that most of the conceptions round which revolve the controversies of modern philosophy, conception; designated by words like 'state', 'ought', 'matter', 'cause', had appeared on the horizon of human thought at ascertainable times in the past, often not very distant times, and that the philosophical controversies of other ages had revolved round other conceptions, not indeed unrelated to ours, but not, except by a person quite blind to historical truth, indistinguishable from them." (P. 68).

Metaphysics is not a museum of dead concepts but an organic

growth ever growing and ever-fresh, sprouting from the soil of time with the smell of the fresh earth clinging to it. If it is rooted out of the soil in which it grows and thrives, it withers and dies. The soil from which Metaphysics grows is the mind of the Metaphysician and his nourishment is the context of time in which he lives or as Prof. Whitehead puts it 'the climate of opinion'. Philosophy becomes then resurgent like life which itself is history. Like the poet who is the child of his age and the voice of his contemporaries who are less endowed with the gift of utterance, the true philosopher is the child of his time and the voice of its absolute presuppositions. It is a sign of life that philosophy can never claim finality for itself. Far from being a weakness this is its strength. It is the purest illusion to think that all philosophical problems were at any time solved completely. In this, Metaphysics is exactly similar to history. The metaphysician's work like "The historian's work is never finished ; every historical subject, like the course of historical events itself, is open at the end, and however hard you work at it the end always remains open. People who are said to 'make history' solve the problems they find confronting them, but create others to be solved, if not by themselves, by their survivors. People who write it, if they write it well, solve problems too ; but every problem solved gives rise to a new problem."

Such are the reflections on Metaphysics that Prof. Collingwood has offered us as the result of his groping after truth from the time when he laid his hands on Descartes' *Principia* in about his ninth year up to the present when recent political events broke up the "pose of a detached professional thinker." The truth dawned on him very early in life "that science is less like a hoard of truths ascertained piecemeal, than an organism which in the course of its history undergoes more or less continuous alteration in every past". (P. 2. *Autobiography*) True to his notion of philosophy as a historical science he has kept pace with the swiftly moving events of the world and is trying "to confront the onslaughts of irrationalism." In the year 1940 he offers his considered opinion that "since

metaphysics is an indispensable condition of science an enemy to metaphysics is an enemy to science, and a reactionary anti-metaphysician is an enemy to whatever in science is progressive". In the critical times through which we are passing, Prof. Collingwood feels that the Metaphysician too has a duty to discharge. In the Epilogue to his monumental work on Metaphysics he writes : "The fate of European science and European civilization is at stake. The gravity of the peril lies especially in the fact that so few recognize any peril to exist. When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed at a college table ; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will." (P-343.)

I have tried to present as fairly as I can Prof. Collingwood's point of view. It now remains for us to consider how far it illuminates the present situation of the study of philosophy in India. We are now full of 'schools' and 'doctrines' of which we proclaim ourselves as adherents. There is nothing wrong in this provided we realize that no one of them can be regarded as having a finished structure, inflexible and unalterable. No one system of philosophy has solved for us for ever our problems. If we seek to study the traditional systems of philosophy to-day it is to detect their absolute presuppositions or those principles which they took absolutely for granted when they emerged from certain historical situations. They have had their roots in their soil and they teem with concepts which were a part of the mental furniture of the people at the time. We are handling those concepts to-day and even use the same terms but our times have changed and the contents of those concepts have also been enriched and enlarged in the light of present-day experience. If to-day some Indian Philosophers have been seeking to interpret Indian philosophy in the light of the concepts of Western philosophy it is but a genuine outcome of the actual historical fact of the coalescence of Eastern and Western thought and their fusion in certain gifted individual minds. Thus a new Indian philosophy is in the making. The study of the history of Indian philosophy is extremely important in the same way as the history

of Western philosophy. To seek to know a tradition is to seek to know the absolute presuppositions that lie at the back of a civilization. Only thus could the uniqueness of philosophical problems be disclosed. The business of a modern Indian philosopher is to approach the study of Indian philosophy in a historical spirit. Each philosopher must learn his philosophy through studying the work of his predecessors. What Prof. Collingwood says of the study of the history of Western philosophical thought is applicable with equal cogency to the study of the history of Indian philosophical thought. "For in that case," he declares, 'each is trying to do what his predecessor did—to philosophize, but to do it better by doing it differently ; assimilating whatever seems true, rejecting whatever seems false, and thus producing a new philosophy which is at the same time an improved version of the old" (P. 195. *Philosophical Method*)

Signs are not wanting that a new *Darsana* is in the making in India. It bids fair to be a unique confluence of several streams of thought rendered possible by certain historical circumstances as they are being shaped in India to-day under the impact of world forces.

The One and the Many

BY

G. R. MALKANI

The problem of the one and the many is a fundamental problem for philosophy. Philosophy seeks the knowledge of the one in the many. But how can we rise to this knowledge? We contend that we can only rise to it through the cancellation of the many. We cannot know the one as real and the many *also* as real. It is evident that if the many are real, the one cannot be real, and *vice-versa*. This is a simple truth. There is no ambiguity about it. But most often we do not recognise it. We start with the assumption that the many which we experience cannot be denied to be real. We have a problem about the one. We have no corresponding problem about the many. The one may or may not be real, the many certainly are. Starting with this bias for the many, it is impossible to get at any real unity. A unity which is consistent with the reality of the many, will be, in the end, subordinate to the many. It will be a spurious unity, not a real unity.

Most western thinkers have suggested unities which are of this kind. They have suggested the unity of a system, the unity of a harmonious whole, the unity of a work of art, etc., as types of real unities. All those unities are valuable and fall within our experience. We cannot deny them. But they are one and all teleological and subjective. Apart from reference to a purpose or an end, the unities in question are meaningless. They are constituted out of the contributions of the many which precede them in existence. The many are distinct entities or real individuals, but they subordinate their separate existence or their individuality to a purpose. The unity is constituted by this purpose. But the purpose is just the thing which we

should rule out from reality conceived as self-existing and non-subjective. What purpose can reality *as a whole* possibly have ? *Whose* purpose can it serve ? What we seek in philosophy is an ontological unity or the unity of being. Here there can be no compromise between the one and the many.

We cannot deny the many. We do not know the one. How shall we proceed and get at the unity ? It is evident that one or the other of these two incompatible concepts must occupy a subordinate position. If the one is real, the many must be apparent and unreal, and *vice-versa*. Faced with this alternative, it is not difficult to make our choice. That which being realised, the other is or can be realised, is fundamental. That, on the other hand, which cannot be realised in and by itself, is non-fundamental.

Let us take the many to be real. In that case, there is no possible means by which their many-ness can be realised. Many-ness is relative. It is achieved through *addition*. *Each one* by itself does not constitute the many. It is only when one is added on to one, that many-ness arises as a possible object of thought or as a thinkable reality. Thus the concept of many-ness is a dependent concept. It depends upon the unity of consciousness or the unity of knowledge. It is not enough that there *should be* many, in order that the many may be realised as such. Knowledge is essential to this realisation. Even existence has no meaning for us apart from the position or the affirmation of it by the subject. This is still more so with the existence of the many. The many which are unasserted may be anything ; they cannot be many in any significant sense. They are many neither to themselves nor to us.

Can we apply the same argument to the unity ? We cannot. Being is naturally unitary. "To be itself" is not a dependent idea like the idea "to be many." Further, the unity does not demand *to be known*. Knowledge involving a dualism of the subject and the object, is external to it. Nay, it contradicts it. As knowledge was seen to be essential to the realisation of the

many, this same knowledge is seen to be contradictory to the nature of the one. The so-called unity of the subject and the object is either no unity at all, in which case the subject and the object are equally real elements standing in a certain external relation ; or it is a real unity, in which case either the subject or the object must be understood and interpreted entirely in terms of the other term and the dualism regarded as apparent and unreal only. What is certain is that unity cannot tolerate knowledge which is external to it and which therefore involves a real dualism. Unity cannot be known. Unity is unity,—and that is really the end of the matter.

It will now be argued : But should not the unity be somehow related to knowledge ! If it is not, how can it be realised the unity it is ? We should have no meaning for a unity which *is*, but which is incapable of being known or the knowledge of which is in conflict with its own proper nature. But if we are to know the unity, we must know the many of which it is the unity. We must naturally ask,—unity *of* what ?, or unity *in* what ? The unity demands the many, as the many demand it.

We admit the unity ought to be essentially related to knowledge. But why should we demand to know it in an external and objective way ? This kind of knowledge is appropriate to the object which is naturally many. It is not appropriate to the unity which cancels the many. The unity is real, if at all, as no-object or as itself the whole. There is no question of knowing *it*. The essential relation to knowledge is only achieved when we conceive the unity as the intelligent self which evidences itself without being known.

It might be thought that we have wrongly equated being with knowledge, and based our whole argument upon this wrong assumption. There is no contradiction in the being of the many. A, B, C, etc., may all severally exist. There is no contradiction in this. Consciousness is the unity underlying our knowledge of the many, not the being of the many. A real many will continue, and ought to continue, inspite of the absence of all knowledge of it. A may not know B, and B may

not know A, etc. But that will not affect their being. Each element may be a universe to itself or in itself. If there is mutual knowledge, that is an additional and accidental fact. From the being of the many, nothing follows as to their mutual knowledge. The many, by their very nature, do not demand any essential or real unity.

It appears to us that although we have no argument *against* a view like this, it is not a view which can be significantly held or defended. If we dissociate being from knowledge, we can make no significant statement about this being. We can neither say that it is one, nor that it is many; we can neither say that it has this particular character, nor that it has another. Are the many left? But who can assert this? If no-one knows the many, in what universe are the many real? If I cannot take note of another, is another real for me? The truth is that reality, for all theoretical as well as practical purposes, is inseparable from the knowledge of it. If A, for example, does not know B, C, D etc., these are as good as non-existent *to it*. What is its universe? Its universe contains one term only, — and that is A. A has every right to declare itself the Absolute, if it could take note of its own situation. Its universe is not limited by anything from outside, whereby it may recognise itself to be one among many. A similar argument applies to every other supposed element of the real. Can we now reasonably say that there are many Absolutes? If we say so, we make a mistake. There is no possible point of view within the real itself from which this could be asserted. Logically, there cannot be many Absolutes. For so to speak of them would be going beyond them to what is a unity of them, and thereby reducing them to finites.

Let us now suppose that the many are known. Are they not real in that case at least? Our knowledge itself proves them to be real. If they are not real, although known, we are reduced to solipsism. One self alone is real, and other selfs are parts of his experience. If that is so, what is this privileged self? Is it you who are asserting or the person with whom you are disputing.

or a third neutral party? The very possibility of this question shows that you can not regard yourself to be the sole reality; and there is no other person who has a better right to it. The very fact of a dispute or a conflict of views arising contradicts the solipsistic position.

We take it for granted that knowledge must have reference to another or a reality which is outside of us. But this is just incomprehensible. Why should an outside reality be at all known? I can directly know myself and my states. They are part of me. An outside reality is no part of me. How is the gulf to be bridged? The view that knowledge, by its very nature, bridges the gulf, is dogmatic. If knowledge were capable of performing this miracle, it should do so unaided by any instruments of knowledge, such as sense-organs, etc. But the very fact that we depend upon our own sensations in order to know an outside reality, reduces that reality to our own state. Can we ever transcend our own states? We do not think that to be possible unless we can intuit reality directly and without subjective mediation of any sort.

It appears to us that there is not a single argument against solipsism. It is absolutely self-consistent. If I hold that the many are part of my experience and have no transcendent reality, what argument can you have against me? You cannot point to something which really transcends my experience. What really transcends cannot fall within my experience and cannot be pointed out. On the other hand, I can argue against you. It is all as in dreams. The other individuals are my creations, and yet I react to them as though they were real and transcendent to me. The solipsistic position is irrefutable. The only argument against it is a certain bias derived from the needs of life and activity, reason or no reason, we do not *want* to believe solipsistically.

You want to know, what self constitutes the unity in question or is the sole reality. *Whose* self is that? We reply, it is *you* or the self of the person asking. Let this person take himself seriously, and try to know his own true self. This self is

the only ground of the appearances of reality which is the world. To know the self as such a ground is to know it as the ultimate reality or the unity of all things. The self in itself is not unknown. It is not unrelated to intuition. In fact, it is the soul of every intuition; it is pure intuition. What we do not know is the true significance of this knowledge of the self which we already possess. This significance has to be elicited. The process of eliciting it is what we call philosophy.

Value-Consciousness

BY

H. M. BHATTACHARYYA

An enquiry into the nature of value-consciousness involves an inescapable reference to some kind of conception of value, subjective or objective, relative or absolute. Values have been distinguished under various heads according to the varied urges of life in relation to reality, such as economic, social, material or spiritual. It is not, however, our present concern to analyse each of them and to show in detail their relation to the consciousness of value in all its possible modes. It would just suffice for our purpose to assume the broad distinction of values into subjective and relative on the one side and objective and absolute on the other; and to proceed with the analysis of the consciousness of value on the line of that distinction.

If, the absolute values are those objectively real spiritual forces which manifest themselves in the course of the progressive realisation of the true being of man and the universe, and as well determine such progressive realisation, then the relative values are only those stages in this realisation-process which mark perpetual transvaluation of the lower values into the higher ones.

This conception of value then marks it out from the "Natural Selection" theory of value in that it does not make value to consist in the mere maintenance of the order of existence of things as they are, and therefore does not obliterate the distinction between fact and value. Nor does it equate it with the 'Appreciative Theory' of value which makes all values subjective and personal, nor again with what is called Timological theory of value which makes values to be mere mystical existences, static and unconcerned with life and the universe,

answering to the Platonic ideas. They are as I have maintained, the real dynamic spiritual entities drawing out the fuller and fuller being of life and the universe as man in his attunement with Reality rises from the biological to the psychical and from the psychical to the spiritual level of his being. The highest and the absolute values of Truth, Love and Goodness are thus the real constituents of the Absolute Reality or God who immanently interpenetrates every being physical, psycho-biological, even spiritual existences, giving them meaning and value according to their degrees of progress towards the fuller and fuller realisation of their being

Such being my conceptions of the absolute and the relative values it is by way of a kind of deduction that I would try to show how the different elements of consciousness are brought to bear upon the values. It is not however exactly on the line of Kantian Transcendental Deduction. It would be deduction in so far as the lower and therefore subjective and relative values are concerned. The elements of consciousness that are involved in the appreciation of the material, economic and social values which are all relative like the *artha*, *kama* and *dharma* as the Indian thinkers conceive them, proceeding as they do from the psycho-biological level of the human existence may be said to be *deduced* in this sense, but not transcendental in as much as they are merely the psychical correlates and not antecedent conditions of the valuation of the goods of the actual world. There is no necessity of an absolute distinction being made between the sensible and the *a priori* elements in value-consciousness in so far as the relative values are concerned, just as there is no necessity of such a distinction according to my standpoint even in purely cognitive consciousness. Both cognitive and valuational consciousness may be said to have the common origin in the same empirical level of which both apprehension and appreciation are but two phases. The values remain in the lower and the relative level so long as psycho-biological aspect of human life persists in any degree and a complete spiritualisation of the human constitution has not been achieved. Truth, Goodness and Love in

their absolute character are beyond the realisation of psycho-biological centres, for no form of consciousness within the reach of psycho-biological centres is adapted to these absolute values.

I have maintained therefore that the kind of consciousness engaged in the appreciation of the relative values is after all empirical or belongs to the empirical level, no matter how it operates in its varied forms and degrees corresponding to the variety of the value and even of the disvalue it sets over itself to evaluate.

But when we come to the realm of absolute values, Truth, Goodness and Love, which make up the ultimate constituents of Reality, then the value-consciousness assumes a different dimension. It is not a case of deduction but one of identity. It is the identity of the spiritual aspect of man with Reality ; the psycho-biological aspect of man in its relation to the relative goods or values having been transcended the essential spiritual nature of man finds its kinship with Reality. I would like to call it Transcendent Identity. But this discernment of identity is not often without its delusions and blindness. What is intrinsically True, Good or blissful may at times be confounded with what is short of these. This often happens in the life of those who are in quest of Reality. It requires a long continued concentration and tremendous psychical energising to uplift the whole being into that spiritual height which, when reached, prepares the man for his attunement to Reality. It will not be proper to say that at this stage the values are attained but rather that the values manifest themselves to the completely spiritualised man who has already transfigured the vital mental part of his being into his essentially spiritual nature. His entire being now vibrates with Reality, Truth, Goodness and Love in their intrinsic transcendent character are appropriated by this essentially spiritual nature, thus establishing the Transcendent identity of essence between itself and Reality. Thus the value-consciousness in

this highest stage is the consciousness of identity between man's spiritual nature with Reality. But the identity here is certainly not complete so long as we maintain the immanent view of Reality, it can only mean the nearest possible approach to Reality. It becomes complete when Reality is viewed as one transcendent reality and the individual spiritual centres in their highest level are conceived as unified with that one transcendent Reality. It is not that at this level the values manifest themselves to individual spiritual centres, but that these centres lose their individuality in the being of Reality only to find themselves in an infinitely enriched Being which is at the same time Truth, Goodness and Love.

It is evident then that the nature of this consciousness cannot be empirical, determined by the Vital-mental constitution of man and distinguishable into varieties of elements. It is transcendent and metempiric and unique. The empirical conditions and factors of consciousness have no longer any force of determining it. For it is not *made* but it *is*, it is not discovered but only uncovered. In this transcendent consciousness the values of Truth, Goodness and Love are one and interpenetrate one another. It is only the human way of distinguishing them for logical purposes that makes us speak of them as distinct, though they are all one.

The Final Subjective Form of Whitehead

BY

ANIL KUMAR SARKAR

The conception of the final subjective form of Whitehead is certainly an important conception of his philosophy of Creativity. It is the goal of creativity. The creative march is towards that final goal. His philosophy of the emergence of forms, the focussing of eternal objects in occasions, is the general thought of his system. That all "forms" ultimately tend towards the final "subjective form," is also an important concept. If understood properly, the final subjective form becomes only the focussing of the universe of eternal objects (the realm of possibilities) into final temporal syntheses or processes or occasions. But the moment it is conceived of, another thought automatically arises, and that is the merging of all "forms" into that "form". If Whitehead does not accept this final absorption or fusion, and maintains a sort of pluralism, a pluralism of forms, and a final subjective form, he will have to hold as well that these forms are linked with the *final*, though they do not merge into it, still, there is some form of connection between the "forms" and the final "subjective form". If all "forms" merge into the final "subjective form", all "forms" become naturally fused into it, but if it be held that the forms remain intact, and the world-move is towards the *final*, and then his doctrine will tend towards "Pluralistic Monism." In that case, also, he will have to posit that the "forms" have surely connection with the final "form", for the final "form" is the goal of all "forms".

If it be admitted that they do not merge into it, it must also be admitted that they at least tend towards it. All are connected with the "final" as tending towards it and trying to reach it by their respective "subjective aims". In fine, all

are connected, for the final end of Creativity itself, and hence all "forms" are nothing but realizations of Creativity, they must be related to, and they must tend to the final "subjective form." The final "subjective form" cannot come into existence without them. The "forms" are nothing but so many attempts of Creativity to realise the final "subjective aim" in the final "subjective form". It is tending towards the final intensive feeling. The final intensive feeling is a harmonised situation, it is the 'final form', hence the final beauty, but, in it, there is a final realization of truth, a perfect conformity of *appearance* and *reality*, it is the final good. There is no further adjustment of "appearance" to "reality", for it is the last "appearance", the end of all "Adventures of Ideas".

As all tend towards the realization of Final Beauty, Final Truth, and Final Good, all have a share in the "subjective aim" of Creativity. In this sense, though each "form" has a distinct "subjective aim" of its own, still the "subjective aim" of each has a tendency to reach the final "subjective aim" of "Creativity". In spite of their distinct entities their aim is the same, the aim of Creativity. This monistic end, and also a pluralistic basis or attitude (in holding the distinct realities of the finite forms) can be very well maintained, but still the thought lingers in this form that in some way all merge into the "subjective aim" of the "final form" otherwise, how can they be directed by Creativity? A real directive control can only be understood when the "subjective aims" tend towards the final "subjective aim". They cannot remain as finite existences in their finite forms. They must tend to reach or become the "final".

Creativity is focussed into them, in various forms, but yet it directs them to the final. In the final, there is a tendency towards annihilation of the finite "form", in the sense they realise a common "subjective aim" in the final "subjective form." But Whitehead says that though they realise it, still they, as distinct forms, maintain their own entities or forms and are distinct from the 'final' as not themselves 'final'. This saving

them from ultimate annihilation is the basis of the "Pluralistic Monism" of Whitehead.

But still when we reflect on the final "subjective form", an idea of total absorption or fusion comes into our minds. Monism thus becomes realised. The whole universe realises a final focussing, and as soon as the final focussing is realised, the further emergence into "forms" ends, there is at least a thought of cessation, an end of further process, though we may not hold an annihilation of all the forms into it, still we shall have to hold, or at least we cannot take objection to the view that all further movement or focussing ceases to exist when the *final* is reached. Whitehead may maintain that we are not very much concerned with the *final*, and we should not think beyond it, but still the human mind wants to think beyond.

If we begin to think of the beyond, we find only this idea. Though there is no complete merging into the final "subjective form", there is no absorption or fusion into monism, as in the Absolute of Bradley, still, there is no further process or "form", is an indubitable fact. If this be a fact, then it goes without saying that there is at least an end or annihilation of the further process on its arrival. So we are constrained to say and admit that it is the final focussing of non-temporality into temporality. The moment this is obtained, creativity passes back into its 'indeterminateness' or at least "immediacy" of the final subjective feeling or subjective aim, though we may admit that this passing into a last "appearance" is an enriched form of indeterminateness, where the full satisfaction of "determinateness" has been realised. It is a cessation of all determination, since the final determination or appearance has been obtained. In this sense, it does not need any further determination, so a kind of indetermination again shrouds Creativity.

If Whitehead says that all determination of Creativity is due to the principle of limitation or concretion or God, and

this is a metaphysical conception and a need,¹ there ought to be further metaphysical principle and a need, the merging of that limitation with eternal objects and occasions into Creativity itself. So that like the Absolute of Hegel, it may be said that the Spiritual Absolute, is a Concrete Absolute, and a return is an enriched form of it. The reacting of Creativity into such a "subjective form" is only getting itself back in its direction by limitation. It is getting an escape from limitation, it is an end of that function. It was a metaphysical demand to make the Creative process determined, and this determination was to understand the world-process of temporality, but never losing the eternal aspect in the process, and coming to the final "subjective form", is passing into eternity, passing into the immediacy of permanence and eternity i.e. "subjective aim" and gaining back into the indeterminate character of it—a gaining back into Creativity itself. As it is a metaphysical need to posit the principle of limitation, so there is a metaphysical need to feel the end of that function of limitation at the final, "subjective form" where that function ends. It is an invitation to a form of "Platonism". So we are to suppose that the principle of limitation is a metaphysical need to understand the directive and determinate movement of the universe towards "form" and at last to a "final form", but the conception of the "final form", brings in another metaphysical need, the end and annihilation of the function of limitation, for when this final stage is attained or the final "Appearance" is attained, there remains no need of further adjustment of "Appearance" to "Reality." All these thoughts lead us to think of the principle of limitation as nothing but a "Maya." It is a metaphysical need to posit it, to understand all the determinate movements, but there is a further need to think of its annihilation or end, and this function when we think of the final "subjective form," we cannot avoid also this last metaphysical need.²

1. *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter, XI. P. 208. (Pelican Books)

2. Though Whitehead does not admit this, still he has no ground to deny

So there can be no doubt that both these functions are metaphysical needs. They serve certain functions. The principle of limitation is at last pragmatic for the understanding of Creativity. It may be called "Maya" or "ineffable" not really an "illusion", and we need such a concept for understanding the evolution and Creativity in our human terms. The metaphysical goal is nothing but the thought of the end of that function. Whitehead does not think of this thought, but we can not avoid this natural conclusion. Our understanding of Creativity is certainly a human conception, it is only real from our human point of view. If we think of the final goal, we may at the beginning say that the goal is towards "Pluralistic Monism", but at last there cannot be but an end in "Monism", for the principle of limitation is not posited to be operative any more, and when it is not operative any more, our eyes cannot go to pluralism, to "forms", we only think of the "final form", and think that the *final* is pure indeterminateness, only an "appearance", an "immediacy of feeling" it is the end of all conceptual adventures, there is the termination of the "Adventures of Ideas",—an intensity of feeling, a harmonious situation no doubt, but in feeling the harmony, no longer the thought of limiting Creativity comes into mind, for its function is ended. To bring its function again would be to repeat the world-process. The final "subjective form" ends all such thought and frees our mind from the principle of limitation. A function that had need once, ceased to be needful any more. So the conception of 'limitation', though a necessary conception for the understanding of 'Creativity', but when its function finishes with the arrival at the "final subjective form", it becomes no longer useful. Viewed, thus, an idea of ineffability comes when we try to think of it. It has only a pragmatic necessity as the concept of "Maya" in our conception of Brahman in the Vedanta philosophy. "Maya" has certain function to perform

since after the final 'subjective form,' the principle of limitation or concretion, is no longer needed, its function ceases as no longer useful.

but when its function ends, it is no longer thought useful, so is Whitehead's principle of limitation or concretion. Thus conceived, this principle becomes a "Maya", of course its function is to be construed in its relation to Creativity. It has a pragmatic necessity, only a human value, and it has no ultimate reality, only Creativity is the ultimate reality.

So the great philosophic venture must end at last in declaring that it is a human necessity, or a metaphysical necessity, though nothing can be spoken of its ultimate reality, for Creativity is alone ultimately real. Whitehead considers this principle as an "attribute" of Creativity. This is no doubt finding out its place and function and also its reality in Creativity. This only carries Whitehead more towards Ramanuja, but he cannot maintain its reality to the end, so he has to admit that it has no need after the attainment of the final "subjective form". This makes it again unreal, or only a human necessity, and his concept of limitation, concretion, or God, does not get more reality than the concept of Maya in advaita Philosophy. We find, therefore, that Whitehead cannot do full justice to his philosophy of Creativity without an ultimate principle of limitation, he cannot say anything about it, but has to admit it only to make his concept of Creativity comprehensible in human terms. It cannot remove its "ineffability". So though it is not the "Maya" principle of advaita philosophy, it is nevertheless the principle of "Maya" admitted to understand a philosophy of Creativity. So the Vedantic concept of the 'ineffable' has really great meaning in philosophy. Only ultimately the thought of reality in some form, Creativity or Brahman, remains and the principle of limitation or 'Maya' ends. The whole philosophic venture, our "Adventures of Ideas," is only to feel the need of ultimate reality and nothing beyond. To explain its ways, to understand its functions, or processes would be to invite all forms of subjectivism, or "Maya", that must be our natural conclusion. Only we cannot deny an ultimate reality, Creativity or Brahman but we do not

know what is its function, what is it in reality without any human qualification. To explain it in any way, we shall have to posit something that will be nothing but a 'Maya'—a human mechanism, and nothing else—the final sword of all monistic conceptions.

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The Effect of Feeling on Memory

BY

SAMBHUNATH ROY

The problem we seek to solve by the experiments we have conducted is : Does feeling affect the recall of our experiences ? Individual and group tests were employed ; and we shall proceed to explain in the following pages the aforesaid tests and the results they have led to.

But before we go to the tests we would like to refer to the experimental results obtained by other workers in the same field. In 1918 E. C. Tolman and J. Johnson gave their subjects, both men and women, three groups of stimulus-words—pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent, and found that “names of simple but unpleasant sense qualities used as stimulus tend to lengthen association times quite as much as do unpleasant words of deeper emotional significance (2) Women show a tendency to be affected by unpleasant stimulus words more than do men”. (Amer. J. of Psy., 1918).

In 1921. W. Whately Smith tried to determine the influence of feeling upon memory by using Jung’s reproduction test and measuring the reaction time. He came to the conclusion that intensely feeling-toned words are better retained or more easily forgotten than less intensely feeling-toned words. (Br. J. of Psy. 1921).

In 1923 A. Wohlgemuth published a paper in the Br. J. of Psy. on the “Influence of Feeling on Memory”. He followed the lines in which Kowalewski’s experiments were conducted. Kowalewski experimented with 105 boys of an elementary school, their ages varying from 9 to 15. After repeated experiments Kowalewski come to the conclusion that the boys

could be classified into "Memory-optimists", "pessimists" and "indifferencists" according to whether the pleasant or unpleasant experiences predominated or were equal.

Wohlgemuth writes that experiments were made on 405 children (age 11-16 years) of one school and on 284 children (age 11-16 years) of another school in respect of their memory of pleasant and unpleasant experiences on a half term holiday. They were asked to write down their pleasant experiences of the preceding holiday on one side of a paper and their unpleasant experiences on the other side of the same paper. On a second occasion in one school 10 days and in another 14 days after the first test was given, the same children were asked to put down all their pleasant and unpleasant experiences of the same holiday about which they had made their records on the first day of the test.

The whole of the results were pooled thus :

Pleasant experiences recorded in first paper 6735

„ „ forgotten in second paper 2700 = 39·8p.c.

Wohlgemuth concluded that "there is no difference whatever between the two feeling tones, pleasure and displeasure, in their influence upon memory."

We shall now proceed to state the method we followed in the experiment.

On Monday the 12th August, 1940, 33 4th-year Psychology students of the B. N. College, their ages ranging from 18 to 25, were asked to write down their pleasant and unpleasant experiences of the previous Sunday on a sheet of paper supplied to them, at the top of which each was asked to put down his name and age. No suggestion was given to the effect that the pleasant experiences were to be written down on one side of the paper and the unpleasant experiences on the other side separately. They were rather advised to record their experiences in the order in which the experiences revived in memory.

A week after this test they were again asked to recollect the pleasant and unpleasant experiences of the Sunday in question and to record them as before.

The results were :

Number of pleasant experiences recalled on
the first day of the test 75

Number of pleasant experiences *forgotten*
on the second day of the test 13-17. 3 p.c.

Number of unpleasant experiences *recalled*
on the first day of the test 67

Number of unpleasant experiences
forgotten on the second day of the test 13-19. 4 p.c.

Then the experiment was tried with Third year Psychology students. 33 students, their ages ranging between 17 and 24, were asked on 27-8-40 the day following the Janmastami holiday, to record each on a sheet of paper supplied, their pleasant and unpleasant experiences of the Janmastami holiday. Each was asked to put down his name and age at the top of the paper. This experiment was repeated after a lapse of 14 days.

The results were :

Number of pleasant experiences recalled
on the first day 96

Number of pleasant experiences *forgotten*
on the second day 22-23 p.c.

Number of unpleasant experiences recalled
on the first day 67

Number of unpleasant experiences *for-*
gotten on the second day 12-18 p.c.

Total results followed :

Number of pleasant experiences recalled
on the first day 171

Number of pleasant experiences for-
gotten on the second day 35-20.5 p.c.

Number of unpleasant experiences recalled
on the first day 134

Number of unpleasant experiences for-
gotten on the second day 25-18.5 p.c.

We attached more importance to the order of revival of these experiences. We found that invariably the pleasant experiences were first recorded and then the unpleasant experiences. The other fact noted by us was that of the first group of 33 boys, 13 boys forgot some of the experiences which they recorded on the first day of the test, but the remaining 20 boys did not forget any of the experiences which they recorded on the first day. Considering these 13 cases only we find that the percentage of pleasant experiences forgotten was 35 and that of the unpleasant experiences forgotten was 36.

Again, of the second group of 33 boys, 18 boys forgot some of the experiences they recorded on the first day and the remaining 15 boys did not forget any of the experiences which they recorded on the first day. Considering these 18 cases only we find that the percentage of pleasant experiences forgotten was 38 and that of unpleasant experiences forgotten was 31.

Another important fact which demands attention is that some boys could recollect some pleasant and unpleasant experiences on the second day of the test, which they failed to recollect on the first day. This fact leads us to believe that recollection depends to some extent upon the attitude of the

subject at the time of recall. It may be held that memory is influenced by a kind of subjective preference and that is why we fail to recollect some recent experiences which however we can easily recall on a later occasion.

But whether or not there is some such subjective preference for materials to be recalled can be understood by reference to other experiments we made.

It was found that out of the 81 subjects examined only 35 numbered the first name *recalled* as first, but in no case the least preferred person was given the last place in the order of recall.

From these observations we come to the conclusion that feeling or subjective preference does not produce any appreciable effect on memory.

These experiments neither prove nor disprove the Freudian theory that the mind has a tendency to brush aside from consciousness unpleasant experiences and to prevent the recall of such experiences and all that is associated with them. The items of experiences forgotten by our subjects, were both pleasant and unpleasant, and we cannot definitely state that they forgot the unpleasant experiences because of repression. "We forget because we wish to forget" is a theory that gets its support from the biological law namely the tendency of the living organism to approach what is pleasant and to avoid what is painful. But 'repression' is a word that suggests an inhibitory force by which consciousness, is guarded against painful experiences, as Dr. E. Jones points out. It is difficult to apply this theory to all cases of forgetting although Dr. Jones is definitely of opinion that all forgetting is due to repression. It is unquestionably true that we fail to remember many pleasant experiences, but whether such introspectively pleasant experiences have associations with unpleasant experiences of the unconscious mind is a question

which we cannot decide. But we can say with certainty that the evidences at our disposal do not prove any conscious preference for the retention of pleasant experiences. Many pleasant experiences are easily forgotten and most intensely unpleasant experiences return to our mind every now and then.

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The Axiology of the Normalbewusstsein

BY

R. M. LOOMBA

This paper proposes to offer a critical examination of an axiological system which holds a place in the advance guard of this contemporary thought-current. Expounded by Windelband, it has laid the foundations of the Neo-Fichtean philosophy of values and sought to reconcile Fichte with Kant. It defines critical philosophy as the science of universal and necessary values. The realm of these universal values comprises, according to it, logical and aesthetic as well as ethical norms. And, it is maintained, the acceptance of all these three types of value is forced upon the empirical consciousness in an immediate experience of a general normative consciousness, a *Normalbewusstsein* with a transcendental subject.

Windelband proceeds to develop the forms in which the immediate transcendental normative consciousness manifests itself in the three types of value. In this attempt he is led to certain sharp divisions, distinctions and classifications which land him into several difficulties and inconsistencies.

Knowledge, for Windelband, as for Kant, consists in the formative and synthetic act of judgment. But, Windelband further holds that the judgment also implies another, a deeper reflective act in which every judgment itself is claimed to be true or false. Over and above the intellectual element of bringing together contents in a certain relation, there is always an act of assent or dissent on the part of a will which defines the realm of validity or *Geltung*. This will is, of course, not the particular empirical will. For truth must be universally valid. It is, according to him, transcendental, "logical consciousness in general", a *logisches Bewusstsein überhaupt*.

Truth, then, is not, for Windelband, a correspondence of ideas to facts. It is, on the other hand, a satisfaction of the fundamental demands of the transcendental subject, the *Normalbewusstsein*, revealed to the empirical subject in this logical consciousness in general.

To complete the picture, then, moral values must be given, according to Windelband, to the empirical subject in an immediate revelation of the transcendental will in a 'moral consciousness in general'; and, likewise, the aesthetic values in a similar 'aesthetic consciousness in general'.

But this sharp division and delimitation of different spheres of consciousness in respect of different types of values is hardly consistent with Windelband's frequent tendency to identify all value in general with moral duty. It is allright when he says that the universal end alone imparts meaning and value to our knowledge. But when he adds immediately afterwards that this end can be achieved only when thought is regarded as a moral duty, and continues to say that it is moral force that, during the activity of thought, restrains extraneous impressions, personal interests and the temptations of the imagination, he is certainly guilty of trespass beyond the self-imposed limits of his own creed. He could have said that thought must be regarded as a duty to the transcendental will and to the ideals revealed to us by it in an immediate experience of the *Normalbewusstsein*. But the moral duties are, by his own doctrine, only one set of ideals thus revealed, and a set absolutely apart and distinct from the logical, and therefore can not govern the latter.

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Further, the unit of knowledge is, according to him, the formative and synthetic act of judgment. Now, he draws a distinction between two kinds of judgments, between judgments in which the connection between two representative

concepts is expressed, which he calls *Urteile*, and judgments which express the relation between the judging consciousness and the represented object, which he calls *Beurteilungen*. The former are of the type "this thing is white" and the latter of the type "this thing is good". There is, according to him, a fundamental difference between the two kinds of judgments which may be expressed by saying that the former, the *Urteile*, are purely theoretic judgments in which we problematically establish a connection between the two presentations without giving any opinion as to their value, while in the latter, the *Beurteilungen*, we ascribe or deny universal validity to that relation, presupposing a determinate end as the unit of measurement, of significance only to him who recognises that end, and presented to us with the two fundamental alternatives of pleasing and displeasing, approving and disapproving, accepting and refusing. The latter alone, he says, are the special object of philosophy, whose business is to determine the *ought* of facts, the *Sollen*, which all must recognise to be equally valid, even if it does not exist in practice or is not actually a fact. The former, on the other hand, constitutes the special object of the "special sciences" whose business is merely to determine the natural necessity of facts, only the *Müssen*, without any reference to their ought, their validity or value.

But, has not Windelband already maintained, at the very start, that every formative and synthetic act of judgment involves a deeper reflexive act in which the judgment itself is claimed to be true or false? Has he not asserted that there is always, over and above the intellectual element of bringing together contents in a certain relation, an act of assent or dissent on the part of the will which defines a realm of validity? Should it not, then, follow, if there is to be any consistency in Windelband's axiological scheme, that even the judgments which he calls the *Urteile* involve the same deeper reflexive act of valuation as those he styles the *Beurteilungen* and are rooted in the same immediate force of the revelation of the transcendental 'logical consciousness in general' to the empirical subject

from which the latter spring ? Should they also not necessarily involve, as such, ascription or denial of validity to the relations asserted therein ? Would it not be self-contradiction to refuse to them, while admitting to the *Beurteilungen*, presupposition of a determinate end as a unit of measurement presented with both its alternatives of approval and disapproval, acceptance or rejection ? Has Windelband, then, the right, or any grounds, on his principles, to refuse the *Urteile* the status of the special object of philosophy whose business is to determine the ought, the *Sollen* of facts, and to whittle them down as merely theoretic, as merely the object of the special sciences with no ought, no *Sollen* but only natural necessity, only the *Müssen* of facts for its sphere of discourse ?

Windelband, firstly, is inconsistent with his own earlier contention that the special sciences, of which history is one, consists of *Urteile*, which do not consider values at all, and are thus opposed to philosophy, which consists of *Beurteilungen* and of which values are the proper and special object. Equally, again, is he inconsistent here with his contention that all judgments are expressions of the logical normative consciousness. For only the historical judgments and the *Beurteilungen* remain as valuational to witness the presentation of the eternal reality of value. At other times, however, the historical judgment is reclaimed in still another manner. It then appears as the special field of philosophy. So that sometimes the historical judgments and sometimes the *Beurteilungen* claim the right to be the exclusive object of philosophy.

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To sum up Windelband unconditionally surrenders himself to Kant and to his fundamental error. The later discovery of logical and aesthetic values, which Windelband himself was probably the first to systematically weave into the axiological scheme, is forgotten and ignored. His own great effort at an exhaustive and comprehensive system of value philosophy stands self-nullified. He had set out to rid the theory of value of the defects of Fichte's thought and his own Neo-Fichteanism

was guilty of them. He had sought to retain Kant's distinction between pure and practical reason without his scepticism of the former, and he himself could not resist the temptation of identifying value with moral sense and of denying it to logical thought altogether. Windelband's object was the systematic synthesis of the valuable in Kant and Fichte, and in effect it has proved an alternation between their respective pitfalls.

The Doctrine of Ultimate Reality and its Application to Society

BY

MANUBHAI C. PANDYA

Sankara's Conception of Reality.

Brahman according to Sankara transcends time, space and causation and is impersonal, indeterminate, attributeless, immutable, eternal and Infinite. It is pure Existence, pure consciousness, and pure Bliss. It is immaterial and pure spirit of self which is all-pervasive. Existence, Consciousness and Bliss are not attributes of Brahman but are identical with one another and with Brahman the subject and they constitute its essence and reality. According to Sankara, Brahman is not an empty abstraction but is a concrete universal existence which is all-comprehensive. Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. Being the material cause of everything, Brahman is ultimately real, while the phenomenal world has a relative reality only and it depends on Brahman for its activities. Brahman being the efficient cause also, it is non-dual as it precludes anything else being such an efficient cause. Brahman includes all the infinite detail of the subject but has no distinctions or plurality within its unity and integrality which transcend thought and relations. Unlike Plato, Sankara does not regard the universal forms of the Phenomenal world of names and forms as eternal but as appearances only. The forms being entirely dependent on Brahman for their subsistence are appearances only. Brahman is the only one and true universal which is non-dual and ultimate reality. It pervades all particulars and appears as the various objects. It is at the back of the world and its ground. The world of appearances on the other hand has only a relative

reality and an instrumental value. For understanding the supreme Brahman, Sankara points to pure self (Atman) and holds that they are identical. Though Brahman is indeterminate and unknowable, yet it is experienceable by intuition which is above intellect and transcends thought. We have glimpses of the supreme Being in certain forms of experience like the aesthetic, the religious, and the mystic.

Ramanuja's Conception

Ramanuja does not view Brahman as attributeless but as an essentially Personal God possessing infinite excellent attributes of truth, good and beauty. He does not accept Sankara's theory of illusory appearance or *Māyāvāda* and looks upon the world as real, having been produced and sustained by Brahman and related to Brahman as part to whole. The individual soul too is not identical with Brahman but constitutes a part of it only. Ramanuja conceives Brahman as an organism having the souls and matter as its body. Brahman according to Ramanuja is not a bare one but a *one in many*, an organic whole, a perfect and harmonious system of an infinite number of finite selves as its members which form its body. The theory of internal relations is a corollary to the organic conception of Brahman by which the individual does not lose itself in the Absolute but is preserved therein with the relations which are inward.

It has been however pointed out by Bradley that in the Absolute there are no relations and that finite selves must blend and undergo complete transformation. Even if we assume that somehow there are relations within the Absolute, we have no criterion to distinguish one individual from another in the liberated state. Again many selves mean many reals and a pluralism which is denounced by the Upanishads. The Upanishads teach the doctrine of transcendental idealism of Brahman as one only without a second.

Sankara is a rigorous monist and he does not accept Ramanuja's doctrine of Brahman as identity in difference as both identity and difference are concepts of thought and they cannot

express the true nature of reality which is transcendental existence and idealism and is realizable by intuition only, when thought is transcended, as also duality. To avoid confusion of thought and for clarification, Sankara describes Brahman under two aspects or standpoints viz., transcendental (*Nirguna*) and immanent (*Saguna*) and prescribes two separate methods viz., knowledge and devotion respectively for realising Brahman. It may however be stated here that Sankara never treats Saguna Brahman or Iswara as something other than and distinct from Nirguna Brahman or that Iswara is a lower Brahman. The immanent God is really the same as the transcendent Brahman. "It is not possible to regard the Nirguna and Saguna as two separate entities. Behind the multiplicity of names and forms there is the underlying unity. The Nirguna aspect is emphasised to show that Brahman is unaffected by the changing names and forms of the phenomenal world. As this unity is the indwelling spirit working in the world, as it is the impelling force or energy which makes thing move or change, its Saguna aspect has been mentioned which shows that it controls and directs all movement-changes in the world. To show this two-fold relation of Brahman with the world viz., standing unaffected, yet controlling, the Nirguna and Saguna aspects are given in the Vedanta".

The supreme goal of Indian life is realization of one's unity with the ultimate reality, and hence it becomes necessary to inquire what the criterion of truth is. Western philosophers have laid down certain tests for determining truth and theories of correspondence, coherence and utility and workability, have been accordingly propounded by Realists, Idealists and Pragmatists respectively. These tests however hold good at empirical level only but they do not help us in determining the nature of ultimate reality or Absolute truth and none of them is ultimate. Ultimate Reality is not a harmonious whole as harmony holds between plurality but this view conflicts with Sankara's view of ultimate Reality which is non-difference and supra-rational. Some of these tests again as utility and workability are tests of value but not of truth.

Non-contradiction as a test of truth and reality gives a correct theory of error and illusion as something positive but denies their existence in ultimate Reality. Further non-contradiction can be the test of both the phenomenal and the noumenal truths and it does not conflict with the dualistic aspect of the former. Thus a false judgment 'That is a man' is contradicted by the judgment 'that is a tree trunk'. Reality is defined by Sankara and Madhusudan Sarasvati the author of *Advaitasidhi*, as that which is never contradicted at any time or place or under any circumstances. Not a single object or thing in this phenomenal world as perceived by our senses is real as it fails to satisfy the above test. Truth is its own criterion and standard and there is no external standard to prove it. Truth is the whole and is eternal existence which is at the back of the phenomenal world. It is self-revealing and is known only through itself. But falsity is not known through itself but through another according to the principle of non-contradiction. Absolute existence alone satisfies the above test of Truth and it can never be contradicted by any existence in this phenomenal world. Truth is identical with reality and is eternal and all-comprehensive existence. The Absolute as eternal Reality is very different from the phenomenal world of empiric reality, which is relative only and has a transitory existence. Absolute Reality or existence alone is ultimate and eternal.

Sankara gives cogent reasons to show why the world as it appears cannot be the real world, and why it is an appearance only. The ultimate reality is a spiritual unity. The reasons urged by Sankara do not much differ from those advanced by the Western philosophers—Plato, Hegel and Bradley for rejecting the outside world as real world. Thus matter is full of contradictions and contradictory statements viz., it is large, small, cold, warm etc., at the same time. Matter is again constantly changing but the ultimate reality is eternal and exempt from change. The material world is extended indefinitely in space and time. But ultimate reality is a completed whole having a transcendental integrality of its own. Therefore

Sankara denies full reality to the ordinary world of names and forms. But even according to Sankara, the world as it appears is not a pure illusion having no basis in reality as propounded by Nihilistic Buddhas.

The ultimate reality is the original unity which is the immediate centre of all mediate experience. When we experience plurality, unity does not cease to exist but recedes to the background. It is only because of its presence even at the background that we are able to connect the differences. Unity does not deny plurality. Likewise the Infinite does not deny the finite. Plurality and diversity can exist phenomenally, because of the unity in which terms and relations germinate and from which they grow. The bond connecting the differences with reality is non-difference. Therefore the world with its differences is in reality non-different from the unity of the Absolute and it has no existence apart from and independent of the Ultimate reality. Non-difference here does not mean identity for this is impossible between the world and the Absolute but it only means that there is no difference. In other words the two, the Absolute and the world have not the same degree of reality. The denial of identity however does not establish the difference of the world and the Absolute as duality is denied by the Upanishads but it establishes the apparent identity or appearance of the world even as the illusory snake is seen in the rope. This is in short the purport of the Mayavada or the doctrine of illusory appearance as propounded by Sankara and according to which unity alone is real while differences are unreal i.e., are relatively real. Thus only by knowledge of the one thing viz., unity, can everything be known as taught by the Sruti. In short it may be stated that the nature of the world is in some sense a mystery according to the Upanishadic view as opposed to the Buddhistic view that it is a void or nothing (Sunya). Because it is incomprehensible and a mystery or *Māyā*, it cannot be asserted either that 'it exists' or that 'it does not exist'. We cannot therefore dogmatically assert that it is of this character or that.

II

Application of the above Doctrine to Society.

The philosophical doctrine of reality as 'unity in diversity' has been found to be of immense value in its application to the structure of Hindu Society and for solving its several knotty social, religious, cultural and political problems.

* * *

The fundamental unity of human Society in India is based upon the peculiar type of culture and civilisation which is brought about by the teachings of its ancient philosophy. The philosophical conception of the unity behind diversity has been a fundamental fact in the Hindu religious consciousness all along its unbroken course from the time of the Vedas to the present day.

If special stress is laid in modern times on the recognition of this universal aspect of the Divine Being with knowledge and devotion, it may serve as the great bond for uniting the religiously minded all over the world and making them work together for common good in a spirit of brotherhood, service and co-operation.

Gandhiji's Political Philosophy

BY

V. S. RAM

and

GOPI NATH DHAWAN.

Gandhiji and the Tradition of Non-violence.

Non-violence is no new revelation. It has a rich historical background and a profound philosophical tradition. Its history is no mere lifeless record of a static doctrine, but is the story of a living, growing principle and its more and more comprehensive applications. It is impossible to attempt in this paper even an extremely brief sketch of this vast and complex history of the ideal. Suffice it to say that nonviolence, being the expression of love, is a universal virtue and has been preached and practised in every country and by people in every stage of culture. Founders of all great religions and many great thinkers have made their contribution to the philosophy of peace and the technique of nonviolent resistance. Nowhere has the tradition of nonviolence been so deep-rooted and continuous as in India. Ahimsa is rightly considered to be India's message and mission, her greatest contribution to the world thought.¹

Against this background Gandhiji stands as the greatest exponent of the philosophy of nonviolence. Never before him did non-violence possess that fulness of meaning, universality of application and that compelling scientific appeal which Gandhiji has imparted to it. Indeed nonviolence had come to be regarded as a cloistered virtue, the almost exclusive preserve of the ascetic and the anchorite, or else a mere mask for the meek and the coward. Gandhiji's great distinction consists in his exploring the possibilities of Ahimsa in all walks of life and its successful application to large mass movements. He has specially devoted his life to the development of the nonviolent

1. According to T. W. Rhys Davids Ahimsa is expressly mentioned for the first time in the Chandogya Upanishad (411, 17). See his article on Ahimsa in the Encyclopaedia of Ethics and Religion.

technique of settling conflicts, resisting aggression and affecting large scale political and social changes. He has, besides, created suitable institutions and trained experts to carry on researches in the Science of Satyagraha, and to help in the establishment of the nonviolent society.

Gandhiji's Political Philosophy : Its Salient Features.

Gandhiji's political philosophy is the corollary of his metaphysical convictions and ethical principles. Insistence on the primacy of spirit, an unshakable faith in God and soul is the starting point of his philosophy of Satyagraha. The soul, which is God-head within us, transcends time and space and unifies all life. It is self-acting and persists even after death ; for its existence does not depend upon the physical body. Hence whatever happens to one individual must affect the whole of spirit.²

There is no comparison between the soul-force and the physical force. "Great as the other forces of the world are... soul-force is the greatest of all."³ Imperfect man cannot bear the full blaze of this force, but even an infinitesimal fraction of it, when it becomes active within him, can work wonders.⁴

Gandhiji's conviction that none without a living faith in God and soul is competent to offer satyagraha should not be dismissed as the unreasoning superstition of a saint. In the darkest hour of his trial, in his worst despair, it is the inner strength alone that can sustain this satyagrahee—the strength that comes of a firm faith in the God of Love and Mercy and in the moral government of the Universe. The non-violent resisters have almost always been firm believers in God. The whole science of Satyagraha is based on the truths that the soul can remain unconquered and unconquerable even when the body is imprisoned and the every human being, however

2. Harijan Vol. VI pp 326-27. Young India 4-12-24

3. Harijan Vol. IV p. 220

4. Harijan Vol. V p. 326

degraded, has in him the divine spark and the limitless potentiality for growth and is capable of responding to kind, generous treatment.

It is due to this faith and soul that in Gandhiji's scheme of social regeneration the emphasis is always laid on the individual. His philosophy does not idolize the narrow, self-regarding, exclusive individual, but aims at transforming him into a selfless, integrated being who finds his fulfilment in love of all through service of all. Not that he neglects the environment, for the growth of the individual is possible only through the service of the community. But unlike the Marxists and the Fascists who work from the outside and work to the inner, Gandhiji starts from the inward and then reaches out to the environment. He believes that the revolution in the inward man is the best way to revolutionize society. In his own words, "The outward freedom...that we shall attain will only be in exact proportion to the inward freedom to which we may have grown at a given moment."⁵

The ultimate object of man's life is his fullest development i. e. realization of Truth or God. The greatest Truth being the unity of all life, self-realization consists in striving after the "greatest good of all." This, Gandhiji believes, can best be achieved in a classless and stateless nonviolent democracy.

In Gandhiji's philosophy the end and the means are convertible terms and should be equally pure. In fact means need even greater attention for the end grows out of the means. Thus unlike the Nazis, the Fascists and the Communists, Gandhiji rejects the Jesuit maxim, "the end sanctifies the means". Undoubtedly recourse to means like cunning, deceit, violence etc., deadens our finer sensibilities, leads us to regard human beings as means rather than ends and results in cruelty and oppression. History as well as contemporary experience teach us that violence engenders violence, revenge leads to counter-

revenge and a war sows the seeds of other wars. Only good means—truth and love, justice and fair dealings—can lead to lasting peace and real progress.

Society can progress to the classless and stateless stage only by means of satyagraha. For this Gandhiji recommends, specially for the leaders, a moral discipline consisting of eleven vows, the first five of which have been enjoined by the Hindu Shastras for thousands of years.

Truth, the guiding principle of Gandhiji's life stands first among these vows. Gandhiji distinguishes between Truth as the end i. e. absolute, universal Truth or Truth as it is and truth as a means i. e. relative truth as known to a man. In order to realise eternal Truth we must hold by truth as we perceive it to be in every sphere of life. To be truthful means to be ready to risk one's all for the cause which one considers to be true. To be able to hear the voice of conscience in regard to truth one must lead an intensely moral life and undergo a discipline like the one recommended by Gandhiji. A satyagrahi leader must be thus well-equipped morally and intellectually to be able to determine truth independently by his own efforts. Of the followers, who accept and pursue the truth as evolved by the leaders, Gandhiji does not expect this high moral level.

Truth as known to man being relative and fragmentary, its pursuit does not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent who must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy i. e. by self-suffering. Violence, moreover, offends against the greatest truth, the unity and sacredness of all life. This is why violence is untruth (*asatya* i. e. non-existent). Non-violence on the other hand is Truth itself, its very soul, its maturest fruit, synonymous like Truth, with God and soul-force.

Ahimsa consists in allowing others the maximum of convenience at the maximum inconvenience to oneself. It means the largest love, love even for the evil doer. It does not however stand for the meek submission to the will of the evil-doer. It seeks to conquer evil by good, to offer moral opposition against

immoralities, to resist physical force by soul-force and thus ultimately to melt the heart of the evil-doer by suffering and sacrifice. Thus "every act of injury to a living creature and endorsement of such act by refraining from non-violent effort, whenever possible, to prevent it, is a breach of Ahimsa."⁶

Nonviolence becomes irresistible only when it is accepted as the law of life and is placed before everything else. This is what Gandhiji calls the nonviolence of the brave. One adopts such non-violence out of inner conviction based on moral considerations and not because it will serve the purpose. Nonviolence of this type presupposes the ability, though not the willingness, to strike.

Nonviolence may also be adopted as a measure of expediency in some particular sphere of life. Gandhiji calls it the nonviolence of the weak, for it is weakness rather than moral conviction which rules out the use of arms. Nonviolence as expediency means "nonviolence so long as profitable, and violence when necessary."

Nonviolence of the second type may, in the case of a dependent nationality like India, bring about political freedom. But this will be "democracy as machinery" or "Parliamentary Swaraj". Real nonviolent swaraj or "Democracy as faith" can be achieved only through nonviolence of the brave, for the basic principle of both democracy and genuine nonviolence is the same i.e. the least among men has infinite moral worth.

To acquire self-control and non-attachment necessary for the pursuit of truth and nonviolence the Satyagrahi must be fearless and humble. He must also attempt and virtually achieve brahmacharya i.e. the full control, in thought, work and deed, over all the senses. The first step towards such self-mastery is the control of the palate. The vows regarding

the removal of untouchability and equal respect for all religions are the application of Truth and Nonviolence to social relations.

The ideals of Asteya (non-stealing), Aparigraha (non-possession) and bread-labour determine the economic outlook of the Satyagrahi. Gandhiji believes that the Satyagrahi grows spiritually as he crucifies the flesh and shares the lot of the poorest and the lowliest and that he should cease to depend upon money and other material media which do not count for much in matters of spirit. Gandhiji admits that a certain degree of comforts is essential for the Satyagrahi, but this should not go beyond the proper limit and the Satyagrahi should try to earn for these minimum needs by engaging in some form of productive manual work. The reason why with Gandhiji the spinning-wheel has become the symbol of nonviolence is that "There is no easier and better productive work than spinning."

Thus the life of inner harmony must of necessity be simple, self-supporting, and so far as possible, self-sufficing. Such a life implies abolition of private property and simple rural civilization based on cottage industries. In Gandhiji's own words "... It is not an attempt to go back to the ignorant, dark ages, but it is an attempt to see beauty in voluntary simplicity, poverty and slowness." Nor is Gandhiji against all machinery. He only excludes as much of it as is dangerous to man's well-being.

Swadeshi is another vow and a key concept in Gandhiji's philosophy. It should not be confused with narrow, aggressive nationalism which thrives on the ruin of others. With Gandhiji Swadeshi is an all-sided patriotism of an exalted, spiritual type. It lays down that the only correct method of serving God's creation is to restrict oneself to the use and service of one's immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the more remote and not to serve one's distant neighbours at the

expense of the nearest. Swadeshi, however, does not countenance the advancing of the narrow, selfish interests of one's country.

To bring about the classless and stateless democracy the leader trains the people for the use of Satyagraha. In common parlance Satyagraha is interpreted as non-violent direct action, but non-cooperation, civil disobedience, fasting and other forms of non-violent direct action, do not exhaust the content of Satyagraha. The literal meaning of Satyagraha is "holding on to truth" or "insistence on truth." Satyagraha is the relentless pursuit of truthful ends by nonviolent means. In this comprehensive sense it includes all constructive, reforming activities, all acts of service. Satyagraha in this sense does not exclude constitutional methods.

Satyagraha in its constructive aspect as well as in the sense of direct actions has to be employed for social progress. The object of the Constructive Satyagraha is to try to transform, along non-violent lines, the present political and the economic structure even before political power and the state machinery are captured. It develops the moral strength of the people and disciplines them for the use of non-violent direct action. The morale of the nonviolent army depends on the thoroughness with which they have practised the constructive programme. Gandhiji believes that adequate attention to constructive non-violence by a group develops in it such tremendous moral strength that it is ordinarily able to achieve its objective even without recourse to direct action.

The realist that Gandhiji is, he does not unlike Marx rule out the possibility of conflicts even in the non-violent state of the distant future. Progress will never be complete and the ideal never fully realised. So there will always be some injustice and evil, maladjustments and conflicts. Hence the need of direct action. But the aim of the Satyagrahi is not to crush defeat or punish the tyrant or break his will. It is not

even to harm or embarrass him. His aim is to convert the wrong-doer, to rouse him to a sense of inequity by an appeal to the best in him. As Gandhiji once remarked to Miss Agatha Harrison, "The essence of non-violent technique is that it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not the antagonists." The Satyagrahi thus fights with a view to a bilateral victory and not a unilateral victory. He aims at the integration and not suppression of legitimate differences.

Satyagraha raises complicated questions of organisation, discipline and strategy but considerations of space rule out even a reference to these.

Gandhiji is a philosophical anarchist and his ideal is that classless and stateless non-violent democracy of autonomous village communities where the individual fulfills himself through social service, where instead of being exclusive, competitive and militant, nationalism is cooperative and an integral part of the universal humanity, where conflicts are resolved on the spiritual plane of love and not on the physical plane of brute force. Gandhiji is, however, not a visionary. And as the nonviolent society is yet an ideal, distant and uncertain his philosophy is mainly concerned with the individual who will live and die for the ideal, and with the new nonviolent way that will lead to the goal. He does not worry about the details of the distant vision. He has discovered the right track and one clear step, he believes, will lead to another, and so on and on and in fulness of time the efforts will grow into achievement, the means into the end.



A study in The Visistadvaita Doctrine of Negation

BY
K. C. VARADACHARI

(A Summary)

There has been no theory of knowledge that has not been forced to consider the problem of negation. The view that Negation involves the concept of non-existence, *śūnya*, has been very carefully dealt with by Buddhist thought. They define it as *itaretarubhāva* or *paraspara-apeksatā*, which means there is relativity. The Nyāya sūtra equates non-existence or *śūnyatā* with *abhāva* and holds that it is perceived. The perception of empty space is relative to prior occupation or later occupation. The perception of the thing and the perception of its absence is relative to the place where it was found. The thing's existence at that place alone is being denied. Its existence at another place is not considered in that context. How it had moved away to another place or did it disintegrate there itself? These are not relevant to the experience of non-existence or emptiness. Emptiness itself is a concept that involves a back-ground, a conception or rather perception of the background considered as unoccupied. Thus the concept of *abhāva* is not anything more than the doctrine of relative occupation, relative to place and to time. The feeling of vacancy or filling up with a sensuous and distinct object that stimulates the vision or provokes the action or reaction adequate or sponsored by it is also an essential ingredient in the total feeling of non-existence. This conative sense of non-existence is more perceptual and is based on it. Therefore those who hold that the conative has a place are right, but they are not likely to be right if they try to emphasize the dominance of the conative only. The non-existence of certain interests cannot lead to the experience of it, but the

existence of certain fundamental motives makes the feeling of tension for them strong and the individual tries to fill it up.

Non-existence as a metaphysical concept gains the status of a dynamic category of destruction and change. It is the positive polar opposite of Being, and strives to swallow up Being, but in so doing passes over into Becoming or change or continuity. This conception leads to varying doctrines of dialectical affirmation and negation, or in Hegelian terms, to the dialectic of opposites. This means that non-existence is essentially implied in all concepts of existence of Being.

Consequent on this affirmation of the negative, there follows the doctrine of great importance that all determination is negation, and *vice versa*, that all negation involves determination. This is, in other words, the principle of relativity introduced in the logical terms suited to prove that absolute Non-existence is a fiction just as much as absolute Existence. But it is not in that sense alone that this is viewed at. We go further and seek to prove that Absolute Being which is not merely temporal existence is also relative to the concept of the Absolute Non-being understood in the sense of non-temporality.

The first defect that is to be avoided in treating Negation is to treat all ideas involving some kind of absence under one head, and to treat them all as of the same order or nature. Destruction and absence are not identical, a thing might be absent without being destroyed, whilst destruction certainly entails absence. It is in the wider meaning of the term that we should seek to know the meaning of *abhāva*.

Indian Logical schools have intimated three kinds of *abhāva* — previous non-existence, consequent non-existence and present non-existence. The reference is definitely to a thing, an individual thing that was, and that is not. Thus the concept of *abhāva* is conditioned by time in this analysis.

Equally we may apply the analysis to space. A thing may not be to the right of and yet left of a thing, though it may be absent from the right when it is in the left, and *vice versa* and

may not be at either place when it is in a different direction or when at the centre itself. Thus non-existence is a relative position.

Thus to speak of bare negation being meaningless, and to speak of it as existing being a contradiction, we have yet to define the nature of negation. The realistic view of the position is that we should not confuse destruction, *vināśa*, with *abhāva*, negation. This *abhāva* has reference to space, time and form. In other words, these are the three co-ordinates of all existence. We have already mentioned the relativity of existence or non-existence to time and place. This is the configuration of existence or to use the expressive phrase of Kant, the condition of all experience. As it has been expressed "the notion of negation is due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in which the negation is affirmed." This answers to the third factor, the form, all the three space, time and form constitute the *ākāśa*, configuration of a thing's existence. Non-existence being correlated with change in any of these or all these conditions, and more especially space and form, since changelessness is the term expressing the continuity in time of the thing's form and spatial position. The concept of negation as an experience of vacuum, pure and simple, is impossible. It has actual experience only in respect of shift and change of place and form. It is integrated with the memory of presence and at some previous moment and that memory now furnishes the sense of absence. This, in essence, is the doctrine of negation according to Sri Vedānta Deśika from the Viśiṣṭadvaita standpoint.

New Light on the Carvaka System

BY

P. S. SASTRI

(A Summary)

Max Muller thinks that "Cārvāka" is the name of a disciple to whom the doctrine was first communicated. Whitney interprets the term to mean "sweet-tongued." Vepi Sambhāra (Act 6) makes Cārvāka, a Rākṣasa, a friend of Duryodhana. The systematisation of the School has been attributed to Bṛhaspati. In the Ṛgveda, some Sūktas breathing an air of revolt and free thinking are attributed to Bṛhaspati, son of Loka. The materialistic views in Mahabharata are propounded by him. That like many other systems of thought, this also has its origin in the Vedas has been ably shown by some scholars.

The cārvākas seem to have a Darśana of their own, with a Bhāṣya, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.

This darśana seems to have been more of a destructive nature directing itself mostly for a refutation of the other systems of thought.

Tradition holds that the Cārvākas accepted only pratyakṣa and if the same tradition also considers them to be Cārūvaks, it is impossible to reconcile these two views, for to be called sweet-tongued, one must be able to convince the other, which, necessarily requires an inferential process. Śankara recognises three sets of lokāyatas.

The first two sets come under the Dhūrta type of Cārvākas, who are uncultured and gross. The last can be classified under the Suśikṣita type, the cultured and the refined. The dhūrta type have no philosophical value ; The Suśikṣitas started the theory of materialism, which later merged into the Sāṅkhya evolution. This cultured set recognised anumāna, as a distinct pramāṇa and we have the authority of no less a man than Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who in his Nyāya Mañjari points out that there is a distinction between the Dhūrta and the Suśikṣita types,

and that the *Suśikṣitas* did not reject *anumāna*. Truth cannot be said to be an unfailing character of all inferences, for we well know that the same logic wielded by both the nihilists and the *naiyāyikas* made them stand at loggerheads. The orthodox followers of the various systems took into account only the *Dhūrta* type, thus causing great injustice to the cultured materialist, who believed in the unity of the society and pursued the fine arts.

Tradition is almost unanimous in ascribing the authorship of this *darśana* to *Brhaspati* and not to *Cārvāka* as some scholars think. Possibly it may be due to the revolting hymns of *Brhaspati*, the son of *Loka*, which explains satisfactorily the term *Laukāyatas*, even though some consider it to mean that which spread in the world. *Bārhaspatya* "artha sāstra" contains some useful material with regard to this system, even though it is a late production. The king is asked not to perform *agnihotras* and the recital of *Veda*. At the time of acquiring gain only the *Lokāyata* doctrine is to be followed. To prosecute his ends it is said the *Laukāyata* performs sacrifices, to conceal his failing he does the *Vedādhyayana*, to drink soma etc., he does the *Yajnas* etc. These things clearly show that these formed themselves a separate set in the *pūrvamimāmsakas*, even though in their heart of hearts they disbelieved in the rituals.

Now let us find out the points of similarity between the *Yājñikas* and the *Laukāyatas*. The *Yājñikas* denied a God, which *Kumārila* deplores.

For *Jaimini* and *Sabara*, the deity is only a word in the dative case. The true *Cārvāka* denies even that. For the *Pūrvamimāmsaka* there is no world more beautiful than this which the materialist also accepts. But giving such a prominence to this world, the *Yājñika* wants us to get rid of *Dukkha* in *Svarga* by performing the sacrifices, which seems to be a self-contradiction. The materialist wants to strive after *Sukha* even in this world. In establishing this world the ritualist gave more prominence to *pratyakṣa*, which the extremist used in his own way. Thus the reality of this world, desire for happiness, the denial of a deity and the

prominence given to *pratyakṣa* are common to both the ritualists and the cultured materialists.

The ordinary *Suśikṣita* disbelieves in the barriers of the caste, which has been taken up later only by *Sri Saṅkara*. This cosmopolitan outlook is shared first by the Buddhists and the *Cārvākas*. But the extremists in them, like *Vātsyāyana* believe in caste system. I may venture to say that the *Cārvāka* view that there is no soul or God other than the body, has in later days been taken subjectively in Absolutism to prove the non-difference between the individual soul and the supreme soul. Their condemnation of the rituals led to the separation of the paths of *Karma* and *Jñāna* in Absolutism. Their denial of the soul has the seeds for the nihilism of *Nāgārjuna*. Their view that the body is an evolution of the elements as embodied in the *Sruti* clearly forecasts the prominence given to *prakṛti* and its evolution in the *Sāṃkhya* system. Both the *advaitin* and the *Cārvāka* deny creation, of course each in his own way to serve his own ends.

The *Cārvāka* preaches the moral consideration of how best a life should be lived with the maximum satisfaction of the mind and the senses. It is neither immoral nor amoral. It is pure hedonistic philosophy.

The Sacred Temples of India

BY

C. T. SRINIVASAN

(An Abstract)

1. The Jnani awakes !

To a true Jnani, the question of Sacred Temple conveys no meaning, for it does not arise. "Isavasyam Idam Sarvam". Is there anything else, alive or blinking other than God ? The whole creation itself rests in Him only. To a Jnani it looks funny to attempt to limit the limitless.

2. The meaning and justification of sacred Temple.

All the world over Temples have always had supreme significance, for they are concerned vitally with the affairs of human life and well-being.

Some of the specific forms of God that have had powerful appeal to mind and heart of mankind have come to be preserved and protected against the ravages of time and place. Thus arose the mighty temples of God on earth zealously guarding over the sacred images. The perception of forms belongs legitimately to consciousness, and therefore it is not wrong to state that in worshipping the forms we are directly perceiving God Himself. Image worship is certainly not a metaphysical error. Even metaphysics has its basis only in consciousness. God who is Reality should at least be consciousness. The Upanishads say "He is Prajnanam or Super-consciousness." Religions one and all, describe God as the Super-personal or Parama Purusha or Father in Heaven. This is intended as a caution lest we should identify God wholly with the impersonal. The impersonal being distinctly below the level of the personal, is essentially abstract and hence has very little appeal to human personalities. Can any one seriously think of worshipping the Law of Gravitation or the second law of Thermo-dynamics ?

God is Super-personal in the sense that He transcends both our conceptions of the personal and impersonal. He includes them both and overflows them infinitely.

3. What is Religion ?

The essence of religion is Faith in God with whose help the weak worshipper hopes to secure and conserve all those values essential for his life and well-being. Worship, Dogma and Ritualism become the defences of religion. Dogma by itself offers weak defence because verbal interpretations are always open to conscious misinterpretations. So religion allies itself to worship and ritualism which are active supports of religion. Surely religion requires actions and not words. Thus arose the mighty temples of worship with their elaborate ceremonials, festivals and fire-works. And with them came the priests as their chosen custodians.

4. Power and privileges of Priest-hood.

A corrupt priesthood is the major curse of the sacred temples. If it cannot be mended should it be then ended for good ?

5. Sanctum Sanctorum.

The question of the sanctity of the temple and the cry of pollution—these cannot be easily shelved or set aside. For, they are concerned with the deep rooted sentiments and feelings of the human heart.

6. The Untouchable.

Untouchability is one such evil in the Hindu fold as the Sale of Indulgences had been in the Catholic Church.

The Idea of 'Personal Contact' in Education

BY
INDRA SEN

'Personal contact' is a most favourite idea in education to-day. It is keenly sought that the students should get as long and frequent a contact with their teachers as possible. Apparently, the reason of it is the belief that the growing mind through the experience of an example learns and acquires much useful knowledge. In a word, that such personal contact stimulates growth in the young mind. 'Social contact' and 'social life' amongst students and teachers is also considered desirable on the same ground. This aspect of educational life is particularly set in contrast to the kind of contact, which the class-room provides. The class-room contact, it is said, is formal and therefore it is necessary that outside informal personal contacts should exist between the teachers and the taught.

The ideas of 'personal contact' and 'social life' in connection with the educational life of schools and colleges are obviously valuable. The conceptions of Unitary residential Universities and residential schools, generally, which are very popular in progressive education, seek simply to realise those ideas and have grown out of a serious sense of defect, educationally, with regard to this merely class-room teaching and the contact provided by it.

But to my mind these ideas are at the moment suffering from much confusion and ambiguity and they need a serious educational consideration, primarily a psychological analysis and clarification. The questions to consider are : Firstly, the aim of education. What is it that the young man is intended to grow to or become ? That he is to become the full man, develop his personality, or unfold his potentialities, are vague.

Secondly, what is exactly the psychology of personal contact ? That is, what mental processes come into operation in that situation ? Is the teacher to become like boys to mix with them, as is usually the belief and the case too in personal contacts ? Or is he to be always an example before them ? Or so to combine the two that he comes down to the level of the boys, when needed for the psychological rapport and harmony, but ultimately simply to lift them to his own. Thirdly, what is it exactly that the boys learn or acquire through personal contact with their teachers ? Is it knowledge and information or primarily certain attitudes, an outlook upon (different aspects of) life ? Lastly, whether every teacher is temperamentally or otherwise competent to afford a personal contact of a positive educational value.

A thorough-going consideration of these questions, to my mind, will serve to clarify the popular conceptions of 'personal contact' and 'social life' and thereby render them more useful to education.

But first a digression, which may prove helpful in the ultimate clarification of the issues, may be permitted. It is a most pleasant indulgence amongst a few friends in an hour of common leisure to recall what they remember of their school and college days. Indeed, if such experiences were extensively collected, they would show what it is that we learned and learned with lasting effects, and the situation under which the learning took place. We would then be able to see how much of it formed part of what was formally taught and how much was acquired otherwise from the so-called life of the school or college as such. One, who rose to be the Principal of a college in life and otherwise distinguished himself in learning and knowledge once, in a reminiscent mood, observed that of his college days he remembers most vividly the sets of tennis, which he played with a professor of his, but not, in the least, the learned lectures of the professor. This recollection can, in fact, be regarded typical. But must class lectures be forgotten ? They are formal. But is it not possible ? or, are there not

teachers, who by the character of their personality, one must say, produce in their classes an atmosphere of pleasant and comfortable at-home-ness, an at-ease frame of mind, in full sense an informal personal contact in the so-called formal class instruction.

The sense of the word 'formal' involves, an element of strain, of something-that-has-got-to-be-done. And, therefore, the situation of formal relation creates distance, even though for the hour, between the teacher and the taught. But the class teaching, though it is a thing that has got to be done, need not necessarily be a formal business, which will tend to be forgotten. Class lectures can be filled with an atmosphere of ease, comfort and thorough personal informal relation and they will surely leave a lasting memory in the mind of the students.

Every body will remember a number of things of his college days. They would be representative of his interests primarily, but would also indirectly reveal the conditions of the educational life of the institution with which he was connected. I have, amongst my memories, an impression which appears to me to be very deep and which has served to determine my growth a good deal. I remember very vividly the occasion when as a B.A. student, I once had the privilege of seeing a professor of mine at his house, where, as I entered his study, I saw him sitting, a contended figure, with a shelf of books at his elbow. That is how, at any rate, I had perceived the situation. Now that scene made a profound impression upon my mind and became a deep aspiration of life. During the years that followed my feeling was, even unconsciously, that to be happy in life was really to have enough books to read and a lot of leisure. So, with me, as it happened, a personal contact served to set up a permanent attitude. I cannot so distinctly remember an occasion when a piece of information obtained from a professor made the same impression. In the other case cited above, it would be worth investigating as to what psychological changes were brought about by the personal contact of the tennis court. One effect can be easily anticipated. The young man at his

adolescent stage becomes keenly self-conscious. He is so much alive to his latest acquisition, the budding manhood and of this he seeks an assuring recognition from his world. The parents usually become conservative in their habit of treating him as a child. The teacher at the college may treat him as an equal. That affords a great satisfaction to the most lively impulses of his stage and through that recognition, being assured of his equality with an adult, he begins to treat himself more fully as an adult and thus becomes responsible. The sense of responsibility itself may lead on the young man to certain ideals of character and promote development of his personality. So here too the contact must have served to intensify an aspiration. By affording satisfaction to the impulse of self-assertion of the young man the personal contact created in him a stronger desire to be a full man. Thus personal contact though not directly contributing knowledge, yet stimulates and promotes education of the youngman by creating and intensifying healthy aspiration and interests in life.

The discussion has been rather long, but it has surely served to bring out certain ideas of this paper, though at this stage by way of anticipation, in a more realistic manner. We may now turn to the several questions raised earlier by us.

The first of our questions is the aim of education. Commonly we talk of a harmonious development of personality of the unfoldment of the potentialities of an individual as the aim of education. But these statements, as pointed out before, are vague. They do not even indicate the nature of education as a science. Education is essentially a normative science. It aims at the discovery of the ideal or the norm or the type of person, which is to be produced by education. This type has even to vary according to the needs or the coveted ambitions of an age. Education, according to our modern conception, is preparation for citizenship. Thus 'the citizen' is the type of person sought to be produced by education. Armstrong says education is preparation for life. 'Life' is the life of the adult. The individual during his early period of

growth is to be prepared for the activities and adaptations of adult life. The realistic emphasis of the definition succeeds in hiding the real normative character of the science. The two statements of the aim of education referred to above, do a similar thing. 'Unfoldment of potentialities' can be a correct definition only if we understand by 'potentialities' the higher and nobler propensities of man, as education cannot have for its aim the development of all the 'potentialities' good, bad or indifferent.

In the relation of our subject of 'personal contact' the value of the consideration of the aim and the nature of education is simply this, that education can never be mere unfoldment in development. It must, in fact, be the development of better and nobler aspects of human personality. Human personality is sharply different from the rest of animal life, as it involves a conflict between instinct and reason, which has to be gradually resolved through education and training. The animal life, on the other hand, is the plain life of instincts, free from the conflict of man's life. Harmony is more or less a given fact of its life. For man the given nature involves conflict of instinct and a higher moral ideal, through the resolution of which by individual's free activity a harmony of a higher plane is a matter of possibility and achievement. Education, while serving the immediate needs of an age in cultivating the qualities of citizenship or anything else, has definitely to seek, as its permanent aim, the improvement of human nature.

The second is the relatively more important question for us here. 'What is exactly the psychology of personal contact?' Now what are the characteristics of the mental situation of such a contact? We have already said that a feeling, of comfort, of at-homeness, is the essence of personal contact. As different from it the usual formal relation of the class-room involves strain and therefore distance. Now this frame of mind, of at-home-ness, in relation to a person who is held high in respect involves a marked degree of suggestibility. Suggestibility

simply means keenly receptive attitude of mind. A student in this attitude will through, what some educationists call, the process of sympathetic induction, take over the attitudes and outlook of the teacher. This takes place, I think, for the most part as an unconscious process. Suggestion, sympathy and imitation are allied psychological processes influencing and regulating social behaviour, and in personal contact, as between two or more people, which is a social contact of an intimate character, it is these mental processes, which dominate. Suggestion or suggestibility involves a suspension of the critical faculty and the transfer of ideas and attitudes takes place from one to the other in spite of their logical unsoundness. Now some teachers by virtue of certain qualities of character evoke amongst students more successfully the suggestible attitude. These qualities primarily involve an appeal to the popular emotions. They constitute an invaluable asset of a personality. But it will entirely depend upon the moral qualities of such a personality as to whether the students will derive a positive or negative educational value through personal contact with it. The moral qualities have to be presented in actual life and not as a word of mouth. In a state of suggestibility the individual tends to reproduce more directly the actual example. Dr. Stekel, an unusually profound student of human nature, so very aptly observes :— "As subsidiary to this question, we had further asked, is the teacher to become like boys to mix with them, as is usually the belief and the case too in personal contacts ? or is he to be always an example before them ?"

The success of the personal contact consists in the rapport of relative suggestibility. In being a mere example the teacher stands at a distance and would not induce the processes of suggestion and sympathy and imitation, which are instrumental in conveying the influence of the teacher to the student. But then the rapport as such is not the goal of personal contact. Thus, though the rapport may be achieved by the teacher by descending to the level of the students, but he can never afford to forget his own level altogether, as he must seek to ultimately raise them to it.

The above psychological analysis of the situation of personal contact would evidently raise the objection in the mind of some discriminating readers, whether in personal contact strong intellectual intercourse cannot take place. 'Platonic love' will probably be cited as an authoritative example. Surely such relations are not denied. The analysis, however, attempted above aimed at giving the general pattern of personal contact. But even a relation of intellectual intercourse, sought to be presented as an objection, involves fundamentally a relation of love and regard. And this implies suggestibility and sympathy, and it is against the background of these that the intercourse of ideas takes place.

The third question, viz., what is it exactly that the boys learn or acquire through personal contact with their teachers? has already been answered in the attempt to analyse memories of college days. It was stated then that what is primarily acquired is the attitude of mind, an outlook of life, rather than a piece of information or knowledge. And it may, in this connection, be further stated that education more truly consists in acquisition of proper attitudes rather than in the storing up of certain information. Thus personal contact, inducing as it does attitudes, educates more effectively. Whether it does so for better or for worse, so far as the individual student is concerned, will depend upon the character of the personality of the teacher and the nature of influence exercised by him. But surely the formal instruction of the class lecture is ineffective education as compared with the influence of the personal contact.

The last question, whether every teacher is temperamentally or otherwise competent to afford a personal contact of a positive educational value. The answer is obviously, No. Surely ability and competence vary and all are not able to exercise personal influence for the betterment of the life of the students. But, positively, who are particularly suited for this work? The modern investigations regarding the psychology of teachers throws valuable light on the subject. The profound educational

value of a good personal example cannot be overstressed. That imposes the first condition upon the teacher qualified for this work. Secondly, it would be a great asset if he possesses the talent to command a popular appeal and direct or control the emotions of the mass mind. Personal guidance is to-day a scientific conception and as such requires analysis of individual cases, but popular inspirational talks have the advantage of giving to the student certain ideals for their life. Sir J. Adams, an eminent educationist, observes that the effect of such talks is heightened if delivered to large groups and there are only a few teachers who are specially fitted for this work.

We have just incidentally affirmed that Personal Guidance is to-day a scientific conception in psychology. It will be helpful to state a little more fully the nature of the psychological assistance sought to be rendered in the matter of personal problems.

The above is a theoretical analysis and clarification of the idea of 'Personal contact' as applied to education. But, whatever the limitations subject to which we must work, it is obvious that the idea of personal contact has got to be increasingly realised in our educational life. And as a practical contribution, which can be the only suitable conclusion to the lengthy foregoing discussion, a draft of a form, with many details of heads for purposes of eliciting information from them, is appended. It will serve as a basis and help for effecting an educational personal contact between the teachers and the taught.

The data of information collected on it, it is intended, may enable the teacher even without expert psychological training to render 'Personal' guidance to students. Some institutions are beginning to have a tutorial system to provide a social personal contact between the teachers and the students. The intention is that each student of the school or college should at least be pretty thoroughly known to one teacher. As at present the fact is that under conditions of virtual mass education we do not know our students, excepting a few, who because of their

social activities in the college, make themselves sufficiently prominent and have to meet, for one or the other thing, some members of the staff. Tutorial system, in fact, stands in education for a personal tutorial work. A relatively better expression may be 'Personal Group system,' as under it we actually do divide the body of students into a number of groups, each of which is to form the personal group of one teacher, who would aim at securing all the important information determining and affecting the growth and development of a student's entire personality. He will, therefore, need to know the significant events of his past history, striking features of his environment and an analysis of his interests, inclinations and ambitions. He will require to know about his health, food and conditions of living much as his psychological equipment. The proposed form seeks to present on paper as much of this information as possible, so that 'Personal Group' teacher will find it so easy to hold all these details in his head, of all the fifteen or twenty students of his group. A part of this information will simply be filled in by the student and the rest shall have to be entered by the teacher through his own observation and judgment regarding the student's character and personality. It is desired that the form may present to the teacher all the necessary data to enable him to know the strong and weak sides of each student's personality, for proper personal guidance and stimulation. Further, these forms may go to constitute the individual files of the students, which may go over to the new 'Personal Group' teacher, when a change has to be made at the commencement of the next year. These forms also seek to elicit data for a general vocational guidance. The purpose is not so much to give expert scientific vocational guidance, as to popularise the guiding principle in the matter of a choice of vocation.

Adolescence is an important critical period in an individual life, which definitely needs a proper personal guidance. Every teacher knows too well the picture of a distracted morbidly self-conscious, introvert youngman, who with all his good record of the past, cannot by any system of persuasion or punishment

be directed to attend to his studies. His attention can be spared for his studies only if he is successfully led out of the personal difficulties in which he has got involved. Thus it should be obvious that the examination results, the fetish of our educational system, too would improve, if proper arrangements for personal guidance of boys exist in an institution. A boy, who for physical or mental conditions of his life, finds it impossible to concentrate on his work, has first necessarily to be led out of the difficulties of health, physical or mental, that he may once again have proper zest for his studies—thus the utility of Personal Guidance work for success in general class-work too is obvious.

Personal Guidance, we said above, is to-day a scientific conception. It needs also expert service. But, as planned and proposed here, it is expected that a general guidance every teacher may give, whereas, in cases of special difficulty the co-operation of a psychologist must be obtained.

The personal data if correctly obtained can be of use for purposes of the discipline of the institution, as with the help of it, it would be relatively easier to deal with boys, ordinarily difficult of management. One could also pick up the better boys, who may then be given positions of prestige and influence and thereby made the custodians of discipline and order in the institution. The prospective criminals could also be detected and turned on to healthier channels of life's activity.

Our present education badly lacks personal contact between the teachers and the taught and until it becomes possible for the country to change over from mass education to a system involving better individual attention, it is absolutely desirable to have a supplementary plan of the kind of 'Personal Group System' proposed here. The form appended herewith is altogether tentative and will naturally require to be modified as we put it into practice.

Personal File

N.B. Please fill in the particulars below in an hour of dispassionate consideration according to the best of your belief. The information obtained here will be treated as confidential and is intended to provide the basis for giving guidance to you in the matter of correct regulation of life. A right word given at the right moment in life may save an individual much worry and misery.

Date..... Address (Residence)... ..
Name.....
Class.....
Date of birth.....

1. General Physical Health.

	Date.	Date.	Date.
Weight.			
Height.	etc.	etc.	(to be taken over from physical examination card.)

Illnesses suffered since birth. Nature of complaints and the toll of time taken by them.

Do you suffer from constipation ? Since when ?
Are you sure that your diet is nutritious and well-balanced ? ...

2. Sleep.

Has there been any occasion when for a number of days together sleep was irregular and disturbed ? What was in your opinion the cause of it ?

3. Intellectual Career.

School.

	Age,	Joined,	Left.
Subjects lined.	Disliked.	Easy.	Difficult.

Promotions.

Failures.

Rank.

 Distinctions.
 Matriculation
 Results.

Colleges.

Age Joined.

Inter Result.

B.A. Result.

(Div.)

(Div.)

Marks.

Marks.

Do you think that you have been intellectually steadily progressing or has there been a deterioration? If so, what, in your opinion, is the reason?

Name the extra books read since joining the college?

Offices held by you in school or college?

Games played?

Part taken in debates, dramas or any other department of general social life of the school or college?

Any active associations with the general social life outside the college?

4. Play, life and the employment of leisure.

Games.

Diversions.

Hobbies.

Do you feel dull on a holiday?.....

or have you enough things to fill your holiday up with?

What are they ?

5. Home Life.

Number of persons in the home... ..

Siblings (brothers and sisters) with dates of birth...

Father.

Name.....

Age.....Profession

Income.....

How much association and company on the average your father is able to give to the children ?

Other persons in the home... ..

How much time in the day do you spend outside the home ?

Do you feel contented or discontented in the home ?

State rather fully how you feel in the home ? What your reactions towards the various members of the home are ?

6. Married or unmarried... ..

if married, when ?

7. Habits.

Tea, Coffee, smoking, wine
or any other.

8. Childhood habits or difficulties.

Thumb-sucking, nail-biting, night terrors, finicky about food, stammering, temper. Any peculiarities : Delinquencies. fabrication, lying, stealing etc.

9. Routine of the day.

Arise, wash, bath, breakfast, morning meal, work, midday repast, games, dinner, bed etc., etc.,

State with hours the succession of the events of the daily routine.

10. Thoughts.

Is it that you cannot sometimes control your thoughts? Do you feel worried and sinful over them. State broadly what these thoughts are and how you have so far attempted to get over them.

11. 'Know Thyself' more fully.

Characterise your personality with the help of the following terms :—

(i) Mood. Cheerful, unhappy, tense, calm, excitable, nervous.

(ii) Other characteristics.

Energetic or phlegmatic.

Healthy or sickly.

Active or passive.

Leader or follower.

Sociable or with-drawing.

Effective or unsuccessful.

Doer or planner and dreamer.

Decisive or doubting.

Dominating or yielding.

Critical of others or self.

Dependent or independent.

(iii) Answer these questions carefully :—

Do you always try to make others agree with you?

Do you make friends easily and quickly?

Do you like to take the lead in a social gathering?

Do you worry over what people think of you?

Are you somewhat suspicious of other people's motives?

Do you prefer to work alone rather than in company?

Are your feelings easily hurt?

(iv) The most dominant interest of life.

Religious, intellectual or scientific; economic (money and property); seeking power (influence and authority); or social.

Other relatively stable interests of life.

(v) What fears sometimes trouble you ?

Fear of failure in the examination or not getting suitable or any work in life, of death, of being incapable of marriage, of going mad etc. etc.

(vi) State your worries and anxieties.

Has there been an occasion when on a/c of an anxiety you could not sleep ? Describe the occasion, giving the anxiety.

(vii) How do you take an illness in life ?

feel much upset or relatively calm and resigned.

(viii) What is your attitude towards the present social organisation, in the wider sense of entire human society as well as in the narrow sense of the Indian society or any smaller social group within it.

Is it just or unjust ? Does it need a radical readjustment ? What appears to you as tyrannical in society ? Name particularly the customs and traditions, which you resent against.

(ix) Do you find it easy to get along with others in society ?

Or, you find very often the people disagreeing or yourself in disagreement with them ? Do you find it difficult to work under any organisation ?

(x) How do you take a reverse in life ?

Feel depressed or otherwise ? Has any time the depression been so great that 'suicidal ideas' occurred to you ?

(xi) Anything that strikes you as abnormal in your personality ?

12. Habits of study.

(a) What is your usual posture while reading ?

(b) What hours in the day do you find most congenial to concentrated study ?

(c) Do you find it relatively easy or difficult to keep your books and papers in an orderly condition ?

(d) Do you learn up better when you study alone or in company with one or more other students ?.....

(e) Discover your type of memory.

Does your memory take :—

- (1) a short time to learn and a long time to forget.
- or (2) a long time to learn and a short time to forget.
- or (3) a short time to learn and a short time to forget.
- or (4) a long time to learn and a long time to forget.

(f) Do you daily read a newspaper ? which ?.....

(g) How many books have you taken out (... ..) and read (... ..) from the college library ?

(h) Do you read any periodicals ?... .. What ?

(i) Do you consult your time-table before coming to the College ?

(j) Do you come prepared to the college ?... ..

(k) Do you review at home what you had done at the College before ?

(l) Are you able to take notes of lectures fairly well ?

.....Do you otherwise keep notes of the books read or not ?

14. Choice of vocation.

What do you wish to become in life ?

Do you think, you possess the necessary aptitude and preparation for it ? When did you first form this ambition ?

15. Facing an examination

(a) Do you feel worried by the thought of an approaching examination ?

(b) How has that worry expressed itself in dreams ?

(c) Are you able to work better in the last month before the examination or worse ?

(d) Do you feel that if you fail in an examination you would lose all the respect that you command in the eyes of your parents, friends and the world as a whole ? Do you think that life would not be worth living then ?

Presidential Address

(Metaphysics and Logic Section)

BY

G. HANUMANTHA RAO

I am grateful to the Executive Committee for the honour they have done me in electing me President of the Metaphysics and Logic Section and I enter upon my duties with great humility. In selecting a subject for my address I had to refrain from the temptation to deal with a special topic in Contemporary Philosophy. I have chosen for my address a very general subject like the prevailing attitudes towards Metaphysics, such as anti-Metaphysicism, and Ego-centricism for I believe that it is the lack of a proper attitude towards metaphysics that has made metaphysics unproductive and unfruitful.

Metaphysics was once the queen of sciences and held a high position in society. That was in the days of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Greece and of Yajnavalkya, Kapila and Kanada in India. Since then it has fallen and is still falling; and to-day desperate efforts are being made to keep it alive. While it has no doubt managed to keep alive, it has undergone every kind of disintegration and is eking out a life of miserable dependence. It does not exist in its own right or walk upon its own legs; it is not a force in life that it once was.

A glance at contemporary philosophy will reveal this sorry state of metaphysics. The current fashion in philosophy is its anti-metaphysical attitude which has had a most disintegrating effect on our subject. But metaphysics has suffered as much

at the hands of the metaphysicians themselves as at the hands of the anti-metaphysicians, for each metaphysician has his own axe to grind. The humanist adopts it only to promote the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. The naturalist defends it only to make it ultimately subservient to science. Idealists, with rare exceptions, embrace it only to uphold the cause of religion and morality. Even logicians who ought to be impartial have tried to make capital of it, by converting it into panlogism. In our own country to-day all our metaphysical interest is confined to Vedanta of some sort or the other. Thus in contemporary philosophy, metaphysics either is negated or allowed to exist only when it has sold its soul in the service of science, morality or religion.

This lack of autonomy has made it incapable of being impartial and honest. A metaphysician should be a spectator of all time and existence. His should be a freeman's worship ; he should worship all ideals impartially and should not uphold any "ism". An impartial lover of all being cannot uphold being in general against being in particular, life against thought, truth against beauty, utility against goodness, science against religion, art against morality, nature against man or both against God. In short, any "ism" must be considered by him as a sophism. This is no mere eclecticism. It is essentially critical, and critical of all impartially. It is not critical of science in order to enthrone religion, nor is it critical of religion with a view to uphold science. It is not for annihilation of art for the sake of the elevation of morality. It is a criticism of all and reconstruction of all. But to-day, unfortunately, rarely is this large-heartedness and impartiality in evidence in the field of philosophy. One philosopher has hardly the patience to read and understand another. Take any of the leaders of contemporary philosophy in the West - Bergson, James, Russell, Bradley, Croce. Each understands the other only to refute the other. When one reads what each philosopher has to say about the other, one is led to ask in wonder : Is all that Russell says false and all that Bradley says true ? Is Realism all false and Idealism all true ? Is Idealism all false and Bergson alone

all true ? Not even Whitehead, the advocate of an organic and synoptic philosophy, shows the understanding spirit always. His reading of Hegel is not so impartial as his reading of Plato ; his reading of Locke is not so impartial as his reading of Leibniz. If he had any respect for history, he would not have brushed aside the entire technique of philosophy and invented his own which is not infrequently cumbersome.

Another characteristic feature of metaphysics to-day seems to be its ego-centricism. One can understand a slight bias unconsciously colouring one's metaphysics ; one can understand the personal equation entering into one's philosophy in spite of one's best efforts to eliminate it. But the common practice in philosophy seems to be an elaborate rationalisation of a bias, universalization of one's own personal equation. This has cut at the very root of the objectivity of metaphysics ; it has made it impossible for metaphysicians to agree even as to what metaphysics should be. Metaphysics has thus no common ground for its subject-matter, no common method or technique. It is no wonder that metaphysics remains where it is and has not progressed. Every book on metaphysics has come to be a work of self-glorification and the negation of loyalty to metaphysics. What wonder then that metaphysics has disintegrated under this orgy of egoistic thinking. The story of metaphysics is the very opposite of that of science ; while science is objective, metaphysics is subjective ; while science is a co-operative enterprise, metaphysics is a cock-pit of strife ; while science is progressive, philosophy is stagnant.

Again, for want of objective and sympathetic understanding metaphysics has lost vitality. It has lost its hold on life and failed to vitalise it. Metaphysics vitalises life when it is itself a type of life that seeks to enter into every department of life with sympathy and understanding. It then enlarges and elevates life. Metaphysics which is mere logic-chopping, hair-splitting and verbal jugglery may impose, confuse, mystify ; but will never illuminate and emancipate. What is the good of metaphysics, if it does not make life full, free and fragrant ? It is

a lame answer which says that metaphysics is the quest of knowledge for its own sake. Knowledge for its own sake will never forsake life. The so-called metaphysical knowledge is knowledge that does not live for its own sake ; for metaphysics is life, life in its most intense form, the passion of reason pervading life. Passion cannot stop short of fruition ; the passion of reason is the fruition of life. A metaphysician who thinks that he can be a metaphysician without this passion of reason, is like one who is blindly groping without knowing what he is seeking after. Contemporary metaphysics is drab and dreary because it is lacking in the passion of reason which should be its sole stimulant. Metaphysics moves not, because the metaphysician loves not metaphysics : it frees not, because it is not free thought ; it is the giving of bad reasons for what one may believe by instinct or sentiment ; it does not fulfil life, because it does not fulfil itself. Real metaphysics cannot allow a man who passes the mansion of metaphysics to return the same way as he entered. If it does, it is not the mansion of metaphysics that he has entered.

So far I have been rather negative and critical. I shall now proceed to state briefly what I consider to be the proper attitude towards metaphysics.

Like all attitudes, metaphysics is essentially an attitude of life towards the world in which one lives. It is the synthesis of a mood, an approach, an endeavour. It is characterised by a passionate dispassion. It is bound neither by the pleasures of this world nor the prospects of the next. It is love creative, not the greed that possesses.

Nothing is dear to the metaphysician because it is a possession—a means to an end. This has nowhere been so beautifully set forth as in the conversation between Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi where Yajnavalkya points out to his philosophic wife wherein the true metaphysical attitude lies.

“It is not for the husband, my dear, that he is loved, but for the sake of the self is he beloved. It is not for the sake of the wife, my dear, that she is loved, but for the self is she loved.

It is not for the sake of the sons, my dear, that they are loved, but for the self do they become dear. It is not for the sake of wealth, my dear, that it is loved, but for the sake of the self is it loved..... It is not for the sake of the Brahman, my dear, that he is loved, but for the sake of the self is he loved.It is not for the sake of the worlds, my dear, that they are loved but for the sake of the self are they loved. It is not for the sake of gods, my dear that they are loved, but for the sake of the self are they loved. It is not for the sake of the Vedas, my dear, that they are loved, but for the sake of self are they loved...It is not for the sake of all, my dear, that they are loved, but for the sake of the self are all loved. When this self is realised, all this is known."

(Brihadaranyakoponishad IV. 5.6.)

Woman is not dear because she is wife, the world is not dear because it is wealth, God is not dear because He is the giver. This does not mean that the philosopher does not relish a fine dish, appreciate beauty, adopt a useful device, fight for justice ; but he never does any of them as a mere means. He enjoys all by renouncing the greed which treats everything only as a means. Socrates stands as a glorious example of one endowed with this mood. He ate, drank and made merry, fought battles, discharged his duties as a citizen and paid his debts. But neither the pleasures of this life, nor the honour of office, nor life itself as a means to these, could even for a while dissuade him from giving up his love of truth and freedom. The world still respects metaphysics for the sake of Socrates. Such metaphysics is always a living force which one may not have the strength to embrace, but which none dare sneer at as almost every one does at contemporary metaphysics.

A sense of the eternal as distinguished from what is ephemeral is another of the essential characteristics of the metaphysical attitude. The metaphysician is a spectator of all time and existence as distinguished from a scientist who is chiefly an observer of the spatio-temporal order only. This is an

assumption that is basic to metaphysics, for without it no metaphysics can exist. Deny to the metaphysician this point of view i.e. of looking at everything SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS you deny metaphysics itself. When we say that metaphysics is looking at time from the point of view of eternity, we are only saying that a metaphysician is viewing things from a really universal point of view. What the nature of the universe may be for this point of view, may differ from metaphysician to metaphysician. What the eternal fully is in all its aspects, may differ from philosopher to philosopher, from time to time ; but the point of view of metaphysics, i. e. seeing things from the point of view of eternity remains the metaphysical point of view for all time.

To say that Metaphysics is the study of the eternal is not saying that it is the study of the Absolute, or God or the Good, even as our saying that physics is a study of matter is not to uphold Aristotle's view of matter, or Newton's view of matter, or Einstein's. It is as ridiculous to doubt the reality of the eternal and yet profess to be a metaphysician as it is for the physicist to doubt material existence and yet claim to be a physicist.

The metaphysical attitude implies a discipline even as the scientific or the aesthetic attitude involves the discipline of our scientific or artistic nature. In contrast with these the metaphysical attitude involves a discipline of our entire nature. It is said that metaphysics is disinterested. Disinterestedness is not uninterestedness—negation of interest. It is denial of the partisan point of view—scientific, religious and so on. Dispassion is not the elimination of emotion but the elevation of it. A metaphysician should not lose his temper, must have infinite patience and restraint. He must resist hasty assertion and denial and should not yield to scepticism. Metaphysics must keep clear of dogmatism, nihilism, scepticism solipsism and sophism—in one word of all "isms." Any "ism" is partisan ; it is disintegrating. This does not mean that there may not be two or three alternative hypotheses about reality ; just as there may be two or more alternatives regarding the explanation of physical phenomenon,

Just as by the experimental method the alternatives are worked out until a sole hypothesis is reached, metaphysical views should be worked up as so many hypotheses to be verified and confirmed by methods evolved through common consent.

A word must be said here regarding the qualifications necessary for one who embarks on a study of metaphysics. The curious assumption that one finds in the present-day philosophical world is that a study of metaphysics needs no discipline of its own or any qualifications on the part of one who seeks to study it. A knowledge that is not in need of any specific discipline can hardly be called knowledge and is not worth the trouble of seeking. While one who studies physics must know mathematics, must have a passion for facts, a sense of the interrelatedness of things, accuracy of observation and experimental skill, a student of metaphysics, on the other hand, is not required to have known anything in particular or acquired any specific discipline or attitude. One who has abandoned science and has a smattering of formal logic and history is supposed to be destined for a study of philosophy in the Universities. I wonder why one who has studied science and mathematics should not be admitted to a metaphysics course. Really one cannot pursue metaphysics usefully unless one has studied science, mathematics, history, logic and literature. The ideal condition will be fulfilled if Metaphysics is studied by one who has obtained his degree in both Science and Arts subjects. The conditions laid down by Plato for the study of dialectic seem to suit our requirements ideally.

Metaphysics is concerned with all experience. As Whitehead puts it: "With experience sober, and experience sleeping, experience working, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake, experience conscious and experience self-forgetful, experience intellectual and experience physical, experience religious and experience sceptical, experience anxious and experience care-free, experience anticipatory, experience retrospective, experience happy and experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion, experience under self-restraint, experience in the light and experience in the dark, experience

normal and experience abnormal." (*Adventures of Ideas* pp. 290-91.) Any metaphysics which neglects any of these or is partial to some of them leads to 'isms'. Empiricism takes experience as consisting only of atomistic sensory elements and overlooks the non-sensory elements; Rationalism overlooks the elements of sensory experience and over-emphasises the non-sensory; Idealism lays emphasis more on ideals than on facts, more on religion than on science; Scepticism and Agnosticism more on our doubts and disappointments than on hopes and fulfilments. Each of these works under sectarian banners and discards the banner of metaphysics under which there is a place for every banner on earth.

With all experience as its subject-matter, metaphysics aims at developing a system of ideas of the highest generality suggested by experience with a view to its illumination, unification and harmony.

The method of metaphysics should be a synthesis of both logical atomism and logical organism. The metaphysician is a logical atomist in so far as he carries out the analysis of experience on as minute a scale as possible. But this is not an end in itself. This analytic method which is of the nature of the logical atomism is a complement to the synthetic method of logical integration. It is a synthesis of intuition and reason. Atomism by itself would completely hide the universal, or show only its microscopic character. Atomistic metaphysics gives us categories and logical organism furnishes us with the conception of a hierarchy among the categories. By the synthesis of both we shall be able to see the universal both in its microcosmic and macrocosmic characters.

It remains now for us to consider the final outcome of the study of metaphysics. The development of a hierarchy of categories must result in a certain intellectual equipoise. This is the first and the most important thing that a metaphysician expects from his cognitive endeavour. Otherwise there is something wrong with the metaphysical quest. Secondly, this intellectual equipoise results in the promotion of a state of peace. This ideal has been very clearly envisaged in Indian thought but

unfortunately it has tended towards asceticism and anti-socialism. If it has not produced anti-social characters, it has at any rate, produced chiefly socially neutral characters. Peace such as is sought in an environment isolated from the larger context of life indicates a certain sense of defeatism, whereas the peace that one should seek through metaphysics is the peace achieved through successful mental, emotional and social adjustments to the world around oneself. This has been very well envisaged by Whitehead : "At the heart of the nature of things, there are always the dream of youth and the harvest of tragedy. The Adventure of the Universe starts with the dream and reaps tragic Beauty. This is the secret of the union of Zest with Peace—that the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies. The immediate experience of this Final Fact with its union of Youth and Tragedy, is the sense of Peace." (*Adventures of Ideas*, p. 381.)

The Philosopher's Enquiry

BY

G. N. MATHRANI

What is the philosopher in search of? The philosopher is said to be a super-scientist who envisages the whole universe as distinct from an ordinary scientist who studies only a particular aspect of the universe. It is said that the object of both, the philosopher and the scientist, is to know the truth; the difference between the two lies only in the fact that the philosopher wants to know the ultimate truth whereas the scientist wants to know the phenomenal truth. In this paper we have attempted to show that this claim of the orthodox philosopher is a pseudo-scientific claim and that in the most fundamental sense a philosopher is not a scientist for *the scientist's enquiry is a pursuit of truth whereas the philosopher's enquiry is a pursuit of meaning.*

The so-called problems of the philosopher may be divided into the metaphysical and the epistemological.¹ The metaphysical problem is known as the problem of Reality. The question when formulated reads as "What is Reality?" and this indeed is the basic question of all philosophers though some answer it consciously and some only implicitly. To follow Wittgensteinian method we should first of all analyse the nature of the question before we attempt to answer it. Now what sort of question is the question "What is Reality?" Is it a scientific question an answer to which should be a description, is it a logical question an answer to which will be an analysis of an innate concept, or is it merely a verbal question an answer to which will be a definition?

1. In this paper we shall deal with only the metaphysical problem of the philosopher.

The question "What is Reality?" certainly is not like the question "What are Siamese cats?". Nor is it like the questions "What is length?" and "What is colour?". But it is more like the latter than the former. The question "What are Siamese cats" is a scientific question about an objective existent and the answer to it will be a description of Siamese cats; whereas the questions "What is length?" "What is colour?" and "What is reality?" are not entity-questions, for, the terms 'length' 'colour' and 'reality' are not nouns but adjectives. Of course in the schoolboy's grammar even 'colour' and 'length' are considered as nouns. But when we designated them as adjectives, what we wanted to say was that they were not generic or proper names, but names of qualities of things and not of things themselves.

The question "What is Reality?" is not also exactly like the questions "What is length?" and "What is colour?", for, though the terms 'length', 'colour' and 'reality' are all adjectival expressions, they are not the same kind of adjectives. In a sense length and colour are parts of a thing, while reality is not a part of a thing. It is perhaps because of this non-objective nature of reality that there is so much disagreement as to the nature of the real. The term 'reality' functions more like the terms 'beauty', 'goodness', 'truth', 'meaning' and such others than like 'length' and 'colour'.

Adjectives may be divided into two types, sensible adjectives and value adjectives. Sensible adjectives are names of qualities sensibly apprehended, whereas value-adjectives are names of values attached to certain things for certain reasons. 'Length' and 'colour' are examples of sensible adjectives; 'reality', 'goodness', 'beauty', 'truth' and 'meaning' are instances of value-adjectives. 'Reality' is an adjective for it is the things experienced which we call real or unreal and illusory. Similarly, 'goodness' is an adjective for goodness always is goodness of something, some man or some action of a man. So also beauty always is beauty of something, of a woman, of a picture, of a statue, etc. 'Truth' and 'meaning' too are adjectives

for it is the statements which are true or false, and sentences and words which possess meaning.

Sensible adjectives, as we said before, are objective constituents of things whereas value-adjectives do not constitute things nor can they be sensibly apprehended. We do not imply thereby that there is any other way of apprehending value-adjectives ; there is nothing to be apprehended, for value-adjectives are not names of things or their constituents. They are just adjectival designations which we attach to certain things when they satisfy certain conditions.

There is however one important difference between 'reality' and other value-adjectives. Value-adjectives like 'goodness,' 'beauty,' 'truth' and 'meaning' have definite and limited scope of application. We can legitimately ask about the goodness of a man and of his actions, but in the same sense we cannot ask about the goodness of a proposition or of a sentence. A proposition can be said to have a meaning or not, possess truth or not, but it can not be said to have goodness or not. Similarly, we can ask about the beauty of a woman, of a picture, of a statue, but we cannot say whether Tooth-ache is beautiful or not. The question of reality, however, can be raised in regard to all things. We can ask about any sort of object whether it is real or not. 'Reality' may be called a 'cosmic value' as different from other values which may be named as 'spherical values', meaning thereby that the scope of application of 'reality' is the entire cosmos and the scope of application of other value-adjectives is some sphere within the cosmos.

What sort of question then is the question 'What is reality ?' 'Reality' we have said, is a value-adjective. The only question we can raise about value-adjectives is the question as to why do we attach these adjectival designations to their respective things ? Why do we say 'this sentence is meaningful' and 'that sentence is meaningless', 'this picture is beautiful' and 'that picture is ugly', 'this object is real' and 'that object is illusory ?' These are all criteria-questions, that is, questions, about the criteria which determine the use of value-adjectives.

So the question 'What is reality ?' is a demand for the criterion of reality, a demand for specifying the conditions which should be satisfied in order that an object be called real. In other words, the question 'What is reality ?' is a question about the meaning of the term 'reality'.

How have the philosophers answered this question ? They too have answered this question by giving one or the other criterion of reality though sometimes they think as if they made a scientific discovery about the universe. More often they assume some logical air about the definition they give of 'reality'. They seem to think that there is something like an innate notion of reality and to answer the question 'what is reality' one has only to keep into one's mind to analyse this intrinsic concept. They are far from thinking that the question 'What is reality ?' is a verbal question demanding a verbal definition or a statement about its use in the language system.

We hold that the question 'what is reality ?' is neither a scientific question demanding a description or a knowledge-statement, nor is it a logical question demanding a logical analysis of some intrinsic concept. but we hold that it is a linguistic enquiry about the actual meaning assigned to it in the language we speak. If our analysis of the question 'what is reality ?' is right, then it is legitimate to hold that the basic proposition of all philosophy is a necessary proposition ; for an answer to the basic question is, as we have seen, of the nature of a definition, and in logic all definitions are necessary propositions.

All other metaphysical propositions are more or less deductions from the basic metaphysical proposition which is always a necessary proposition. That this is really the case is obvious from the method philosophers employ.

It has been said that different metaphysicians or philosophical system-builders have employed different methods. Historians of European philosophy distinguish three methods which, they

say, have been used by different philosophers in the past. These three methods are known as 'the rational method', 'the empirical method' and 'the critical method'. The rational method is said to have been employed in different degrees by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and others of their school. Empirical method is said to have been employed by the British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Critical method is the name given to the method employed by Kant. Critical method is more an epistemological method than metaphysical. In fact, Kant did not call himself a metaphysician. He made a preliminary distinction between the real and the apparent, but he said that the real was unknowable. He employed his critical method not in investigating the nature of the real or the noumenal, but in understanding the apparent or the phenomenal. Rational and empirical methods are similar in so far as both involve the element of deduction (though it is denied by the empiricists), and they are different in so far as they employ different criteria of reality.

That all metaphysics must necessarily involve the process of deduction is evident from the very nature of the basic enquiry of metaphysics. Metaphysics is an enquiry into the real as distinct from the apparent, and as we have already seen, 'real' is value-adjective, and unless we have a criterion of reality we cannot talk about the reality or unreality of anything. Whether the world is real or not, whether material objects are real or otherwise, whether other-minds are real things or mere conceptual constructions, whether time is a real entity or a fiction, all this is to be deduced from the criterion of reality we accept. In short, the accepted definition of metaphysics necessitates deduction as a necessary method in all metaphysical enquiry. Now we shall proceed to show that all the so-called metaphysical systems do make use of deduction and that without deduction no metaphysical system could be possible.

Metaphysical systems may be divided into purely-deductive systems and mixed-deductive systems, that is, deduction coupled with some sort of analysis. The following is the detailed

scheme of metaphysical systems. With a view to have a better grasp of these, the same is being given in the form of a chart.

Metaphysics	
Purely-deductive	Analytic-deductive
(1) Rationalist School.	(1) Deduction preceded by analysis of concepts.
(2) Hegelian School.	(2) Deduction preceded by analysis of experience.
	(3) Deduction preceded by natural investigation.

Nobody would question our contention that the Rationalists and the Hegelians practised deduction for they themselves professed to practise deduction. Controversy may arise about the analytic-deductive philosophers, as we call them, for they were unaware of the deductive element in their philosophy. Here we shall show that each one of the analytic-deductive systems is based on deduction.

(1) Different analytic-deductive philosophers base their deduction on different sorts of analysis. Absolutist philosophers of Bradleyan type analyse certain concepts and then deduce their metaphysical conclusions. Bradley in his 'Appearance and Reality' and Mr. A. E. Taylor, a Bradleyan philosopher, in his 'Elements of Metaphysics' first formulate the criterion of reality, then analyse concepts (logically) and then deduce metaphysical conclusions. We shall explain this by taking concrete instances. Absolutists say that change is unreal. How do they come to this conclusion? Their argument is as follows: 'Real is self-consistent, concept of change is self-contradictory, therefore change is unreal'. They say the same thing about Space, Time, Causality and all other relations. They argue also in the same way: 'Concept of relation involves indefinite regress, but the real is harmonious and therefore definite and therefore all relations are unreal.'

This kind of deduction is to be distinguished from the pure deduction practised by Spinoza and Hegel. In pure-deduction, directly from certain definitions and axioms philosophical propositions are deduced ; whereas in the deduction practised by Bradley and others, from definitions by themselves nothing is deduced. In this latter kind, deduction is based on some kind of analysis. Spinozistic deduction may be called 'geometrical deduction' and the 'latter kind of deduction may be called 'Syllogistic deduction.' We shall show in due course that all analytic-deductive philosophers practise syllogistic-deduction.

(2) British Empiricism is an instance of the second type of 'Analytic-deductive metaphysics'. It is claimed by Empiricists that deduction plays no part in their systems. We shall soon show that they too are not immune from deduction and that without deduction they cannot arrive at their philosophic conclusions.

It is said that Empiricism came as a reaction against Rationalism. Let us be clear as to what the Empiricist condemned in Rationalism. So far as their aim and object is concerned, both were in pursuit of philosophical knowledge. The Empiricist's reaction was in respect of the Rationalist's method. We contend that in principle the Empiricist's method also was the same as the Rationalist's, for, both practised deduction, the only difference was that the Empiricist's deduction was based on some sort of analysis.

The basic criterion of reality accepted by Empiricist philosophers is 'the perceivable alone is real'. The main conclusions of Empirical philosophy are syllogistic deductions from this criterion. Locke started the Empiricist tendencies, but he could not carry out the programme to its culmination. We shall give a short summary of the development of empirical doctrines showing that all of them are based on syllogistic deductions.

LOCKE :—For convenience sake, we may divide the universe into the Self, the material world and God. Locke rejected the

innate ideas of the Rationalist for they could not be perceived. He admitted 'Ideas in the Mind' to be real, the implicit argument being that ideas can be perceived. By 'Ideas' he meant ideas of the external world (that is, percepts, images and abstract ideas) and mental operations i.e. feelings, desires, etc. But he also postulated 'Mind' or substratum of ideas' though it could not be perceived. As regards the material world, he admitted primary qualities such as extension, weight height etc., to be real (because they could be perceived), but he denied reality to sensible qualities like colour, touch, taste, etc., though they also could be perceived. The reason he gave was that sensible qualities were mind-dependent. He also postulated material substance or the substratum in which primary qualities inhere. He also believed in the existence of God, not because God could be seen but on the ground that contingent existents necessitate some necessary existent. Thus we see that some of the doctrines of Locke are syllogistic-deductions from his Empiricist-criterion of reality and some are logical postulates.

BERKELEY :—Berkeley took up the weapon which Locke had already used and with that very weapon he rejected some of the doctrines held by Locke, but he also failed to prove himself a consistent Empiricist for he accepted the reality of Mind and God. He excluded from his system material substance and primary qualities and retained Mind, Ideas and God. He rejected material substance because it could not be perceived, and he rejected primary qualities because according to him they too were mind-dependent. But he admitted Mind to be real and his argument was that though we do not have an 'idea' of the Mind, we have, what he called, 'notion' of the Mind. His belief in God, however, was unbecoming to an Empiricist.

HUME :—Hume, the most thorough-going Empiricist of all the three, rejected Mind and God also because they are not objects of perception. He retained only 'Ideas' or what he called 'Impressions'. Hume's doctrine was "All that there is, is the impressions in an eternal flux".

This short summary of the Empirical School is enough to show that Empiricist philosophy also, is based on syllogistic

deduction. But their syllogistic deduction is based on analysis of experience or empirical observation and not on the analysis of concepts as in the case of Bradley. The contention 'that the Empiricist's conclusions are based on empirical observation' is only partially true. No amount of empirical analysis by itself could entitle the empiricist to make propositions about the real. Unless the philosopher has a criterion of reality, he possibly cannot say 'X is real' and 'Y is not real'. Even when by analysing his experience, Hume found that all that one perceives are one's 'impressions', how could he proceed to say that only impressions are real? He could make this judgment only by presupposing that the perceivable alone is real.

(3) The third kind of analytic-deductive systems is what may be called 'scientific philosophy'. Here the scientist first investigates facts and then claims to find out some philosophic truths about the universe. Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington are the supposed scientific philosophers. Here we shall show that scientific investigation as such, no matter how great, cannot solve philosophical problems, for, the problem of the real is a normative problem whereas scientific research is only a natural process.

Take a crude case of scientific investigation. Look at a piece of paper through various scientific instruments. You will get different results. Suppose for instance, that when you look at it through a particular instrument, you see instead of paper a group of atoms (this is just a supposal, it may not be an actual truth). Now does his experiment by itself prove anything? Does it prove that paper does not exist or that paper is not real? Take another case. We see an object through different coloured glasses and every time we see a different colour, shall we say that that colour is not real as some philosophers do say?

It is when a scientist becomes a philosopher that he makes such statements, as Mr. Stocks of Manchester University says in his recent publication on 'Reason and Intuition' that the controversy is not between a scientist and a philosopher but

between a philosopher and a philosopher. Statements that paper is not real or that colour is not real are deductive conclusions. In the first case the argument is 'the Real is that which can be perceived. Scientific instruments are superior sources of perception, therefore that which we perceive with a bare eye is less real than that which is perceived through a scientific instrument'. In the latter case the argument is 'that which changes with a change in the instrument is unreal. Colour changes with a change in the instrument, therefore colour is not real'. Thus we see that mere scientific facts cannot entitle us to make any philosophical propositions.

We have thus shown that the first proposition in all the metaphysical systems must be and is a definition and therefore a necessary and verbal proposition ; and the remaining propositions in all Metaphysics are either pure geometrical deductions or syllogistic deductions from the first proposition. If the above-mentioned analysis of metaphysical systems be right, is it not clear that Metaphysics cannot be a pursuit of knowledge, but that it can only be and has always been a pursuit of meaning ?

The first proposition undoubtedly is about meaning, for it only defines the term 'Real'. The remaining propositions are deductive conclusions from it. Deduction can never give us knowledge, for, the conclusion in any piece of deduction is a mere explication of the meaning of the terms and their relations employed in the premises. Deduction has remained condemned as a proper source of knowledge since the days of J. S. Mill.

The Nature and Significance of Religious Experience

BY

N. V. BENERJEE

Religious experience at all stages of development, it is universally admitted, involves a certain mental attitude, a certain feeling or feelings, emotion or emotions inspired by causes lying within human nature as well as in man's environment, and, as such, serves as a stimulus to certain actions. This may be enquired into, and the enquiry in question would obviously belong to Psychology and Sociology. Religious experience, like moral and aesthetic experiences, may thus provide data for widening the range of scientific knowledge.

Religious experience may, however, serve to achieve more, especially to interpret the universe in a super-empirical sense, provided that it is found to involve some synthetic judgment *a priori* referring to an element or elements which do not merely bear, in some sense or another, upon the existent order of the universe, but are themselves existents of a super-empirical nature, and not, like the *a priori* elements referred to by moral or aesthetic judgments, of the nature of *ideals* to be pursued by man.

Although certain matters relating to the practical life of man are judged to be meritorious or otherwise from the religious point of view, such judgments, strictly speaking, are not judgments of value, that is to say, do not express the realisedness or otherwise of an ideal or ideals in and through those matters, but primarily point out whether those matters conform to the will of a god or gods, or not ; so that such religious judgments should ultimately follow from what may be called an *a priori* existential judgment, viz., 'God exists' or 'gods exist'. And if in the face of the view that that which, strictly speaking, is an ideal can not

be an 'existent', it be asserted that an ideal, essentially, is a concrete existent of a super-empirical nature, even then the deliverance of religious experience would primarily be not a judgment of value but an *a priori* existential judgment, affirming the existence of a god or of gods,—it being understood that God in the singular or in the plural, would be an ideal because he exists and not, conversely, that he exists because he is an ideal. This view of the primary deliverance of religious experience, it is needless to mention, is precisely the view that is entertained by the religious man as he is ordinarily understood to be ; and it is again this view that may be said to enable philosophy to interpret the universe in a super-empirical sense.

Our question, then, is whether the religious judgment, 'God exists' or 'gods exist' is true,—which is the same thing as to ask whether the concept of God or of gods is genuine.

Now one of the senses in which a judgment could be said to be true is that it is empirically verifiable, that the concept or concepts involved in it are *genuine*, corresponding to an existent or existents that can be experienced. But, notwithstanding the fact that many philosophers admit the possibility of man's immediate acquaintance with God, the judgment under consideration can not be true in this sense. For God can not be known to exist at least in the same manner and in the same sense as things such as a tree, a house, etc., are known to exist ; and if the so-called immediate acquaintance with God be said to have the same sense of acquaintance as our acquaintance with things such as these has, then the former would at best be immediate experience of a religious emotion, but not of an existing god. This, however, amounts to stating something which, far from being opposed to the religious sentiment, is universally regarded as essential to religious belief, viz., that the validity of the fundamental religious judgment can not be determined empirically.

There is another sense in which God may be held to be an object of immediate acquaintance, namely, in the sense that he is the object of faith or of a purely mystical intuition,—this

sense depending on the belief that the nature of God is a mystery which transcends the human understanding. Now since God, on this view, cannot evidently be defined in terms which are intelligible to the human understanding, the so-called fundamental religious judgment cannot only not be validated empirically, but cannot also admit of *a priori* validation, and, consequently, may at best be a subjective belief, and not a judgment in the strict sense of the term, namely as an objective or universal belief, a judgment validated empirically or in an *a priori* manner, as the case may be.

At least two more ways of understanding the nature of the so-called primary religious judgment are still open, namely, (1) that while it appears to be a judgment, it has not the sense of judgment, but, really, is the expression of a command or imperative, and (2) that it not only is not a judgment but does not also express a command, and yet is something distinct from either.

The former alternative is ruled out by the simple consideration that the judgment in question, in-as-much as it has directly and immediately no sense of a command, relates primarily not to *doing* but to *being*. Commands or imperatives there may indeed be in the religious sphere ; but the possibility of these should depend on the existence of God which the present judgment is specially concerned to affirm. Now if the so-called fundamental religious judgment cannot thus be the expression of a command, as it is not a judgment in the strict sense of the term, and yet, as suggested by the second of the two alternatives mentioned above, is something distinct from either, the question necessarily arises, what this something can be. In answering this it is first necessary to observe that if one wishes, as the religious man wishes, to affirm the existence of something other than oneself or a state or attitude of one's own mind, namely, God, one may do so either directly by means of an objective existential judgment, or indirectly through an objective command, that is to say, a command originating from a source other than oneself, or a command to perform an action in

relation to something other than oneself. But if the so-called fundamental religious judgment is not, and as just seen, it cannot be, a judgment or a command, it can in no manner whatsoever serve to affirm the existence of God. And if it still be worth any thing, it may at best be an expression of an inner state or attitude of the mind. So if religion be taken to fall outside of the field of the understanding as well as of the field of experience, then the existence of God either would be purely a matter of subjective belief, or would not have the sense of the existence of a trans-subjective being, namely, God, but shrink into a subjective attitude or state, feeling or emotion.

However, if the religious judgment in question cannot thus be objectively valid in a super-rational sense as it obviously is not such in an empirical sense, may it not, then, be that the existence of God, while inadmissible on empirical grounds, is, for that reason, neither a mystery nor a fiction but can adequately be vouched for by the human understanding, and, consequently, may it not be that this judgment is genuinely synthetic *a priori*? This question which is, in fact, the only question which remains to be considered in the present connection, may now be dealt with briefly as follows.

If it be held as the present-day positivists hold, that those propositions alone are *a priori* that are tautologous, having for their terms mere symbols, so that whether any thing exists corresponding to their terms is absolutely irrelevant, then the question raised above, in-as-much as it relates to the possibility of a judgment that is primarily concerned to assert the existence of something, viz., God, and, yet, is *a priori*, should be, as by the positivists it actually is, answered in the negative, and the judgment, 'there exists a god' should have no literal significance. But in consideration of the view that may reasonably be maintained, viz., that there are judgments, for example, judgments in Mathematics which are *a priori* and yet are not analytic or tautologous, but synthetic, referring to genuine contents corresponding to the terms occurring in them, this conclusion, even if it be true, cannot be deduced simply in the manner in

which it is deduced by the contemporary positivists. Nevertheless, the present conclusion seems to be unavoidable for the reason that the content referred to by the so-called religious judgment is neither of the nature of abstract entities, nor of the nature of ideals, referred to by the two possible kinds of synthetic judgments *a priori*, mathematical judgments and judgments of value respectively, but rather is of the nature of independent existents which properly constitute the subject-matter of empirical judgments, a kind of judgments to which the judgment under consideration, *ex hypothesi*, does not belong. The real point here is that since judgments that are *a priori* are either tautologous or synthetic in the sense that they refer to contents which, however they may bear upon the existing order of the universe, cannot themselves be existents and since the religious judgment under consideration refers to a content which is held not merely to bear upon the existent order of the universe but to be itself an existent, the latter judgment cannot be a genuine synthetic judgment *a priori*.

If the judgment, 'there exists a god', thus, cannot be *a priori* as it evidently is not empirical then either of two alternatives would necessarily follow, viz., (1) that this judgment, if judgment it still be called, would be a judgment in a super-empirico-rational sense, in which case the existence of God would be, as previously observed, a matter of purely subjective belief, or (2) that it would not have the sense of judgment, but would merely be an expression of religious feeling or emotion. But whichever alternative be admitted, the claim of philosophy to reach a higher supra-scientific interpretation of the objective order of the universe on the basis of the deliverances of religious experience would, in either event, remain unfulfilled.

Our finding that the so-called religious judgment, if a judgment it at all be, must be super-empirical-rational means that it is beyond truth and falsity ; it cannot be invalid as it cannot be valid. This undoubtedly provides comfort to the religious man, and yet points to the true significance of this judgment which may be brought out as follows.

As in the case of moral or aesthetic experience so in the case of religious experience, the foundation is laid in some feeling or emotion. However the nature, origin and growth of the primary religious feeling be interpreted by the psychologist and the sociologist whose special business it is to deal with this matter, religious experience as such, unlike cognitive experience or even moral and aesthetic experiences, lacks objectivity. And the apparent objectivity that has characterised religion at all stages of its development, owes its origin to a natural tendency of that experience to feed itself on the relevant deliverances of experiences that are objective, together with certain social factors that are wont to translate the needs of individuals into elements of social structure. While religion in the ordinary sense, owing to the operation of these social factors, has always been a social phenomenon, its quality has varied according as the quality of the objective experiences utilised by it has varied. This lower forms of religion, for example, animism, fetishism, etc., have been confined to the perceptual level of mental life dominated by the interplay of instincts and emotions, whereas the higher, theistic religions have occupied the ideational level governed by the nobler sentiments. Although theism, as religion, may, for this reason, be preferable to the so-called lower forms of religion, it cannot be said that the former is true and the latter false, nor that the former is truer than the latter, religion as such being beyond truth and falsity. While from this point of view the theistic religions should have no advantage over the religions of people occupying a lower stage of cultural development, the difference that there may be between the two is mainly a difference between the pragmatic values which they respectively produce.

The fact that the religions that have actually come to be professed on a large scale, while they are expressions of the varying stages of the cultural development of the individual and society, turn out to be instruments for the production of pragmatic values, is indeed very significant, its significance lying in that it serves to show why these religions do not represent the true spirit of religion as it should be. The reason

is not merely that the pragmatic value supposed to proceed from religion may come and, as a matter of fact, in certain quarters of philosophic thought, has actually come to be regarded as the test of its validity, to the result that religion which, really, is beyond truth and falsity, will come to admit of this distinction. It is indeed much deeper, and may be expressed by stating that true religion not only is beyond truth and falsity, but also transcends the limitation of values, lower and higher, of utility, goodness and beauty.

From common sense to science, from science to moral consciousness, and again from moral consciousness to aesthetic consciousness there runs, in obedience to a spiritual demand for freedom from bondage, a process of gradual relaxation of the subjection of man to an objective order. But even at the stage of aesthetic consciousness that demand still remains unfulfilled and man still is in a state of bondage; so that if complete freedom from bondage be ever realisable, it can be realised only in a state which transcends the limitation of objectivity in every form, of fact as well as of value. And if by religious consciousness be meant a distinct form of consciousness, not derivable from, or reducible to any other form, having a special significance of its own, then it is religious consciousness alone that can be said to provide the state in question.

Religion, truly speaking, is then a state in which man is truly himself; it marks the return of the soul to itself on the termination of all the adventures an earnest and enthusiastic undertaking of which is a necessary condition of admission into the religious state. If religion in this sense be the final destination of the soul, it is clear that it will open itself out only to those who have fulfilled this condition, and, consequently, that very few can lay claim to the attainment of the true religious state. But since the demand for religion is, as a matter of fact, universal, religion, in order to cater to the demand of the majority of human beings, has had to fall from its height of purity and come to live in the field of man's adventures where he is in bondage and where religion is really out of place. This explains how religion which, properly speaking, consists primarily in the soul's discovery of itself, in the spirit's being what it essentially is, has produced merely a show of man's release from bondage by throwing man into relationship with a super-empirical being or beings and by making it possible for the admission of the existence of a god or gods to bear upon the fruits of man's adventure, more particularly, by leading the enquiring spirit of man to interpret the world in a super-empirical sense, viz., as divine.

Personal and Impersonal Persistence

BY

H. D. BHATTACHARYYA

The value and destiny of the individual have puzzled philosophers and theologians alike from very early times and even primitive thought was not altogether free from speculations about the persistence of the individual after bodily death. The body decays visibly after death and it is futile to discuss its post-mortem persistence. Even then imagination has not given up all thoughts of its survival in some form and the funerary rites designed to ensure the translation of the body in some form to the other world have not been few or confined to one locality. Let alone the cases of literal translation as of saints and sages like Elijah, Ezra, Yudhisthira and Christ or of desirable pages like Ganymede and others. Even others less fortunate are expected in some religions to rise up at the call of the angelic trumpet on the Judgment Day and assume a body proportioned to merit for enjoyment or suffering. A hell that is only a torment of the sinning soul and a heaven that does not regale the senses in some form would prove extremely vacuous in nature for heaven and hell are so physically conceived that their meaning would be lost if there be no embodied souls to enjoy or to suffer. When the earlier races of men stuffed the graves of worthies with wives and servants and materials of enjoyment, they expected these to share the fates of their masters and to rise in the appropriate sphere as did a *sati* when she burnt herself to death on the funeral pyre of her husband. Not only those whose whole body was put intact into the grave but also those who were burnt were assured of some sort of bodily persistence and therefore in some religions bones were sedulously collected and thrown into the water lest some might remain behind and make the owner cripple or deformed in the other world. Of course, in what exact form the body found itself in the other world was not a matter of uniform belief ;

for while according to some the body retained its age and infirmity in the grave, according to others distinctions of age were obliterated in the other world and possibly also sex. Some postulated a shadowy persistence beyond the grave and others allowed only the heroes to survive in a realm of martial exercise and enjoyment. Still others thought the persistence of the physical body to be a crude conception and gave to liberated souls a finer vesture in heaven and called it a spiritual body. The promise that the righteous shall see God raised a double presumption, namely, that God is visible in some way and that the heavenly body is capable of seeing in some form. While the second was more widely believed the first raised such theological difficulties that the problem was not seriously tackled at all, even though talk with God was not totally disbelieved in many of the monotheistic systems. The diaphanous character of speech was supposed to be no bar to the non-physicality of the Divine Revealer as His visible presence was. Symbolic presence as in various theologumena was also connived at inasmuch as it did not involve the assumption of a definite human shape. What was forbidden to the Deity was however allowed to the devotee and body of some form was regarded as essential for beatific vision in heaven. And this is true even of systems of belief which did not postulate and describe a geographical heaven or hell with topographical details.

The decay of this belief in a physical heaven marks the first stage in the emancipation of human thought. Perhaps this liberation would have been quicker had not heaven and hell been very concretely imagined and filled with their own denizens—either just men made perfect and changed into angels and unjust men hardened into tormentors of sinners, or in the alternative a lot of original inhabitants tenanted the domains as the earth is filled with its dwellers. The existence of these spirits by the side of the dispenser of happiness or of unhappiness necessitated a belief in spatial locality whether as a part of this universe (*lokakāśa*) or above it (*alokakāśa*) and inasmuch as some sort of commerce between this world and the supernatural world was also conceived the emissaries of heaven

and hell had to be endowed with a sort of physical embodiment, however glorious might be the composition of the angelic bodies and however hideous that of the hellish agents. The throne and other regalia came as a matter of logical sequence in such a heavenly court and so also the splendour of the streets, towers and battlements of the empyrean city as described, for instance, in the Book of Revelation. A heavenly Utopia was felt to be less objectionable than an earthly one. The abstemious on earth were fully assured of better enjoyment than what earthly things could provide and the indulgent were threatened with more drastic suffering than what they had avoided here. But the sensuous appeal never lost its vigour even in spiritual matters, and so the departed had to be endowed with the capacity of sensuous enjoyment in the other world and naturally, therefore, with some sort of bodily persistence.

The fact is that what the individual would be without its body is difficult to imagine and how individuals belonging to other realms could be an object of interest to us and also interested in us without the capacity to receive and return the homage of men in some tangible form is not easy to conceive. Spirits descending to report the doings of men and blessing the doers of good—and even Godhead performing the same function—could be understood only as traversing space to know things, and as spiritual knowledge does not require locomotion in space the inevitable conclusion is that these beings possess the physical limitations of incarnation and their individuality is not determined by their spiritual nature alone. If this is true of the permanent residents of heaven, the immigrants from earth could not be expected to be divested entirely of their vestment of matter when entering heaven. We need not discuss whether there is only one supernatural realm where the dead go or there are many *lokas* to receive them according to their merits—the point to note is that so long as “going to heaven or hell” is regarded as *giving* some physical association becomes inevitable, whether that locomotion is done by the old body resurging after an intermediate purification and by an etherial body or by

another more vacuous still. We need not take seriously the popular hope that in the world beyond there will be re-uniting of relations sundered by death here below and their mutual recognition; but the belief is interesting because it frankly advocates the theory that in the absence of the familiar form recognition may not be possible. Possibly in the deathless heaven people assume the form of their youth and do not decay just as the gods and angels do not; but speculations of an opposite type are not wanting and sojourners in heaven losing lustre and longevity and falling from their high station down below are not unknown in certain religious speculations.

Possibly at the root of this clinging to material persistence lies the belief that heaven and hell are places of enjoyment and torture respectively and these are ultimately unthinkable except in terms of bodily stimulation. The affective feeling must be produced by an actual sensation in order to have the maximum intensity. An ideal feeling lacks the strength of a sensory feeling and would act as a doubtful incentive to good behaviour when an actual pleasant stimulation of this earth is pitted against an ideal pleasure of heaven. When the imaginary joys of heaven and horrors of hell fail to prevail against the pleasurable temptations of the flesh, it is obvious that idea does not always succeed in surpassing sensation in point of attractiveness. For instance, it is quite conceivable that in the other world there is no actual bodily sensation of any kind but that the departing spirit is left to enjoy the sweet memories of virtuous deeds done here below and get supreme satisfaction at a life well lived. Conversely, it is quite possible to imagine that a soul in hell is a lonely spirit chewing the cud of bitter memories of wrongs done by it when alive on earth. The anguish of soul by which every wrong act is expiated in hell and the euphoria memory by which every right act is recompensed in heaven might have been regarded as the only pain and pleasure enjoyed in these conditions of existence. That no mitigating memory of a pleasure-producing nature should be recoverable in hell or no sorrowful memory should be revivable in heaven would have sufficed to stamp each with its characteristic feature of unalloyed suffering

or unmixed enjoyment. But then this sorrow and this joy would not have been new—they would have been merely revivals of earthly affections or hedonic effects of regrets about lost opportunities and of complacent self-feelings about opportunities utilised in a proper fashion. For this type of heavenly pleasure or hellish anguish it is not necessary to die, for even when alive a man may suffer the same kind of agony or the same kind of satisfaction ; but then the difficulty is that so long as we retain our personal identity we cannot dissociate the pleasant and the unpleasant in our memory and this, it may be thought, is possible after we die. Death, therefore is the great separator or dissociator of memories—the Chinvat Bridge of Zoroastrianism or the Al Sirat of Islam which divides the wicked and the righteous not physically but by obliterating their pleasant and and unpleasant memories respectively. It is only in recent times that speculations on these lines are being made ; but no institutional religion is likely to agree to this mode of conceiving heaven and hell for this would eliminate the question of proximity to the throne of God and of enjoying the delicious sights and sounds of heaven which is a major attraction for the multitude. Primitive thought which believed in a thumb-sized soul located in the body and getting out of it at death might be troubled about its spatial destination ; but that advanced religions should also attempt to deposit the soul in a sanctuary for its good behaviour and supply it with the pleasures of sense there is a matter of some surprise. It is obvious that in such a belief the facts supplied by empirical knowledge are carried over to transcendental regions and the body-mind relation is supposed to persist even after death.

This would constitute a complete personal survival, for not only the soul but also the body in some form is supposed to persist and to distinguish the possessor thereof from other individuals. It is obvious that those who are unable to conceive of any other type of self-preservation model their conception of post-mortem individuality on their experience of earthly personalities. In fact, the idea that all souls must go to either heaven or hell (or a limited number of heavens and hells) is

ultimately traceable to our craving for social existence, for there is nothing to prevent the supposition that each liberated soul goes to a different heaven and each condemned soul gets into its own private hell except that in that case heaven would lose most of its attractiveness and hell in the absence of spectators of our sufferings would lose a material portion of its terror. We are not sure if, as in this world, spirits in heaven have mutual rights and obligations as conditions of personality—possibly they have none ; but that they should throng together or shout joyfully together at the arrival of a new immigrant from this world or crowd round the throne of God and sing hallelujahs in unison shows that social life is as much a desideratum in heaven as on earth. To suppose that this is necessitated by the fact that all saved souls must live in the proximity of God is again to bring in spatial relations in heaven and in a more outrageous fashion, for without compromising the omnipresence of God we cannot insist on spatial proximity to God as a reward of virtue. Nearness to God must be made to mean spiritual kinship to God and this does not demand that souls must nestle close to the throne of God. It is interesting to note in this connection the Indian philosophical position that such kinship is attainable here below and also that spiritual elevation may mean absolute isolation (*kaivalya*) instead of a concourse of kindred souls. Whether this is one more point of difference between asceticism and congregationalism in religious attitude it is not easy to say ; but those who refused to contemplate God as a separate entity (as, for instance, the mystics and the absolutists) denied at the same time the necessity of company in heaven, if they admitted the reality of heaven at all.

Philosophers have generally fought shy of the belief in the psycho-physical persistence of the departed but not so of their psychical continuity. It has been felt by moralists and theologians alike that unless the individual consciousness is retained reward and punishment lose all meaning. We do not know what transformation the psychic constellation undergoes as it crosses over to the other side of bodily death, but we believe that it does not change so radically as to lose all sense of

continuity with its earthly past. If only the substance of the soul persists but not the memory of its earthly life, then the individuals of heaven would be quantitatively distinct but not qualitatively so—we could count their number but not differentiate their psychic contents. But it is not unidentifiable multiplicity but distinguishable individuality that we ascribe to souls in heaven—they are supposed to maintain in some form their personal identity or at least to develop a distinctive personality of their own. This does not mean that people on earth always imagine distinct individualities to tenant the heavens and hells—just as the immediate ancestors are worshipped by name in China, Japan and India and the remote ones are simply the fathers without distinction so also a few departed worthies might be thought of as distinct personalities and the rest as forming an indistinguishable mass. The angels, for instance, are each distinct from the rest and yet only a few are specially named and thought of as possessing special functions while the others just swell the ranks of their order unnamed and undistinguished. Similarly, we might imagine that in heaven as on earth there are distinctions of rank graded according to merit and those at the top have some kind of individual function there as being most worthy while the rest might dwell in heaven and yet not be important enough to be separately considered. Of course, in religion where tribal feeling is very strong, as in later Judaism, no one minds not having a separate importance so long as the nation as a whole is saved ; but the general aspiration is to attain individual immortality and not to be lost in a heavenly crowd.

Philosophers have sometimes been repelled by the inanity of the heavenly life. To have the same round of enjoyment without end without the pleasure attending upon want, adventure and pursuit is a rather dull sort of existence—like the perpetual singing of the Lord's name in a *kirtan* or its recital in a rosary ; it may pall after some time unless we think, of course, that there is no time in heaven and repetition has no meaning there, being, as Kant says, based upon number which in its turn is based upon time. We may, to avoid this position,

believe either that heavenly life is a life akin to ecstasy or rapture where time-sense ceases to function or that immortality is perfectly compatible with further moral progress, as Kant thought it was. Just as to relieve the dullness of residence in the grave between death and resurrection we might postulate the existence of a purgatorio where the peccadilloes of earthly life are expiated and progress towards paradise made, so also we might imagine that a single life does not suffice for attaining the perfection that leads to heaven and that immortality and heavenly residence are not identical inasmuch as continued existence may be enjoyed in some other realm which gives opportunities of ultimately gaining heaven. The difference between this view and transmigration is that it does not believe in a return to this world nor in the possibility of ups and downs in spiritual fortune in different embodiments nor in the persistence of a material sheath of the soul (the *linga-sarira*) until liberation as the theory of transmigration does. The fancy is almost like the belief in the seven planes (*loka*) or heavens which according to many religious systems, the soul traverses in its upward march to final rest. What the ultimate state is remains obscure but the intermediate states keep the ascending soul busy with achieving higher aims and in diversified occupations, thereby taking away the monotony which even unending pleasure cannot dispel.

It is also worthy of note that those who postulate a personal persistence mostly belong to that class which believes in the temporal creation of finite souls. Indian philosophers who postulated an eternal existence of souls could with better logic establish the thesis that things that had no origin had also no end. But theistic religions mostly proceed on the assumption that origin at a point of time is no bar to unending existence in future (or in timeless eternity) provided the thing created is worthy of maintenance unto eternity. Possibly the witness of the soul that it is identical in spite of its temporal history on earth is responsible for the belief that personal identity is indissoluble even after bodily death—possibly the craving for continued existence is also a powerful factor in establishing this

faith in us. It is yet too early to anticipate what the bearing of our knowledge of cases of double and multiple personality will have on this belief in the persistence of a unitary personality after death, specially when the cognitive, affective and moral contents of the different selves are not homogeneous or linked up through memory or uniform conduct and appreciation. A working organisation of the different selves characterises normal beings and serves to hide the conflicts and contradictions that exist among them ; hence if we believe that heavenly life is far more well knit than earthly life, we must assume that dissociated personalities cannot get in or exist there (although it may be admitted that on this supposition the revolt of the angels becomes difficult to understand). To suppose that fragmentary personalities get in there would raise great difficulties for then it would be possible to assume that the good in us goes to heaven while the evil descends to hell and hence each one of us is partially saved, namely, to the extent our personality has been good here below. To use the quaint analogy of Hindu philosophers, this would be like cooking one half of a hen and keeping the other half for laying eggs. We would then be called upon to disentangle the various selves and trace the destiny of each self independently of the rest. But those who plead for immortality hardly countenance this colonial conception of self.

If persistence of the individual has reference to the psychic constellation or organisation, it also is not altogether free from criticism. It need cause no wonder if the logical difficulties of defending the persistence of systems of personality lead some thinkers to fall back upon a kind of substantial continuity akin to the indestructibility of an atom. When immortality is supposed to be due to the simplicity and indivisibility of the soul the underlying thought is that the soul is a bit of substance that resists disintegration. Here there is no question of preserving the psychic acquisitions of earthly life, but simply the contentless unity is supposed to persist. The question of value is immaterial for the bad and the good are alike entitled to survival because every soul is indestructible. True, in some

religious speculations the annihilation of the wicked soul, has been advocated, but the major verdict is for conserving every soul, whether good or bad, and in some systems the redemption of all souls at the end is a major creed. Those who believe that souls are eternal are committed to their unending persistence almost as a matter of course, but they too often preach the persistence only of the soul-substance, and some go to the length of supposing that it is only as an unconscious entity that the soul preserves itself. Consciousness, dependent as it is on the conjunction of soul and mind, mind and sense-organs and sense-organs and objects, lapses when any of these conjunctions fail. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika mode of thought loss of personality and consciousness necessarily follows in the state of release, for the soul becomes dissociated from the mind. What it becomes when deprived of the conditions of phenomenal consciousness it is not possible to determine. That the identity of personal consciousness is discarded is however certain. Had pre-existence or rather eternal existence been not a postulate, possibly this contentless persistence would have been abandoned also. This much is certain that the persistence is not of the personal order in an ultimate reference. Even such systems as the Samkhya and the Yoga which believed in the persistence of the conscious entity (*purusa*) after dissociation from matter (*prakṛti*) hardly endowed it with personality as ordinarily understood ; for according to them, the disappearance of the basis of discriminative intelligence (*buddhi*) and ego-sense (*aḥamkāra*) deprived the spiritual entities of their sense of personality—these lost the sense of possessing states of consciousness as so many I's and became identical with consciousness itself (*aitanyavastu*). In other words, the released souls are numerically many but void of the sense of personality that social concourse brings. This is due to the fact that released souls are not supposed to attain a social condition after the dissolution of the material frame ; and as contact with the material world is also gone there is no discrimination of the self from the not-self. In the absence of relation both with nature and with other souls the element of personality suffers a disintegration—possibly if souls had not been

defined as spiritual and therefore conscious, it is doubtful if they would have been identified even with consciousness itself. The impersonality, however, is regarded as individual in the Samkhya and the Yoga.

From this position a double advance is possible. We may suppose that individual consciousness is always personal in character and that therefore impersonality cannot be an ultimate feature of finite spirits. The Absolute, however, is not personal as it lacks the limitations that personality implies and is consciousness itself without a sense of owning the consciousness as a personal being. As outside the Absolute there can be nothing, the finite has two ways open to it. It either loses itself in the Absolute and thus ceases to be in the finite sense. The only reality is the Absolute and whatever is finite and personal is an unreal appearance that is absorbed in the whole. The individual persists not as an individual but as the Absolute—in other words, the Whole alone persists whether as Brahman or as Dharmakāya or the Absolute. In Mahayanism and in Advaita Vedanta we have the most logical statement of this position. Persistence loses all proper meaning when what persists is not the individual but the whole, which as indivisible can hardly be said to consist of parts and to preserve the parts within itself. There is not even a ripple in the Absolute to indicate that a finite being has disappeared in it here or there. In the unruffled bosom of the Absolute all is perfect calm and even the necessity of the finite does not exist from its standpoint. We need not enter here into the vexed question of Maya or Avidya - the phenomenal appearance of the finite does not in any way add to the richness of the Absolute life.

The other possible view is that the finite does not survive in the Absolute in its proper form but does contribute to the life of the Whole though not in any temporal sense, at least in the sense that it represents a *quale* which the Absolute would be without had it not existed and experienced as a personal being. How the Absolute Experience assumes also the form of finite personality need not be discussed here ; but the point is that

the integration that makes up the finite personality does not exist in the Absolute as such and all the finite experiences are redistributed in the Absolute in such a manner that they get harmonised and reconciled there. If we take time as real we may hold as Bosanquet does that we leave a perfume of our personal life, as it were, in the Absolute like faded leaves ; this enriching the life of the Whole is our only individual contribution to reality. This is quite in accord with what we observe in the phenomena of life where individuals perish but leave their impress upon the race. The theory of evolution has familiarised us with the idea of impersonal persistence in succeeding generations after the individual has ceased to exist as such. Similarly we may believe that we persist in the social life of the race which we have either enriched or degraded. Whether in addition to this we also continue our private existence elsewhere is not easy to defend except with the logic of the heart. If what the longings of the heart postulate have an equal right to existence with what the intellect can justify, then of course a pleasurable personal existence after bodily death would be proved. If again the logic of our limited vision has no application to transcendental things, then also heaven and its joys and hell and its horrors can be assumed to have real existence ; but it should be frankly admitted that in that case anything can be proved regarding things beyond our ken. There is no difficulty in conceiving, however, that just as energy can change its concrete form and living things transmit their capacities to their descendants, and evolve a better race so also the fruits of action performed by each individual pervade the entire universe without being individually enjoyed—whether this takes place without our personal wish, as in Buddhism, or according to our resolution, as in the Bhagavadgita-theory of dedication of fruits of karma (karmasannyasa) to God. When the Absolute is non-temporally viewed, the individual has no real existence and the question of its persistence does not arise.

Schematically represented the whole problem of persistence boils down to the following :—

A. The Individual persists separately

1. As a substance only (Nyaya-Vaisesika)

2. As impersonal consciousness only (Samkhya-Yoga)

3. As conscious personality (Dvaita and Visistadvaita and theistic religions)

i. Without body (Jaina)

ii. With body (Vedic, Islamic, Christian)

and therefore

i. In a psychic condition only

ii. In a spatially conceivable locality (Amidism, popular religion)

B. The Individual persists impersonally in the Whole

1. With no real existence of any kind in the impartible Absolute (Advaita)

2. With its experiences redistributed in the Absolute but contributing nothing new to its perfect life (Bradley)

3. With its experiences enriching the Absolute life but not maintaining any separate existence (Bosanquet).

We refrain from making any reference to the doctrine which preaches absolute vacuity (Sunyavada) for there the whole and the parts share a common fate. The persistence of the personality is based more upon ethical than upon speculative needs. If the denial of personal consciousness is not easy, the belief in the persistence of the finite is not altogether free from speculative difficulties. It is more to enjoy a pension than to earn a living that the liberated soul is allowed to persist indefinitely ; and the reward is out of proportion to the service rendered. Divine grace with or without prophetic intercession is a necessary assumption in any scheme of redemption which promises more reward than what personal effort deserves. That the only nirvana is a blowing out of the evil that is in us and that just as a blown-out lamp goes nowhere so also the individual goes nowhere when freed from the trammels of phenomenal existence is a disheartening future for the majority of mankind. So we long for the eternal musical programme of heaven if we are

quietistically inclined or if we are active by nature, for eternal service to God not so much to help Him as to enjoy the pleasure of serving Him—if, of course, service has any meaning in a transcendental region. The instinct of self-preservation infects not only our mortal thoughts but also our idea of immortality.

Classicism and Romanticism in Art

BY

M. M. SHARIFF

The part which the content involved in the personality of the artist plays in determining the nature and value of his intuitions, throws light on the question whether there are any kind of art. Croce's answer to this question is in the negative ; but a deep study of the content of art leads to a positive answer. This content involves internal distinctions and distinctions within distinctions. First we have the distinction between sense *presentation*, as in the aesthetic apprehension of a physical object, or *representation*, as in imagining, on the one side ; and *sentiments, emotions and impulses* of the artist on the other. This is distinction between the primarily externally grounded sense-content and the primarily internally grounded emotional content of intuition.

Again, within this latter content there is distinction between that content which a man shares with the whole of humanity and that which is distinctive of his age. Within that content which is peculiar to his age, there is distinction between what he has in common with other people and that which is characteristically his own. What a person shares with all men and the men of his age is *form* in relation to that *content* which is peculiar to himself ; since form is a trait or an assemblage of traits *common to all individuals* of a group and content is a trait or an assemblage of traits *distinctive of each individual* in that group. While for the whole intuitional content, expression is form, both as a common characteristic of all aesthetic experience and as a formative and constructive activity, for the *content* peculiar to a man, the essential qualities he shares with the other men of his age and of all ages, i. e., the qualities which make him a *typical man of his age*, are to be regarded as *form*. These distinctions are made only by analysis and abstraction,

otherwise personality is a concrete unity. As in the case of all others, so in the case of the artist, this concrete unified personality has on its formal side the sentiments he shares with humanity at large and the men of his own age. But by virtue of his hereditary connection, his environments and his special reactions to these environments, he develops some sentiments and dispositions which distinguish him from other people. The sentiments he shares with others have peculiar shades of their own. These shades of difference in common sentiments, and the strictly personal and private sentiments and impulses and emotions of the artist, constitute the content side of his being. The two sides are interrelated and held together in the whole of his personality. If personality is well-integrated, it is called character.¹

Now if the formal side dominates the personality of an artist, his art, will be *classical*. If the content side dominates, it will be *romantic*. The artist's personality, like all personality, develops in a society embodying the accumulated heritage of the past, and it bears the stamp of that society; consequently its expression in his works of art also bears that stamp. If society in a certain age of peace and prosperity is satisfied with its intellectual, moral and social achievements and has fixed beliefs, set ideals, clear codes of behaviour and decorum, the artists of that society will as a rule develop the formal side of their personalities at some sacrifice and comparative exclusion of their content side and they will produce *classical works*. Thus if the formal side of the artist's life dominates their personality, their art would be classical. They will "look to the past", to the balanced, the stable, the standard, the typical and the commonly accepted and felt, with confidence and respect; and this outlook of theirs will find expression in their works.

But after a time society becomes rigid. Its convictions become conventions and dogmas and prejudices, and its rules

1. Herbert Read is wrong in distinguishing character from personality (*Collected Essays*). The former is only a species of the latter.

become chains. The delicate social equilibrium gets jammed. Spirit changes into form and form into abstraction. Life becomes stagnant and art becomes empty, commonplace, repetitive, mechanical.

Yet this state does not last very long. Life also has its autumn and spring. From within the stagnated society rises the spirit of revolt and history takes a new turn. The frozen gods are shattered ; customs and conventions are shed and fresh thoughts and basic emotions sprout forth in all their freshness. The shell of dead form breaks and a new spirit issues forth. The old rules and technique and standards are discarded and a sense of freedom prevails. There is a bustle and a struggle in life and a shaking of social balance. New ventures are undertaken, some destined to succeed and others doomed to fail.

The artist being more sensitive than an average man, becomes the first embodiment of the new spirit. The formal side of his nature leaves the *conventional and the customary* and retains only the *instinctive and the natural*. The content side of his personality—the assemblage of his sentiments and impulses—bursts forth into violent emotionality, natural sensibility, romantic thrill, subtle though vaguer thoughts, wild dreams, new ideals, new forms and new visions, and he produces *romantic works*.

This romantic period lasts till society again settles down to an equilibrium and life and art again become classical in character.

Thus broadly speaking the progress of both society and art goes on dialectically, each period leading to its real opposite and then to the synthesis of both the thesis and the antithesis in the reappearance of the thesis in a higher form. Broadly speaking classicism leads to romanticism and romanticism to classicism and so the process goes on to higher and still higher planes.

In his essay on the classical and the romantic, Professor Grierson traces this movement in the history of European literature. According to him the classical age of Pericles, led to the

romantic period of Plato to St. Paul. This latter was followed by the Roman classicism of the period from Cicero to Virgil and Horace, only to be followed by the romantic and humanistic revolt against "Christian theology and ascetic ideals" in the Twelfth and the Thirteenth Century, culminating in the Italian Renaissance of the Fifteenth Century. This romanticism was again succeeded by the French classicism of the age of Louis XIV, inaugurated in England by Dryden, and was followed by the romantic period of Rousseau, Schelling, Fichte, Blake, Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats and Byron.²

The distinction between the classical and the romantic, it may be concluded, is broad, but it is nonetheless genuine and is essentially based on the nature of man as manifested both in the individual and in society. It is owing to its fundamental nature that the distinction has persisted through history. Croce himself holds that differences in art arise, not on account of any differences in form (in the sense of expression) but because of differences in content. It has been contended that differences of kinds of art also arise in the same way; only it has been shown that the content itself has a formal and a material side and the difference between the romantic and the classical at least depends on the relative significance and importance of these sides.

Here it may be objected that, though the above hypothesis explains the distinction between the romantic and the classical art, it makes appreciation of the romantic art inexplicable. If the romantic artist, it may be asked, has the personal elements of his personality more prominent than the formal or commonly shared, then why is it that his art has as wide, if not wider, an appeal as the classical? If it cannot arouse similar sentiments in its contemplators as much as the classical art can do, how is it that it is no less appreciated by them? Truly speaking it is the universal or formal side of personality which is responsible for the appreciation of the work of an artist by others. But as it has been pointed out already, the formal side is not eliminated;

2. See Grierson, H. J. C., *Background of English Literature*. Essay on Classical and Romantic, p. 256 f.

it is simply purified, by the *conventional* being replaced by the *instinctive*. Freedom from what is *common among the people of a certain age*, brings into prominence and gives a wider field for play to what is common to men of all ages and to humanity as a whole. It is for this reason that the appeal of the romantic, far from being narrower, is actually wider than that of the classical.³

Moreover, there is no form without content and it is the content which is responsible for variety. Therefore, the strictly personal, instead of taking away something from the formal, adds those essential elements to it which give it concreteness ; and, despite its universality, embodies it in novel and unique particulars of infinite variety. It is this union of the formal and the concrete which justifies the Aristotelian view that works of art are not mere particulars, as Corce regards them, but they are the universal or general or common as embodied in the particular—they are universal—particulars. Both the elements are present in the romantic. Only the form of the romantic is different from that of the classical, being narrower in intension and wider in extension ; and its content is richer in movelty and variety, and is, for that reason, more prominent than form for attention.

Of course, a budding artist's *immediate* surroundings may bear a classical pattern even in a romantic period ; and if he is influenced more by his immediate surroundings than by the remote ones, he will develop into a classical artist. Likewise a romantic artist may appear in a classical period. Classical and romantic are primarily societies, then personalities developing in those societies and then, last of all, works of art.

"Romantic and Classical", says Mr. Abercornbie, "designate not periods of art, but rather varieties of art which occur in every period, only that in so-called classical and romantic periods

3. But if in a work of art form is too much reduced, its appeal also gets proportionately limited.

the classical or the romantic habit predominates."⁴ This statement embodies a great deal of truth, but it needs modification. It would be truer to say that they designate not only *periods of social history* and *the history of arts*, but also *varieties of personalities*, and, in consequence, *varieties of art* which may occur in every period.

4. Quoted by Alexander, in *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 169.

The Nature of the Methods of Political Science

BY

K. R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR

The question concerns the source or origin, nature and validity of political principles. Consider principles like the following : (1) The happiness of the whole society must be the first concern of the state ; (2) Sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable ; (3) The laws of the state must aim at excluding all arbitrary inequality among the people ; (4) They should aim at securing a sufficiently high level of economic competency for all before providing luxuries for the few ; (5) The natural rights of life, liberty and property must be safeguarded for all people consistently with the maintenance of the unity and integrity of the state; (6) Without democracy there is no liberty ; (7) Without the separation of the judiciary from the executive, there is no liberty ; (8) But the separation of the executive from the legislature is neither necessary nor desirable ; (9) The judiciary must be irremovable by a fiat of the executive ; (10) Universal education, promotion of knowledge and an honest and free press are the spiritual conditions of freedom.

By what method are these principles obtained ? Text-book writers generally enumerate and discuss several methods in politics such as the sociological, the biological, the psychological, the juridical, the historical, the observational, the comparative, the deductive etc., but when we have assigned their proper place to the first three or four in turn, we are left with the choice between two fundamentally opposite methods, viz., the historical, observational, comparative or the inductive method on the one hand, (for the three are only different aspects of one and the same method), and the logical, analytical,

philosophical or the deductive method on the other. The first method in its comparative form, as adopted by Montesquieu, De Tocqueville, Sir Henry Maine, Lord Bryce and others, "aims through the study of existing politics or those which have existed in the past to assemble a definite body of material from which the investigator by selection, comparison and elimination may discover the ideal types and progressive forces of political history" (Garner : *Political Science and Government*, p. 23). And in its historical form it "seeks an explanation" in the words of Sir Frederick Pollock, "of what institutions are and are tending to be, more in the knowledge of what they have been and how they came to be what they are, than in the analysis of them as they stand" (*History of the Science of Politics*, p. 11). The historical or inductive method in short is nothing but the application of the evolutionary method to human institutions, describing the rise of great political movements of the past and the growth of political ideas and their influence upon objective institutions of society. The alternative method, the analytical, logical or deductive method as it has been called, honoured by the names of Plato and Aristotle in ancient and of Sidgwick in modern times, starts by assuming certain general characteristics of the fairly civilized social man and then considers what laws and institutions are likely to conduce most to the welfare of an aggregate of such beings living in social relations. This method necessarily makes certain assumptions about human nature both on the basis of psychology and on that of ethics and metaphysics. Those who adopting the historical and observational method start with a vast mass of political facts, note resemblances and differences amongst them and then try to read out of them general laws of sequence and causation, think they are following the scientific method and thereby making of their subject a true science. And they are apt to scorn the logical deductive method as being fruitless and unscientific. For it starts with certain *a priori* assumptions regarding human nature and the ends or purposes of the state, the nature of the ideal state etc. Seeley criticised this method as unnatural, as exhibiting the "irresistible temptation to mix up what ought to be with what is".

If ever political thinkers aspired to make of their subject a science in the strict sense of a positive science, their hope must for ever remain an unrealisable dream, for apart from the fact that we are dealing in politics with free agents whose volitions cannot be completely determined or foreseen, we must remember that political action is also, like moral action, a species of willed action, and if so, exhibits all the characteristics of deliberate action. And the chiefmost feature of a willed action is that it is motivated with a purpose which it seeks to realise. In enacting a new law, in imposing a fresh tax, in tearing away agreements as mere scraps of paper, in concluding new alliances, in declaring war or affirming peace—in every case, the administrators of the government have some definite end in view which they want to realise by their action. This act of motivation of political action once for all removes politics from the field of the natural sciences where unconscious forces work their irresistible way. It places politics alongside of sciences of purpose like ethics and economics. It at once makes it unambiguously clear that the question of the end or ends of the state is irremovable in politics. State the end however you may, either as the maintenance of peace, order and security, or as the happiness of the society or as the civilization of mankind, it is idle to suggest, as Seeley seems to suggest, that we must, instead of beginning with the question of the end of the state, begin with classifying states, tracing their growth and history, noting similarities and resemblances and any abnormal conditions in its life-history and *then* try to philosophise upon the nature as if *this* mode of approach could in any way bring politics into closer alliance with the natural sciences of the state in general. "We must" he says "think, reason, generalise, define and distinguish ; we must also collect, authenticate, and investigate" (*Introduction to Political Science*, p. 19). There seems to be a confusion of issues here. The second part of the statement is unexceptionable ; but what are we called upon to think, reason and generalise about ? What is it that we have got to define ? Surely the true scientific procedure is that you start with some hypothesis, some tentative explanation, some ideal, regarding the facts under observation, and study the facts in the light of this

idea or hypothesis. Otherwise a mere array of facts, like a mere column of figures, is absolutely dumb and tells us nothing. And what, in the field of political phenomena, can this idea be if it be not a conception regarding the best or ideal state we should like to have, or some fundamental policy vitally connected with such an ideal state which we wish to see realised etc. ? Even supposing that theory comes last, are you merely theorising—i.e., tracing laws of causation—about existing facts as they are, as does the physicist or the chemist, or are you suggesting ways of improvement, reformation, in the existing state of affairs ? If your task be only the first, is the task worth while, is it true to actual political experience ? When Cole wants Guild Socialism and Laski wants some form of Communism and Roosevelt wants the New Deal and Hitler and Mussolini want National Socialism, are they not aspiring to introduce into society a form of life which they think most desirable and which they do not find existing already ? How then can the political scientist claim that he is merely grouping and classifying and comparing facts and discovering only laws of political causation ? If on the other hand you admit that this is not all that is involved in political theorising and that you do take into consideration the influence of ideas and ideals also, are you not making the question of the end of the state—of the ideal state, in short, of the state as it ought to be the supreme question in political science ?

Admitting then that this question is most important, it may still be contended that the ideals and principles that shape political action are themselves discovered through observation of the political experience of mankind over long ages, experience consisting of trial and error, successful hits and sad failures, political loops, zigzags, atavisms, reversions etc., all of which, when set in relationships of comparison and contrast, teach valuable lessons to the political historian or scientist as well as to the statesman and the administrator. Ideals in short are derived from actual experiences of success and failure. There is doubtless a good deal of truth in this contention. We do not start with a ready-made list of ideal policies and principles

and then go on applying them to society *ab extra*. Our ideals themselves evolve through experience and experiment. But as in the case of moral ideals and principles, we must remember that evolution does not create anything new which was not present in germ before or whose bases did not exist before. I am not raising here the vexed questions of creative and emergent evolution, but even those who, like myself, advocate these theories must recognise that the bases of the "new" were already given in the elements of the old. In the case of the evolution of *values* in particular—and political and ethical principles are values—it is clear that the evolutionary hypothesis works in favour of the mental origin of these values, for values are created by the experiencing mind in relation to certain given situations. Experience, therefore, may make explicit, develop, intensify, unite, synthesise, certain principles of human nature—ethical and political—but it cannot originate an altogether new principle. This is proved by the fact that whatever new principles experience may discover, when once they are discovered, they would appear to be grounded in the necessities of human nature and reason, when that nature is confronted with a given situation. The discovery of a principle by means of experience, in short, is not incompatible with its being logically grounded in the nature of reason when that reason becomes fully self-conscious and aware of its own implications.

The whole matter may be clinched by saying that politics like ethics and economics is a normative science, and that the norm, however, it may be moulded, shaped, altered and developed by experience, is essentially mind-or reason-engendered, the ideal of the best, which the norm expresses or approximates to, having presented itself to reason as it considers man in his relation to society. Let it not be said that because we take the social man as the unit here, therefore social experience is presupposed in the arriving at of ideals etc. What is presupposed is not social *experience* but the social *character* of man as a gregarious being, and the question then would be, given this social character of man, which is part of his own nature, what should be the ideal that would best suit the realisation of

his social self and its potentialities? Take the question of law *versus* liberty as a concrete example. What justifies the exercise of constraint upon an individual's freedom by means of a law? Why is the individual obliged to obey the law? If we grant that man must live in a society and rub shoulders with his fellow-men, we may reply, as the idealists have replied, that social institutions being ethical ideas, the obligation of obeying a law arises in that the law attempts to express an aspect of the individual's own moral freedom or at least helps to make possible the realisation of that freedom under given conditions. This is what I call a purely rational explanation based on the nature of man as a social being. Laski would not accept this and he would say that the law should be justifiable on moral grounds which can be defended in rational terms. This view, while rejecting the *sittlichkeit* theory, would still refer in its insistence on moral grounds, to the *social* man as the unit of political analysis, and it would still be largely a rational explanation without necessary reference to experience. When, faced with the problem that rationalisation by itself is no sure justification of a law, Laski goes further and says that the rational *consent* of the party affected by the law to that law is a justifiable ground of obligation, he is still arguing on the basis of the rational nature of social man, however unsatisfactory that answer may be. For rational consent cannot be the *ne plus ultra* of rational analysis of a political principle expressed in terms of a law. For it is conceivable that a party adversely affected by a law might still yield consent to it on what are believed to be the most rational grounds as for instance the untouchables and the Hindu wife generally reconciled themselves to their position of inferiority till recently. Objective standards of judgment must be possible to validate a law, consent or no consent, and when these are discovered, they would reveal themselves to be purely rational based on the social nature of man, rational in the sense that when a law approves itself to the moral reason of a cultivated person, its rational approvability should alone be its title to justification irrespective of the question whether the parties submitted to that law give their consent or not.

The grounds of rational approvability, however, may be

various. It is clear that the soundness of a law must be judged *entirely* by its consequences on society and these consequences must be such as to promote on the whole social well-being. So far there can be no two opinions on the matter and so far the theory is undoubtedly utilitarian in the broad sense of the term. But in what terms this social well-being is to be defined, whether as happiness or economic equalisation or moral self-realisation or spiritual regeneration etc., is a question which must be solved only by saying with Laski that each age lives in a particular social and moral climate of its own and will therefore value things differently, and any absolute formula of intrinsic worth would be obsolete as soon as it is made.

So far then we have said with Sidgwick and Laski that political principles should be formulated by an analysis of the psychological and the moral nature of man as a member of society. The social man, however, is still a being with its own nature *as man* primarily—a nature which may be affected variously by the fact of sociality but which is not identical with it or exhaustible by it. It is even a question whether morality itself is essentially social but it need not be discussed here. The consideration that I am now advancing is that human nature is part of cosmic nature and that in politics as in ethics we cannot finally settle the question of what is good for man without a necessary reference to the nature of Reality as a whole, its relation to the human reality that we know as the self etc. Upon our answer to these questions partly depends how we shall shape our social and political life, what kinds of end or purpose we propose for politics etc. If Plato says that Reality is spiritual and known to man under the forms of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, and that the end of man is "assimilation to God as far as possible", realisation of the Idea of God as a harmony of the aesthetic, intellectual and moral aspects of reality, then society must be so organised as to make it possible for all to achieve this self-realisation. If Aristotle thinks that Nature is dynamic and tries to actualise its potentialities, and the virtue of anything consists in the active exercise of its particular end or function, and the virtue of a human being consists in realising his perfect

form through the exercise of his rational faculty which links him to the divine, then the state must be so organised as to help its citizens attain this kind of wholeness. To take an illustration nearer home, it is because Mahatma Gandhi thinks that the realisation of the divine in man is incompatible with the practice of violence, that he advocates the complete eschewing of all violence in practical politics both as regards the inner organisation of a state and its relations with other states. Particular examples apart, it is clear that our metaphysical view of the universe must colour our view of man and his destiny and that this latter view must in turn influence the aims and policies of a state which exists to safeguard the synthesis of values in a society.

We have so far argued then that political science consists of principles and that these principles are discovered largely as the result of a logical analysis of human nature in all its aspects—psychological, ethical, metaphysical, etc. We must now hasten to add that the empirical and experimental method can by no means be ignored. Human nature, we must remember, consists of both static and dynamic principles. Plato and some others with him may have thought that human nature is only static and that its principles can rationally be determined entirely like the principles of mathematics. A more balanced philosophy would recognise that there is an element of contingency, uncertainty, variableness and incalculability in human nature which defies the rationalist's attempt at complete analysis. But having recognised this element we should in fairness to philosophic analysis erect it also into a principle: for that a change in the stimulus will produce a change in the response is also a principle. We may call this the principle of dynamism in human nature, and try to explain certain principles of politics—those which appear to be derived from experience—with its help. Variety is as much a characteristic of human nature as uniformity, but if so, the tendency to variation has its own proper causes in the environment also. The study of the social, political and economic environment in which policies originate thus acquires peculiar importance in an effort to explain the origin of those

policies. If we would cast our eyes back on the list of principles mentioned earlier, we should find that while the first five are universal, certain, necessary and almost *a priori* in character, the last five, while being equally grounded in human nature and reason, are not equally universal, certain and necessary. Their truth depends on the nature of the society to which they are sought to be applied, its cultural heritage, its traditions, its limitations, aspirations etc. Hence such principles are bound to appear relative and experimental. The relativity of the end of society which we noticed before has also its basis in this relativity of human nature. But it should never be forgotten that such principles also have their source in human nature itself though experience acts as their exciting cause and makes them manifest. It is disregard of this truth that makes Spender and others think that politics is not a science.

Lastly we must remember that while the ends of state may be quite laudable, idealistic and universal, the means by which they are sought to be realised must perforce be relative—relative to the needs and circumstances weaknesses and limitations of the given social material. Not abstract justice but feasibility, expediency, immediate needs as opposed to remote interests etc, are the watch-words here. In other words the *application* of principles to concrete situations is always a conditional matter and this introduces another source of relativity and indicates another field for the employment of inductive and empirical methods of observation and experiment.

Democracy as Plural Government

BY

BEPIN VEHARI RAY

The one important lesson which Rousseau tries to convey in his "Social Contract" is the identity of the state with public good. In all elections to the representative assembly, Rousseau would put one straight question to the Electorate. Is this line of action consistent with public good or is the opposite line consistent with public good? Rousseau wants a clear answer "yes" or "no" to the question. And as the issue is decided one way or the other, the complexion of Government is determined. Those in whose favour a larger number of votes are cast, are chosen to govern the country. Others lose the election. "The vote of the majority", he tells us, "always binds all the rest".¹ He writes, "When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what is asked of them is...whether it is conformable or not to the general will..., and from the counting of the votes is obtained the declaration of the general will".² It will be seen that for Rousseau there exist only two ways of deciding political matters. Hence two political parties: a Government party and an Opposition party. And the two parties are considered to be the antipodes to one another, having nothing in common. One possesses the power and therefore the absolute right to govern; the other does not. Accordingly in Rousseau's democracy, the plan outlined is that of singular Government, i. e., Government by majority party. Either your party governs or my party governs. Both cannot govern.

A careful examination of party politics and the evolution that has been taking place since Rousseau's times do not give justification for Rousseau's assumption. It is not true that there

1. 'Social Contract', translated by H. J. Tozer, Page 230.

2. Ibid.

are only two ways of looking at political problems ; nor is it true to say that political parties remain unalterably fixed in plan and programme. Religion and Economics having invaded politics political parties are becoming larger in number than they were before. And the increase in the number of parties has seriously disturbed the plan of majority rule. For where more than two parties contest the election, the chance of one party being returned with absolute majority decreases in proportion to the number of parties. And if the desired majority is not obtained a party has to form a coalition with one or more parties to carry on the work of Government. Actually such a thing is happening in many democratic countries. Numerous instances can be cited from history, so much so that singular Government is receding to the back-ground and plural Government is coming to the forefront. Plural Government has ceased to be a matter of emergency ; it is rapidly becoming the order of the day. Concomitantly with the emergence of many political parties, the dividing line between one party and another is getting thinner. Parties do not appear so violently opposed as they used to be. Vertical differences are being replaced by horizontal ones. All parties have become progressive ; the question is one of more or less.

Thus it is that in place of a left and a right party, we find each side to consist of more than one group. The splitting up into sections of classical parties, not only reduces the divergence as between groups but also has the effect of bringing the two sides closer together. The extreme left and the extreme right may be wide apart. But others are not so. The left group nearest to the right side contains differences that may be worked into harmony. Parties again are moving with the times. The old groupings are undergoing changes. An impartial observer of the present party politics in Britain will have no hesitation in saying that the present Conservative party is not what it was before. It is less tenacious of the Principles it once held sacred and is more open to conviction. It is the ruling party in Britain, and it rules not by rigorously following, but by gradually discarding hidebound conservatism. The Liberal party also is in

course of disintegration, some favouring the right and others the left tendency. And the Labour party is broken up into a moderate and an extreme section. This is how political parties are undergoing transformations, how time, experience and deeper political thinking are slowly bringing about a new alignment of political forces.

Such being the movement and direction of political groups in democratic countries, is it not time to think seriously of plural Government? Should we make a fetish of singular Government in the name of peace and order? If such Governments can be formed in times of danger to avert national danger, can we not form them in times of peace to further peaceful progress? Political parties are loud in proclaiming that they are all here to solve national questions, despite the difference in creeds to which they owe allegiance. If it be so, one must ask what problems are there which are said to be national and yet which concern one party alone and which cannot be tackled by some other party? If the issues to be faced are of a national character, it is difficult to understand why they be confided to a single party. Such matters are likely to be handled better by a Government on which several parties are represented than a party Government; for that Government will have given due weight to different points of view before it arrives at a decision. And that decision will carry behind it an authority which can not be challenged by any group worth considering.

We think, a plural State will be an improvement upon one party Government. It will meet the objection urged against Unitary Government, viz., that in it the legislative and administrative powers are entrusted to one interested party. The largest political group conscious of its voting strength in the legislature carries through measures which will satisfy its own constituents. And the Executive being entirely dependent upon that section of deputies, proceeds straightaway to translate them into action. The objection strikes at the root of good Government. Absolute monarchy was discarded because it was found to use the state for its own purposes. The same thing is

likely to happen in a majority rule in a more organised manner and with less fear of opposition. The Plural Government appeals to the national conscience of the people ; party Government appeals to the selfish interests of the Electorate. "You give me seat, and I agree to give you meat", is the burden of the Party Electoral song. Apart from the ethical objection that this method converts Government to a satisfaction of mutual interests, the foundation of the State does not appear to be stable. Self-interest is a dividing quality. It separates one man, one party, from another. My interest differs from yours ; your interest differs from mine. Left to pursue our sectional interests, we run at each other's throat. The clash becomes inevitable. Yet they hope to build the orderly life of a nation out of these essentially anarchical materials.

There are other objections too. Party Government breaks up the nation into two or more incompatible political groups and is inconsistent with the true view of national life as one indivisible whole. In the words of Professor Laski, "The will of the state is the will which is adopted out of the conflict of myriad wills which contend with each other for the mastery of social forces".³ But is competition more valuable than co-operation in the sphere of social life ? So far as lower stages in life are concerned, competition probably provides a useful stimulus to legitimate growth. A student needs it when he is at the threshold of his life. But as he grows up, he discards it. He pursues knowledge because it attracts him, because it is a good. What is true of individuals applies in a larger measure to group-life. In politics, we follow common interests, a good which is to be shared. We are seeking a value that is a value for all of us. Where interests are common, the realisation of the same is hampered by political antagonism. It is furthered by political co-operation.

Those who are making a fetish of party Government can easily notice that the multiplication of parties, has produced an

3. Grammar of Politics, p. 35.

unsteady effect on present-day Governments. One party Government fitted in with the old times, when the functions of administration were confined to the Police and the Judiciary, and when there existed only two parties irreconcilably opposed to one another. It is out of joint with the present ordering. For present-day democracy, the problem is not one of upholding *Laissez-Faire*, i.e., of maintaining civil liberty, but one of adjusting civil liberty to economic security. We find national life getting varied and complex day by day, The work of Government has tremendously increased. On the one hand, the Government has to face ever-recurring socio-economical problems: on the other hand, the emergence of sectional movements has thrown a serious responsibility upon successive administrations. The pronounced antagonism among the different economic units and rival social forces has added to the difficulties of party Government. No political party, whatever be its strength, considers itself competent to tackle such issues. Any attempt at solving socio-economic questions would require assistance of the opposed groups as much as of those who take an independent view of the matter. A broad governmental basis, cooperation between one group and another, and continued efforts are essential to a successful handling of socio-political needs. Again a composite Government which represents different shades of political opinion is more likely to enjoy these days stability and continuity of life, if only members know how to work. Therefore what we need is not a unitary Government which keeps away all differences, but a pluralistic state in which "the commonwealth resulting from the successful coordination of all social forces will ultimately be a comprehensive all-satisfying unity."⁴

But the sceptics will say that a cabinet composed of men drawn from different parties will be a "Chatham's ministry, a tesselated pavement without cement, here a bit of black stone

4. Hsiao : Political Pluralism, p. 257.

and there a bit of white, patriots and courtiers, king's friends and republicans, Whigs and Tories, that it would indeed be a curious show, but utterly unsafe to touch and unsound to stand on." The implication is that men of different ways of thinking will prove so many brakes to the administrative machinery ; and that the absence of a common platform will render uniform and smooth working of Government almost impossible. The criticism fails to take note of the essence of human character. Human beings are not the Kilkenny cats that the moment you bring them together, they will quarrel and break up. It is wrong to suppose that different groups within the sphere of Government will be eternally at war with one another. Human beings know how to unite for national purposes and to share in the work of Government. Moreover whatever extreme views they may have had, it is well known that party men, when actually engaged in the work of administration, learn to modify their principles. Participation in Government has the effect of softening the rigour of party tenets. Power begets a sense of responsibility and enables men to take a wider view of the situation.

A pluralistic State is opposed to a unitary structure. In it the legislature and the cabinet are both composite, consisting of men who represent different politico-economical forces, of men who want to move quickly and others who desire a slow progress. But a plural State must not be understood to mean a conglomeration of heterogeneous elements. Here opposed members are present, and the opposed members have one mission. They are there as fellow workers in a common cause. A plural cabinet signifies national front. This does not mean sacrifice of principles or domination of one group over another. There is no absorption, no merging of one party in another, no question of one constituent group coercing another. What is meant is that different parties place their varied experiences at the service of the nation. Government is essentially a matter of exchange of ideas, and eventually one of give and take. Each party contributes elements to the total result which it alone is competent to give and in return each is rewarded by gifts which it is

incapable of producing out of its own store. A plural Government is not the negation, but the completion of party Government. There will be in it majority and minority interests. The minority will be there to influence the majority to such extent as it reasonably can. The majority will be there to tolerate the existence of the minority. The plural parties in a plural cabinet constitute unique members in a unique whole.

Some people think plural Governments to be lacking in necessary strength. We differ from this view. A plural Government is not so weak as it is supposed to be. It was Baldwin's first plural Government of 1931, which saved England from an acute financial crisis. Others would say that the presence of minority group or groups in the cabinet will prove worse than useless. For such groups either succeed in changing the policy of Government or they do not. In the former case, the administration becomes a minority administration; and as such, it will be against the will of people as reflected in the majority group. In the latter case, they will be so many superfluous bodies. But the dilemma is false, because it assumes majority and minority groups to be wholly incompatible elements; and that the majority never listens to what is said from the other side, and the minorities are there simply to obstruct others. A Government by one party either is or is not prepared to entertain suggestions from other parties. If it is, it ought to admit for that very reason, members of other party into the cabinet. If it is not, that betrays a morbid mentality which scents danger in everything that comes from the other side. Even if a minority group stands for radical changes, it is preferable to have someone who represents that point of view by our side. For then we can meet and discuss about peace and progress and decide as to what is desirable and practicable. We cannot prevent revolution by keeping revolutionaries at a distance. That will drive revolution deep into national life.

It is true that the presence of more than one party in the sphere of Government involves a certain amount of restriction

on the powers and liberties of majority group. This group whatever be its complexion, is not wholly free to act in the way in which it wishes to act. For example, the admixture of non-socialistic element proves a hindrance to the socialistic party, which, because of the obstruction it receives from the other side, cannot carry to the extreme its plan of social equality. But this obstruction is not purely an evil. On the contrary it forms a necessary ingredient to the expansion of political life. In our individual life, we all experience the antagonism between the sentient self and the rational self; and we know that the growth of the rational self is not hampered by the opposition it has to face and overcome from the lower nature. The same thing is true of Governments. The narrow party life rises to fullness by the impact of other parties. We learn to accommodate, to appreciate other points of view. The contact with other parties which to superficial observation appears to be an evil, is the very factor which renders possible the growth of our civic sense.

And we arrive at the same conclusion, judging by the sense of freedom. There can be no real freedom where the component limbs in socio-political life of the nation, are not represented in some proportion to their intrinsic service to the nation. True freedom is never absolute. Freedom rightly understood involves a negative factor. The association of one or more parties in the work of Government imposes a check on the absolute rule by the majority section. But that constraint is the means through which actions of the majority receive an added value. And such value is gained because the ruling parties are heterogeneous. If parties were all of the same stuff, they would represent so many mathematical figures in which case gain to one side must mean loss to another. Such however is not the case where Government is an organic structure. Bosanquet expresses this idea very well. "The root of the difficulty obviously lies", he writes, "in assuming that the pressure of the claims of others in society is a mere general curtailment of the liberty of the one, while acknowledging, not contrary to fact,

but contrary to the hypothesis of that curtailment, that the one, so far from surrendering some of his capacity for life through his fellowship with others, acquires and extends that capacity wholly in and through such fellowship."⁵

5. *Philosophic Theory of the State*, pages 58—59.

On The Alleged Instinct for Music

BY

P. S. NAIDU

The lay as well as learned misunderstanding of the psychological nature of instincts is so wide-spread and persistent that when it is contended, on flimsy grounds, that there are instincts for music and mathematics, and for patriotism, painting, social service etc., just as there are for anger, fear, and sex-lust, no one cares to look beneath the surface and examine the foundations for such unscientific contentions. These pseudo-psychological assertions have largely come into fashion through well-meaning but fruitless efforts of historians, sociologists, political theorists and economists, who have constructed and given currency to *ad hoc* psychologies of a most unscientific nature. It is necessary to clear the haze surrounding the concept of instinct, and throw clear light upon its structure. The work has been done admirably by such leaders of contemporary schools as McDougall, Freud, and Koffka. In this paper an attempt will be made to show why in spite of the valuable findings of the hormic and psycho-analytic schools, confusion still prevails regarding the nature of human instincts.

The term instinct has been used (and often misused) in many different senses by the different schools of psychology, and oftentimes its meaning has been wilfully restricted or twisted in order to make it bear out the peculiar psychological theory of the school using it. For example, Watson, Woodworth, Allport and Heidbreder use it in entirely different senses. Setting aside all purely speculative considerations, let us ask what are the experimentally ascertained facts about instinct? Our answer is as follows :

(1) There are certain ascertained facts about the innate mental structure of living organisms common to the species,

and often characteristic of the species, and passed on from one generation to another.

(2) Amongst these innate and inherited mental dispositions there are some which are fundamental, and are possessed in common by human beings and the higher organisms alike.

(3) These facts of mental structure are directly inferable from facts of behaviour as observed and recorded objectively by the most rigorous scientific methods. They are as real as the electrons of physics and the genes of biology.

(4) These facts of mental structure are the instincts.

(5) Each of these reveals a characteristic organisation. It has three aspects—the cognitive, the affective and the conative. No one of these can function apart from and independent of the other aspects.

This is the sense in which McDougall used the word instinct in his earlier works. In the later works he displayed a tendency to accommodate himself to the views of his critics by using the word propensity in the place of instinct, and by speaking of native abilities linked to innate capacities. This, in my view, is an unfortunate climbing down from the rigorous hormic position. The theory outlined in the *Social Psychology* is sound from the surface down to its very core. There is no need to alter it even in its small details.

The wordy duels over instinct have their origin in the wilful tendency of opponents of the hormic theory to restrict the term in scope, or to distort its meaning. Instinct has been often identified with its last phase—its motor mechanism—, to the exclusion of the first two phases. This is the fallacy of the behaviourist, and as a result we are presented with an interminable list of instincts, such as that of Thorndike, running into a figure of three digits. Each reflex or each innately organised pattern of reflexes becomes an independent instinct on this

scheme. The absurdity of it is seen easily. The same motor mechanism is used by many instincts, and to identify the motor mechanism as an instinct is as bad as identifying a carpenter with his tools and calling the hammer, the chisel, the plane etc., each a carpenter ! Instinct is essentially mental, and the bodily reflexes are merely the tools with which it works.

The second type of fallacy is much more insidious, though it is as common as the absurdity discussed above. McDougall has pointed out very clearly the fundamental distinction between instincts and sentiments, and between primary, blended and derived emotions. Yet, un-understanding minds would insist on making a confusion between the two, and calling joy, gratitude, grief and hope emotions in the same sense as anger, fear and disgust. A sentiment is a highly complex mental organisation formed out of the union of two or more fundamental instincts and their emotions. And in its formation cognitive abilities play a very important part. If one shuts one's eyes to the process of development in a sentiment, one has oneself to blame, and not the hormic theory for the follies that might result from the fallacy.

The third source of fallacy in the minds of the unenlightened critics of the hormic theory is due to a very technical point relating to the status of cognition in hormism. McDougall has not made the point very clear. It is true that he discusses in '*An Outline of Psychology*' the way in which the cognitive structure of the mind develops as the result of a conative urge. Conation, it should be remembered, is the very life and soul of cognition. Even perception of the humblest kind is the result of conation. And according to the degree of the intensity and quality of the conative urge, cognition develops and differentiates. Taking colour perception or sound perception, the layman's range is very limited and poor. Contrast this with the rich differentiation in the mind of the artist or the musical composer. This richness is not the result of accretion through external addition, but of inner differentiation of parts within the whole. It is similar to the marvellous differentiation of the

nervous system within the embryonic neural tube. Hormic psychology, therefore, has provided within its conative framework for the full and unfettered development of conative abilities.

We may now take the question—is there a musical instinct? The question is absurd, but unfortunately the supporters of the hormic theory have, by their ambiguous statements, paved the way for such strange queries. It has been suggested that in addition to the fundamental instincts mentioned by McDougall those for truth, beauty and goodness should be recognised. If so, why not an instinct for music?

In the first place an instinct as a fact of mental structure must be innate to the mental organisation not only of the individual, but of the species, and in many cases of the whole range of living organisms. Musical ability is a rare phenomenon occurring in the mental organisation of a very few gifted individuals. It is, therefore, not an instinct in the hormic sense.

This immediately raises the question of the evolution of instincts. McDougall himself has suggested that some of the instincts, the acquisitive for example, have differentiated from others. The submissive instinct has in all probability emerged out of fear. It will be possible to exhibit all the fourteen instincts discussed in *'An Outline of Psychology'* as successive differentiations of one or two matrix-instincts. When this is granted, there is no reason why new instincts should not come into existence in the future. Telepathy and the sudden appearance of musical and mathematical prodigies, are intimations of what is to happen in the future. But until such evolution of mental structure has occurred in the whole species we cannot speak of instinct for music or mathematics.

McDougall's experiments on white rats have gone to support the Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of *mental* characteristics. Now, when it is claimed that the aptitude for music runs in a family and should therefore, be considered instinctive,

it becomes necessary for us to examine the implications of such a statement. There is a world of difference between musical genius for original soul-stirring composition of heavenly music, and the capacity to sing or play on a musical instrument tune-fully and with accuracy. The former reveals a high degree of creativity, the result of a creative faculty which is intuitive and beyond the comprehension of science. The latter, on the other hand, depends on the fineness of musical discrimination of frequency, pitch and timbre. The capacity for nice discrimination may be produced by the influence of the environment. The home of the accomplished musician is steeped in an atmosphere of music. The children born and bred in such an atmosphere are bound to have their auditory acuity developed to a remarkable degree of nicety. Through imitation the vocal organs too are trained to a high degree of refinement, and the delicacy of motor coordination involved in playing on Veena or Violin is also acquired easily in such a favourable atmosphere. The inheritance is very largely environmental, and if there is an innate factor it is certainly Lamarckian in its structure.

Music of this type is certainly not instinctive, for an instinct is an act of mental structure or organisation which is excited by the perception of a suitable object, making the organism experience a specific emotion, and finally leading it to a specific course of action, which would allay the craving generated by the appetite of the instinct. Music is, in fact, a part of the central affective aspect of the higher type of organisation characteristic of human beings, namely the sentiment. It is the expression of the blended emotion pertaining to a sentiment. The expression of a fundamental emotion, such as fear or anger is simple and straight-forward, and there are many elementary sentiments which resemble emotions in this respect. But there are deep sentiments which demand deep expressions, too deep for language and for the ordinary neuro-muscular reflex organisations. Music, then, serves as the profound channel for the expression of these great sentiments. Hindu music illustrates my point very clearly. Our aesthetic philosophers have associated the great ragas with the sublime sentiments and emotions. It is thus that the musical

genius expresses his unfathomable soul-stirring sentiments. Music is not an instinct, but only a part of the central aspect of the complex organisation of instincts known in hormic psychology as a sentiment.

We have distinguished between the innate capacity of a musical genius and of a skilled musician. The psychological basis of the former has been analysed and the fallacy in the position which holds that it is instinctive has been revealed. With regard to the latter, our explanation is very simple. We are familiar with the 'expression of the emotions' achieved by the accomplished actress or danseuse. Through prolonged training of the muscles of the face and the limbs, the danseuse is able to simulate the outward expressions of anger, fear, or any other emotion or sentiment, without having the corresponding mental experience. Similarly, through proper training the expression of the deep sentiments in the shape of vocal singing or playing on Veena or Violin may be achieved through imitation without corresponding mental states.

There is no innately organised mental structure which, on the hormic hypothesis, may be called an instinct for music.

The Place of Emotion in Mental Life and Its Relation with Feelings

BY

D. D. VADEKAR

Since the good old days of Tetens and Kant, three aspects of mental life have been distinguished : Knowing, Feeling, and Striving ; or Cognition, Affection, and Conation. And this distinction has, ever since, found a more or less general acceptance at the hands of our leading psychologists to date, such as Ward (*Psychological Principles*, II, 6), Stout (*Manual of Psychology*, p. 98) and McDougall (*Energies of Men*, pp. 146-8). The last named writer says :

“Knowing, striving and feeling, these seem to be three distinguishable but inseparable aspects of all mental activity. They are three modes of mental functioning which seem to be ultimate,”

For purposes of clarity and precision in this paper, the above three terms and the term Emotion which are the four basic technical terms which will have to be repeatedly used in this paper are explained below :

Knowing : Presentation of an object, such as a sense-quality, percept, image, idea or concept, to the mind. Technically known as Cognition.

Striving : Subjective Tendency or urge towards activity of some sort, such as attraction, or repulsion, seeking or avoiding. Technically known as Conation.

Feeling : Subjective Attitude towards the presented object, characterised by a sort of mental luminosity, glow or halo, a sort of penumbra, such as pleasure or displeasure. Technically known as Affection.

Emotion : Deliberately to be kept undefined for purposes of and as the subject of this investigation which is meant to reach some clarification of the nature of emotion towards its end. Still as concrete instances of the kind of things that emotions are, we may mention joy, sorrow, anger, fear, etc.

Now Emotion is a most universally recognised mode of experience ; and yet with all the controversies that have raged and the investigations that have been made about it in the history of psychology, we do not appear by any means to have reached any decent consensus of opinion as regards its essential nature and content as a mode of experience and its consequent assimilability distinctly to one or the other or more of the above three aspects of mental life. As a matter of fact, a reference to the recognised authorities on the subject reveals an unexpectedly bewildering variety of views. At the outset I propose to present a graded and classified statement of these views, and then I shall proceed to consider them.

(1) James takes an essentially 'cognitive' view of emotion :

"Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion". (Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 449.) [Note : It will be remembered that James uses 'feeling' or 'thought' to mean simply mental states at large, irrespective of their kind, Vide Principles, vol. I, pp. 186-7. In the passage quoted the word feeling is used in a purely general, cognitive sense.]

Stout well states the Jamesian theory in the following terse definition :

"Emotion simply consists in organic and kinaesthetic sensations. (Groundwork of Psychology, p. 171.)

(2) Stout himself took an 'affective' view of the nature of emotion :

"Under feeling-attitude is included the being agreeably or disagreeably affected towards an object, feeling some kind of emotion towards it, such as anger, surprise or fear." (Groundwork, p. 16.)

Or more briefly :

"An emotion is a feeling attitude of the subject towards an object. (p. 173.)

(3) McDougall takes a 'conative' view of emotion ;

"To experience an emotion is to be excited, to be moved to activity of some sort." (Energies, p. 148.)

Nor do these statements exhaust the variety of opinion on the subject ; for views of a more complex or composite kind involving the combination of two or more of the aspects of mental life in the definition of emotion have been held :

(4) Warren records an "affective-conative" view of emotion :

Emotion is "a total state of consciousness involving a distinctive feeling tone and a characteristic trend of activity." (Dictionary of Psychology, p. 91.)

I believe Thouless takes this view :

"The dominant element in the state of mind of a person under the influence of emotion is affection or feeling. (It is also characteristic of emotion that this feeling is attached to some object or situation.).....Also it is characteristic of an emotion that it is a total state of mind which includes a conation or impulsion to some line of behaviour." (General and Social Psychology, p. 74. *Brackets mine.*)

(5) I have not met any writer taking a 'cognitive-conative' view of emotion.

(6) But among the witnesses whom I have examined in connection with this investigation on the basis of a specially prepared questionnaire, I have a colleague (a discriminating literary critic) who holds the cognitive-affective view of emotion.

(7) And, finally, here is Drever holding the 'cognitive-affective-conative' view of the nature of emotion :

Complaining about the backwardness of contemporary psychological theory of the emotions, he says : 'The best way out of the difficulty appears to be to regard emotions as complex phenomena of experience, constituted by a mass of organic sensations, definite impulses, and simple feelings, all combined in the total mental state,' (Psychology of Everyday Life p. 31.)

(Perhaps Thouless also may be said to belong to this group,)

Such is the gamut of views held on the nature and content of Emotion.

The problem of this Paper is to make an attempt on the basis of introspective data to locate the exact place of Emotion in mental life, in particular to discover to which one or ones of these three aspects of mental life Emotion belongs, and to elucidate the nature of the exact relationship of emotion and feeling.

We proceed now to examine the several typical views regarding the nature of Emotion which have been stated above. To begin with, it is obvious that the purely 'cognitive' view of emotion can soon be disposed of as being out of the question. The most essential feature of the cognitive consciousness is its objective standpoint, which naturally attributes the qualities of experience, whatever they are, to the object cognised,—colors, sounds, tastes, etc. The standpoint of the emotional consciousness on the other hand is essentially subjective in its character.

The angry man never attributes his anger to the object, as the same person in apprehending the object itself would attribute the sense-qualities to it. Theories of emotion therefore which would make cognition the sole or predominant feature of emotion are essentially on the wrong track. We therefore dismiss View (1) above, though there may be an occasion to return to this point again at a later stage.

Passing on to the other theories (simple or complex) of emotion, our criticism of them must be based on a fresh psychological analysis. We maintain that in an experience admittedly emotional, the most essential element is the peculiar subjective glow or halo about the object apprehended, which is distinct from, though it may be and is attended by, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and yet is somehow generically akin to it in that this latter also is of the nature of a subjective glow or halo about the object. It would appear therefore that Emotion is essentially assimilable to the affective aspect of mental life rather than to any other.

The witnesses whom I have examined on the basis of my questionnaire are almost unanimous on this question in thinking that the essence of emotion is affective. And this is the View (2) presented above. This Paper supports it. It of course raises the question of the relationship of the affective feelings of pleasure and displeasure and emotion, which have as seen above a specific difference against a background of generic kinship; but that will be taken up later. In the meanwhile, the above analysis, if correct, dismisses any theories of emotion simple or composite, which assimilate it only to the aspect or aspects of mental life other than or not including the affective aspect. This means that it dismisses Views (1), (3), and (5) above, i. e., the cognitive, conative, and cognitive-conative views of emotion. Of these, (1) has already been rejected on an independent ground; and this is a confirmation of it. View (5) is held by no psychologist. And (3) may require some further consideration to confirm its rejection suggested by the analysis above.

It is true that the 'conative' view of emotion cannot be rejected on the ground on which we rejected the 'cognitive' view, viz., the objective standpoint of cognition as contrasted with the subjective standpoint of emotion, for the standpoint of conation also is subjective in character as that of emotion. Conation also like emotion is a subjective attitude of the mind to the object with no objective reference like cognition. Hence the greater kinship of emotion and conation. But does this mean that conation, because a subjective attitude, belongs to the essence of emotion which also is subjective attitude? I do not think so. For the conative or the active element in experience, though subjective is not what we mean by emotion. Tendency to smile IS NOT joy, nor to fly, fear. The tendencies respectively are the expressions of joy and fear. Conation is the expression, invariable and inevitable, of emotion, but not its essence.

I have questioned my witnesses on this subject. Some of them originally did begin with thinking that the conative aspect belonged to the very essence of emotion. But in the course of the discussion I discovered that what they meant by taking this position was only that emotion found expression in and through conation of some sort in every case. But this only meant that emotion is the cause of conation, a position which can by all means be granted. But this also means that conation cannot be the essence of emotion, for howsoever close the relations of cause and effect, the cause certainly IS NOT the effect. My witnesses accordingly agree that emotion IS purely an affective mode of experience, though conative aspect immediately develops in it as its effect.

That leaves us now with View (4), (6) and (7), i. e. the affective-conative, cognitive-affective, and cognitive-affective-conative views of emotion still to consider. The common feature of these views is that the irreducible affective character of emotion is recognised in them all: but along with the affective feature, the cognitive or conative or both are also mentioned as the other features of emotion. And these are

the positions that we must now consider and question. Nor need we point out any special grounds for our rejection of them, as the non-essential character of the cognitive and conative features for the definition of emotion has already been stressed. (Rejection of Views (1) and (2) above.) These features of experience are the attendant circumstances, antecedent and consequent, - one, the cause, the other, the effect of emotion,—but none of them IS the emotion, psychologically. We have already said that Emotion is the subjective attitude of the mind to the object. This means that there must be the apprehension of the object towards which the mind may develop an emotional attitude. And this should also mean that emotion must imply and presuppose cognition. Cognition may be the condition precedent of emotion, but it cannot be the essential constituent of it.

The essential character of emotion is affective. And this leads us now to the consideration of the relation of feelings and emotions.

Here we come to a problem on which, in the nature of things, introspective evidence must necessarily be considerably obscure ; and it may therefore be necessary to resort to the indirect logical method of explanation by a suitable hypothesis.

It now being assumed that the affective feelings of pleasure-pain and emotion are generically allied, the problem of their mutual relations raises a series of intriguing questions. I take here an extract from my questionnaire :

- (a) Are pleasure and displeasure emotions ?
- (b) Are emotions pleasure and displeasure feelings ?
- (c) Or, are pleasure and displeasure feelings and emotions two distinct and ultimate modes of the affective aspect of mental life ?
- (d) If so, is emotion always co-present, explicitly or implicitly, with the pleasure and displeasure feelings in mental life ?

(e) Or, is emotion, though a distinct and ultimate mode of the affective aspect of mental life, only occasionally present in it ?

It may not be possible within the limits of this paper to give a complete or satisfactory answer to all these questions. But a brief synoptic answer to them all, necessarily somewhat dogmatic in character, is attempted in what follows below.

It appears clear that the pleasure-displeasure feelings are not emotions. These feelings are the irreducible aspects of every mode or phase of experience, present explicitly or implicitly in every psychosis or mental state : but this does not apply to emotions and cannot be said of them. It can hardly be said that one is always experiencing some or other of the emotional types, anger, fear, sorrow, joy etc. All feelings have a hedonic quality, but not necessarily any emotional. On the other hand, all emotions, as affective modes of experience, are feelings and as such have a hedonic quality. Anger, fear, sorrow and all other emotions may be and are pleasurable or otherwise. Thus it would appear that though the hedonic feelings are common to all the phases and modes of our experience, emotional feelings are not so. Not every psychosis is tinged emotionally, though every psychosis is hedonically coloured. And thus also, though there are no mental states (including the emotional) devoid of hedonic quality, there may be mental states devoid of emotional quality. And yet with all this specific distinctness of hedonic and emotional feelings, as belonging to the stem of the affective side of mental life, they have a common generic essence which must lead us to suspect some kind of closer connection between them. And I suggest that, whereas hedonic feelings are the first ripple of differentiation on the affective continuum, the emotional feelings are a later, more developed and crystallised phase of the process. It would be an interesting and fruitful line of inquiry to investigate the specific conditions of the emergence, in the way suggested, of the typical emotional feelings, but an enquiry beyond the limits of this paper, which

may therefore now be concluded with a brief restatement of the conclusions reached :

(1) Place of Emotion in Mental Life : Emotion definitely and essentially belongs to the affective aspect of mental life, not to the cognitive or conative, which latter elements, even if the necessary attendant conditions antecedent and consequent, must not be mistaken for the essence of emotion.

(2) Relation of Emotion and Feeling : Emerging as they do from a common stem, viz. the affective or feeling aspect of life, hedonic and emotional feelings are the earlier and later phases in the development through differentiation of the affective continuum.

What a Thing is In Itself.

By

K. R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR

Before trying to answer this question, it may be said, a prior question which is more insistent needs to be considered in this connection, viz., whether things have an intrinsic nature of their own at all. The logic of substance and attributes and of primary and secondary qualities in the empiricist school, the epistemology of sense-data and of essences in the realist schools, the metaphysics of event and occasion in Whitehead's system, and various other similar doctrines in the history of philosophy, no less than the theory of the radiation and electronic constitution of matter in recent science, may all seem to render otiose or impossible the very conception of a "thing" or an "object" as a persistent entity having an identical nature of its own. . But this is a large question into which it is not possible to enter in this connection. My present task is the humbler one of assuming on an empirical basis some sort of a substantial, persisting or "enduring object" and then asking, with reference to such an object, what, if anything, constitutes its intrinsic nature, and how this intrinsic nature is to be distinguished from its extrinsic characters.

The *locus classicus* for the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic characters is G. E. Moore's discussion of the subject in his *Philosophical Studies*, Ch. VIII, pp. 261-275. He begins by saying that the phrase "having a different intrinsic nature" is not equivalent to the phrase "intrinsically different" or "having

different intrinsic properties." For he thinks that two things may be exactly like and still they may be intrinsically different and have different intrinsic properties, merely because they are two. Their numerical difference itself constitutes an intrinsic difference between them and each will have at least one intrinsic property which the other has not got, viz., that of being identical with itself. To say therefore that two things have different intrinsic natures should imply not only that they are numerically different but also that they are *not exactly alike*.

Moore is evidently distinguishing here between the intrinsic properties which are intrinsic in the sense that they depend solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them and that intrinsic nature of the thing itself. We shall have to revert to this distinction in a subsequent connection.

Next Moore tells us that intrinsic difference is not the same as qualitative difference either. He admits that all qualitative difference is difference in intrinsic nature, but contends that all intrinsic difference is not qualitative. For two things may possess the same quality in different degrees and yet or consequently be intrinsically different ; e.g., a loud sound a soft one, or two things of different sizes, or a yellow circle with a red centre and a yellow circle with a blue centre, although not these wholes but only single elements of it are qualitatively different—a case, says Moore, which can only loosely be called a difference in quality. Now in regard to these examples, it must be observed that if a loud sound and a soft one, or a big stone and a small one, cannot be said to be qualitatively different, i.e., if loudness and size are not qualities, much less can two circles with differently coloured spots in the middle be said to be identical in quality. To avoid this absurdity, we should have to say that if, as is admitted, two such patches differ in intrinsic nature, this is because they differ in quality, *any* difference in quality—not necessarily qualitative difference throughout—constituting difference in intrinsic nature. And if, as Moore contends, it is true that the difference between a big and a small stone is a difference in intrinsic nature but still not in quality, then we should have to say that the intrinsic nature of

a thing includes quantity also in addition to its quality. Quality of course includes colour as well.

Moore seems to be satisfied with distinguishing intrinsic difference from numerical and qualitative differences in order to determine the intrinsic nature of a thing. What about form and shape? Consider, e.g., two coins one made of copper round in shape, the other made of bronze square in shape. It is evident that so far as shape is concerned there is a difference in the intrinsic nature of the two coins in the sense that any coin which was round in precisely the same manner as the given coin would *necessarily*, or *must* always, under all circumstances, possess in virtue of its roundness certain properties which another coin, which was square in precisely the same manner as the other given coin, could not in virtue of its squareness possess. Likewise difference in form refer to the internal structural constitution of the two coins, the arrangement of their particles which makes the one a copper coin and the other a coin in bronze and these differences of form are certainly differences in intrinsic nature in the sense that any coin made of copper would *necessarily* or *must* always possess certain properties (chemical and mechanical) which a coin made of bronze could not possess. Note that formal differences are not always identical with qualitative differences. Bronze differs from copper in quality in as much as it is an alloy of copper and tin; but the difference in form consists in that the internal or objective structure of its particles is necessarily different from that of the particles of copper. Ice and water again are qualitatively identical but formally different.

We have so far said then that the intrinsic nature of an object is to be determined by its quality, including colour, quantity,—including both volume and weight—form and shape. Have relations no place in this determination? Relations are of three kinds: the relation of an object to objects other than it and its elements, the relation of the object as a whole to its own parts, and the relation of the parts to one another. I should at once hasten to explain that the mention of relations in this connection need not arouse any anxiety in the reader's

mind that we are plunging into a discussion either of Whitehead's theory of prehensions or of the time-honoured distinction of substance and qualities. For my purpose, as I said, I shall assume on an empirical basis the reality of given particular things each unique after its kind : I can make nothing out of the doctrine that a particular thing has no being of its own, but is merely a unity of the aspects of other things having no definite spatial and temporal location of its own, that the world consists of nothing else but relations which are not relations between things. And if we cannot altogether avoid the other contentious question, we shall just touch upon its fringe so far as it relates to our problem.

The relation of an object to objects other than it and its elements is, I think, pre-empted, by the very conception of the *intrinsic* nature of an object which we are investigating, from finding a place in that nature. However important and unique such a relation may be, it yet is not part of what an object is "in itself". Cook Wilson who discusses this relationship in connection with the problem of substance and attribute, says that while an orange was in itself yellow and round, its being on the table we should not call "what it is in itself".¹ But in the case of a reality whose being is entirely constituted by relation to something else, say, the movement of a body, we have to say that its relation to the body is part of what it is in itself, though its relation to another movement of the same body, or to the movement of another body, would again be excluded from what it is in itself.

The relation of the parts of a thing to one another need not be brought into our account of what a thing is in itself over and above its quality, quantity, form etc., for such relation is but the internal structure of the parts, the objective arrangement of its particles etc., whereby the thing is determined to have such and such properties (both chemical and mechanical) and so it falls under the category of form.

The relation of the whole to its parts or elements, however, stands on a different footing. There are of course wholes of

1. Statement and Inference, i., 152-158

different kinds—physical such as a table, a violin etc., organic such as a human body, a plant etc., aesthetic (under which I include the intellectual also) such as a poem, a scenery, an argument or a system of thought etc., and moral or spiritual such as a community, an association, a life as a whole etc. The analysis so far given of what a thing is in itself applies pre-eminently to physical wholes though mental and moral wholes are not excluded from it. The argument that I shall now present in regard to the question whether the relation of a whole to its parts (which involves also the correlative relation of the parts to the whole) enters into the determination of what a thing is in itself, applies more particularly to organic, aesthetic, and moral wholes than to physical. Nevertheless it does apply to the physical also.

Every object in the universe has a certain end, a purpose, or function set before it whose realisation is "according to nature" and constitutes the destiny of that object. But every object is a complex entity, a whole in which we may distinguish some part or parts which alone are fitted to express the characteristic function of that object from other parts which are more or less accessory to such fulfilment of function by the former parts. The primary purpose of a knife is to cut, and while the blade is the part which expresses the characteristic function, the handle, the fissure in the handle, the ring attached to it etc., are only accessory to the proper fulfilment of function by the blade. If rational activity is the unique function of man, then mind alone is capable of expressing that function, but for its proper functioning a material organism with the senses etc., is doubtless a necessity. A musical mode (*rāga*) has certain characteristic notes called *Jivasvaras* (in Indian music), and while these express the soul of the tune, the other notes serve as its vestment. A painting is intended to express a certain sentiment (*rasa*) which is its life, but it can be expressed only through a certain disposition of line and colour, light and shade etc., which serve as its body. Likewise we can distinguish between a thesis and its supporting considerations in the development of an argument. The goal of social life is self-realisation, let us say ; and while liberty is the constitutive element

in society which achieves that destiny, law is the accessory element which provides the necessary atmosphere in which liberty can function fruitfully and more effectively.

It is unnecessary to multiply examples. The subordinate parts of a whole are no doubt equally essential with the constitutive parts to the making of the whole and both co-operate to achieve the destiny of the whole ; but the nature, the essence, of the whole is expressed chiefly by the constitutive parts. The knife is the blade primarily, a man is his mind essentially, social and moral life are largely the life of freedom. In this sense, the constitutive part or parts may be said to stand for what a thing is "in itself". What a thing is in itself is what it is in its *essence*, in its constitutive nature—that without which a knife would not be knife, man would not be man etc. This is its intrinsic nature. The subsidiary parts are those which help to make the thing what it is as it appears, in its *existence*. When we talk of the relation of the whole to its parts, we mean or ought to mean this relation of the constitutive to the subsidiary parts, for otherwise there is no whole, over and above the unity of the parts, which can be said to stand in a relation to the parts. This relation of the whole to the parts is what may be called ontological involvement. Likewise there is no relation of the parts *to the whole*, but only of some parts to the rest of the whole, and this relation in this case of the subsidiary to the constitutive parts, may be called dependence.

I should hasten to correct one possible misunderstanding of my position. The unity of the parts certainly engenders a life of the whole which is richer, and in every sense higher than the life of the parts individually as shown by the fact that while the thing as such—i.e., as a whole—is relatively independent of other things, any part i. e., an attribute-element, say, the point of a needle, e. g.,—can exist only as an element in a thing, and is not conceivable otherwise. But to say that this stands in a relation to the parts is incorrect, for it is nothing apart from the unity of the parts *qua* unity, and this unity is inconceivable apart from the parts. The Unity and the parts which make up the unity do not exist as two separate facts, and though the unity has a life richer far than the life of the parts individually, the case is not

similar to the formation of water out of hydrogen and oxygen, for in this latter the constituents do not exist as parts of a whole, but have disappeared entirely giving rise to a novel existent altogether. Moreover, what we are in search of is what the thing is "in itself" and the thing in itself is certainly not the thing as it is in its unity, i. e., in all its developed complexity of relations both internal and external. If the full-fledged self-realised thing were in question, we need not have asked at all what the thing is "in itself." The thing in itself is the constitutive part which is the thing's intrinsic nature : the thing as it appears, i.e., exists, is the fully developed unity of the constitutive and the subordinate parts, their determinate existence, so to say.

It follows therefore that what a thing is in itself is neither the ideal, nor the average, of the thing ; it is not the substance as the support of the attributes ; it is not the subject as the bearer of the attribute-elements (for the substance or the subject as at present understood. is simply the unity of the diverse parts). It is rather the constitutive part or parts of a thing which alone, though in conjunction with the accessory parts, are capable of truly expressing the inner meaning of the thing. From this standpoint, the form of the thing acquires a new significance, for the objective structure of a thing, philosophically speaking, is the objective meaning, the soul-significance, the intelligible essence, which it bears, and this is what it is *in itself*. It may also be described as the idea or the universal of the thing, and such a conception of the universal would afford an excellent explanation of the relation of the universal to the particular. It may as well be called substance or subject whose relation to qualities or attributes would thereby get illumined. But these are separate problems whose discussion must be postponed to a later occasion.

If what a thing is in itself is what it is in its *essence* only, which is obviously different from what it is in its *existence*, a question arises as to whether this essence exists or not. In reply, it must be stated that logically speaking, it could exist by itself, but factually it always exists in conjunction with the subsidiary parts. The subsidiary parts, while having an essence of their

own, cannot exist at all, either logically or factually, except in union with the constitutive.

It may be recalled that according to Moore, the intrinsic property of a thing needs to be distinguished from the intrinsic character of the thing upon which the property solely depends. But he does not point out how in any given case we have to distinguish the property from the intrinsic character. We have tried to analyse the intrinsic character of things. And this intrinsic character may have its own qualities which may be called the intrinsic *attributes* of the object, *e.g.*, the sharpness of a blade, the qualities of a mind etc. The intrinsic *property* of an object is the property which it acquires in virtue of the union of the constitutive with the subordinate parts. *e.g.*, the health and vitality of an organism, its alertness, the length, topical distribution and qualities of style of an essay, the elaboration (*ālāpanam*) of a musical mode or melody-mould, the disposition of line and colour, light and shade, mass etc., in a painting, the social and moral institutions of a society etc. When two or more relatively independent objects as they exist enter into relation with one another, the properties which emerge out of the relation may be called emergent or consequential properties such as the properties of a molecule emerging out of the relatedness of atoms, the values of truth, beauty and goodness.

And finally a word about the kinds of necessity operative in the formation of the different kinds of whole. Moore is of opinion that the necessity by which, if one patch of colour is yellow or beautiful, another having the same intrinsic nature must be yellow or beautiful is neither a necessity of material implication, nor one of logical implication, nor one of causality even. It is a peculiar kind of necessity different from all the three sorts mentioned. I should suggest that the necessity by virtue of which if one coin is red or round another having the same intrinsic nature must be red or round is nothing but a logical necessity, for it refers to the attributes constituting the intrinsic nature of the object. The necessity which generates consequential properties out of the interrelation of two or more independent things is plainly a causal or empirical necessity whether it be of the natural or of the teleological order. But

the necessity by virtue of which the constitutive part is joined to the subsidiary parts and thereby the thing in itself is converted into the thing as it appears, is truly neither causal merely nor logical solely, but partakes of the nature of both. That an organism is a union of body and mind, that a painting is an embodiment of a dominant sentiment (emotional tone, *rusa*) in a particular combination of form and colour, that a given moral institution is the incarnation of a people's cultural soul-universal in their sociological space-time particular, are neither analytic nor synthetic propositions. The limits of this paper prohibit my discussing this question further, but I shall here content myself with observing that we have here a sense of "must" different from the causal or the logical. We can see neither a causal nor a logical necessity about such unions or syntheses.

Is Intelligence Inherited?

By

B. KUPPUSAWMY

The Eugenic programme presupposes that superior intelligence runs in some families. Cattell, for instance, writes in his "The fight for our national intelligence": "To create a civilisation, to let it burst forth in flower from a previous state of barbarism, the race concerned must first accumulate a rich crop of men—or rather of family strains—possessed of great natural mental capacity. To maintain a civilisation in good working order it must retain an adequate proportion of these relatively good strains."

An attempt is made in this paper to study how far and in what sense intelligence is 'inherited'. In the main the hypothesis that intelligence is inherited is based on the following four facts: (a) the constancy of I. Q. (b) the difference in I.Q. between the rural and urban populations, (c) the correlation between the I.Q's. of parents and children and finally (d) the relation between I. Q. and social status. It is asserted that these facts clearly demonstrate that intelligence is inherited.

Before we proceed further, let us see the meaning of the word 'Inheritance'. According to the Oxford Dictionary 'Inherit' means "Receive (property, rank, title) by legal descent or succession: derive (quality, character) from one's progenitors". The Eugenists believe that intelligence is a character that is derived from one's progenitors just as one receives property, rank or title. The whole eugenic programme is based on the assumption that the children of people with superior ability are themselves superior. It is assumed that ability is a unit character that is transmitted from generation to generation. In the present state of our knowledge we can only assert that feeble-mindedness appears to be an inheritable factor¹ We can further assert

1. See, for example, Gates' 'Heredity in man'. Constable & Co., Ltd., London 1929. P. 268.

that general ability is innate, in the sense that the distribution of ability is according to the normal probability curve. What we know now concerning general ability clearly indicates that it is not of the nature of a unit character which can be handed down from generation to generation. The modern researches about the physiology of the central nervous system do not warrant any such hypothesis.

The constancy of I. Q. cannot be regarded as an evidence about the inheritability of Intelligence nor that it is uninfluenced by environmental changes. It is probable that I. Q. remains fairly constant because the educational environment remains fairly constant. Radical changes in the environmental conditions do not occur in the lives of many individuals. Consequently the constancy of the I. Q. remains statistically true for the group as a whole.

Cattell argues that the average I. Q. for the urban population is more than that for the rural because the intelligent families migrate to the towns. This can hardly be substantiated. The urban population has a higher I. Q. not because it is composed of the 'more gifted biological strains' but because the environment in the cities and towns is more stimulating and rich. In every sphere of human adjustment social, familial, and vocational, the urban life is more exacting. Whereas in an Indian village, for instance, a boy of ten or twelve has learnt whatever there is to learn by way of adjustment, in the towns and cities even adults have to continue learning since the traditions and institutions continually change. Fundamentally, Intelligence is a matter of stimulation. The variety and the facility in reaction are dependent upon the variety and complexity of the stimuli—particularly in the early years of an individual's life. This might be the explanation for the close relationship that has been observed between the intelligence of parents and that of children as well as for the relationship between I. Q. and social status.

The most fruitful line of research about this problem in the

recent years is the study of resemblances and differences between twins. Newman, Freeman and Holzinger studied carefully twenty cases of identical twins who were separated in early infancy. They got experts to rate the educational, social and physical environment and tried to find the correlation between twin differences and the environmental differences. They found very high and significant correlation between educational and social environment and Binet I. Q and Stanford Educational Age. They write : 'There thus appears an undeniable tendency for wide social differences to be associated with differences in intelligence, whether measured by verbal or non-verbal tests ... Taken as a whole, these correlations indicate that differences in educational and social environment produce undeniable differences in intelligence and scholastic achievement as measured by our tests.'²

With these results in view it is obvious that it is very hazardous to assert that the constancy of I. Q. indicates that the I. Q. is an absolute measure of the ability of the individual and particularly more so when it is asserted that the amount of intelligence varies with the social status and earning capacity.

There is another line of evidence which indicates the importance of the early environment. Though the I. Q. remains fairly constant from test to retest among school children, it has been found that large changes occur among children below five. The 'Developmental Quotient,' as it is called, does not remain constant.

The best way of interpreting these results appears to be to look upon intelligence as a character which is innate in the sense that the limits of its development appear to be fixed. (The dictionary meaning of 'innate' is 'Inborn'). Since the distribution of ability is according to the normal probability curve it might be inferred that there are *innate limits* to educability, some children being very superior, some very inferior and the large majority average. The feeble-minded, for example, remain so whatever the influences of environment may be.

2. Newman, Freeman and Holzinger : 'Twins—A study of Heredity and Environment'. The University of Chicago Press, 1937 p. 341.

Then again, contrary to the assertions of the environmentalists of the last decade we find that a mere provision of equal facilities does not equalise the abilities of the children in the nursery schools. The children vary in their ability. But during the period from birth to about four or five years of age it is possible that the ability is quite plastic. It is thus that we can understand the close relationship between I. Q. and social status. The children in superior homes are given better food, better opportunities for play and expression and they go to school with a richer experience and vocabulary as compared with the children brought up in the inferior homes. Just as the cells in the earlier embryonic state can be removed and transplanted in other positions without causing any injury to the development whereas a little later such an interference leads to monstrosities or death, similarly we can conceive that to start with general ability is quite plastic bound only by an innate limitation, whereas after four or five years it becomes quite fixed and develops at a constant rate thus resulting in the constancy of I. Q.

This hypothesis also explains the observed differences between races. The members of the different races are brought up under different conditions and measuring their ability with the help of some tests standardised under certain specific conditions can hardly reveal anything else. In this connection it is interesting to note that Arlitt found that the superiority of the whites only begins after the fifth or sixth year of life.³

Thus mental ability is not a unit to be passed on from parent to child. But, of course, it is not asserted that there are no limitations to the growth of intelligence in any given individual. It is possible that though intelligence is innate it is not handed down from parent to child like property. There are variations in ability from feeble-mindedness to genius. The exact ability of any given individual does not depend upon the ability of the parent except indirectly on the basis of the social and educational environment provided.

Such a view is supported by the results of experiments on

3. Reported in Spearman 'Abilities of Man' Mcmillan & Co. London. 1932. p. 379

animal learning. To take but one instance, McDougall's experiments on the efficacy of selection show that continuous breeding from the better half of fourteen successive generations and from the worse half of twenty-four generations has little effect on the ability of the rats to learn. Rats of inferior ability and of superior ability are to be found both among the progeny of the favourably selected and among the adversely selected groups. Thus in spite of deliberate attempt to breed continuously for generations from rats with superior ability and from those with inferior ability we find that the ability to learn appears to be distributed in an even manner between the two groups. Consequently ability appears to be innate in the sense that there are original individual variations with limits for development and not inherited in the sense that it is passed on from parent to child like the property.

Our analysis implies that special educational facilities should be provided to the mentally deficient and the mentally advanced, for the rest equal opportunities should be given irrespective of parentage or social status. Thus the type of educational opportunity should be determined not by the social caste or class but by the measured ability of the individual. It lays a particular stress on the opportunities to be given to the children of socially inferior parents during early childhood.

Is Gestalttheorie Apriori ?

By

P. S. NAIDU

The entry of Gestalt Theory into the field of contemporary psychology evoked, as every new theory in any science is bound to evoke, a chorus of protests and disproofs. The two major counts in the charge against the theory are (1) that it tells us nothing new, and (2) that it has created a straw man as the target for its attacks on atomism. Several other defects of greater or less importance have been pointed out. Rignano, a sympathetic critic of the new school, condemns it for its subjectivity, while Scheerer, the disciple of the great personalist Stern, takes objection to (what he considers to be the most serious drawback of configurationism) the attempt to solve the problem of subjectivity by objectifying it. Brunswick points out that the 'school has been unduly insistent on stretching its physical interpretation, and that its 'structural monism,' has blinded it to the fact that psychology needs other categories in addition to those of configuration.' Petermann says that 'a serious defect of configurationist theory has been its implied belief that it is possible to solve research problems by the introduction of a few new categories.'¹ Criticisms of these types are familiar to us, and they serve the very useful purpose of opening the eyes of the proponents of a theory to points of view which are not easily visible to them. But a highly destructive type of criticism has been urged recently against Gestalt theory as a whole.² The gist of this criticism is this ; Gestalt theory is so completely *a prioristic* that it claims that the mind can reach factual conclusions by purely rationalistic methods. Therefore, such a theory can lay

1. Hartmann : *Gestalt Psychology* p. 284

2. Weber : *Gestalttheorie and the theory of Relations*, Jr. of Phil. Vol. XXXV, 1938.

no legitimate claim to recognition as a scientific system. A criticism of an extreme character like this is always open to suspicion, and as *Gestalttheorie* takes its rise in a definite experimental situation (viz., the phi-phenomenon), the intolerant charge of apriorism requires very careful examination.

It is necessary to narrow down the scope of our examination to one or two important aspects of the whole question. Our discussion will be fruitful if we confine ourselves to two questions :

- (1) What are the characteristics of *Gestalttheorie* which may lend colour to the charge of apriorism ? and
- (2) Is there anything in the latest developments of configurationism which may still lay the school open to that charge ?

I

The first important count in the charge against *Gestalttheorie* is based on internal relations. The critic propounds a neat dilemma. Either accept atomism and be admitted to the fold of science, or subscribe to wholism and be dubbed a non-scientist. Configurationism is decidedly wholistic, and so it is non-scientific. 'Wholes' says Weber³ (and—if *Gestalttheorie* goes all the way with absolute idealism—ultimately the single whole constitutes the total system of reality, 'are not mere collections of parts, but are organised in such a way that their parts necessarily derive their natures from the relations in which they stand..... The whole line of argument might very well have been taken from the pages of Bradley or Bosanquet.'.. 'One can't at times hardly avoid the feeling that the arguments of the adherents of this movement assume with absolute idealism that because a logical necessity governs the universe we can know apriori that experience is a single systematic whole.'

In fairness to the critic it must be pointed out that configurationists are pre-occupied with theoretical considerations too much. The German temperament is no doubt, partly responsible for this state of affairs. And as some one has pointed out, the

3. The article in the *Journal of Philosophy* mentioned above.

main postulate of Gestalt may be easily interpreted as the refugee's flight into the haven of postulates when faced with the problem of explaining the relationship between the parts in a whole. The problem to be solved is transformed into an axiom. But is this picture altogether true ? Is the Gestaltist so utterly helpless in the realm of facts that he has to retreat into the heights of abstract speculation ? I think not. One has only to examine a recent publication or two to be amazed at the impressive array of experimental evidence of every conceivable kind presented in these volumes. (And that reminds one of another apparent cause for this baseless charge of *apriorism*. Lewin has made a brilliant attempt to apply the mathematics of field dynamics to the solution of psychological problems. And mathematicisation of psychological methods is being condemned as a retreat into *a priorem*). In the face of this evidence it seems incredible that any one should consider *Gestalttheorie a priori*.

There is a fundamental confusion in the minds of the critics with regard to the nature of axioms, postulates and hypotheses. The *Gestalt* is not an axiom, but a postulate, and a postulate which as soon as it is erected is transformed into a hypothesis to be tested by experiment. The acceptance of relations as internal does not necessarily condemn one to *a priorem* and deductive rationalism. The very acceptance may be made the starting point for experimental investigation, and that is exactly what the Gestalt theorist does.

The crucial test for a scientific theory lies in its ability to direct fruitful research. And judged by the very valuable results which configurationism has achieved in the field of experimental research, it must be pronounced to be a very vigorous inductive theory.

Koffka foresaw this un-understanding criticism of configurationism, and answered it most effectively in his brilliant book, 'Principles of Gestalt Psychology'. 'There can be no doubt that the intellectual climates of Germany and the United States are widely different...in America the climate is chiefly practical ; the here and now, the immediate present with its needs, holds the centre of the stage...Therefore when the first attempts were

made to introduce gestalt theory to the American public...those aspects which had a direct bearing on science were emphasised. Had the procedure been different, we might have incurred the danger of biasing our readers against our ideas. Living in a different intellectual climate they might have taken this aspect of Gestalt theory for pure mysticism...'4 Unfortunately what Koffka feared has come to pass. Before understanding the theory critics are condemning it on the imaginary ground of *a priorism*.

The whole question reduces itself to this: Does the configurationist prescribe wholeness to nature solely on apriori grounds, or does he, keeping an open mind, seek for the true nature of organisation in experience, and finding it wholistic declare it as a scientific hypothesis? The answer is self-evident.

We may raise here a very significant question. Is not a critic of Gestalt of the type of Weber begging the question? By his very attitude is he not assuming that internal and external relations exhaust the whole field of possibilities, and that the world being pluralistic, relations must necessarily be external? His assumption and arguments would have worked well in the world of classical science where the relata were assumed to be independent of relations. In the new world of science where matter has been dematerialised, and made interchangeable with energy, where a kink in space generates matter which is compared to a soap bubble, and where the space-time continuum has greater reality than matter, the concept of an independent atomism is entirely out of place. Relations and the related merge into one another, and create a new world of experience transcending those of the old fashioned scientific realist. It is such a world that Gestalt theory is discovering through experimental research in psychology. And the critic has just missed the point!

It seems to me that the real reason why the Gestalt theory is being discredited is that it is attempting (and has achieved much success in the attempt) to give value its true place in the world of fact, including the world of physical facts. Gestalten are

claimed to govern the physical sciences. So the value factor determines physical laws. And when once value is admitted into the sciences, these have to bow down on their knees to philosophy !

Arguing even on a much less exalted level, we may show that the leaders of this school are always insisting on empirical evidence. In the brilliant articles contributed by the leaders of the school to the *Psychologien* of 1925 and 1930 it is clearly shown that Hegelian absolutism does not dominate over configurationism, and that empirical experimentation is made use of here as extensively as in any other branch of science.

We may close this section with the observations of Thouless who says, 'This (Gestalt) approach is often represented as if it were principally a body of speculative theories...This view neglects, however, its most important aspect. Gestalt psychology is primarily a body of experimental research. Its theoretical doctrines have directed this research and systematised its results. Even if all of its doctrines were either false or not original (as some of its opponents have suggested) it would remain true that what has been found out in the course of the experimental investigations inspired by those doctrines is a new and important addition to psychological knowledge...The value of a scientific theory is to be judged by the extent to which its systematisation of known facts leads to fruitful results in the search for new facts and new hypotheses. Judged by this criterion, Gestalt psychology has amply proved its value.'⁵

II

Probably because Gestalt psychologists are keen on examining the philosophical foundations of their scientific procedure they have given rise to the suspicion in the minds of the conservative mechanists that they are indulging in mere *a priori* speculations. But, is a standpointless psychology possible ? Is any standpointless science possible at all ? Has not the positivistic and empirical sciences foundations which are purely axiomatic ? Both mechanistic physics and biology make extensive philosophical assumptions which have been brought to light

5. Stout ; *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 655-686

recently by Woodger, Uexhill, Burtt. Jeans and Eddington. Referring to the rational elements in physics, Professor Dingle writes 'He (Eddington) maintains that there is nothing in the whole system of law of physics that cannot be deduced unambiguously from epistemological considerations.'⁶ Those who would uphold the standards of modern physics as the most suitable norms by which the youngest of all the sciences should conduct herself have here a significant eye-opener. What is good for mathematical physics, may not be bad for psychology. And, so, why should a cloud of dust be raised over a point which seems to be conceded by the practice of physics, if not by its avowed declarations ?

III

We contend that Gestalt psychology is as experimental as contemporary physics, and any degree of apriorism found in the former has its parallel in the latter.

Be that as it may, how do the most recent advances in Gestalt theory stand with respect to this charge of apriorism ? It is, perhaps, not widely known that the term 'Gestalt' does not occur in Wertheimer's original article. As the word creates a tendency in the minds of young students to over-simplification and superficiality in thinking, its use is forbidden by some of the contemporary leaders of configurationism. Moreover, the dynamic aspect of mental functioning is being emphasised more and more in contemporary theory. The field theory of stresses and strains is taking the place of the concept of wholism. The recent psychological studies of memory, learning, and wit have proved the value of the new orientation to the investigation of human behaviour. Lastly Lewin's attempt to solve sociological problems by the employment of topological concepts have extended the boundaries of psychology very considerably.

In the light of these facts it is unfair to accuse Gestalttheorie of apriorism.



6. Dingle, 'The Rational and Empirical Elements in Physics'
Phil, vol. xii 1938.

The Unconscious in Yoga and Psycho-Analysis

BY

S. M. SREENIVASACHAR

Despite the vast differences between Yoga and Psycho-analysis, both in theoretical and in practical aspects, the theory of the unconscious has been recognised as a fundamental problem of mental study. Both the Psycho-analysts and the Yoga-psychologists have laid emphasis on the importance of the unconscious over the conscious part of the psyche and have mainly centred their attention on bringing up to the field of consciousness the hidden forces of man in order to obtain true insight into man's real self. Though they work on this common basis, differences arise as regards the interpretation of the nature and content of the unconscious. It has been attempted in this paper to point out how the unconscious has been understood both in the East and in the West.

Before going deeper into the problem it is necessary to be clear about the term "Unconscious" for it is a term to which very different connotations have been attached. There are three views regarding the nature and origin of the unconscious.

According to the first, the popular notion, the unconscious is used as equivalent to the non-mental. This is the general sense in which the term is used by many psychologists and medical men. This view is incorrect as it begs the whole question by assuming that no mental processes can exist that are not accompanied by consciousness or awareness.¹

The second conception of the unconscious—the scientific one—is chiefly developed by Freud. According to this view "the unconscious is a region of the mind the content of which is characterised by the attributes of being repressed, conative,

1. See Jone's papers on Psycho-analysis pp. 145.

instinctive, infantile, unreasoning and predominantly sexual."² Freud regards the mind somewhat as an apparatus which can be divided into three portions. First there is the ordinary consciousness comprising all the thoughts we are aware of at a given moment. Then there is what is called the pre-conscious, the thoughts of which become conscious in appropriate circumstances with little effort. Finally, there is the true unconscious, consisting of latent ideas which do not penetrate into consciousness however strong they may have become. In short, the term "unconscious", according to Freud, "designates not only latent ideas in general, but especially ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity."³ Freud believes that these ideas are derived entirely from the individual's experience and most of them are repressed ideas

The third view of the unconscious is the philosophical one. Jung is the chief exponent of this view. For him, the unconscious does not include only the repressed tendencies or complexes, as Freud explains it, but all the instinctive foundations of our mental life and ill-defined mass of innate tendencies of a more developed cognitive nature. In his own words, "the unconscious is a psychical boundary concept which covers all those psychic contents or processes which are not conscious, that is, not related to the ego in a perceptible way."⁴ On the basis of experience he distinguishes between the individual unconscious, and the collective unconscious. The individual or personal unconscious embraces all the acquisitions of the personal existence—the forgotten, the repressed, the subliminally perceived thought and felt. The other form of the unconscious—the collective unconscious—contains supra-individual qualities which were not acquired but inherited as for instance, instincts and various primitive and universal symbols found in myths and legends. The justification for speaking

2. Ibid.

3. Selections from Freud's works. By Rickman. p. 58.

4. Jung's "Psychological Types". pp. 615-616.

of a collective unconscious is the striking similarities found among various psychic products such as ancient religions, mythologies and superstitions, which we find in the history of human culture throughout the ages.⁵ Jung ascribes this similarity to the common psychical structure of the unconscious mind. In other words, Jung gives the name of "collective unconscious" to that part of the mind which in the course of ages has been determined by the inherited form of brain-structure and which we find expressed in the disposition common to all mankind. He calls these racial dispositions to particular modes of thinking "Archetypes" which are different in different races according to their historical evolution and psychological environments. He also conceives that the development of a personality consists in the unfolding more and more of the primitive unconscious.

While in the West so much about the unconscious has been studied only during the last few decades, the Hindus in the East had long ago realized the need for, and perfected a method of contacting the unconscious processes of the human mind by the Yoga practice. Yoga, though born in a pre-scientific age and in a spiritualistic atmosphere, has devoted special attention to the analysis of mental facts and has thus developed a theory of the unconscious which agrees as well as differs from that of psycho-analysts.

A word about the nature of Chitta is necessary to understand the Yogic theory of the unconscious.

The cosmic scheme of the evolution of Prakriti into its modifications and the doctrine of pre-existence have enabled Yoga-psychologists to formulate a theory of the mind very well suited to explain the unconscious. According to the Yogic explanation, Chitta is the product of Prakriti formed of the three Gunas Sattva, Rajas and Tamas with an absolute preponderance of the first. It is non-intelligent by nature and it becomes intelligent by the reflection of the Pususha or self which abides by it. It is ever undergoing modifications like the flame

5. See Van Der Hoop "The character & The unconscious". pp. 201-202.

of a lamp. It is conceived in two aspects—Chitta as cause and Chitta as effect. Chitta as cause or Karana-Chitta is all-pervading like Akasa and there are as many Chittas as there are Purushas, since each Purusha has a Chitta. When Chitta exists in the form of its states called Vrittis, it appears either contracted or expanded according to a particular body which it may be said to occupy. This aspect of the Chitta is called the Karya-Chitta or Chitta as effect. "After death the Karana-chitta which is always connected with the Purusha, manifests itself in the new body which is formed by the Apurva, or the filling in of Prakriti on account of past merit or demerit."⁶

Another important feature of the Chitta with which we are concerned here is that it contains within it all the latent impressions (Samskaras) and the tastes and instincts or the tendencies of all past lives (Vasanas). This aspect of the Chitta where lie the traces of all our experiences of the past as well as of the present life in the form of Vasanas or latent impressions I call the unconscious. This part of the mind is more important than the conscious as its role is predominant in shaping our destinies in life and influencing all our actions.

The word Samskara, which is significant in Indian Philosophy explains the origin and the content of the unconscious. When a particular mental state passes away into another it is not altogether lost, but it leaves behind it a residue or potency which is preserved in the mind in a latent form as Samskara. This Samskara is always tending to manifest itself in actuality and as such it generates a Vritti or actual state, which in turn produces a Samskara. This process goes on endlessly.⁷ By the repeated occurrence of a mental state its impression also is strengthened and thereby a permanent impression will be left in the Chitta. These deeply rooted potencies or Samskaras are called Vasanas. The Chitta being a subtle substance can retain all the latent impressions of our past actions.

6. Dasgupta's "Yoga as Philosophy & Religion" p. 93.

7. Yoga Sutra Bhashya I. 5.

The repository of the latent impressions of our actions are called Karmasayas. "They remain accumulated from thousands of past lives the mind being pervaded all over with them, as a fishing net is covered all over with knots."⁸ Now as the Chitta remains constant in all the births and deaths that an individual undergoes from eternity, it can keep the memory of those various experiences of thousands of lives in the form of Vasanas or latent impressions.

These Karmasayas play a very important part in our life, for what takes place in our conscious life is symbolic of the play of forces underneath it. They not only determine our actions in this life but the very life itself (Jati), its character, (Bhoga) and its duration (Ayus).⁹

Avdiya, which is beginningless, is the root cause both of the origin of the actions, virtuous or sinful and also of the fruition of the Karmasayas into life-state, life-experience and life-time.¹⁰ This Avidya also exists in the Chitta in the form of Vasana from which originate all the actions.

In the light of the above reflections we may note certain important points. While psycho-analysis for the most part deals with the experiences of present life, Yoga goes far beyond it and covers the experiences of the past lives also. The unconscious, therefore, covers a wider region in Yoga than in psycho-analysis.

For Freud as we have noted above mostly the repressed desires constitute the content of the unconscious. This theory which emphasises repression seems unsatisfactory, because it does not take into account the development of new possibilities out of unconscious impulses.¹¹ Jung, therefore, extends the theory of the unconscious by regarding the unconscious as the inherited disposition which he calls the collective unconscious. This collective unconscious contains in it all the undeveloped part of our experiences. In other words, the contents of the

8. Yoga Sutra Bhashya : II. 13.

9. Yoga sutra II. 13.

10 Y. S. II. 13.

11. See Van Der Hoop's "The Character and the Unconscious" p. 201.

collective unconscious cover all those psychic qualities such as instincts and "mythological associations"—those motives and images which can spring anew in every age and clime without historical tradition or migration'. Jung uses the word "Archetype" to designate these 'pre-existent forms of apprehension' or the racial dispositions to particular modes of thinking which, therefore, are peculiar to each race according to its historical evolution and psychological environments.

These "Archetypes" may be compared to the "Samskaras" which involve the dispositions of an individual as well as the dispositions common to a particular race—the racial dispositions' of Jung. So far Jung's theory is justifiable. But when we go a step further and question the origin of these contents of the collective unconscious, difference arises. What is the origin of these contents of the unconscious? Jung suggests that they originate not in the personal acquisitions, but in the inherited possibility of psychic functioning in general viz., "the inherited brain-structure".¹² Though this explanation holds to some extent it does not carry us very far, for a mere possession of inherited form of brain-structure cannot account for the manifestation of certain motives and images belonging to a different age. It is quite possible that we may inherit the dispositions of our previous generation but it is not possible to assume that the same will continue for the coming generation, for we would be ignoring the question of the progress of the society or race. Progress involves changes in the mental dispositions also. Then how could there be a continuity of the mass of phylogenetic material—the instinctive reactions', 'ancestral modes of behaviours' and 'the ancestral interpretations of experience'—which constitute the content or material of the collective unconscious.

The Yogic theory of the mind or Chitta and the doctrine of rebirth afford a satisfactory explanation for the above difficulty. The cosmic scheme of evolution has enabled Yoga to conceive the mind as a subtle mental substance, and Chitta, when

12. See "Psychological Types", p. 616.

conceived in such a form, could contain all the latent impressions of our actions. Further by accepting the doctrine of pre-existence Yoga can account for the presence of the racial dispositions or archetypes in the unconscious, which are the experiences of a previous life and which exist in the mind in the form of Vasanas. Yoga maintains that every organism has a gross and a subtle body. We may call the latter psychical body. It is all-pervading and always connected with the Purusha. All the tendencies and dispositions which we develop in one life lie in a congealed and concentrated form latent in the psychical body. After death, this psychical body in conjunction with the Purusha is ready to re-embodify itself in a gross organism. Now as the subtle body remains constant in all the births and rebirths that an individual undergoes, from eternity, it can keep the memory of those various experiences of thousands of lives in the form of Samskaras or latent impressions,—the racial dispositions of Jung. What transmigrates in Yoga is not the soul but Chitta—the subtle aspect of it called Karana-Chitta which being a subtle substance can remain a repository of all previous experiences. Thus the “Primal Phantasies”, “Dominants” and “Archetypes” attributed by Jung to a collective unconscious and by Freud to Phylogenetic inheritance can satisfactorily be explained on an individual basis if the Yogic theory of subtle mental substance, which might constitute the principle of individuality, is accepted.¹³ Also as McTaggart¹⁴ suggests, by the acceptance of the theory of pre-existence, all the inborn characters or gifts of a being can be explained in the condensed results of experience i. e., experience in an earlier life.

This application of the doctrine of the East to that of the West does not confuse the psychological issues as the former is based on equally rationalistic and scientific explanation. Materialism cannot be the last word in philosophy and the theory of pre-existence is not a myth. It is an undeniable fact that our present life is based on our past and all our experiences of the past may influence the present.

13. Yoga by Behanan. p. 156.

14. Some Dogmas in Religion.

This influence of the past usually works in our unconscious. We seldom concentrate our attention upon our ego and we seldom are conscious of the influence of the past on our present life. But nevertheless we cannot deny the existence of the unconscious and the influence exerted by the past on our present through it. "All living organisms only develop through the inter-actions of outer circumstances and inner dispositions, so that they are continually finding ever better adaptations to the demands of both !"¹⁵ This is the meaning of psychic development. Hence for the development of true personality we must unearth these hidden forces—the inner dispositions—and bring them into contact with the outer circumstances, so that a true harmony is established. It is only then that reality will play its part fully and infuse true light into man's real self.

15. Van Der Hoop. "The Character and the Unconscious."

Heredity and Environment.

By

Mr. ANGELO MOSES

Those who deal with the education of children of any age are constantly faced with questions as to the extent to which behaviour is influenced by hereditary predispositions. If a child behaves as he does solely because of a physical and mental make-up inherited directly from his ancestors, then education can influence his behaviour only in so far as it modifies such inherited make-up. If, on the contrary, behaviour is solely the result of environment, then the educator is the sole determiner of the behaviour of the children under his charge. Such a point of view would hold that even mental level is the result of the type of training and the degree of richness of environment with which the children come in contact, particularly in the early period of their lives.

Authorities tell us that the period of most rapid growth of the brain is from infancy to five years of age. Those who hold the point of view that environment is the sole determiner, contend that the environment has the greatest effect during this period of rapid growth ; and this position would seem to be logical.

Few hold the first point of view in its extreme form. A number of recent authorities have taken the second point of view. For the most part, opinions as to the relative effects of nature and nurture lie between the extremes.

In its broadest meaning heredity is production of like by like. Man early noted that each kind of plant and animal produced individuals of its own kind. Later it was recognised that all living things could be grouped into species, the members of which resembled each other. Further observation showed that more special characteristics of families and indivi-

duals were reproduced in their descendants. After much experience the following general truths were formulated :—

First, children usually resemble their parents. A child is never exactly like either the father or the mother, nor does he possess the sum of all the characteristics of both or an equal fusion, but surely some of each. The prominent qualities of one parent or the other, rather than a fusion of those of both, frequently appear in the child. The child usually has also characteristics not possessed by either of his parents. The resemblance to a grandparent or to an even more remote ancestor or to a relative not in the direct line of descent, as an uncle or a cousin, may be more marked than to the parents.

Secondly, inheritance is not simply from parents, but from the two lines of ancestry of the two families. This view is supported by the fact that stock breeders cannot predict the characteristics of the offspring of mongrels or mixed breeds, while they can of those known to have been of pure blood for many generations.

Thirdly, heredity is often of a general capacity rather than of a specific ability. For example, the son of a great scientist may become a great writer or may attain great success in business or in sport. Moreover, nervous irregularity in the parents may appear in the children in the form of imbecility, insanity or emotional instability.

Fourthly, the offspring of parents of pure blood sometimes show characteristics of the remote ancestors of the breed ; this is known as atavism or reversion. For example, pigeons like the original blue-rock pigeons from which all are descended, are occasionally found among the offspring of fancy strains which ordinarily breed true. Reversion is more likely to occur when distinct breeds are crossed. For example, mules which result from crossing the horse and the ass, often have stripes similar to those of their zebra-like common ancestor.

Fifthly, not all hereditary qualities are apparent at birth. There is good reason to believe that they appear at various

stages of development, as do instincts, especially at the time of puberty. Physical features and mental and moral qualities of father or mother, hitherto unnoticed, often become conspicuous at this time.

We shall now cite such weight of opinion and such scientific evidence as we have relative to the extent to which inherited pre-dispositions are influential in determining the four phases of a child's make-up viz. (a) mental level, (b) special abilities and disabilities, (c) physical make-up including health, and (d) personality.

We have much scientific evidence as to the inheritance both of mental level and of special abilities and disabilities. The first point to be considered is the extent to which the child's mental level—his position as feeble-minded, dull, average, superior or very superior—is determined by the fact that his parents belonged to one of these five groups. The evidence on this point comes from various fields of investigation, a few of which will be cited.

Wood's study of Royal families shows the extent to which greatness in the Royal families of Europe was dependent upon the racial stocks from which they came. Wood examined 671 members of Royal families in Europe. He gave them ratings on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 representing extremely low ability and 10 extremely high ability. He found that those who were rated high were descended from 4 stocks or families viz., the families of Frederick the Great of Germany, Queen Isabella of Spain, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and William the Silent of Holland. Those who were rated as mediocres were descended from the Houses of Hanover, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Mecklenburg. Those who were rated low were descended from certain families in Russia and Spain. Since the environment and educational opportunities with which the members of all these royal families were provided left nothing to be desired, we are forced to attribute the differences of mental level to heredity.

As an example of studies of genius and intelligence levels, one may take such researches as those of Galton, in which he found

that 977 eminent men, each of whom was the most eminent among 4000 persons, possessed a total of 535 eminent relatives, whereas 977 ordinary men selected at random from the population, had only 4 such eminent relatives.

From such studies as the ones cited above, the following conclusions may be drawn. The mental level tends to run in families. In other words, certain stocks of families tend to produce men of eminence in larger proportion than certain other families. Also, certain families tends to produce a larger proportion of defectives and criminals than certain other families.

Special abilities and disabilities may occur irrespective of mental level. The question therefore arises, are they inherited or not? In the field of inheritance of special abilities, we have good evidence that certain abilities tend to run in families; for example, there is a fairly high correlation between the abilities of brothers and sisters in some school subjects. According to Starch, speed of writing shows a correlation of 0.72 and ability in reading a correlation of 0.64. The following conclusions may be drawn as to the inheritance of mental traits :—(1) Grades of ability appear to be inherited, but not to the same degree by all of the descendants of a stock. Children from highly intelligent parents tend to be intelligent also, but one cannot predict the intelligence level of the children of a family accurately, even though the intelligence level of the parents is known. (2) Special abilities also appear to be transmitted, but here again, the degree to which these will appear cannot be predicted from the degree to which they have appeared in the parent stock.

In discussing the subject of inherited predispositions to health, it must be kept in mind that much of what the baby comes into the world with, as health conditions, may be the result of some pre-natal influence, rather than the result of inherited tendencies. According to Rasmussen, the mother may harm the health of the child by infection with some social disease, by over-exertion on her part, or by dissipation and other abnormal modes of life. Many superstitions are current in regard to the extent to which children's development may be influenced

by pre-natal conditions. The mental attitude of the mother and the things of which she thinks during her pregnancy have no effect on the child. No shock or fright to the mother during pregnancy, unless some actual injury results, has any effect upon the mental condition, character or personality of the child. Pre-natal influence therefore resolves, itself into the influence of the mother's nutrition on the child. With regard to the inheritance of physical characteristics such as the colour of the hair or the eye, the shape of the head and the face, the tendency to be tall or short or average in height, the case is somewhat different. They are determined entirely by heredity.

There is very little evidence based on scientific investigation, as to the extent to which tendencies to personality are inherited. Some children are born with a strong tendency to emotional disturbances, others again are born with a strong tendency to resist stimuli which produce emotional disturbances. According to Watson personality is the result of a series of habits. A child is normal to the extent to which these habits adjust him normally in society. He presents a problem that is abnormal to the extent to which his habits do not adjust him.

After birth the child reacts directly to his environment, instead of the protecting environment of the mother's body. He may however still be nourished by her and is to a considerable extent protected from many of the vicissitudes of the world into which he has been ushered. The question as to whether heredity or environment is the more important influence in determining what the child becomes as a man, is as old as history and remains unanswered. The child, like all living things, continues to live only because the environment is more or less favourable to the existence of his species.

Environment begins to act as soon as one is born and continues its influence all through life. The development of an individual may be modified by changing his surroundings. These changes will be effective in proportion as the individual is or is not sensitive, because of ripening instincts or previous experience, to the particular portion of the environment changed.

It is now almost conclusively established that the mental level of a child is incapable of being improved to a great extent by nurture or environment. Slight changes are however possible as is evident from the cases which were under the observation of Terman. X is the son of very intelligent and educated parents. His home environment leaves practically nothing to be desired from the point of view of learned pursuits and cultivated tastes. He was 8 years old when he was brought for examination. Before that he had been twice admitted in school but as he would accomplish nothing he was withdrawn. The Binet Tests gave an I. Q. of about 75 which indicated that mentally he was 2 years younger for his age. The child was examined again 3 years later. During the period between the first and the second examination, he attended school and completed the first grade. But his I. Q. in the second examination was 73. The cases of Walter and Frank are also interesting. Till the ages of 5 and 7 they lived in a very poor home. Shortly afterwards when both the parents died, the two boys were adopted by a woman of decidedly more than average ability. At the time of adoption Walter's I. Q. was 73 and Frank's 82. Four years after adoption, Walter's I. Q. was 70 and Frank's 77. From these two sets of studies we can draw the conclusion that the mental level of a child may deteriorate to a certain extent if he is placed in an inferior or superior environment. Feeble-minded children showed no appreciable increase in I. Q. even though the conditions under which they lived were the best that could be provided. Intelligence level therefore is much more due to inherited pre-dispositions than to lack of opportunity.

Inherited pre-dispositions to health are to some extent modified by environment. According to Rasmussen, breast-feeding exercises a certain amount of influence on both the health and later behaviour of the child. He examined 1075 children in Dresden. Those who were rated very good had been nursed for a long period, and those who were rated bad had been nursed for a short period. He also examined 6,744 men all of 20 years. He found that those who were best fitted for military service had been nursed as infants longer than those who were less fitted. Physical characteristics like the colour of the eye and hair, the

shape of the head or face, etc., are almost non-modified by environment, though it appears that height is capable of modification by environmental conditions with slight degrees. According to Mrs. Woolley, nutrition and other health conditions are conducive to height to a certain extent. From the statistics of the Japanese Educational Association of America, we learn that Japanese children born in the United States are taller and weigh more than children of corresponding ages brought up under Japanese conditions. Holt cites a similar increase in height and weight in the case of the children of Russian Jews who have become Americanised. He states that these "children are frequently 4 or 5 inches taller than their parents." These findings indicate that height and weight may be modified by environmental conditions, but in spite of the fact that average height and weight appeared to increase with Mrs. Woolley's group and in the case of the Japanese and Russian groups, individual differences were still apparent in all of these groups. Some children increased in height more slowly than others. The tendency to grow at different rates is therefore largely a matter of the race and of the parent stock from which a child comes, though the environment may increase or decrease height within the limits set by race or stock.

Personality appears to be so enormously modifiable by the health condition of the child, and the treatment which he receives in the first two or three years of his life, that it is difficult to determine in the child of two or three or more just how much any one character trait is the result of an inherited tendency, and just how much it is the result of the influences to which he is being subjected. Such things as sullenness, temper-tantrums, unwholesome fears, etc., are the result of the child's experience in the environment in which he lives. The child may inherit the tendency to emotional embarrassment from his parents, but by the time he reaches the age of 2 or 3, he may be either fairly balanced or a neurotic. Children possessing at birth a greater tendency to emotional instability and other unsocial traits, require patient, careful and intelligent handling if they are to approximate normal stability.

To sum up, in all of the four fields which we have examined—physical make-up, mental level, special abilities and disabilities and personality—hereditary predispositions and environmental conditions each play a part. Environment seems to be most effective in changing health conditions and personality make-up and least effective in changing mental level and such physical conditions as eye and hair colour, the shape of the head and so on. Since the effect of environment appears to depend in part on hereditary predispositions, these should be determined as far as possible and taken into account in the training of a child.

Perception and Evolution of Sense Organs.

By

B. KUPPUSAWMY

In the American museum of Natural History in New York City an arrangement has been made, it appears, to show to the visitor how things look like to the various animals. For example, the ordinary housefly sees everything through its compound eyes in mosaic form. On the other hand the dog sees the universe as colourless, as being only of different shades of grey. The objects in the environment do not look the same to all living beings. There are a number of factors which condition the way objects look to the different organisms. This fact led the subjective idealist to assert that knowledge is always subjective. There is no means by which we can know what things really are. Such a conclusion inevitably follows from the premises. But are the premises true? Our knowledge of the external world is obtained through our sense-organs. Consequently it is asserted that our knowledge is always indirect and never direct. But this argument presumes that the self as Knower is distinct and separate from the sense-organs through which we know. The sense-organs are part and parcel of the self and not independent of the self. The self can know at all through the sense-organs. The question of mediacy or immediacy does not arise here. Such a question will arise only if we artificially introduce a distinction between the self as some entity and the sense-organs through which knowledge arises, as something quite independent of the self.

It is not proposed to unravel the relationship between self and sense-organs in this paper. Nor are we going to consider the different factors which enter into any single act of perception.¹ We shall consider in this paper the development of the

1. This latter problem has been briefly discussed in my paper 'Analysis of perception and its relation to reality' published in 'Prabuddha Bharata' Calcutta, April 1940.

knowledge of external world from a phylogenetic standpoint. We shall adopt in this inquiry the principle of continuity. As Dewey writes "The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and forms." By the term 'naturalistic' is meant "on the one side, that there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations." "Continuity" on the other side, means that rational operations *grow out* of organic activities, without being identical with that from which they emerge."² Unless such a principle is assumed as the basis of explanation and understanding we are bound to land ourselves in mystery and superstition. We cannot, if we are logical, invoke any principle of explanation from outside the sphere of inquiry.

The problem now is, how do we come to perceive things in the way we do. It is submitted that the innumerable controversies regarding the problem of perception have arisen because adult perception is taken as the starting point for analysis. But as a matter of fact no fruitful result can accrue by analysing adult perception as it involves a whole development, ontogenetic and, more than that, phylogenetic. The principle of continuity implies that for a proper understanding of the problem of perception we must study it from its developmental aspect in its proper setting.

Now the simplest living creature is an organism surrounded by other objects. An organism does not live 'in' an environment; it lives 'by means of' an environment as Dewey puts it. The continued existence of the organism as a separate living entity depends on the continued suitability of its reactions towards the other objects surrounding it. Thus every organic function is an interaction between the intra-organic and extra-organic energies. So the very processes of living are an integration of the organic and environmental activities. As Haldane writes "We find that organisms are in constant active relations with their environment ; but that this activity is on the whole so directed

2. John Dewey 'Logic : The theory of Inquiry'. Henry Holt and Co., N. Y. 1939 P. 23 and 19.

as to maintain in each organism a normal or specific condition, expressing itself as actively maintained structure and composition. In other words, the properties or mode of action on one another of the parts involved in the life of an organism, whether these parts are within or outside its body, not only depend on their active relations to one another, but those relations are specific or normal for each organism.³ Though all philosophers concede such a statement of the relationship between the organisms and environment they do not work up the implication of such a position with respect to the problem of perception.

Biological investigations have shown that organisms come to be what they are because of evolution. New species arise because of mutations or certain new gene combinations. Organic evolution teaches that all forms of living matter, all plant and animal species have descended by gradual changes from the primordial unicellular organisms. The important thing to note is that the sensory, motor, and the nervous structures are the results of such an evolution. All these structures have developed from that primitive property of the protoplasm, namely, irritability. Let us take for example the visual sense. If an intense beam of light is thrown upon an Amoeba, made up of undifferentiated protoplasm, there is a contraction of the stimulated region and then of the other parts, so that the animal crawls away from the source of light. The highly complicated visual sense starts from such a crude sensitivity to light. The next step in the evolution of vision consists in the development of a certain part of the body specially irritable to light. But such eye-spots do not really involve any image-formation. They merely react specifically to light. In the earthworm for instance, there are a number of such isolated cells, sensitive to light, scattered all over the skin. The next great step is the collection of these scattered cells together forming a primitive eye. In a number of worms and such other creatures there is a crude image-formation so that it is able to distinguish light and shade. Later still we have the formation of the lens. As Thomson

3. J. S. Haldane "The Sciences and Philosophy" Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1928. P. 10.

writes "There is seeing and seeing in many degrees on a long inclined plane. For the first use of the eye in the animal Kingdom was simply to distinguish light and shade; later on it was able to detect movements of surrounding objects; later on it became an image-forming and colour-perceiving instrument—the chief gateway of knowledge."⁴

We have a similar indication of the evolution of sense-organs in the Jaina classification of Jivas into "*Sthāvāra* souls," literally 'immobile' souls, but probably rather souls with hardly more than a kind of tactile perception" and *Trasa* or mobile souls. "The Trasa souls have sense-organs and are classified accordingly into four classes namely into (1) those which have two senses, of touch and taste; (2) those which have three senses i.e. of smell also; (3) those which have four senses i.e. of sight also; and (4) those which have five senses i.e. hearing also."⁵ Thus the Jainas believed that the various organisms in this world could be classified on the basis of the number of sense-organs they had. The most primitive type of organisms are the *Sthāvāra* which have only one sense-organ, viz., touch and which reside in the minerals, water, air etc.

Thus if we study the problem of perception from the genetic and evolutionary standpoint we see that the entire neuro-muscular structures have evolved in the course of ages in order to bring about an adjustment between the organisms and the environment. Two important consequences follows from this :

(1) In the first place the term 'environment' is a relative one.⁶ As Mair and Schneirlar write 'Since the 'environment' of a given animal depends upon the nature of the stimuli to which it is sensitive, the animals will have different environments

4. J. A. Thomson "The new natural History". George Newnes Ltd., London. P. 1105.
5. J. Jaini 'Outlines of Jainism.' University Press, Cambridge 1916. P. 8-9.
6. There is also another aspect of this problem. As Koffka points out in his 'Principles of Gestalt Psychology' we must

according to differences in their equipment of receptors."⁷ The receptors have come into being as a result of the differentiation of organic structure in order to help in the struggle for survival. Thus it follows that with every differentiation of structure the environment expands. A new sense-organ or a further differentiation of a sense-organ will provide a new way of interacting with the environment so that those things in the world that were hitherto foreign or unknown, now, participate in the life-functions. As a further illustration of this tendency for the environment to expand we notice that in the human society in order to aid clearer perception new instruments are devised by the technician. Thus the microscope, the telescope and a host

distinguish between the 'Real' properties of the objects, those properties which, for instance, can be found by physical measurement; and the 'stimulus' properties of the object, the properties which stimulate the sense-organs of an organism and elicit response. Koffka proposes to call the 'real' properties as belonging to the 'geographical' environment and the 'phenomenal' properties to the 'behavioural' environment to avoid the confusion involved in the use of the terms 'real' and 'phenomenal'. The behavioural object is the object as it appears to one and as it elicits behaviour reactions from one. Behaviour takes place in the behavioural environment and this depends on two sets of conditions—geographical and organismal. But the results of the behaviour depend not only on the behavioural but also on the geographical environment and any reaction changes not only the former but the latter also. The sole criterion whether the response is correct or incorrect lies in the adequacy or inadequacy of the further responses based on the perception. We find this criterion employed not only by the modern pragmatists but by the ancient systems of Indian Philosophy as well—the chief 'pramāṇa', test, is that which leads to knowledge whose content is not sublated (abādhita) by later experiences.

7. Maier & Schneirlar 'Principles of Animal Psychology'. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York. 1935. P. 7.

of such instruments enable us to perceive aspects of the environment which are not accessible to the natural sense-organs.

(2) Secondly we notice that the sense-organs not only enable the organism to react suitably to the environment, but that they are themselves the results of such reactions to environment. The different sense-organs have come into being in the course of evolution, so as to enable the organisms to react in a proper and adequate manner to the environment. Thus the receptors have evolved as a result of the interaction between the organisms and environment. As Freud writes " ..our organisation, i.e. our mental apparatus, has been developed actually in the attempt to explore the outer world, and therefore it must have realised in its structure a certain measure of appropriateness."⁸ Thus we notice that our sense-organs have come to be so that they might enable us to perceive reality and to make the necessary adjustment for survival. This aspect of the problem of perception has not been taken into account by philosophers and psychologists ; hence the confusion about the content as well as the process of perception.

Before concluding I shall indicate in a brief manner the implication of such a naturalistic account of perception on the epistemological problem of the relation of our experience to the world of reality. As we have seen organisms have evolved on the basis of the interaction with environment. The sense-organs by means of which organisms establish a contact with the environment are themselves the results of the interaction with the reality outside. Thus the contention of subjective idealism that the world is just a reflection of our ideas which lands us in what is called by Perry the 'Ego-Centric predicament' is resolved by such a naturalistic and genetic account. As noted above an organism lives by means of an environment. If it lives at all it must enter into an intimate interaction with the environmental forces. So any distinction which implies that there are three entities which come into relation with each other in any act of

8. Freud 'The Future of Illusion'. Hogarth Press, London. 1928. P. 97.

perception or response viz., the self on the one hand, the reality on the other and the sense-organs in the middle establishing a contact between the two, any such distinction is artificial. The organism with its sense-organs comes into interaction with the environment.

The Self and Aesthetic Experience.

By

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

(A summary)

I propose to discuss in this paper, the nature of the relation between the subject conceived as the centre of consciousness and the world of facts, in aesthetic experience. In what relation does the self stand to things of beauty when it performs the activity of aesthetic contemplation ? The statement of this relation, whatever form it may take, is fraught with deep philosophic consequences, which can be only indicated in rough outline. The question itself is of ultimate importance as *it involves the role of the ego in all the vital experiences of life and the connection of the objective world to human values.* It is almost impossible to raise any philosophic issue which does not entail these problems about the self and the world.

The work of aesthetic activity, according to one possible theory, is to effect self-recovery. It restores to consciousness its lost contents. It is a mode of self-recognition or recollection. The theory is suggested by Kalidasa in his statement that exquisite music recalls to our mind some past moments of happiness. By itself the aesthetic object has no value. It suggests some deep experiences of the individual, revives buried ecstasies and agonies and constitutes a monument of ancient memories. Every act of aesthetic experience is an act of remembrance. It is the restoration of the lost threads of consciousness. Association becomes very fundamental to such an explanation.

Then, is the account of aesthetic experiences, as the negation of the subject in the beatific vision of the objective order, sound ? Should we consider this freedom of self-transcendence as ultimate ? The main modification that this view requires is that there is the fact of self-fulfilment or self-attainment in aesthetic experience. We escape from our past and present selves in order

to attain a fuller degree of self-hood. 'Beauty adds to the permanent richness of self-attainment.' Deep and creative contemplation of beauty always amplifies personality.

The aesthetic environment contributes some permanent properties to personality. The idea that aesthetic experience is transitory is very untrue to facts. It does not leave the experiencing individual unaffected. It alters and re-shapes his life and its inward essence so as to render impossible the return of his former self. There occur both self-transcendence and self-amplification. The facts of aesthetic contemplation differ from other facts fundamentally on the ground that they afford some satisfaction or fulfilment to the subject. Beauty is *an end in itself*, it is an intrinsic value because the soul of man finds itself satisfied in the experience. Beauty is an objective fact but all objective facts are not aesthetic. They must be so arranged or so observed that they yield the joy of self-fulfilment to the observer.

Apart from these two conditions of the addition of fresh dimensions of spiritual existence to the self and the realization of the needs of personality as evinced in the self-satisfaction experienced in aesthetic moods, there is another factor which falsifies the unconditional negation of personality in the aesthetic situation. There is the intensification of the self, the abolition of the wastage of mental division and conflict, and the entire power of personality is employed in going through the highest levels of aesthetic experience.

This unification of experience is the meaning of personality, the ground for the affirmation of the ego. Distinction from the non-ego is a negative connotation and it depends upon the *relating* activity of consciousness which is itself the expression of the principle of the unification of content. Therefore, as the essential principle of self-hood is self-integration, beauty which enhances and deepens this process really contributes to the development of personality.

The outcome of our discussion is that objectivity is fundamental to aesthetic experience and the aesthetic object constitutes a realm of self-realization for the subject.

It is possible to see the metaphysical implications of this truth. If beauty were purely a subjective phenomenon, an artificial device to re-establish the inner relations of self-consciousness, no inference as to the character of objective Reality could ever be developed on the basis of aesthetic experience. In the last analysis all solipsism of aesthetic explanation, discloses a metaphysical dualism, the dualism of subject and object, the Ego and objective Reality. All external objects are to be regarded as alien to the inner life of the spirit. The values of human life are, in that case, utterly divorced from the facts of existence, The ideal and the actual form two thoroughly exclusive kingdoms. Self-affirmation becomes absolutely incompatible with world-affirmation.

The perfection of the self is the 'last for which the first was made.' It is the Divine event towards which the whole creation moves. Reality is so constituted that 'Soul-making' is an intrinsic principle of its structure.

The Visistadvaitic Conception of Upasana.

By

M. YAMUNACHARYA.

(A Summary)

Bhakti is synonymous in Visistādvaita philosophy with *Upāsana*, *Dhyāna*, *Vedana* etc. In his *Vedantasangraha* Ramanuja speaks of *Bhakti* as a form of *Jnana* itself "*Bhakti eva Jnāna viśesa eva*". The fundamental metaphysical idea to be grasped here is the triune constitution of the Universe implied in the concepts, *cit*, *acit*, *Isvara* the *Tatva Trayā*. The Trinity involved here is God, soul and matter. This triune character always remains inviolate. The Universe exists in two aspects, the unmanifested (*avyakta*) and the manifested (*Vyakta*). The aspects rhythmically swing from the one to the other, in temporal, spatial and causal circumstances ; but the Universe is the one and the same and is self-contained. This is what is expressed by the phrase : '*Kūrya-kāranayor ananyatvam*' i.e. what we know as cause and effect differ only in the causeness and effectness, but the substance or the substratum appearing in these aspects remains the same.

Visistadvaita Vedanta conceives of God as the Spirit *par-excellence*, of which individual souls and inanimate nature are the two-fold modes as it were, of Spirit. It professes to show that the meditation of the modes is really the meditation of the Spirit of which they are the expression, the difference consisting in the mediateness of the modes and the immediateness of the Spirit, for purposes of contemplation. According to Ramanuja all intelligent and non-intelligent beings are mere modes of the highest Brahman and have reality thereby only.

The Worship of God is of two kinds, direct and through his Body. Through the body (*Sarira*) the spirit (*Saṁīri*) is reached, as when I eat through my body, I eat. The direct worship is the

Svarup-Upasana, the meditated is the *Pratik-Upasana* representative or 'symbolic. The direct worship on the essence of God' is inaccessible to uncultured minds. The symbolic worship gives the mind a direction, attention and a sensuous hold, which is an easy step to higher heights.

Hegel's philosophy of Art throws a light on this conception of symbol worship (*pratikopasana*). Hegel distinguishes in every work of art two aspects (1) The spiritual content and (2) the material embodiment, or form. "Beauty is the vision of the Absolute shining through a sensuous medium." Ramanuja speaks of this beauty as *Divya Mangala Vighraha*. The Absolute which thus shines through is the spiritual content. The sensuous medium, through which it shines is the material embodiment. The human mind adopts material symbols as its instrument to express its spiritual ideas. The essence of a symbol is that it *suggests* a meaning but does not express it. The symbol itself is always a material thing set before us. That which it symbolises is some thought or spiritual significance. The Hindu imagination is impelled to attempt in its art the reconciliation between the Absolute and the sense-object. It seeks to force the sensuous into congruity with the Absolute. It can only do this by the measureless extension of sense-objects. One can however realise that image-worship is something far more deeply interfused with philosophical significance than mere idolatry with which it is often confounded and railed at. The image is of value to us only because it reminds us of something beyond itself. It is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. In the words of Edwyn Bevan "Not to get rid of anthropomorphism, which is impossible if man is going to have any idea of God at all, but to make the division between right and wrong anthropomorphism where it ought to be made—that is the main problem for all philosophy of religion."

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